

*Examen de Ingenios.*  
**THE EXAMINATION**  
of mens Wits.

In which, by discovering the varietie of natures,  
is shewed for what profession each one is apt,  
and how far he shall profit therein.

*By John Huarte.*

Translated out of the Spanish tongue by

*M. Camillo Camilli.*


Englised out of his Italian, by

*R. C. Esquire.*



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
TO THE RIGAT WOR-  
SHIPFVL SIR FRANCIS GODOL-  
PHIN KNIGHT, ONE OF THE DE-  
PVTIE LIEVTENANTS OF  
CORNWAILE.



Ood Sir, your Booke retur-  
neth vnto you clad in a Cor-  
nish gabardine, which if it  
become him not wel, the fault  
is not in the stufte, but in the botching  
Tailor, who neuer bound Prentice to the  
occupation, & working only for his passe-  
time, could hardly obserue the precise rules  
of measure: but such as it is, yours it is,  
and yours is the workeman, entirely addi-  
cted to reuerence you for your vertues, to  
loue you for your kindnesse, and so more  
readie in desire than able in power to testi-  
fie the same, and doe with my dewest re-  
membrance take leaue, resting

At your disposition.

R.C.



TO THE MAIESTIE  
of *Don Philip*, our Soueraigne.



O the end that Artificers may attaine the perfection requisit for the vse of the commonwealth, me thinketh (Catholike royall Maiesty) a law should be enacted, that no carpenter should exercise himselfe in any worke which appertained to the occupation of an husbandman, nor a tailor to that of an architect, and that the Aduocat should not minister Phisick, nor the Phisition play the Aduocat, but ech one exercise onely that art to which he beareth a naturall inclination, and let passe the residue. For considering how base and narrowly bounded a mans wit is for one thing and no more, I haue alwayes held it for a matter certain, That no man can be perfectly seene in two arts,  
without

## *To the king of Spaine.*

in one of them : now to the end he may not erre in chusing that which fitteth best with his owne nature, there should be deputed in the common-wealth, men of great wisedome and knowledge, who might discouer each ones wit in his tender age, and cause him perforce to studie that science which is agreeable for him, not permitting him to make his owne choice: whence this good would ensue to your states and signiories, that in them should reside the rarest artificers of the world, and their workes should be of the greatest perfection, for nought else than because they vnited art with nature. The like would I that the vniuersities of our kingdoms did put in practise, for seeing they allow not that a scholler should passe to another facultie, vnlesse he perfectly vnderstand the Latine tongue, they should haue also examiners, to trie whether he vwho purposeth to study Logick, Philosophy, Diuinity, or the Laws, haue such a wit as is requisit for euery of these sciences, for otherwise, besides the dammage that such a one shall worke afterwards to the Common-wealth, by vsing an art vwherein he is not skilled, it is a grieue to see that a man should take paines, and beat his braines about a matter vwherein he

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cannot reape any aduantage. For that at this day  
such a diligence is not vsed, those vvho had not a  
wit fit for Diuinity, haue destroyed the Christian  
religion. So do those who are vntoward for Phi-  
sicke, shorten many a mans dayes : neither pos-  
sesseth the Legall Science that perfection vvhich  
it might receiue, because it is not made knowne,  
to what reasonable power the vse and interpreta-  
tion of the lawes appertaineth. All the antient  
Philosophers found by experience, that vvhere  
nature doth not dispose a man to knowledge, it  
falleth out a superfluous labour to toile in the  
rules of art. But none hath cleerely & distinctly  
deliuered vvhat that nature is vvhich maketh a  
man able for one science, and vncapable of ano-  
ther, nor how many differences of vvits there are  
found in mankind, nor vvhat Arts or Sciences  
do ansvvere each in particular, nor by vvhat to-  
kens this may be knowne, vvhich is the thing  
thar most importeth.

These foure points (though they seem vnpos-  
sible) containe the matter vvhereof I am to en-  
treat, besides many others appurtenant to the  
purpose of this doctrine, vvith intention that cu-  
rious parents may haue an art & maner to disco-

uer

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
uer the wit of their children, & may weet how to  
set ech of them in hand with that science, where-  
in he shall principally profit. And this is an aduise  
vvhich *Galen* sayth vvas giuen his father, namely  
that he should set him to study Phisicke, because  
for that science he had a singular vvitt. By vvhich  
your Maiestie shall vnderstand how much it im-  
porteth the common-wealth, that there be esta-  
blished in the same a choice, and examination of  
wits for the sciences, seeing from the study which  
*Galen* bestowed in Phisick, there ensued so great  
good to the diseased of his time, & he left so ma-  
ny remedies in writing for the posterity, Euen as  
*Baldus* (a notable man in profession of the laws)  
vvhen he studied and practised Phisick, if he had  
passed further therein, vvould haue prooued but  
an ordinarie Phisitian, as he vvas not better, for  
that he vvanted the difference of vvitt requisit for  
this science, but the laws should haue lost one of  
the greatest helps that might be found amongst  
men for expounding them.

When I therfore purposed to reduce this new  
manner of Philosophie to art, and to proue the  
same in some wits, I remembered my selfe of your  
Maiestie, as the best knowne, and one, at whom

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the whole world wondereth, beholding a Prince  
of so great knowvledge and vvisedome, of vvhom  
here vve cannot conueniently entreat, the last  
chapter saue one is your conuenient place, vvhere  
your Maiestie shall see the purport of your owne  
vvit, and the art and learning vvherevvith you  
vvould haue benefited our common-vvealth,  
if you had bene a priuat person, as by  
nature you are our king and  
souereigne.





## ☞ The second Proeme to the Reader

**W**Hen Plato would teach any doctrine  
graue, subtile, and deuised from the  
vulgar opinion, hee made choise a-  
mongst his schollers of such as hee re-  
puted best witted, and to those onely  
he imparted his mind, knowing by experience, that to  
teach delicat matters to persons of base vnderstan-  
ding, was losse of time, losse of pains, and losse of lear-  
ning. The second thing which he did after this choise  
made, was to preuent them with certaine presupposi-  
tions, cleare and true, which should not be wide from  
his conclusion: for the speeches and sentences which  
vnllooked for are deliuered against that which the  
vulgar beleeueth, at the beginning serue for nought  
else, (such preuention not being made) than to put in a  
confusion him that listeneth, and to breed such a loe-  
thing in mens minds, as it causeth them to loose their  
good

## The Epistle

good affection, and to abhorre and detest this doctrine. This manner of proceeding would I, that I might obserue with thee, (curious Reader) if meanes could be vsed, that I might first treat with thee, and discouer betweene thee and me the disposition of thy wit. For if it be such as is requisite for this doctrine, and estranged from the ordinarie capacities, I would in secret tell thee such new and speciall conceits, as thou wouldest neuer haue thought could fall within the compasse of a mans imagination. But inasmuch as this will not be, and this worke must issue in publicke for all sortes, I could not but set thy braines somewhat aworke: for if thy wit bee of the common and vulgar alloy, I know right well thou art alreadie perswaded, that the number of the sciences, and their perfection, hath beene accomplished many dayes agoe. And hereto thou art moued by a vaine reason, that they hauing found out no more what to ad, it is a token, that now there is in nothing, any more nouelties. Now if by hap thou art possessed of such an opinion, goe no further, nor read thou any longer on, for thou wilt be much agreed, to see how miserable a difference of wit possesseth thee. But if thou be discreet, wel compounded, and sufferent, I will  
deliuer

## to the Reader.

deliuer vnto thee 3 conclusions very true, albeit for their noueltie they are worthie of great maruell.

The first is, that of many differences of wit, which are in mankind, one onely with preheminance can sal to thy lot, if already nature, as very mightie, at such time as she framed it for thee, did not bestow all her endeavour, in vnitng two onely, or three, or (in that she could not effect the same) left thee a dolt, and deprived of them all.

The second, that to euery difference of wit there answereth in preheminance but one onely science, and no more of that condition. So as if thou drine not to chuse that which answereth thy natural ability, thou shalt be very remisse in the rest, though thou ply them night and day.

The third, that after thou hast knowne which the science is, that most answereth thy wit, there resteth yet (that thou mayst not be deceiued) another greater difficultie, which is, whether thine abilitie be more appliable to the practick than theorick, for these 2 parts (be it what science it wil) are so opposit betwixt themselves, & require wits so different, that they may be placed one against the other, as if they were contraries. Hard are these sentences, but yet they haue greater  
difficul

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difficultie and hardnesse, v<sup>z</sup>. that we cannot appeale from them, nor pretend that we haue receiued wrong. For God being the author of nature, and seeing that he gaue not to each man more than one difference of wit, (as I haue said before) through the opposition or difficultie which combreth vs in vniting them, he applied himselfe to her, & of the Sciences which are distributed amongst men by grace, it is a miracle, if in an eminent degree, he giue more than one. But there are (sayth S. Paul) diuisions of graces, and the same Spirit; there are diuisions of ministeries, and the same Lord; there are diuisions of operations, but the same God, who worketh all things in all persons. To euery one is giuen the ministerie of the spirit for profit: and to one is giuen by the spirit the word of wisdom, to another that of knowledge, after the same spirit, to another sayth, in the same spirit, and to another the grace of healing, in the same spirit, to another the working of vertues, to another prophecying, and the description of spirits, vnto others the varietie of tongues, to another the interpretation of words: but one selfe spirit, which diuideth to euery one as him pleaseth, worketh all these things.

This bestowing of sciences (I doubt not) God vsseth,  
hauing

## to the Reader.

having regard to the wit and naturall disposition of euery person. For the Talents which hee disturberh in S. Matthew, the same Euangelist sayth, that he gaue them vnto euery one according to his proper vertue.

And to thinke that these supernaturall Sciences require not some dispositions in the subiect, before they be infused, is an errorr very great: for when God formed Adam and Eue, it is certain that before he filled them with wisdom, hee instrumentalized their braine in such sort, as they might receiue it with ease, and serue as a commodious instrument, therewith to be able to discourse, & to forme reasons. And therefore the diuine scripture sayth; God gaue them an heart to thinke, and filled them with the discipline of vnderstanding, and that according to the difference of which euery one partaketh, one science is infused, and not another, or more or lesse of each of them, is a thing which may be vnderstood by this example of our first parents, for God filling them both with wisdom, it is a verified conclusion, that he infused the lesser portion into her, for which reasons the Diuines say, that the dewill tooke hardinesse to beguile her, and durst not tempt the man, as fearing his much wisdom:

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wisedome. The reason hereof (as hereafter we will proue) is, that the naturall composition which the woman hath in her braine, is not capable of much wit, nor much wisdom. In the Angelicall substances, we shall find also the like count and reason: for God, to giue an angel more degrees of glory and higher gifts, first giueth him a more delicat nature, and if you enquire of the Diuines whereto this delicat nature serueth, they answered, that the Angel who hath the deepest vnderstanding, and the best nature, with most facilitie conuerteth himselfe vnto God, and useth his gift with the more efficacie; and that the like betideth in men. Hence we cleerely inferre, that there being an election of wit for sciences supernaturall, and that, not whatsoeuer difference of abilitie, is their commodious instrument, humane learning (with more reason) requireth the same, because it is to be learned by men, with the force of their wit.

To be able then to distinguish and discern these naturall differences of mans wit, and to applie to each by art, that science wherein he may profit, is the intention of this my worke. If I bring the same to end (as I haue purposed) we will yeeld the glory to God, seeing from his hand proceedeth whatsoeuer is good  
and

## to the Reader.


and certaine: and if not, thou knowest well (discreet Reader) that it is impossible both to deuise an art, and to reduce the same to perfection. For so long and large are humane sciences, that a mans life sufficeth not to find them out, and to giue them that perfection which is requisit.

The first inuenter performeth very much, if hee discover some notable principles, to the end that such as come after, may with this seed take an occasion to amplifie the art, and to bring it into that estimation and account which is due thereunto. Aristotle alluding hereunto, saith: that the errors of those who first began to handle matters of Philosophie, are to be held in great reuerence, for it proouing a matter so difficult, to deuise new things, and so easie to ad vnto that which hath bene already spoken and treated of: the defects of the first deserue not (by this reason) to be much reprooued, neither he who addeth ought, meriteth any great commendation. I confesse that this my worke cannot be excused from some errors, seeing the matter is so delicat, and no way fore-opened to entreat thereof. But if the same be in a matter where the vnderstanding hath place to thinke, in this case I pray thee (wittie Reader) that before thou giue sentence

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*tence thou read ouer the whole worke, and assure thy  
selfe what the difference of thine owne wit is, and if  
in the worke thou find ought which in thine opinion is  
not well said, consider wel of the reasons which sway  
the most against it, and if thou canst not resolue, then  
turne to read the eleuenth chapter, for in that  
shalt thou find the answere which  
they may receiue.*





## The Examination or Triall of mens wits and dispositions.

### CHAP. I.

*He prooueth by an example, that if a Child haue not the disposition and abilitie, which is requisit for that science whereunto he will addict himselfe, it is a superfluous labour to be instructed therein by good schoolemaisters, to haue store of bookes, and continually to studie it.*



He opinion of *Cicero* was good, who, that his sonne *Marke* might prooue such a one in that kind of learning, which himselfe had made choice of, as he desired; iudged, that it sufficed to send him to a place of studie, so renowned and famous in the world, as that of *Athens*, and to giue him *Cratippus* for his schoolemaister, who was the greatest Philosopher of those daies, bringing him vp in a citie so populous, where, through the great concourse of people which thither assembled, he should of necessitie haue many examples and profitings of strangers, fit to teach him by experience those things which appertained to the knowledge that himselfe was to learne. But, notwithstanding all this diligence, and much more besides, which (as a good father)

he vsed, prouiding him bookes, and writing some vnto him of his owne head; the Historians report, that he proued but a Cods-head, with little eloquence, and lesse Philosophie, (a matter visuall amongst men, that the sonne abies the much wisdome of the father.) Verely *Cicero* greatly beguiled himselfe, imagining that albeit his sonne were not issued out of Natures hands, with that wit and habilitie which is requisit for eloquence and Philosophie, yet by meanes of the good industrie of such a teacher, and the many bookes, and examples of *Athens*, together with the young mans continuall endeauour, and proceesse of time, the defects of his vnderstanding would bee amended: but wee see, that finally hee deceiued himselfe; neither doe I maruell thereat, for hee had manie examples to this purpose, which encouraged him to beleecue, that the same might also befall in the person of his sonne.

For the same *Cicero* reports in his booke of *Destinie*, that *Zenocrates* had a wit very vntoward for the studie of Naturall and Morall Philosophie, of whom *Plato* sayd, That he had a scholler, who stood in need of a spurte; and yet notwithstanding, through the good industrie of such a maister, and the continuall trauell of *Zenocrates* himselfe, he became a very great Philosopher. And he writes the like also of *Cleantes*, who was so doltish and void of vnderstanding, that no teacher would receiue him into his schoole; whereat the young man agreed and ashamed, endured so great toile in studying, that hee came afterwards to be called a second *Hercules* for wisdome. No lesse vntoward for matters of eloquence, seemed the wit of *Demosthenes*, of whom it is sayd, that when he was now growne big, he could not yet speake plaine, but labouring and applying the art, by hearing of good teachers, he produced

ued the best Oratour of the world : and specially (as *Cicero* recounts) he could not pronounce the letter, R, for that he did somewhat stammer, and yet by practise he grew to articulat it so well, as if he had neuer had that way any defect. Hence tooke that prouerbe his originall, which saith, That mans wit in matters of science is like a player at dice, for if any one prooue vnluckie in throwing his chaunce, by artificiall practise he comes to amend his euill fortune. But none of these examples produced by *Cicero*, remains without a conuenient answeare in my doctrine : for (as wee will hereafter prooue) there is in young men a certaine dullnesse, which argues a greater wit in another age, than if the same had beene sharpe from their childhood : nay it is a iudgement that they will prooue lowtish men, when they begin very soone to discourtse, and be quicke of conceipt. Wherefore, if *Cicero* had knowne the true tokens by which wits are in the first age to be discouered, he would haue held it a good signe, that *Demosthenes* was rude and slow of speech, and that *Zenocrates* had need of a spurte whilest hee learned. I take not from a good instructor art, and industrie, their vertue and force, to manure wits, as well rude as pliant : but that which I will say, is, that if a young man haue not of himselfe an vnderstanding capable of precepts and rules, which properly belong to the art he would learne, and to none other, that the diligence vsed by *Cicero* with his sonne, was as vaine as that which any other parent shall vse with his sonne, will be in the like. Those who haue read *Plato*, shall easily know, that this doctrine is true, who reports that *Socrates* was the sonne, (as he also reported himselfe) of a midwife, and that as his mother (albeit she were much praised in the art) could not make a woman to be deliuered, that before her comming to her was not with child ; so he (performing the like of-

fice as his mother) could not make his schollers bring forth any science, if of themselves they had not their vnderstanding conceiued therewith. He was of opinion, that sciences were (as it were) naturall to those men only, who had their wits appliable thereunto; and that in such it befell, as we see by experience in those who haue forgotten somewhat which they first knew, who if we put them in mind but of one word, gather from that all the residue.

Maisters (for ought that I can gather) haue none other office with their schollers, than to bring learning to their remembrance: for if they haue a fruitfull wit, they make them with this onely to bring forth wonderfull conceits, otherwise they doe but afflict themselves, and those whom they instruct, nor euer obtaine their desires. And (at least if I were a teacher) before I receiued any scholler into my schoole, I would grow to many trials and experiments with him, vntill I might discouer the qualitie of his wit, and if I found it by nature directed to that science whereof I made profession, I would willingly receiue him, for it breeds a great contentment in the teacher, to instruct one of good towardlinesse: and if not, I would counsaile him to studie that science which were most agreeable with his wit. But if I saw, that he had no disposition or capacitie for any sort of learning, I would friendly and with gentle words tell him; Brother, you haue no meanes to proue a man of that profession which you haue vndertaken, take care not to loose your time and your labour, and prouide you some other trade of liuing, which requires not so great an habilitie as appertaineth to learning. Hereof is seene very plaine experience, for we behold a great number of schollers enter the course of whatsoeuer science, and (be the teacher very good or very bad) finally euery day some prooue of great skill, some of meane, and some in  
their

### *The Triall of Wits.*

3

their whole course, haue done nought else than leese their time, spend their goods, and beat their braines without any manner of profit.

I wot nere whence this effect may spring, they all hearing one selfe teacher, and with equall diligence and care, and perhaps the dull taking more pain than the wittie: and this difficultie growes the greater, by seeing that those who are vntoward for one science, are very apt to another, and the toward in one sort of learning, passing to another sort, can vnderstand nothing. But my selfe am at least a good witnesse in this truth; for there were three companions of vs, who entered together to studie the Latine toong, and one of vs learned the same with great facilitie, the rest could neuer make any commendable composition; but all passing on to Logicke, one of those who could not learne Grammar, proued in that art a principall Aegle, and the other two, in the whole, neuer learned one readie point; then all three comming to heare Astrologie, it was a matter worthie of consideration, that he who could no skill of Latine or Logicke, in few daies knew more in Astrologie than his maister that taught them, and the rest could neuer learne it. I then maruelling hereat, began forthwith to make discourses, and play the Philosopher hereon, and so I found that euerie science required a speciall and particullar wit, which reaued from that, was little worth in other sorts of learning. And if this be true (as verely it is, and we will so proue it hereafter) he that at this day should enter into the schooles of our times, making prooffe and assay of the schollers wits, how many would he change from one science to another, and how many would he send into the fields for dolts and vnable to learne? and how many would he call backe of those, who for want of abilitie are occupied in base exercises, and yet their wits

were by nature created onely for learning? but sithens this cannot be brought about nor remedied, it behooues to stay no longer hereon, but to passe forward.

It cannot be denied, but that (as I haue sayd) there are wits found capable of one science, which are vntoward for another: and therefore it behooues, before the child be set to studie, to discouer the manner of his wit, and to see what science agreeth with his capacitie, and then to prouide that he may apply the same. But it is necessarie also to consider, that this which hath beene sayd, sufficeth not to make a man prooue sufficiently learned, but wee must haue regard of other conditions no lesse requisit than is this of towardlinesse. For *Hippocrates* sayth, That mans wit holds the like proportion with knowledge, as the earth doth with seed, which though of her selfe she be fruitfull and fat, yet it behooues to manure her, and vse aduisement to what sort of seed her naturall disposition enclineth: for euery sort of earth cannot without distinction produce euerie sort of seed. Some better brings forth Wheat than Barley, and some Barley better than Wheat; and of Wheats some bring a plentifull increase of good Lammas Wheat, and cannot away with the Barst fort.

Neither doth the good husbandman content himselfe to make this onely distinction, but after he hath manured the earth in due season, he lookes for conuenient time to sow it, for it cannot be done at all times of the yeare, and after that the graine is sprung vp, he clenseth and weedeth it, that it may encrease and grow, giuing the fruit which of the seed is expected. After this sort, it is necessarie that the science being knowne, which best fitteth with the person, he begin to studie from his first age, for this (sayth *Aristotle*) is the most pliant of all others to learning. Moreo-

uer, mans life is very short, and the arts long and toilesome, for which it behooues that there bee time sufficient to know them, and space to exercise them, and therewith to profit the commonwealth. Childrens memorie (saith *Aristotle*) is a table without any picture, because it was but a little while since they were borne, and so they receiue any thing whatsoever with facilitie; and not as the memorie of old men, which full of those many things they haue seene in the long course of their life, is not capable of more: and therefore *Plato* sayth, That in the presence of youth, we should recount honest tales and actions, which many incite them to vertuous doings, for what they learne in that age, abides still in their minds, and not (as *Galen* sayth) that then it behooues to learne the arts, when our nature hath accrued all the forces that she can haue; which point is void of reason, if you admit no distinction. He that is to learne the Latine tongue or any other language, ought to doe it in his childhood, for if he tarie till the bodie be hardened, and take the perfection that it ought to haue, he shall neuer reape auailable profit. In his second age, namely boyes state, it is requisit that he trauaile in the art of Syllogismes, for then the vnderstanding begins to display his forces, which hath the same proportion with Logicke, as shackles haue with the feet of mules not yet trayned, who going some daies therewith, take afterward a certaine grace in their pace: so our vnderstanding shackled with the rules and precepts of Logicke, takes afterwards a gracefull kind of discourfing and arguing in sciences and disputations. Then followes youth, in which all the sciences appertaining to the vnderstanding may be learned, for that hath a ripened knowledge.

True it is, that *Aristotle* excepteth naturall Philosophy, saying, a young man is not of fit disposition for this kind

of doctrine, wherein it seemeth he hath reason, for that it is a science of deeper consideration and wisdom than any other.

Now the age thus knowne, in which sciences are to be learned, it behooues to search out a commodious place for the same, where nothing else saue learning may be handled, and such are the Vniuersitie: but the youth must forgoe his fathers house, for the dandling of the mother, brethren, kindred, and friends which are not of his profession, doe greatly hinder his profiting. This is plainly seene in the schollers who are native of the citties and places where Vniuersities are seated, none of which (saue by great miracle) euer become learned. And this may easily bee remedied; by changing of Vniuersities, and the native of one citie going to studie in another. This faring, that a man takes from his owne country to make himselfe of worth and discretion, is of so great importance, that there is no maister in the world who can teach him more, and especially, when a man sees himselfe (sometimes) abandoned of the fauour and delights of his countrie. Depart out of thy land (saide God to *Abraham*) and seuer thy selfe from amidst thy kindred and thy fathers house, and come to the place where I will shew thee, in which thou shalt make thy name great, and I will giue thee my blessing. The like sayes God to all men, who desire to prooue of value and wisdom: for albeit he can blesse them in their native countrey, yet he will, that men dispose themselves by this meane which he hath ordained, and that wisdom be not attained by them with idlenesse. All this is meant with a foregoing presupposall, that a man haue a good wit and be apt; for otherwise, *He that goes a beast to Rome, returns a beast againe.* Little auails it, that a dullard go to learne in the famous places of studie, where there is no chaire of vnder-

vnderstanding, nor wisdom, nor a man to teach it.

The third point of diligence is, to seeke out a maister who hath a direction and method in teaching, whose doctrine is sound and firme, not sophistickall nor of yaine considerations: for all that the scholler doth, whilest he is a learning, is to credite all that which his maister propounds vnto him, for he hath no sound iudgement or discretion to discerne or seperat falshood from truth; albeit this is a chauncefull case, and not placed in the choice of such as learne; that the schollers come in due time to studie, and that the Vniuersities haue good or vsfit instructors; as it befell certaine Philosophitions, of whom *Galen* reports, that hauing conuinced them by many reasons and experiments, and shewed them, that the practise which they vsed was false and preiudiciall to mens health; the teares fell from their eyes, and in his presence they began to curse their hard hap, in lighting on such bad maisters as bare sway during the time that they were learners. True it is, that there are found some schollers of so ripe wit, as they straightwaies looke into the condition of the teachers, and the learning which he teacheth, and if it be vitious, they know how to confute the same, and to giue allowance to such as deliuer soundly: these at the yeares end teach their maister much more than their maister taught them; for doubting and demaunding wittily, they make him to vnderstand and answere things so exquisit, as he himselfe neuer knew nor should haue knowne, if the scholler with the felicitie of his wit, had not brought them to his mind: but those who can doe this, are one or two at the most, and the dullards are infinit. Through which, it would doe well (seeing this choise and Examination of Wits for euery science is not had) that the

Vniuer-

Vniuersities alwaies made prouision of good teachers, endued with sound learning, and a cleere discerning wit, to the end they may not instruct the ignorant in errors and false propositions.

The fourth diligence requisite to be vsed, is to studie euery science with order, beginning at his principles, and passing through the midst to the end; without hauiug matter that may presuppose another thing before. For which cause, I haue alwaies held it an errour, to heare many lessons of diuers matters, and to carry them all home fardled vp together. By this meanes there is made a masse of things in the vnderstanding, which afterwards, when they come to practise, a man knowes not how to turne to vse the precepts of his art, nor to assigne them a place conuenient: and it is much better to bestow labour in euery matter by it selfe, and with that naturall order which it holds in his composition; for in the selfe manner as it is learned, so is it also preserved in the memorie. And more in particular, it is necessarie that they doe this, who of their owne nature haue a confused wit: and this may easily be remedied by hearing one matter by it selfe, and that being ended, to enter into the next following, till the whole art be atchieued. *Galen* well vnderstanding of how great importance it was to studie matters with order and concert, wrot a booke to teach the manner that was to be held in reading his workes, to the end that the Phisition might not be tangled in confusion. Others adde hereunto, that the scholler whilest he learneth, haue but one booke which may plainly containe the points of his learning, and that he attend to studie that only and no more, least he grow into a garboile and confusion: and herein they are warranted by great reason.

The last thing which makes a man proue of rare learning, is to consume much time at his booke, and to expect, that knowledge haue his due digestion, and take deepe root ; for as the bodie is not maintained by the much which we eat and drinke in one day, but by that which the stomacke digesteth and turneth : so our vnderstanding is not filled by the much which we read in little time, but by that which by little and little it proceeds to conceiue and chew vpon. Our wit day by day disposeth it selfe better and better, and comes (by proceffe of time) to light on things which before it could neither vnderstand nor conceiue. Vnderstanding hath his beginning, his increase, his standing, and his declining; as hath a man, and other creatures and plants ; it begins in boies age, hath his increase in youth, his standing in middle or mans age, and in old age it begins to decline. Who so therefore would know at what time his vnderstanding enioieth all the forces which it may partake; let him weet, that it is from the age of thirtie and three, vntill fiftie, little more or lesse, within which compasse we may best giue credit to graue authors, if in the discourse of their life, they haue held contrarie opinions ; and he that will write bookes, let him do it about this age, and not before nor after, if he meane not to vnlay againe, or change opinion.

But mans age hath not in all people a like measure and reason : for in some, childhood ends in twelue yeeres, in some at foureteene, some haue sixteene, and some eghteeene; such liues very long, because their youth arriues to little lesse than fortie yeares, and their ripe or firme age to threescore, and they haue afterward twentie yeares of old age, wherethrough their life amounts to fourescore; and this is the tearme of those who are  
very

very strong. The first sort, who finish their childhood at twelue yeares, are very short liued, and begin speedily to discourse, their beard soone sprowteth out, and their wit lasteth but a small time; these at thirtie five years begin to decline, and at fortie and eight finish their life.

Of all the conditions aboue specified, there is not any one which is not very necessarie, profitable, and helpfull in practise for a young man to receiue notice of; but to haue a good and answerable nature to the science which he pretendeth to studie, is the matter which most makes for the purpose: for with this, we haue seene, that diuers men haue begun to studie, after their youth was expired, and were instructed by bad teachers, with euill order, and in their owne birth-places, and yet for all that haue prooued great clearkes. But if the wit faile (saith *Hippocrates*) all other diligences are lost. But there is no man who hath better verified this, than the good *Marcus Cicero*, who through grieve of seeing his sonne such a doo-nought, with whom none of the meanes could preuaile, that he had procured to breed him wisdom, said in the end after this sort: *What else is it, after the manner of the giants, to fight with the gods, than to resist against nature?* as if he should haue sayd: What thing is there, which better resembles the battaile which the giants vndertooke against the gods, than that a man who wanteth capacitie, should set himselfe to studie? for as the giants neuer ouercame the gods, but were still vanquished by them: so whatsoeuer scholler will labour to ouercome his owne vntoward nature, shall rest vanquished by her. For which cause, the same *Cicero* counsel-leth vs, that we should not vse force against our nature, nor endeuour to become Orators, if she assent not, for we shall vndergo labour in vaine.

CHAP. II.

*That Nature is that which makes a man of habilitie  
to learne.*

**T** is an opinion very common and  
ordinarie amongst the antient Phi-  
losophers, to say, That Nature is she  
who makes a man of habilitie to  
learne, and that art with her precepts  
and rules giues a facilitie thereunto:  
but then vse and experience, which  
he reapes of particular things, makes him mightie in  
working. Yet none of them euer shewed in particular,  
what thing this Nature was, nor in what ranke of causes  
it ought to be placed: only they affirmed, that this, wan-  
ting, in him who learned; art, experience, teachers,  
bookes, and trauaile are of none auaile. The ignorant  
vulgar, seeing a man of great wit and readinesse, straight-  
waies asigne God to be the author thereof, and looke  
no further; but hold euery other imagination that goes  
beyond this, for vanitie: but naturall Philosophers de-  
spise this manner of talking; for put case that the same be  
godly, and containe therein religion and truth; yet it  
groweth from not knowing the order and disposition  
which God placed amongst naturall things, that day  
when they were created, and so couer their ignorance  
with a kind of warrantise; and in sort, that none may  
reprehend or gaine say the same, they affirme that all be-  
falls as God will, and that nothing succeeds, which  
springs not from his diuine pleasure. But though this be  
neuer so apparant a truth, yet are they worthie of re-  
prooffe,

prooffe : becaufe, as not euerie kind of demaund (saith *Aristotle*) is to be made after one fashon, fo not euerie anfwere (though true) is to be giuen.

Whileft a naturall Philofopher reafoned with a Grammarian, there came to them an inquisitiue Gardener, and asked, What the caufe might be, that he cherifhing the earth fo charily, in deluing, turning, dunging, and watering it, yet the fame neuer well brought forth the herbage which he fowed therein; whereas the hearbes which ſhe bred of her ſelfe, ſhe cauſed to encrease with great facilitie? The Grammarian answered, This grew from the diuine providence, and was fo ordained thorough the good gouernment of the world : at which anfwere the naturall Philofopher laughed, ſeeing he reduced this to God; becauſe he knew not the diſcourſe of naturall cauſes, nor in what ſort they proceeded to their effects. The Grammarian perceiving the other laugh, asked whether he mocked him, or whereat elſe he laughed? The Philoſopher answered, that he laughed not at him, but at the maiſter who taught him ſo ill : for the knowledge and ſolution of things which ſpring from the diuine providence (as are the workes ſupernaturall) appertaine to the Metaphiſicks (whom we now tearme Diuines :) but this queſtion propounded by the Gardener, is naturall, and appertaineth to the iuriſdiction of the naturall Philoſophers, becauſe there are certaine ordered and manifeſt cauſes, from which this effect may ſpring. And thus the naturall Philoſopher answered, ſaying, That the earth is conditioned like a ſtepmother, who very carefully brings vp her owne children which ſhee breeds her ſelfe, but takes away the ſuſtenance from thoſe which appertaine to her husband; and ſo we ſee that her owne children are fat and freſh, and her ſtepmother  
children

children weake and ill coloured. The hearbes which the earth brings forth of her selfe, are borne of her proper bowels, and those which the Gardener makes to grow by force, are the daughters of another mother, where-through shee takes from them the vertue and nourishment by which they ought to increase, that she may giue it to the hearbes which are borne of her selfe.

*Hippocrates* likewise reports, that he going to visit the great Philosopher *Democritus*, he told him the follies which the vulgar speake of Phisicke, namely, that seeing themselves recouered from sicknesse, they would say, it was God who healed them; and that if his will were not, little had the good diligence of the Phisition auailed. This is so antient a manner of talke, and the naturall Philosophers haue so often refuted it, that the seeking to take the same away, were superfluous, neither is it conuenient: for the vulgar, who know not the particular causes of any effect, answereth better and with more truth, as touching the vniuersall cause, which is God, than to say some other vnfitting thing. But I haue often gone about to consider the reason and the cause whence it may grow, that the vulgar sort is so great a friend to impute all things to God, and to reauce them from Nature, and do so abhorre the naturall meanes: and I know not whether I haue been able to find it out. The vulgar (at least) giues hereby to vnderstand, that for as much as they know not what effects they ought to attribute to God immediatly, and what to Nature, they speake after this manner. Besides that, men are for the most part impatient, and desirous to accomplish speedily what they couet. But because the naturall means are of such prolixitie, and worke with length of time, they possesse not the patience to stand marking thereof; and knowing that God is  
omni-

omnipotent, and in a moment of time performeth whatsoeuer him pleaseth (whereof they find many examples) they would that he should giue them health, as he did to the sick of the palsie; and wisdom, as to *Salomon*; riches, as to *Iob*; and that he should deliuer them from their enemy, as he did *Dauid*.

The second cause is, for that men are arrogant, and vaine conceited; many of whom desire secretly in their hearts, that God would bestow vpon them some particular graces, which should not befall after the common vse (as is, that the sunne ariseth vpon the good and bad, and that the raine falls vpon all in generall:) for benefites are so much the more highly prized, as they are the more rare. And for this cause we haue seene many men to feigne miracles in houses and places of deuotion, for straightwaies the people flockes vnto them, and holds them in great reuerence, as persons of whome God makes a speciall account: and if they be poore, they fauour them with large almes; and so some sinne vpon interest.

The third reason is, that men haue a liking to be well at their ease: whereas naturall causes are disposed with such order and conceit, that to attaine their effects, it behooues to bestow labour. Wherefore they would haue God demeane himselfe towards them, after his omnipotencie, and that (without sweating) they might come to the well head of their desires. I leaue aside the mallice of those, who require miracles at Gods hand, thereby to tempt his almightinesse, and to prooue whether he be able to doe it: and other some, who to be reuenged after their hearts desire, call for fire from heauen, and such other cruell chastisements.

The last cause is, for that many of the vulgar are religiously

ligiously giuen, and hold decree, that God may be honored and magnified, which is much sooner brought about by way of miracles than by naturall effects: but the common sort of men know not, that workes about nature and woonderfull, are done by God, to shew those who know it not, That he is omnipotent, and that he serues himselfe of them, as an argument to prooue his doctrine; and that this necessitie once ceasing, he neuer doth it more. This may well be perceiued, considering that God doth no longer those vnwoonted things of the new testament: and the reason is, for that on his behalfe hee hath performed all necessarie diligence, that men might not pretend ignorance. And to thinke that he will begin anew to doe the like miracles, and by them once againe to prooue his doctrine, in raising the dead, restoring sight to the blind, and healing the lame and sicke of the palsie, is an errour very great; for once God taught men what is behoofefull, and prooued the same by miracles, but returnes not to doe it any more. God speakes once (sayth *Iob*) and turnes not to a second repliall.

The token whereon I ground my iudgement, when I would discouer whether a man haue a wit appropriat to Naturall Philosophie, is, to see whether he be addicted to reduce all matters to miracle, without distinction: and contrariwise, such as hold not themselves contented, vntill they know the particular cause of euerie effect, leaue no occasion to mistrust the goodnesse of their wit. These doe well know, that there are effects which must be reduced to God immediately; (as miracles) and others to Nature, (and such are those, which haue their ordinarie causes from whence they accustome to spring:) but speaking both of the one manner and the

other, we alwaies place God for author: for when *Aristotle* said, That God and Nature did nothing in vaine, hee meant not, that Nature was an vniuersall cause, endowed with a iurisdiction seuered from God, but that there was a name of the order and concert which God hath bestowed in the frame of the world, to the end that the necessarie effects might follow for the preservation thereof. For in the same manner it is vsually said, that the King and Ciuile Reason doe no man wrong. In which kind of speech no man conceiueth, that this name Reason, signifieth a prince which possesseth a seuerall iurisdiction from that of the king; but a tearme, which by his signification embraceth all the roiall lawes and constitutions ordained by the same king, for the preservation of his commonwealth in peace. And as the king hath his speciall cases reserued to himselfe, which cannot be decided by the law, for that they are vnusuall and waightie: in like manner God left miraculous effects reserued for himselfe, neither gaue allowance vnto naturall causes, that they might produce them. But here we must note, that he who should know them for such, and difference them from naturall workes, behooues to bee a great naturall Philosopher, and to vnderstand the ordinary causes that euery effect may hold, and yet all this sufficeth not, vnlesse the Catholike church ratifie them to be such. And as the Doctors labour and studie in reading this Ciuile Reason, preserving the whole in their memorie, that they may know and vnderstand what the kings will was, in the determination of such a case: so wee naturall Philosophers (as doctors in this facultie) bestow all our studie in knowing the discourse and order, which God placed that day when he created the world, so to contemplate and vnderstand  
in

in what sort, and vpon what cause he would that things should succeed. And as it were a matter worthy laughter, that a doctor should alleage in his writings (though approoued) that the king commaunds a case should be thus determined, without shewing the Law and Reason, through which it was so decided: so naturall Philosophers laugh at such as say, This is Gods doing; without assigning the order and discourse of the particular causes whence they may spring. And as the king will giue them no care, when they require him to breake some iust law, or to rule some case besides the order of iustice, which hee hath commaunded to bee obserued: so God will not hearken when any man demaunds of him miracles and workes besides naturall order, without cause why. For albeit the king euery day abrogates and establisheth new lawes, and changeth iudicial order, as well through the variation of times, as for that it is the iudgement of a fraile man, and cannot at one only time attaine to perfect right and iustice: notwithstanding the naturall order of the vniuerse, which we cal Nature, from that day wherein God created the world, vnto this, hath had no need of adioining or reauing any one ior, because hee framed the same with such prouidence and wisdome, that to require this order might not be obserued, were to say, that his workes were vnperfect.

To returne then to that sentence so often vsed by naturall Philosophers, that *Nature makes able*; we must vnderstand that there are Wits, and there are Abilities, which God bestoweth vpon men besides naturall order, as was the wisdome of the Apostles, who being simple and of base account, were miraculously enlightened and replenished with knowledge and learning. Of this sort of abilitie & wisdome it cannot be verified,

That Nature makes able; for this is a worke, which is to be imputed immediatly vnto God, & not vnto Nature. The like is to be vnderstood of the wisdom of the Prophets, and of all those to whom God graunted some grace infused. Another sort of abilitie is found in men, which springs of their being begotten, with that order and consent of causes which are established by God to this end: and of this sort it may be said with truth, *Nature makes able*. For (as we will prooue in the last chapter of this Worke) there is to be found such an order and consent in naturall things, that if the fathers in time of procreation haue regard to obserue the same, all their children shall prooue wise, and none otherwise. But the whilest this signification of Nature is very vniuersall and confused, and the vnderstanding contents not it selfe, nor staieth, vntill it conceiue the particular discourse, and the latest cause; therefore it behooues to Teach our another signification of this name Nature, which may be more agreeable to our purpose.

*Aristotle* and other naturall Philosophers discend into more particularities, and call Nature, whatsoeuer substantiall forme, which giues the being to any thing, and is the originall of all the working thereof: in which signification, our reasonable soule may reasonably be termed Nature, for from her we receiue our formall being, which we haue of being men, and the selfesame is the beginning of whatsoeuer wee doe and worke. But all soules being of equall perfection (as well that of the wiser, as that of the foolish) it cannot be affirmed, that Nature in this signification is that which makes a man able, for if this were true, all men should haue a like measure of wit and wisdom: and therefore the same *Aristotle* found out another signification of Nature, which is the  
cause

cause, that a man is able or vnable; saying, that the temperature of the foure first qualities, (hot, cold, moist, and drie) is to be called Nature; for from this issue al the habilities of man, all his vertues and vices, and this great varietie of wits which we behold. And this is clearely prooued, by considering the age of a man when he is wisest, who in his childhood is no more than a bruit beast, and vseth none other powers than those of anger and concupiscence; but comming to youth, there begins to shoot out in him a maruellous wit, and we see that it lasteth till a time certaine, and no longer, for old age growing on, he goes euery day loosing his wit, vnill it come to be quite decayed.

This varietie of wits, it is a matter certaine, that it springs not from the reasonable soule, for that is one selfe in all ages, without hauing receiued in his forces and substance any alteration: but man hath in euery age a diuers temperature, and a contrarie disposition, by meanes whereof, the soule doth other workes in childhood, other in youth, and other in old age. Whence we draw an euident argument, that one selfe soule doing contrarie workes in one selfe bodie, for that it partakes in euery age a contrarie temperature, when of young men, the one is able, and the other vnapt: this growes for that the one of them enioies a diuers temperature from the other: And this (for that it is the beginning of all the workes of the reasonable soule) was by the Phisitions and the Philosophers tearmed Nature; of which signification this sentence is properly verified, that *Nature makes able.*

For confirmation of this doctrine, *Galen* writ a book, wherein he prooueth, That the manners of the soule follow the temperature of the bodie in which it keepes residence,

science, and that by reason of the heat, the coldnesse, the  
 moisture, and the drouth of the territorie where men  
 inhabit, of the meats which they feed on, of the waters  
 which they drinke, and of the aire which they breath :  
 some are blockish, and some wise : some of woorth, and  
 some base : some cruell, and some mercifull : many straight  
 breasted, and many large : part liers, and part true spea-  
 kers : sundrie traitors, and sundrie faithfull : somewhere  
 vnquiet, and somewhere staied : there double, here single :  
 one pinching, another liberall : this man shamefast, that  
 shamelesse : such hard, and such light of beleefe. And to  
 prooue this, he cites many places of *Hippocrates*, *Plato*,  
 and *Aristotle*, who affirme, that the difference of nations,  
 as well in composition of the bodie, as in conditions of  
 the soule, springeth from the varietie of this temperature :  
 and experience it selfe euidently sheweth this, how farre  
 are different *Greekes* from *Tartarians*, *Frenchmen* from  
*Spaniards*, *Indians* from *Dutch*, and *Aethiopians* from *En-  
 glish*. And this may be seene, not only in countries so far  
 distant, but if we consider the prouinces that enuiron all  
*Spaine*, wee may depart the vertues and vices which wee  
 haue recounted amongst the inhabitants, giuing ech one  
 his particular vice and vertue : and if we consider the wit  
 and manners of the *Catalonians*, *Valentians*, *Mercians*,  
*Granatines*, *Andalusians*, *Estremerians*, *Portugals*, *Ga-  
 lesians*, *Asturians*, *Montagneses*, *Biscanes*, *Nauarrists*,  
*Aragonois*, and of the kingdome of *Castile* ; who sees not  
 and knowes not, how farre these are different amongst  
 themselues, not onely in shape of countenance, and in  
 feature of bodie, but euen in the vertues and vices of the  
 soule ? Which all growes, for that euery of these pro-  
 uinces hath his particular and different temperature.  
 And this varietie of manners is knowne, not onely in  
 coun-

countries so farre off, but in places also that are not more than a litle league in distance, it cannot bee credited what ods there is found in the wits of the inhabitants. Finally, all that which *Galen* writeth in this his booke, is the groundplot of this my Treatise, albeit hee declares not in particular the differences of the habilities which are in men, neither as touching the sciences which euerie one requires in particular. Notwithstanding, hee understood that it was necessarie to depart the sciences amongst young men, and to giue each one that which to his naturall habilitie was requisit, in as much as hee said, That well ordered commonwealths ought to haue men of great wisdom and knowledge, who might in their tender age discouer each ones wit and naturall sharpenesse, to the end they might be set to learne that art which was agreeable, and not leaue it to their owne election.

CHAP. III.

*What part of the bodie ought to be well tempered, that a young man may haue habilitie.*



Ans bodie hath so many varieties of parts and powerts (applied each to his end) that it shall not stray frō our purpose, but rather grows a matter of necessitie, to know first, what member was ordained by nature for the principall instrument, to the end man might become wise and aduised. For it is a thing apparant, that we discourse not with our foot, nor walke on our head,

nor see with our nostrils, nor heare with our eyes, but that euery of these parts hath his vse and particular disposition, for the worke which it is to accomplish.

Before *Hippocrates* and *Plato* came into the world, it held for a generall conceit amongst the naturall Philosophers, that the heart was the principall part where the reasonable facultie made his residence, and the instrument wherewith the soule wrought the workes of wisdom, of diligence, of memorie, and of vnderstanding. For which cause, the diuine scripture (applying it selfe to the ordinarie speech of those times) in many places calls the heart the foueraigne part of a man. But these two graue Philosophers comming into the world, gaue euidence that this opinion was false, and prooued by many reasons and experiments, that the braine is the principall seat of the reasonable soule, and so they all gaue hands to this opinion, saue onely *Aristotle*, who (with a purpose of crossing *Plato* in all points) turned to reuiue the former opinion, and with topicall places to make it probable: with which of these opinions the truth swayeth, time serueth not now to discusse. For there is none of these Philosophers that doubteth, but that the braine is the instrument ordained by nature, to the end that man might become wise and skillfull, it sufficeth onely to declare with what conditions this part ought to be endued, so as we may affirme, that it is duly instrumentalized, and that a young man in this behalfe may possesse a good wit and habilitie.

Four conditions the braine ought to enioy, to the end the reasonable soule may therewith commodiously performe the workes which appertaine to vnderstanding and wisdom. The first, good composition; the second, that his parts be well vnited; the third, that the  
heart

heat exceed not the cold, nor the moist the drie; the fourth, that his substance bee made of parts subtile and very delicate.

In the good composition are contained other foure things: the first is, good figure: the second, quantitie sufficient: the third, that in the braine the foure ventricles be distinct and seuered, each duly bestowed in his seat and place: the fourth, that the capablenesse of these be neither greater nor lesse than is conuenient for their workings.

*Galen* collecteth the good figure of the braine by an outward consideration, namely the forme and disposition of the head, which he saith ought to be such, as it should be, if taking a perfect round ball of wax, and pressing it together somewhat on the sides, there will remaine (after that manner) the forehead and the nape with a little bunchinesse. Hence it followes, that the man who hath his forehead very plaine, and his noddocke flat, hath not his braine so figured, as is requisit for wit and habilitie. The quantitie of the braine, which the soule needeth to discourse and consider, is a matter that breeds feare, for amongst all the bruite beasts there is none found to haue so much braine as a man, in sort, as if we ioine those of two the greatest oxen together, they will not equall that of one onely man, be he neuer so little. And that whereto behooues more consideration, is, that amongst bruite beasts, those who approach neere to mans wisdom and discretion (as the ape, the fox, and the dog,) haue a greater quantitie of braine than the other, though bigger bodied than they. For which cause, *Galen* said, That a little head in any man is neuer faultie, because that it wanteth braine; notwithstanding, I auouch, that if his hauing a great head proceedeth from abundance

dance of matter, and ill tempered, at such time as the same was shaped by Nature, it is an euill token, for the same consists all of bones and flesh, and contains a small quantitie of braine, as it befalls in very big oranges, which opened, are found scarce of iuice, and hard of rinde. Nothing offends the reasonable soule so much, as to make his abode in a bodie surcharged with bones, fat, and flesh. For which cause *Plato* said, That wise mens heads are ordinarily weake, and vpon any occasion are easily annoied, and the reason is, for that Nature made them of an emptie skull, with intention not to offend the wit, by compassing it with much matter. And this doctrine of *Plato* is so true, that albeit the stomacke abides so far distant from the braine, yet the same workes it offence, when it is replenished with fat and flesh. For confirmation hereof, *Galen* alleageth a prouerbe which saith, *A grosse bellie makes a grosse vnderstanding*, and that this proceeds from nothing else, than that the braine and the stomacke are vnited and chained together with certaine sinewes, by way of which they interchangeably communicat their dammages. And contrariwise, when the stomacke is drie and shrunke, it affoordes great aid to the wit, as wee see in the hungerstarued, and such as are driuen to their shifts, on which doctrine (it may be) *Persius* founded himselfe, when he said, That the belly is that which quickens vp the wit. But the thing most pertinent to be noted for this purpose, is, that if the other parts of the bodie bee fat and fleshie, and therethrough a man growes ouergrosse, *Aristotle* sayes, It makes him to leese his wit. For which cause I am of opinion, that if a man haue a great head, albeit the same proceed for that he is endued with a very able nature, and that he is furnished with a quantitie of well tempered matter, yet he shall

not be owner of so good a wit, as if the same held a meaner size.

*Aristotle* is of a contrary opinion, whilst he enquires for what cause a man is the wisest of all living creatures? to which doubt he answers, That you shall find no creature which hath so little a head as man, respecting with all the greatnesse of his bodie: but herein hee swarued from reason, for if he had opened some mans head, and viewed the quantitie of his braine, hee should haue found, that two horses together had not so much braine as that one man. That which I haue gathered by experience, is, that in little men it is best that the head incline somewhat to greatnesse; and in those who are big bodied, it prooues best that they be little: and the reason is, for that after this sort there is found a measurable quantitie, with which the reasonable soule may well performe his working.

Besides this, there are needfull the foure ventricles in the braine, to the end the reasonable soule may discourse and Philosophize: one must be placed on the right side of the braine, the second on the left, the third in the middle of these, and the fourth in the part behind the braine. Whereunto these ventricles setue, and their large or narrow capablenesse for the reasonable soule, all shall bee told by vs a little hereafter, when we shall intreat of the diuersities of mens wits.

But it sufficeth not, that the braine possesse good figure, sufficient quantitie, and the number of ventricles by vs forementioned, with their capablenesse great or little, but it behooues also that his parts hold a certaine kind of continuednesse, and that they bee not deuided. For which cause, we haue seene in hurts of the head, that some men haue lost their memorie, some their vnderstanding,

standing, and others their imagination: and put case, that after they haue recovered their health, the braine re-vnited it selfe againe, yet this notwithstanding, the naturall vnion was not made, which the braine before possessed.

The third condition of the fourth principall, was, that the braine should bee tempered with measurable heat, and without excesse of the other qualities, which disposition wee said heretofore that it is called *good nature*; for it is that which principally makes a man able, and the contrarie vnable.

But the fourth, (namely that the braine haue his substance or composition of subtile and delicate parts) *Galen* sayth is the most important of all the rest. For when he would giue a token of the good disposition of the braine, he affirmeth, that a subtile wit sheweth that the braine is framed of subtile and very delicat parts, and if the vnderstanding be dull, it giues euidence of a grosse substance, but hee makes no mention of the temperature. These conditions the braine ought to bee endued withall, to the end the reasonable soule may therethrough shape his reasons and sillogismes. But here encounters vs a difficultie very great, and this is, that if we open the head of any beast, we shall find his braine composed with the same forme and manner as a mans, without that any of the fore-reported conditions will be failing. Whence we gather, that the bruite beasts haue also the vse of Prudence and reason, by meanes of the composition of their braine, or else that our reasonable soule senses not it selfe of this member, for the vse of his operations; which may not be auouched. To this doubt *Galen* answereth in this manner: Amongst the kinds of beasts it is doubted, whether that which is termed vntreasonable, be altogether

get her void of reason, or not. For albeit the same want that which consists in voice (which is named speech) yet that which is conceived in the soule, and teamed discourse, of this it may be, that all sorts of beasts are partakers, albeit the same is bestowed more sparingly vpon some, and more largely on other some. But verely, how far man in the way of reason outgoeth all the rest, there is none who maketh question. By these words *Galen* giues vs to vnderstand (albeit with some fearefulnesse) that bruit beasts doe partake reason, one more, and another lesse, and in their mind doe frame some fillogismes and discourses, though they cannot vtter them by way of speech. And then the difference betweene them and man consisteth in being more reasonable, and in vsing Prudence with greater perfection.

The same *Galen* prooues also by many reasons and experiments, that Asses (being of all bruit beasts the bluntest) doe arriue with their wit to the most curious and nice points, which were deuised by *Plato* and *Aristotle*: and thereon he collectts, saying; I am therefore so far from praising the ancient Philosophers, in that they haue found out some ample matter and of rare inuention, (as when they say, We must hold that there is selfe, and diuers: one, and not one: not only in number, but also in kind:) as I dare boldly affirme, that euen the very Asses (who notwithstanding seeme most blockish of  
 • all beasts) haue this from Nature.

This selfesame meant *Aristotle*, when he enquired the cause, Why man amongst all liuing creatures is wisest: and in another place he turnes to doubt, For what cause man is the most vniult of all liuing creatures: in which he giues vs to vnderstand the selfesame which *Galen* said, That the difference which is found betweene  
 man

man and bruit beast, is the selfesame which is found betweene a foole and a wise man; which is nought else than in respect of the more and the lesse. This (truly) is not to be doubted, that bruit beasts enjoy memorie and imagination, and another power which resembles vnderstanding: as the Ape is very like a man, and that his soule takes vse of the composition of the braine, it is a matter apparant: which being good, and such as is behooffull, performes his works very well, and with much prudence, and if the braine be ill instrumentalized, it executes the same vntowardly. For which cause we see, that there be asses, which in their knowledge are properly such: and others againe are found so quicke conceived and malicious, that they passe the propertie of their kind. And amongst horses are found many iadishnesses, and good qualities, and some there are more trainable than the rest: all which growes from hauing their braine well or ill instrumentalized. The reason and solution of this doubt, shall be placed in the chapter which followeth, for there we returne to reason anew of this matter.

There are in the bodie some other parts, from whose temperature, as well the wit as the braine depend; of which wee will reason in the last chapter of this worke. But besides these and the braine, there is found in the bodie another substance, whose seruice the reasonable soule vseth in his operations, and so requireth the three last qualities which we haue assigned to the braine, that is, quantitie sufficient, delicat substance, and good temperature. These are the vitall spirits, and arteriall bloud, which goe wandering through the whole bodie, and remaine euermore vnited to the imagination, following his contemplation. The office of this spirituall substance

is, to stir vp the powers of man, and to giue them force and vigour that they may bee able to worke. This shall evidently be knowne to be their manner, if we take consideration of the motions, of the imaginations, and of that which after succeeds in working. For if a man begin to imagine vpon any iniurie that hath beene profered him, the bloud of the arteries runs sodainly to the heart, and stirs vp the wrathfull part, and giues the same heat and forces for reuenge.

If a man stand contemplating any faire woman, or stay in giuing and receiuing by that imagination touching the venerious act, these vitall spirits run forthwith to the genitall members, and raise them to the performance. The like befals when we remember any delicat & sauourie meat, which once called to mind, they straight abandon the rest of the bodie, and flie to the stomacke, and replenish the mouth with water. And this their motion is so swift, that if a woman with child long for any meat whatsoeuer, and still retaine the same in her imagination, we see by experience that she looseth her burthen, if speedily it be not yeelded vnto her. The naturall reason of this, is, because these vitall spirits before the woman conceived this longing, made abode in the bellie, helping her there to retaine the creature; and through this new imagination of eating, they hie to the stomacke to raise the appetite, and in this space, if the belly haue no strong retentive, it cannot sustaine the same, and so by this meanes she leese her burthen.

*Galen* vnderstanding this condition of the vitall spirits, counsaileth Phisitions that they giue not sicke folke to eat, when their humors are raw and vpon digestion, for when they first feele the meat in the stomacke, they straightwaies abandon the worke about which before they

they were occupied, and come thereunto to helpe it. The like benefite and aid the braine receiues of these vitall spirits, when the reasonable soule is about to contem-plate, vnderstand, imagine, or performe actions of memorie, without which it cannot worke. And like as the grosse substance of the braine, and his euill temperature brings the wit to confusion: so the vitall spirits and the arteriall blood (not being delicat and of good temperature) hinder in a man his discourse and vse of reason. Wherefore *Plato* said, That the suppleness and good temperature of the heart makes the wit sharpe and quicke-sighted. Hauing prooued before, that the braine and not the heart is the principall seat of the reasonable soule. And the reason is, because these vitall spirits are engendred in the heart, and partake of that substance and that temperature which rested in that which formed them. Of this arteriall blood *Aristotle* meant, when he said, That those men are well compounded who haue their blood hote, delicate, and pure; for they are also of good bodily forces, and of a wit well disposed. These vitall spirits are by the Phisitions termed Nature, for they are the principall instrument with which the reasonable soule performeth his works, and of these also may that sentence be veresified, *Nature makes able*.

## CHAP. IIIL.

*It is prooued, that the soule vegetatiue, sensitiue, and reasonable, haue knowledge without that any thing bee taught them, if so be that they possesse that conuenient temperature which is requisit for their operation.*



He temperature of the soute first qualities (which wee heretofore tearmed Nature) hath so great force, to cause that ( of plants, brute beasts, and man) each one set himselfe to performe those workes which are proper to his kind, that they arriue to that vtmost bound of perfection which may be attained, suddainly and without any others teaching them: the plants know how to forme roots vnder ground, and by way of them to draw nourishment to retaine it, to digest it, and to driue soorth the excrements: and the brute beasts likewise so soone as they are borne, know that which is agretable to their nature, and flie the things which are naughtie and noisome. And that which makes them most to maruell who are not seene in naturall Philosophie, is, that a man hauing his braine well tempered, and of that disposition which is requisit for this or that science, suddainly and without hauing euer learned it of any, hee speaketh and vtereth such exquisit matters, as could hardly win credit. Vulgar Philosophers seeing the marvellous workes which brute beasts performe, affirme it holds no cause of maruell, because they doe it by naturall instinct, in as much as nature sheweth and teacheth each in his kind what he is to doe. And in this they say very well, for we haue already alleaged and prooued, that Nature is nothing else than this temperature of the soute first qualities, and that this is the schoolemaister who teacheth the soules in what sort they are to worke: but they tearme instinct of Nature a certaine masse of things, which rise from the noddocke vpward, neither could they euer expound or giue vs to vnderstand, what

it is. The graue Philosophers (as *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Aristotle*) attribute all these maruellous works to heat, cold, moisture, and drouth; and this they affirme of the first principle, and passe no farther. And if you aske who hath taught the brute beasts to doe these works, (which breed vs such maruell) and men to discourse with reason; *Hippocrates* answereth, It is the natures of them all without any teacher: as if he should say, The faculties or the temperature of which they consist, are all giuen them without being taught by any other. Which is clearly discerned, if they passe on to consider the workes of the soule vegetatiue, and of all the rest which gouerne man, who if it haue a quantitie of mans seed well digested and seasoned with good temperature, makes a body so seemly and duly instrumentalized, that all the caruers in the world cannot shape the like.

For which cause *Galen* woondring to see a frame so maruellous, the number of his seuerall parts, the seating, the figure, and the vse of each one by it selfe, grew to conclude, It was not possible that the vegetatiue soule, nor the temperature, could fashion a workmanship so singular, but that the author thereof was God, or some other most wise vnderstanding. But this maner of speech is alreadie by vs heretofore refuted: for it becomes not naturall Philosophers to reduce the effects immediately to God, and so to slip ouer the assigning of the second reasons, and especially in this case, where wee see by experience, that if mans seed consist of an euill substance, and enioy not a temperature conuenient, the vegetatiue soule runs into a thousand disorders: for if the same be cold and moist more than is requisit, *Hippocrates* sayth, that the men prooue Eunuches, or Hermofrodites; and if it be very hote and drie, *Aristotle* saith, that

it makes them curle-pated, crooke-legged, and flat-nosed as are the *Aethiopians*: and if it be moist, the same *Galen* saith, That they grow long and lithie: and if it be drie, low of stature. All this is a great defect in mankind, and for such workes we find little cause to giue Nature any commendation, or to hold her for aduised; and if God were the author hereof, none of these qualities could diuert him. Only the first men which the world possessed, *Plato* affirmes were made by God, but the rest were born answerable to the discourse of the second causes, which if they be well ordered, the vegetatiue soule doth well performe his operations: and if they concur not in sort conuenient, it produceth a thousand dammageable effects.

What the good order of Nature for this effect must be, is, that the vegetatiue soule haue an endowment of a good temperature, or else, let *Galen* and all the Philosophers in the world answer me, What the cause is that the vegetatiue soule possesseth such skill and power in the first age of man to shape his bodie, and to increase and nourish the same, and when old age groweth on, can yeeld the same no longer? For if an old man leese but a tooth, he is past remedie of recovering another; but if a child cast them all, we see that Nature returnes to renew them againe. Is it then possible that a soule which hath done nought else in all the course of life, than to receiue food, retaine the same, digest it, and expell the excrements, new begetting the parts which faile, should towards the end of life forget this, and want abilitie to doe the same any longer? *Galen* (for certaine) will answere, that this skill and habilitie of the vegetatiue soule in youth, springs from his possessing much naturall heat and moisture, and that in age the same wants skill and

power to performe it, by meanes of the coldnesse and drinesse, to which a bodie of those yeares is subiect. The knowledge of the sensitiue soule takes his dependance also from the temperature of the braine, for if the same be such as his operations require that it should be, it can performe with due perfection; otherwise, the same must also erre no lesse than the soule vegetatiue. The manner which *Galen* held to behold and discerne by eyesight the wisdom of the sensitiue soule, was to take a young kid, but newly kidded, which set on the ground; begins to goe (as if it had beene told and taught that his legs were made to that purpose) and after that, he shakes from his backe the superfluous moisture which he brought with him from his mothers bellie, and lifting vp the one foot, scrapes behind his eare; and setting before him sundrie platters with wine, water, vineger, oile, and milke, after hee hath smelt them all, he fed onely on that of milke. Which being beheld by diuers Philosophers there present, they all with one voice cried out, That *Hippocrates* had great reason to say, That soules were skilfull without the instruction of any teacher. But *Galen* held not himselfe contented with this one prooffe, for two moneths after he caused the same kid, being very hungrie, to bee brought into the field, where smelling at many hearbes, hee did eat onely those, whercon goats accustomedly feed.

But if *Galen*, as he set himselfe to contemplat the demeanure of this kid, had done the like with three or foure together, hee should haue seene some gone better than othersome, shrug themselues better, scratch better, and performe better all the other actions which we haue recounted. And if *Galen* had reared two colts, bred of one horse and mare, hee should haue seene the one to  
 pace

pace with more grace than the other, and to gallop and stop better, and shew more fidelitie. And if he had taken an ayrie of Faulcons, and manned them, he should haue found the first good of wing, the second good of prey, and the third rauening and ill conditioned. The like shall we find in hounds, who being whelpes of the same litter, the one for perfection of hunting, will seeme to want but speech, and the other haue no more inclination thereunto, than if he had beene engendered by a heardmans bandog.

All this cannot be reduced to those vaine instincts of Nature; which the Philosophers saine. For if you aske for what cause one dog hath more instinct than another, both comming of one kind, and whelpes of one sire, I cannot coniecture what they may answer, saue to flie backe to their old leaning post, saying, That God hath taught the one better than the other, and giuen him a more naturall instinct. And if wee demaund the reason, why this good hound, being yet but a whelp, is a perfect hunter, and growing in age, hath no such sufficiency: and contrariwise, another being young cannot hunt at all, and waxing old, is wilie and readie; I know not what they can yeeld in replie. My selfe at least would say, that the towardly hunting of one dog more than another, growes from the better temperature of his braine; and againe, that his well hunting whilst he is young, and his decay in age, is occasioned by means that in one age he partakes the temperature which is requisit to the qualities of hunting, and in the other not. Whence wee infer, that fithens the temperature of the foure first qualities is the reason and cause, for which one brute beast better performs the works of his kind than another, that this temperature is the schoolemaister which teacheth

the sensitive soule what it is to doe.

And if *Galen* had considered the demeanure and voyages of the Ant, and noted his prudence, his mercie, his iustice, and his government, he would haue taken astonishment to see a beast so little, endued with so great sagenesse, without the helpe of any maister or teacher to instruct him. But the temperature which the Ant hath in his braine, being knowne, and how aptly it is appropriated to wisdom, (as hereafter shall be shewne) this woonderment will cease; and we shall conceiue, that brute beasts with the temperature of their braine, and the fantasmes which enter thereinto by the five senses, make such discourses and partake those abilities which we do so note in them. And amongst beasts of one kind, he which is most schooleable and skilfull, is such, because he hath his braine better tempered, and if through any occasion or infirmitie the temperature of his braine incur alteration, he will suddenly leese his skill and ability as men also doe.

But now we are to treat of a difficultie touching the reasonable soule, which is, in what sort he hath this naturall instinct for the operations of his kiud, (namely, Sapience and Prudence) and how on the suddaine, by meanes of his good temperature, a man can be skilled in the sciences, without the instruction of any other: seeing experience telleth vs, that if they be not gotten by learning, no man is at his birth endued with them.

Betweene *Plato* and *Aristotle* there is a waighty question, as touching the veresieng the reason or cause from whence the wisdom of man may spring. One saith, That the reasonable soule is more ancient than the bodie, for that before such time as Nature endowed the same with these instruments, it made abode in heaven,

in the companie of God, whence it issued full of science and sapience : but when it entered to forme this matter, through the euill temperature which it found therein, it forewent the whole, vntill by proceffe of time this ill temperature grew to amendment, and there succeeded another in steed thereof, with which (as more applicable to the sciences it had lost) it grew by little and little to call that to remembrance which before it had forgotten. This opinion is false, and I much maruell that *Plato* being so great a Philosopher, could not render the reasons of mans wildome, considering that brute beasts haue their prudences and naturall habilities, without that their soule departs from their bodie, or sties vp to heauen to learne them. In which regard he cannot goe blamelesse, especially hauing red in Genesis (whereto he gaue so great credit) that God instrumentalized the bodie of *Adam*, before he created his soule. The selfesame befals also now, saue that it is Nature who begets the bodie, and in the last disposing thereof, God createth the soule in the same body, without that it be sundred therefrom any time or moment.

*Plato* tooke out of the holy scripture the best sentences which are to be found in his works, in respect whereof, he was called Diuine.

*Aristotle* tooke another course, affirming, that euery doctrine and euery discipline comes from a foregoing knowledge, as if he would say, all that which men know and learne, springs from that they haue heard the same, seene it, smelt it, tasted it, or felt it : for there can grow no notice in the vnderstanding, which hath not first taken passage by some of the five senses : for which cause hee said, that these powers issue out of the hands of Nature, as a plaine table in which is no manner of painting. Which opinion is also false, as well as that of *Plato*. But that we may the better prooue and make the same apparant, it behooues first to agree with the vulgar Philosophers,

Plato attributes  
three soules vnto  
man.

that in mans body there rests but one soule, and that the same is reasonable, which is the originall of whatsoeuer we doe or effect: albeit there are opinions, and there want not, who against this defend, that in companie of the reasonable soule there are associated some two or three more.

This then standing thus in the workes which the reasonable soule performes, as it is vegetatiue, we haue already proued that the same knowes how to shape man, and to giue him the figure which he is to keepe, and knowes likewise how to receiue nourishment, to retaine it, to digest it, and to expell the excrements, and if any part of the bodie doe faile, she knowes how to supplie the same anew, and yeeld it that composition agreeable to the vse which it is to hold. And in the workes of the sensitiue and motiue, the child so soone as it is borne, knowes to sucke, and fashion his lips to draw forth the milke, and this so readily, as not the wisest man can doe the like. And herewithall it assures the qualities which are incident to the preservation of his nature, shuns that which is noisome and dammageable therevnto, knowes to weepe and laugh, without being taught by any. And if this be not so, let the vulgar Philosophers tell me a while, who hath taught the children to do these things, or by what sence they haue learned it. Well I know they will answer, That God hath giuen them this naturall instinct as to the brute beasts, wherein they say not ill, if the naturall instinct be the selfesame with the temperature.

The proper operations of the reasonable soule, namely, to vnderstand, to imagine, and to performe actions of memorie, a man cannot do them forthwith so soone as he is borne, for the temperature of infancie serueth very

vnfitly therefore, and is meerey appropriat to the vegetatiue and sensitiue, as that of old age is appropriat to the reasonable soule, and contrary to the vegetatiue and sensitiue. And if as the temperature which serues for prudence, is gotten in the braine by little and little, so the same could all be ioyned together at one instant, man should on the suddaine haue better skill to discourse and play the Philosopher, than if he had attained the same in the schooles.

But because Nature cannot performe this saue by processe of time, a man growes to gather wisedome by little and little, and that this is the reason and cause thereof, is manifestly prooued, if we consider, that a man after he hath beene very wise, growes by little and little into folly, for that he daily goes (till his decrepit age) accrewing a contrarie temperature. I for mine owne part am of opinion, that if Nature, as she hath made man of seed hot and moist (and this is the temperature which directs the vegetatiue and the sensitiue what they are to effectuat) so she had made him of seed cold and drie, euen after his birth, he should straightwaies haue beene able to discourse and reason, and not haue attended to sucke, in as much as this is the temperature agreeable to these operations. But for that we find by experience, that if the braine haue the temperature requisit for naturall sciences, he hath no need of a maister to teach him, it fals out necessarie that wee marke one thing, which is, that if a man fall into any disease, by which his braine vpon a suddaine changeth his temperature (as are madnesse, melancholie, and frenzie) it happens, that at one instant hee looseth, if he were wise, all his knowledge, and vtters a thousand follies; and if he were a foole, he accrues more wit and abilitie than he had before.

The seed and menstruall bloud which are two materiall principles of which we be formed, are hot & moist, through which temperature children are so vnskilled.

I can speake of a rude country fellow, who becoming franticke, made a very eloquent discourse in my presence, recommending his well dooing to the by-standers, and that they should take care of his wife and children (if it pleased God to call him away in that sicknesse) with so many flowers of Rhetorike, and such apt choice of words, as if *Cicero* had spoken in the presence of the Senate: whereat the beholders maruelling, asked me whence so great eloquence and wisdom might grow, in a man who in his health time could scantly speake? and I remember I made answer, That the art of Oratorie was a science, which springs from a certaine point or degree of heat, and that this country fellow, before sound, had by meanes of this infirmitie attained thereunto.

I can also speake of another frantike person, who for the space of more than eight daies neuer vttered word which I found not to carrie his iust quantitie, and mostly he made couplements of verses very well composed: whereat the by-standers wondring to heare a man speak in verse, who in his health had neuer so much skill; I sayd, It sildome fell out, that he who was a poet in his health time, should be so also in his sicknesse: For the temperature of the braine, by which when a man is whole, he becommeth a Poet, in sicknesse altereth and brings forth contrarie operations. I remember that the wife of this frantike fellow, and a sister of his, named *Margaret*, reprooued him, because he spake ill of the saints; whereat the patient growing impatient, said to his wife these words: I renounce God for the loue of you; and *S. Marie* for the loue of *Margaret*; and *S. Peter* for the loue of *John of Olmedo*; and so he ran thorow a beadroll of many saints, whose names had consonance with

with the other by standers there present.

But this is nothing, and a matter of small importance, in respect of the notable speeches vttered by a Page of one of the great ones of this realme, whilst he was mad, who in his health was reputed a youth of slender capacitie; but falling into this infirmitie, hee deliuered such rare conceits, resemblances, and answeres to such as asked him, and deuised so excellent manners of gouerning a kingdome (of which he imagined himselfe to be soueraigne) that for great wonder people flocked to see him and heare him, and his very maister scarcely euer departed from his beds head, praying God that he might neuer be cured. Which afterwards plainly appeared, for being recouered, his Phisition (who had healed him) came to take leaue of his lord, with a mind to receiue some good reward, if of nothing else, yet at least in good words; but he encountred this greeting: I promise you maister doctor, that I was neuer more aggrieved at any ill successe, than to see this my page recouered, for it was not behoofesfull that he should change so wise folly for an vnderstanding so simple as is this which in his health he inioieth; me thinks, that of one who tofore was wise and well aduised, you haue made him a foole againe, which is the greatest miserie that may light vpon any man. The poore Phisition seeing how little thankfully his cure was accepted, went to take leaue of the page, who amongst many other words that passed betweene them, told him this: Maister doctor, I kisse your hands for so great a benefit bestowed on me, in restoring mine vnderstanding, but I assure you on my faith, that in some sort it displeaseth me to haue beene cured; for whilest I rested in my follie, I led my life in the deepest discourses of the world, and imagined my selfe so great a lord as  
there

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cured.

there reigned no king on the earth, who was not my vassall, and were this a ieast or a lie, what imported that, whilest I conceiued thereof so great a contentment, as if it had beene true? I rest now in far worse case, finding my selfe in troth to be but a poore page, and to morrow I must begin againe to serue one, who whilest I was in mine infirmitie, I would haue disdained for my foot-man.

It skils not much, whether the Philosophers admit all this, and belecue that it may be so or not; but what if I should prooue by very true stories, that ignorant men strooken with this infirmitie, haue spoken Latine, which they neuer learned in their health; and that a franticke woman told all persons who came to visit her, their vertues and vices, and sometimes reported matters with that assurance which they vse to giue who speake by coniectures and tokens: and for this cause, none almost durst come in to visit her, fearing to heare of those true tales which she would deliuer? and (which is more to be maruelled at) when a barber came to let her bloud, Friend (quoth she) haue regard what you doe, for you haue but few daies to liue, and your wife shall marrie such a man: and this, though spoken by chance, fell out so true, as it tooke effect before halfe a yeare came to an end.

Me thinks I heare them who flie natural Philosophy; to say that this is a foule leasing, & that (put case it were true) the diuell as hee is wise and craftie by Gods sufferance, entred into this womans bodie, and into the rest of those frantike persons whom I haue mentioned, and caused them to vtter those strange matters, and yet euen to confesse this, they are very loath; for the diuell fore-knoweth not what is to come, because he hath no propheticall

pheticall spirit. They hold it a very sufficient argument to auouch, This is false, because I cannot conceiue how it may be so: as if difficult & quaint matters were subiect to blunt wits, and came within the reach of their capacities. I pretend not hereby to take those to taske who haue defect of vnderstanding, for that were a bootlesse labour, but to make *Aristotle* himselfe confesse, That men endowed with the temperature requisit for such operations, may conceiue many things without hauing receiued thereof any particular perseuerance, or learned the same at the hands of any other. Sundry also, because this heat is a neighbour to the seat of the mind, are wrapped in the infirmitie of sottishnesse, or are heated by some furious instinct, whence grew the *Sibils* and *Bacchants*, and all those, who men thinke are egged on by some diuine inspiration, whereas this takes his originall, not from any disease, but from a naturall distemperature. *Marcus* a citizen of *Siracusa* was excellentest poet after he lost his vnderstanding. And those in whom this abated heat approacheth least to mediocritie, are (verely) altogether melancholike, but thereby much the wiser. In these words *Aristotle* cleerely confesseth, That when the braine is excessiue heated, many thereby attaine the knowledge of things to come, (as were the *Sibils*) which *Aristotle* saith, growes not by reason of any disease, but thorow the inequalitye of the naturall heat: and that this is the very reason and cause thereof, he prooues apparantly by an example; alleaging that *Mark* a citizen of *Siracusa*, was a Poet in most excellencie, at such time as through excessiue heat of the braine hee fell besides himselfe, and when he returned to a more moderat temperature, he lost his versifying, but yet remained more wise and aduised. Insomuch that *Aristotle* not onely admits:

mits the temperature of the braine, for the principall occasion of these extravagant successes, but also reprooves them who hold the same for a diuine reuelation, and no naturall cause.

When the diseased diuine thus, it is a signe that the reasonable soule is now awaie of the bodie, and so none such recouer.

The first who termed these maruellous matters by the name of diuinesse, was *Hippocrates*; and that if any such point of diuinesse bee found in the disease, that it manifesteth also a prouidence. Vpon which sentence, he chargeth Phisitions, that if the diseased utter any such diuine matters, they may thereby know in what case they rest, and prognosticate what will become of them. But that which in this behalfe driues mee to most woonder, is, that demaunding of *Plato* how it may come to passe, that of two sonnes begotten by one father, one hath the skill of versifying, without any other teaching, and the other toiling in the art of poetrie, can neuer beget so much as one verse: hee answereth, That he who was borne a poet, is possessed, and the other not. In which behalfe, *Aristotle* had good cause to find fault with him, for that hee might haue reduced this to the temperature, as elsewhere he did.

The frantike persons speaking of Latine, without that he euer learned the same in his health time, shewes the consonance which the Latin toong holds with the reasonable soule, and (as we will prooue hereafter) there is to be found a particular wit, appliable to the inuention of languages, and Latine words; & the phraes of speech in that toong are so fitting with the eare, that the reasonable soule possessing the necessarie temperature for the inuention of some delicat language, suddainly encounters with this: And that two deuisers of languages may shape the like words (hauing the like wit and habilitie) it is very manifest, presupposing that when God created

*Adam*

*Adam*, and set all things before him, to the end he might bestow on each his severall name, whereby it should be called, he had likewise at that instant molded another man with the same perfection and supernaturall grace; now I demaund, if God had placed the same things before this other man, that he might also set them names whereby they should be called, of what manner those names should haue beene? for mine owne part I make no doubt, but he would haue giuen these things those very names which *Adam* did: and the reason is very apparant, for both carried one selfe eye to the nature of each thing, which of it selfe was no more but one. After this manner might the frantike person light vpon the Latine toong, and speake the same without euer hauing learned it in his health, for the naturall temperature of his braine, conceiting alteration, through the infirmities it might (for a space) become like his who first inuented the Latine toong, and faine the like words, but yet not with that concert and continued finenesse, for this would giue token that the diuell mooued that toong, as the church teacheth her exorcists. This selfe (saith *Aristotle*) befell some children, who at their birth-time spake some words very plainly, and afterward kept silence: and he finds fault with the vulgar Philosophers of his time, who for that they knew not the naturall cause of this effect, imputed it to the diuell.

The cause why children speake so soone as they are borne, and after forthwith turne to hold their peace, *Aristotle* could neuer find out, though he went much about it; but yet it could neuer sinke into his braine, that it was a deuice of the Diuels, nor an effect aboue nature, as the vulgar Philosophers held opinion; who seeing themselves hedged in with the curious and nice points  
of

of naturall Philosophie, make them beleeue who know little, that God or the diuell are authours of the prodigious and strange effects, of whose naturall cause they haue no knowledge and vnderstanding.

Children which are engendred of seed cold and drie, (as are those begotten in old age) some few daies and moneths after their birth, begin to discourse and philosophise; for the temperature cold and drie (as we will hereafter prooue) is most appropriat to the operations of the reasonable soule, and that which proceffe of time, and manie daies and months should bring about, is supplied by the present temperature of the braine, which for many causes anticipateth what it was to effect. Other children there are (saith *Aristotle*) who as soone as they are borne, begin to speake, and afterwards hold their peace vntill they attaine the ordinarie and conuenient age of speaking: which effect floweth from the same originall and cause that we recounted of the page, and of those furious and franticke persons, and of him who spake Latine on a sudden, without hauing learned it in his health. And that children whilst they make abode in their mothers bellie, and so soone as they are borne, may vndergoe these infirmities, is a matter past deniall. But whence that diuining of the franticke woman proceeded, I can better make *Cicero* to conceiue, than these naturall Philosophers: for he describing the nature of man, said in this manner: The creature foresightfull, searchfull, apt for many matters, sharpe conceited, mindfull, replenished with reason and counsell, whome we call by the name of Man. And in particular he affirmeth, that there is found a certaine nature in some men, which in foreknowing things to come, exceedeth other mens, and his words are these: For there is found a certaine  
force

force and nature, which foretels things to come, the force and nature of which, is not by reason to be vnfolded. The error of the naturall Philosophers consisteth, in not considering (as *Plato* did) that man was made to the likenesse of God, and that hee is a partaker of his diuine prouidence, and that the power of discerning all the three differences of time, (memorie for the passed, conceiuing for the present, and imagination and vnderstanding for those that are to come.) And as there are men superior to others in remembring things past, and others in knowing the present, so they are also many, who partake a more naturall habilitie for imagining of what shall come to passe. One of the greatest arguments which forced *Cicero* to thinke, that the reasonable soule is vncorruptible, was to see the certaintie with which the diseased tell things to come, and especially when they are neere their end. But the difference which rests betweene a propheticall spirit and this naturall wit, is, that that which God speaks by the mouth of his Prophets, is infallible, for it is the expresse word of God: but that which man prognosticateth by the power of his imagination holds no such certaintie.

Those who say, that the discovering of their vertues and vices by the franticke woman to the persons who came to visit her, was a trick of the deuils playing; let them know, that God bestowes on men a certaine supernaturall grace, to attaine and conceiue, which are the workes of God, and which of the deuill: the which *saint Paul* placeth amongst the diuine gifts, and calls it, The imparting of spirits. Whereby we may discern, whether it be the diuell or some good angell that intermedleth with vs. For many times the deuill sets to beguile vs vnder the cloke of a good angell, and we haue

neede of this grace and supernaturall gift, to know him, and difference him from the good. From this gift they are farthest sundered, who haue not a wit capable of naturall Philosophie: for this science, and that supernaturall infused by God, fall vnder one selfe abilitie, to weete, the vnderstanding at least; if it be true, that God in bestowing his graces, do apply himselfe to the natural good of euery one, as I haue afore rehearsed.

*Jacob* lying at the point of death, (at which time the reasonable soule is most at libertie, to see what is to come) all the twelue children entred to visit him; and he to each of them in particular recited their vertues and vices, and prophesied what should befall, as touching them and their posteritie. Certaine it is, that he did all this inspired by God, but if the diuine scripture, and our faith, had not ascertained vs hereof, how would these naturall Philosophers haue knowne this to be the worke of God: and that the vertues and vices which the franticke woman told to such as came to visit her, were discovered by the power of the deuill, whilst this case in part resembles that of *Jacob*?

They reckon that the nature of the reasonable soule, is far different from that of the deuill, and that the powers thereof (vnderstanding, imagination, and memory,) are of another very diuers kind, and herein they bee decciued. For if a reasonable soule informe a well instrumentalized body (as was that of *Adam*) his knowledge comes little behind that of the subtillest deuill, and without the body he partakes as perfect qualities as the other. And if the deuils foresee things to come, coniecturing and discoursing by certaine tokens, the same also may a reasonable man doe when he is about to be freed from his body, or when he is endowed with that disse-

rence of temperature, which makes a man capable of this providence. For it is a matter as difficult for the vnderstanding to conceiue how the deuill can know these hidden things, as to impute the same to the reasonable soule. It will not fall in these mens heads, that in naturall things there may be found out certaine signes, by meanes of which they may attaine to the knowledge of matters to come. And I affirme, there are certaine tokens to be found, which bring vs to the notice of things passed and present, and to forecast what is to follow, yea, & to coniecture some secrets of the heauen: Therefore we see that his things inuisible are vnderstoode by the creatures of the world, by meanes of the things which haue bene created. Whosoeuer shall haue power to accomplish this, shall attaine thereunto, and the other shall be such as *Hommer* spake of, The ignorant vnderstandeth the things passed, but not the things to come. But the wise and discreet is the Ape of God, for he immitates him in many matters, and albeit he cannot accomplish them with so great perfection, yet he carries some resemblance vnto him by following him.

CHAP. V.

*It is proued that of the three qualities, hot, moist, and drie, proceed all the differences of mens wits.*



He reasonable soule making abode in the body, it is impossible that the same can performe contrarie and different operations, if for each of them it vse not a particular instrument. This is plainly seen in the power of the soule, which performeth diuers operations in the

outward senses, for euery one hath his particular composition; the eyes haue one, the eares another, the smelling another, and the feeling another: and if it were not so, there should be no more but one sort of operations, and that should all be seeing, tasting, or feeling, for the instrument determines & rules the power of one action, and for no more.

By this so plaine and manifest a matter, which passeth through the outward senses, we may gather what that is in the inward. With this selfe power of the soule, we vnderstand, imagine, and remember. But if it be true, that euery worke requires a particular instrument, it behooueth of necessitie, that within the braine there be one instrument for the vnderstanding; one for the imagination, and another different from them for the memorie: for if all the braine were instrumentalized after one selfe manner, either the whole should bee memorie, or the whole vnderstanding, or the whole imagination. But we see that these are very different operations, and therefore it is of force that there bee also a varietie in the instruments. But if we open by skill, and make an anotomy of the braine, we shall find the whole compounded after one maner, of one kind of substance, and alike, without parts of other kinds, or a different sort; onely there appeare foure little hollowneses, who (if we will marke them) haue all one selfe composition and figure, without any thing comming betweene which may breede a difference.

What the vse and profit of these may be, and where they serue in the head, is not easily decideable: for *Galen* and the Anotomists, as well new as ancient, haue laboured to find out the truth, but none of them hath precisely nor in particular expressed whereto the right ventricle

ventricle serueth, nor the left, nor that which is placed in the middest of these two, nor the fourth, whose seat in the braine keeps the hinder part of the head. They affirme onely (though with some doubt) that these foure concauities are the shops where the vitall spirits are digested, and conuerted into animals, so to giue sence and motion to all the parts of the body. In which operation, *Galen* said once, That the middle ventricle was the principall, and in another place he vnshies it againe, affirming that the hindermost is of greatest efficacie and valure.

But this doctrine is not true, nor founded on good naturall Philosophie, for in all mans bodie there are not two so contrarie operations, nor that so much hinder one another, as are discourfing, and digestion of nourishment: and the reason is, because contemplation requireth quiet, rest, and a cleerenesse in the animall spirits; and digestion is performed with great stirring and trauaile, & from this action rise vp many vapours, which trouble and darken the animall spirits, so as by meanes of them, the reasonable soule cannot discerne the figures. And Nature was not so vnaduised, as in one selfe place to conioine two actions, which are performed with so great repugnancie. But *Plato* highly commends the wisdom and knowledge of him who shaped vs, for that he seuered the liuer from the braine by so great a distance, to the end, that by the rumbling there made, whilst the nourishments are mingled, and by the obscurenesse and darkenesse occasioned through the vapours in the animall spirits, the reasonable soule might not be troubled in his discourfes and considerarions. But though *Plato* had not touched this point of Philosophie, we see hourly by experience, that because the liuer and the stomacke

are so far from the braine, presently vpon meat, and some space thereafter; there is no man that can giue himselfe to studie.

The truth of this matter is, that the fourth ventricle hath the office of digesting and altering the vitall spirits, and to conuert them into animall, for that end which we haue before remembred. And therefore Nature hath seuered the same by so great a distance from the other three, and made that braine sundred apart, and so farre off (as appeareth) to the end, that by his operation he hinder not the contemplation of the rest. The three ventricles placed in the forepart, I doubt not, but that Nature made them to none other end than to discourse and philosophise. Which is apparantly proued, for that in great studyings and contemplations, alwaies that part of the head finds it selfe agreed which answereth these three concauities. The force of this argument is to be knowne by consideration, that when the other powers are wearie of performing their workes, the instruments are alwaies agreed, whose seruice they vsed; as in our much looking, the eies are pained; and with much going the soles of the feet wax sore.

Now the difficultie consists, to know in which of these ventricles the vnderstanding is placed, in which the memorie, and in which the imagination; for they are so vnited and neere neighboured, that neither by the last argument, nor by any other notice, they can be distinguished or discerned. Then considering that the vnderstanding cannot worke without the memorie be present, representing vnto the same the figures and fantasies agreeable thereunto, it behoueth that the vnderstanding part busie it selfe in beholding the fantasmies, and that the memorie cannot doe it, if the imagination doe

not accompany the same (as we haue already heretofore declared) we shall easily vnderstand, that all the powers are vnited in euery seuerall ventricle, and that the vnderstanding is not solely in the one, nor the memory solely in the other, nor the imagination in the third, as the vulgar Philosophers haue imagined, but that this vnion of powers is accustomably made in mans bodie, in as much as the one cannot worke without the aid of the other, as appeareth in the foure naturall abilities, digestiue, retentiu, attractiue, and expulsiue, where, because each one stands in need of all the residue, Nature disposed to vnite them in one selfe place, and made them not deuided or sundered.

But if this be true, then to what end made Nature those three ventricles, and ioyned together the three reasonable powers in euery of them, seeing that one alone sufficed to vnderstand and to performe the actions of memorie? To this may be answered, that there riseth a like difficultie, in skanning whence it commeth, that Nature made two eyes and two eares, sithens in each of them is placed the whole power of sight and hearing, and we can see, hauing but one eye? VV hereto may be said, that the powers ordained for the perfection of a creature, how much the greater number they carrie, so much the better assured is that their perfection, for vpon some occasion one or two may faile, and therefore it serues well to the purpose, that there remaine some others of the same kind, which may be applied to vse.

In an infirmitie which the Phisitions tearme Resolution, or Palsie of the middle side, the operation is ordinarily lost of that ventricle which is stricken on that side, and if the other two remained not sound, and without endammageance, a man should thereby become witles,

and void of reason. And yet for all this, by wanting that onely ventricke, there is a great abatement discerned in his operations, as well in those of the vnderstanding, as of the imaginative and memorie, as they shall also find in the losse of one sight, who were woont to behold with two; whereby we cleerely comprize, that in euery ventricke are all the three powers; sithens by the annoiance of any one, all the three are weakened. Seeing then all the three ventricles are of one selfe composition, and that there rests not amongst them any varietie of parts, we may not leaue to take the first qualities for an instrument, and to make so many generall differences of wits, as they are in number. For to thinke that the reasonable soule being in the bodie, can worke without some bodily instrument to asist her, is against all naturall Philosophie. But of the foure qualities, heat, cold, moisture, and drouth: all Phisitions leaue out cold, as vnprofitable to any operation of the reasonable soule, wherethrough it is seene by experience in the other habilities, that if the same mount about heat, all the powers of man do badly performe their operations, neither can the stomacke digest his meat, nor the cods yeeld fruitfull seed, nor the muscles mooue the bodie; nor the braine discourse. For which cause *Galen* said, Coldnesse is apparantly noisome to all the offices of the soule; as if he should say, Cold is the ruine of all the operations of the soule, onely it serues in the bodie to temper the naturall heat, and to procure that it burne not ouermuch: and yet *Aristotle* is of a contrary opinion, where he affirmeth, it is a matter certaine, That that blood carrieth most forcible efficacie, which is thickest and hottest, but the coldest and thinnest hath a more accomplished force to perceiue and vnderstand; as if he would say, the thicke and hot blood makes

makes great bodily forces, but the pure and cold is cause that man possesseth great vnderstanding. Wherby we plainly see, that from coldnesse springeth the greatest difference of wit that is in any man, namely in the vnderstanding.

*Aristotle* moreouer moues a doubt, and that is, Why men who inhabite very hot countries (as *Egypt*) are more wittie and aduised than those who are borne in cold regions. Which doubt he resolues in this manner: That the excessiue heat of the countrey fretteth and consumeth the naturall heat of the braine, and so leaues it cold, whereby man growes to befull of reasonablenesse. And that contrariwise, the much cold of the aire fortifieth the much naturall heat of the braine, and yeelds it not place to resolue. For which cause (sayth he) such as are very hot brained, cannot discourse nor philosophise, but are giddie headed, and not settled in any one opinion. To which opinion it seemes that *Galen* leaneth, saying, That the cause why a man is vnsable, and changeth opinion at euery moment, is, for that he hath a hote braine: and contrariwise, his being stable and firme, springs from the coldnesse of his braine. But the truth is, that from this heat there groweth not any difference of wit: neither did *Aristotle* meane, that the cold bloud by his predominance did better the vnderstanding, but that which is lesse hote. True it is, that mans variablenesse springs from his partaking of much heat, which lifts vp the figures that are in the braine, and makes them to boile, by which operation there are represented to the soule many images of things, which inuite him to their contemplation, and the soule to possesse them all, leaues one and takes another. Contrariwise it befalls in coldnesse, which for that it imprints inwardly these figures,

figures, and suffers them not to rise, makes a man firme in one opinion, and it prooues so, because none other presents it selfe to call the same away. Coldnesse hath this qualitie, that it not onely hindereth the motions of bodily things, but also makes that the figures and shapes which the Philosophers call spirituall, be ynmoueable in the braine. And this firmnesse seemeth rather a negligence, than a difference of habilitie. Alike true it is, that there is found another diuersitie of firmenesse, which proceeds from possessing an vnderstanding well compacted together, & not from the coldnesse of the braine. So there remaine drouth, moisture, and heat for the seruice of the reasonable facultie. But no Philosopher as yet wist to giue to euery difference of wit determinately that which was his. *Heraclitus* said, *A drie brightnesse makes a most wise mind*: by which sentence he giues vs to vnderstand, that driness is the cause why a man becomes very wise, but he declares not in what kind of knowledge.

The selfesame meant *Plato*, when he said, That the soule descended into the bodie endowed with great wisdom, and through the much moisture which it there found, grew to become dull and vntoward. But this wearing away in the course of age, and purchasing driness, the soule grew to discover the knowledge which he before enjoyed. Amongst brute beasts, saith *Aristotle*, those are wisest whose temperature is most enclined to cold and drie, as are the ants and bees, who for wisdom concur with those men that partake most of reason. Moreouer, no brute beast is found of more moisture, or lesse wit than a hog, wherethrough the Poet *Pindare*, to gibe at the people of *Beotia*, and to handle them as fooles, sayd thus:

*Th'vn-*

Th' untoward folke which now is nam'd  
*Beotia*, were once cal'd *Hogs*.

Moreouer, bloud through his much moisture, sayth *Galen*, makes men simple. And for such, the same *Galen* recounts, that the Commicks ieausted at *Hippocrates* children, saying of them, That they had much naturall heat, which is a substance moist and very vaporous. This is ordinarily incident to the children of wise men, and hereafter I will make report of the cause whence it groweth. Amongst the foure humours which we enioy, there is none so cold and drie as that of melancholie, and whatsoever notable men for learning haue liued in the world (saith *Aristotle*) they were all melancholike. Finally, al agree in this point, that drinesse makes a man very wise: but they expresse not to which of the reasonable powers it affoordeth greatest helpe; onely *Esay* the Prophet calls it by his right name, where he sayth, *That trauaile giues vnderstanding*: for sadnesse and affliction not only diminisheth and consumeth the moisture of the brain, but also drieth vp the bones, with which qualitie the vnderstanding groweth more sharpe & sightfull. Vherof we may gather an example very manifest by taking into consideration many men, who cast into pouertie and affliction, haue therethrough vttered and written sentences worth the maruelling at, and afterwards rising to better fortune, to eat and drinke well, would neuer once open their mouths. For a delicious life, contentment, and good successe, and to see that all things fall out after our liking, looseth and maketh the braine moist. And this is it which *Hippocrates* said, *Mirth looseth the heart*, as if he would haue said, That the same enlargeth and giueth it heat and grossnesse.

And the same may easily be prooued another way,  
 for

for if sadnesse and affliction drie vp and consume the flesh, and for that reason man gaineth more vnderstanding, it fals out a matter certaine, that his contrarie, namely mirth, will make the braine moist, and diminish the vnderstanding. Such as haue purchased this manner, of wit, are suddenly enclined to pastimes, to musicke, and to pleasant conuersations, and flie the contrarie, which at other times gaue them a rellish and contentment. Now by this, the vulgar sort may conceiue whence it growes, that a wise and vertuous man attaining to some great dignitie (whereas at first he was but poore and base) sodainly changeth his manners and his fashion of speech: and the reason is, because he hath gotten a new temperature, moist and full of vapours, whence it followes, that the figures are cancelled which tofore he had in his brain, and his vnderstanding dulled.

From moisture it is hard to know what difference of wit may spring, sithens it is so far contrarie to the reasonable facultie. At least (after *Galens* opinion) all the humours of our bodie, which hold ouermuch moisture, make a man blockish and foolish, for which cause he said, The readinesse of mind and wisdome growes from the humour of choler: the humour of melancholie is author of firmenesse and constancie; bloud, of simplicitie and dulnesse; the flegmaticke complexion auaieth nothing to the polishing of mans. Insomuch, that bloud with his moistures, and the flegme, cause an impairing of the reasonable facultie.

But this is vnderstood of the faculties or reasonable wits, which are discoursive and actiue, and not of the passiue, as is the memorie, which depends as well on the moist, as the vnderstanding doth on the drie. And we call memorie a reasonable power, because without it the  
vnder.

vnderstanding and the imaginative are of no valure. It ministreth matter and figures to them all, whereupon they may syllogise conformably to that which *Aristotle* sayth, It behooues that the vnderstander go beholding the fantasmes; and the office of the memorie is, to preserve these fantasmes, to the end that the vnderstanding may contemplat them, and if this be lost, it is impossible that the powers can worke; and that the office of memorie is none other, than to presentie the figures of things, without that it appertaines thereto to deuise them. *Galen* expresseth in these words, *Memorie* (verely) laies vp and preserveth in it selfe the things knowne by the sense, and by the mind, & is therein as it were their storehouse and receiuing place, and not their inuenter. And if this be the vse thereof, it falls out apparant, that the same dependeth on moisture, for this makes the braine pliant, and the figure is imprinted by way of straying. To proue this, we haue an euident argument in boyes age, in which any one shall better conne by heart, than in any other time of life, and then doth the braine partake greatest moisture. Whence *Aristotle* moueth this doubt, Why in old age we haue better wit, and in yong age we learne more readily? as if he should say, What is the cause, that when we are old we haue much vnderstanding, and when we are yong we learne with more towardlinesse? Whereto he answereth, That the memory of old men is full of so many figures of things which they haue seene and heard in the long course of their life, that when they would bestow more therein, it is not capable thereof, for it hath no void place where to receiue it. But the memory of yong folke, which they are newly borne, is full of plaits, and for this cause they receiue readily whatsoever is told or taught them. And he

Wherethrough  
Cicero defining  
the nature of  
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lity & Memory,  
which as it were  
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makes this playner, by comparing the memorie of the morning with that of the euening, saying, That in the morning we learne best, because at that time our memorie is emptie, and at the euening illy, because then it is full of those things which wee encountred during the day. To this Probleme *Aristotle* wist not how to answer, and the reason is very plaine: for if the spices and figures which are in the memorie, had a body and quantitie to occupie the place, it would seeme that this were a fitting answer; but being vndeuided and spirituall, they cannot fill nor emptie any place where they abide: yea we see by experience, that by how much more the memorie is exercised euery day receiuing new figures, so much the more capable it becommeth. The answer of this Probleme is very euident after my doctrine, and the same importeth, that old men partake much vnderstanding, because they haue great drinesse, and faile of memorie, for that they haue little moisture, and by this meanes the substance of the braine hardneth, and so cannot receiue the impression of the figures, as hard waxe with difficultie admitteth the figure of the seale, and the soft with easinesse. The contrary befalls in children, who through the much moisture wherewith the braine is endowed, faile in vnderstanding, and through the great supplenesse of their braine abound in memory: wherein, by reason of the moisture, the shapes and figures that come from without, make a great, easie, deepe, and well formed impression.

That the memorie is better in the morning than the euening, cannot be denied, but this springeth not from the occasion alleaged by *Aristotle*; but the sleepe of the night passed hath made the braine moist, and fortified the same, and by the waking of the whole day, it is dried  
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and hardened. For which cause *Hippocrates* affirmeth, those who haue great thirst at night, shall doe well to drinke, for sleepe makes the flesh moist, and fortifieth all the powers which gouern man: and that sleepe so doth, *Aristotle* himselfe confesseth.

By this doctrine is perfectly scene, that the vnderstanding and memorie are powers opposit and contrarie, in sort, that the man who hath a great memorie, shall find a defect in his vnderstanding, and hee who hath a great vnderstanding, cannot enioy a good memorie; for it is impossible that the braine should of his owne nature be at one selfe time drie and moist. On this maxime *Aristotle* grounded himselfe, to prooue, that memorie is a power different from remembrance, and he frames his argument in this manner: Those who haue much remembrance, are men of great vnderstanding, and those who possesse a great memorie, find want of vnderstanding; so then memorie and remembrance are contrarie powers. The former proposition, after my doctrine, is false; for those who haue much remembrance, are of little vnderstanding, and haue great imaginations, as soone hereafter I will prooue: but the second proposition is very true, albeit *Aristotle* knew not the cause, whereon was founded the enmitie which the vnderstanding hath with the memorie.

From heat, which is the third qualitie, groweth the imaginative, for there is no other reasonable power in the braine, nor any other qualitie to which it may be assigned; besides that, the sciences which appertaine to the imaginative, are those, which such vtter as dote in their sicknesse, and not of those which appertaine to the vnderstanding, or to the memorie. And frenzie, peccunnesse, and melancholic, being hot passions of the braine,

it yeelds a great argument, to prooue that imagination consists in heat. One thing breedes me a difficultie herein, and that is, that the imagination carrieth a contrarietie to the vnderstanding, as also to the memorie, and the reason hereof is not to be gotten by experience, for in the braine may very well be vnited much heat and much drinesse; and so likewise, much heat and much moisture, to a large quantitie: and for this cause, a man may haue a great vnderstanding and a great imagination, and much memorie with much imagination: and verely, it is a miracle to find a man of great imagination, who hath a good vnderstanding, and a sound memorie. And the cause thereof behooues to bee, for that the vnderstanding requires that the braine be made of parts very subtile and delicate, as we haue prooued heretofore out of *Galen*, and much heat frets and consumes what is dedicate, and leaues behind the parts grosse and earthly. For the like reason, a good imagination cannot bee vnited with much memorie; for excessiue heat resolue the moisture of the braine, and leaueth it hard and drie, by meanes whereof it cannot easily receiue the figures. In sort, that in man there are no more but three generall differences of wits, for there are no more but three qualities whence they may grow. But vnder these three vniuersall differences, there are contained many other particulars, by meanes of degrees of heate, which heat, moisture and drinesse may haue.

Any distemperature whatsoever, cannot any long time endure alone.

Notwithstanding there springs a difference in wits from euery degree of these three qualities, for the dry, the hot, and the moist, may exceede in so high a degree, that it may altogether disturbe the animall power, conformable to that sentence of *Galen*. Euery excessiue distemperature resolues the forces, and so it is. For albeit

drinesse

drinesse giue helpe to the vnderstanding; yet it may be that the same shal consume his operations. Which *Galen* and the ancient Philosophers would not admit, but affirme, that if old mens brains grew not cold, they should neuer decay, though they became drie in the fourth degree. But they haue no reason for this, as we will prooue in the imaginatiue; for albeit his operations be performed with heat, yet if it passe the third degree, forthwith the same begins to resoluē, and the like doth the memorie through ouermuch moisture.

How many differences of wits grow by means of the superabounding of each of these three qualities, cannot for this present be particularly recited, except tofore we recount all the operations and actions of the vnderstanding, the imagination, and the memorie. But the whilest we are to know, that the principall workes of the vnderstanding are three: the first, to discourse; the second, to distinguish; and the third, to chuse. Hence comes it, that they place also three differences in the vnderstanding: into three other is the memorie deuided: one receiues with ease, and suddenly forgetteth; another is slow to receiue, but a long time retaineth; and the last receiueth with ease, and is very slow to forget.

The imagination containeth many more differences, for he hath three, no lesse than the vnderstanding and memorie, and from each degree ariseth three other. Of these we will more distinctly discourse hereafter, when we shall assigne to each the science which answereth it in particular.

But he that will consider three other differences of wit, shall find, that there are habilities in those who studie, some which haue a disposition for the cleare and easie contemplations of the art which they learne, but if

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you set them about matters obscure and very difficult, it will prove a lost labour for the teacher to shape them a figure thereof by fit examples, or that they frame themselves the like by their owne imagination, for they want the capacitie.

In this degree are all the bad schollers of whatsoeuer facultie, who being demaunded touching the easie points of their art, answer to the purpose: but comming to matters of more curiousnesse, they will tell you a hundred follies. Other wits aduance themselves one degree higher, for they are pliant and easie in learning things, and they can imprint in themselves all the rules and considerations of art, plaine, obscure, easie, and difficult; but as for doctrine, argument, doubting, answering, and distinguishing, they are all matters wherewith they may in no wise be compred: these need to learne sciences at the hands of good teachers, well skilled in knowledge, and to have plentie of bookes, and to studie them hard; for so much the lesse shall their knowledge be, as they forbear to reade and take paines. Of these may be verified that so famous sentence of *Aristotle*: Our vnderstanding is like a plaine table, wherein nothing is pourtraied. For whatsoeuer they are to know and attaine, it behooues that first they heare the same of some other, and are barren of all inuention themselves. In the third degree, Nature maketh some wits so perfect, that they stand not in need of teachers to instruct them, nor to direct in what sort they are to philosophise, for out of one consideration endited to them by their schoole-maister, they will gather a hundred, and without that ought be bestowed vnto them, they fill their wit with science and knowledge. These wits beguiled *Plato*, and made him to say, That our knowledge is a certaine spice  
of

of remembrance, when he heard them speake and say that which neuer fell into consideration with other men.

To such it is allowable that they write bookes, and to others not: for the order and concert which is to be held, to the end that sciences may dayly receiue increase and greater perfection, is to ioine the new inuention of our selues, who liue now, with that which the auntients left written in their bookes. For dealing after this manner, each in his time, shall adde an increase to the arts, and men who are yet vnborne, shall enioy the inuention and trauell of such as liued before. As for such who want inuention, the commonwealth should not consent that they make bookes, nor suffer them to be printed, because they doe nought else saue heape vp matters already deliuered, and sentences of graue authours, returning to repeat the selfe things, stealing one from hence, and taking another from thence; and there is no man, but after such a fashion may make a booke.

Wits full of inuention are by the *Tuscanes* called goatish, for the likenesse which they haue with a goat in their demeanure and proceeding. These neuer take pleasure in the plaines, but euer delight to walke alone thorough dangerous and high places, and to approach neere steepe downe-falls, for they will not follow any beaten path, nor goe in companie. A propertie like this is found in the reasonable soule, when it possesseth a braine well instrumentalized and tempered, for it neuer resteth settled in any contemplation, but fatcheth forthwith vnquiet, seeking to know and vnderstand new matters. Of such a soule, is verified the saying of *Hippocrates*, The going of the soule is the thought of men. For there are some, who neuer passe out of one contemplation, and thinke

not that the whole world can discouer another such. These haue the proprietie of a beast, who neuer forsakes the beaten path, nor careth to walke through desert and vnhaunted places, but only in the high market way, and with a guide before him. Both these diuersities of wits are ordinarie amongst professors of learning. Some others there are of high searching capacities, and estranged from the common course of opinions, they iudge and entreat of matters with a particular fashion, they are franke in deliuering their opinion, and tie not themselves to that of any other. Some sorts are close, moist, and very quiet, distrusting themselves, and relying vpon the iudgement of some graue man whom they follow, whose sayings and sentences they repute as sciences and demonstrations, and all things contrarying the same, they reckon vanitie and leasings.

These two differences of wits are very profitable, if they be vnited; for as amongst a great droue of cattell the heardsmen accustome to mingle some dozen of goats to lead them and make them trot apace, to enioy new pastures, that they may not suffer scarcitie; so also it behoueth, that in humane learning there be some goat-like wits, who may discouer to the cattell like vnderstanding, thorow secrets of Nature, and deliuer vnto them contemplations not heard of, wherein they may exercise themselves, for after this manner arts take increase, and men daily know more and more.

## CHAP. VI.

*Certaine doubts and arguments are propounded against the doctrine of the last chapter, and their answer.*



No of the causes for which the wisdom of Socrates hath bene so famous till this day, is, for that after he was adiudged by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest man of the world, he sayd thus: *I know this only; that I know nothing at all*; which folly, all those that have scene and read, passed it over, as spoken by Socrates, for that he was a man of great humbleness, a despiser of worldly things, and one to whom, in respect of diuine matters, all else seemed of no value. But they vnicely are beguiled, for none of the ancient Philosophers possessed the vertue of humilitie, nor knew what thing it was, till God came into the world and taught the same.

The meaning of Socrates was, to giue vnderstanding how little certaintie is contained in humane sciences, and how vncertain and fearefull the vnderstanding of a Philosopher is that which he knoweth, seeing by experience, that all is full of doubts and uncertainties, and that we can yeeld assent to nothing, without fearing that it may be contrary. For it was said, The vnderstanding of man is doubtful; and our foreseings thereof are. And he who will attaine to the true knowledge of things, is he who hath his heart settled and quiet without any doubt of being deceived; and the Philosopher who is not thus wise grounded, may with much dooth affirme that he knoweth nothing.

This same consideration had Plato, when he sayd, Science is a conuention and firme notice, which neuer departeth from reason: therefore thou shalt not find it amongst the Philosophers, especially when they consi-

der the nature of things : but verely much lesse in matters of Philosophie, may rather (to speake all in one word) it neuer makes his full arrivall where men are.

Whereby it seemeth that the true notice of things failes to come this way, and to min arriveth only a certaine opinion, which makes him to walke vncertaine, and with feare whether the matter which he affirmeth be so or no. But that which *Galen* noteth more particularly, touching this, is, that Philosophie and Philicke are the most vncertaine of all those, wherewith men are to deale. And if this be true, what shall we say touching the Philosophie whereof we now intreat, where with the vnderstanding we make an anatomic of a matter so obscure and difficult, as are the powers and faculties of the reasonable soule : in which point are offered so many doubts and argumets, that there remaines no cleare doctrine vpon which we may relye.

One of which, and the principall, is, that we haue made the Vnderstanding an instrumentall power, as the Imagination, and the Memory, and haue giuen direction to the braine, as an instrument with which it may worke : a thing far repugnant to the doctrine of *Aristotle* and all his followers, who placing the vnderstanding severed from the bodily instrument, p[ro]oue easily the immortality of the reasonable soule, and that the same issuing out of the body, endureth for euer. Now the contrary opinion being disputable, the way hereby is stopped vp, so that this cannot be p[ro]oued. Moreover, the reasons on which *Aristotle* groundeth himselfe, to p[ro]oue that the vnderstanding is not an instrumentall power, carrie such efficacy, as other than that cannot bee concluded. For to this power appertaineth the knowing and vnderstanding the nature and being of whatsoeuer materiall

teriall things in the world; and if the same should be con-  
ioyned with any bodily thing, that selfe would hinder  
the knowledge of the residue: as we see in the outward  
sences, that if the tast be bitter, all the things which the  
tongue toucheth partake the same savour; and if the  
christalline humour be greene or yellow, all that the eye  
seeth, it iudgeth to be of the same colour. The reason of  
this is, for that the thing within breedeth an impediment  
to that without.

*Aristotle* sayth moreover, That if the vnderstanding  
were mingled with any bodily instrument, it would re-  
taine some qualitie, for whatsoeuer vniteth it selfe with  
heat or cold, it is of force that it partake of the same qua-  
lity. But to say that the vnderstanding is hot, cold, moist,  
or drie, is to viter a matter abhominable to the eares of all  
naturall Philosophers.

The second principall doubt is, that *Aristotle* and all  
the *Peripateticks* bring in two other powers besides the  
Vnderstanding, the Imagination, & the Memory; name-  
ly, Remembrance; and Common sense, grounding op-  
on that rule, That the powers are knowne by way of the  
actions. They sayd, That besides the operations of the  
Vnderstanding, the Imagination, and the Memorie, there  
are also two other different. So then the wit of man ta-  
keth his originall from five powers; and not from three  
only, as we did proue.

We sayd also in the last chapter, after the opinion of  
*Galen*, that the memorie doth none other worke in the  
braine, save only to preserve the shapes and figures of  
things, in such sort as a chest preserveth and keepeth ap-  
parell and whatso else is put thereinto. And if by such a  
comparison, we are to vnderstand the office of this po-  
wer, it is requisite also to proue another reasonable fa-  
cultie,

color, & thicknes which receiue figures from the memo-  
rie, as things seen throughe glass, or water standing, even as it  
is made manifest by the opening of the chest, and to  
the eye which perceiveth them laid upon the skin.  
But thus farre sayd, that the understanding and the  
operation are separate powers; and that the one cha-  
racterizeth the other, some by their great drynesse,  
and others by their moisture, and suppleness of the  
braine. And if this be true, wherefore sayd Aristotle and  
Plato, That men who have their flesh tender, enjoy great  
understanding, seeing this suppleness is an effect of moi-  
sture. But it is likewise true, that similar and dissimilar  
things are received more easily in soft than in hard substances.  
We sayd also, that for effecting that a memorie may  
be good, it was necessary the braine should be endowed  
with moisture, for the figures ought to be printed there-  
in by way of compression, and the same being hard, they  
cannot so easily make a signe therein. True it is, that to  
receiue figures with readinesse, it requirerh that the  
braine be pliant, but to preserve the shapes some long  
time, all affirme that it is necessarie the same be hard and  
drie, as it appeareth in outward things, where the figure  
printed in a pliant substance, is easily cancelled, but in  
the drie and hard it neuer perisheth. Wherethrough we  
see many men who can by heart with great readinesse,  
but forget againe very speedily. Of which Galen rende-  
ring a reason, sayth, that such through much moisture,  
have the substance of their braine tender and not setled,  
for the figure is soon cancelled, as if it were sealed in  
water. And contrariwise, other learne by heart with dif-  
ficultie, but what they haue once learned, they neuer  
forget againe. Wherethrough it seemeth a matter im-  
possible, that there should be that difference of memo-  
rie which we speake of, which should learne with ease,  
and

and preserve a long time.

It is also hard to vnderstand how it is possible that so many figures being sealed together in the braine, the one should not cancell the other, for if in a piece of sofined wax there be printed many seals of diuers figures, it falls out certaine, that some cancell either some, by the intermingling of these figures.

And that which breedeth no lesse difficulty is to know whence it proceedeth, that the memory by exercising it selfe, becommeth the more easie to receive figures, it being certaine, that not onely bodily exercise, but spirittuall much more, drieth and foketh the flesh.

It is also hard to conceiue, in what sort the imagination is contrarie to the understanding, if there be none other more vrgent cause, than to say, That excessive heat resoluth the subtile partes of the braine, leauing an earthly and grosse remnant, seeing the Melancholy is one of the grossest and earthliest humours of our bodie. And *Aristotle* sayth, That the vnderstanding wasth the seruice of none so much, as of that. And this difficultie is encreased, considering that melancholy is a grosse humour, cold and drie: and choler is of a delicate substance, and of temperance hot and drie, and yet for all this, melancholy is more appropriat to the vnderstanding than choler. Which seemeth repugnant to reason, for this humour aideth the vnderstanding with two qualities, and gainseth it selfe only with one, which is heat. But melancholy aideth it with his drieffe, and with none other, and opposeth it selfe by his cold and by his grosse substance, which is a thing that the vnderstanding most abhorreth. For which cause, *Galien* assigneth more wit and prudence to choler, than to melancholy, saying thus: Readinesse and Prudence spring from the humour of choler,

choler, and the melancholicke humour is author of integrity and constancie.

Lastly, the cause may be demaunded, whence it may grow, that toiling, and continuall contemplation of studie maketh many wise, in whome at the beginning, the good nature of these qualities, which we speake of, was wanting: and so by giuing and receiuing with the imagination; they come to make themselves capable of many verities, which before they knew not, nor had the temperature which thereto was requisite. For if they had possessed the same, so much labour should not haue been needfull.

-135- All these difficulties, and many other besides, are contrary to the doctrine of the last chapter. For naturall Philosophie hath not so certaine principles as the Mathematicall sciences, wherein, the Physition, and the Philosopher (if he be also a Mathematician) may alwayes make demonstration: but comming afterwards to the cure which is conformable to the art of Physicke, hee shall commit therein many errours, and yet not alwayes thorow his owne fault (sithens in the Mathematicks he alwayes followed a certaintie) but through the little assurance of the art, for which cause *Aristotle* said, The Physition though he alwayes cure not, is not therefore a bad one, provided, that he foreslow not to performe any of those points which appertaine to the art. But if he should commit any errout in the Mathematicks, he would be void of excuse: for performing in this science all the diligences which it requireth, it is impossible that the truth should not appeare. In sort, that albeit we yeelde not a manifest demonstration of this doctrine, yet the whole fault is not to be layd on our want of capacitie; neither may it straightwayes bee recounted as false that

we deliuer.

To the first principall doubt, we answer, that if the vnderstanding were seuered from the body, and had nought to doe with heat, cold, moist, and drie, nor with the other bodily qualities, it would follow that all men should partake equall vnderstanding, and that all should equally discourse. But wee see by experience, that one man vnderstandeth and discourseth better than another; then this groweth, for that the vnderstanding is an instrumentall power, and better disposed in one than in another, and not from any other occasion. For all reasonable soules and their vnderstandings (sundered from the body) are of equall perfection and knowledge. Those who follow *Aristotles* doctrine, seeing by experience, that some discourse better than other some, haue found an excuse in apparence, saying; That the discoursing of one better than another, is not caused, for that the vnderstanding is an instrumentall power, & that the brain is better disposed in some than in othersome: but for that the vnderstanding (whilst the reasonable soule remaineth in the body) standeth in need of the fantasmes and figures which are in the imagination, and in the memorie: through default whereof, the vnderstanding fals to discourse illy, and not through his owne fault, nor for that it is ioyned with a matter badly instrumentalized. But this answer is contrary to the doctrine of *Aristotle* himselfe, who proueth, that by how much the memorie is the worse, by so much the vnderstanding is the better; and by how much the memorie is bettered, by so much the vnderstanding is impaired: and the same we haue heretofore proued as touching the imagination, in confirmation of that which *Aristotle* demaundeth, What the cause is, that we waxing old, haue

so bad a memorie, and so good an vnderstanding: and when we are yooing, it falls out contrary, that we possesse a great memorie and small vnderstanding. Hereof, in one thing we see the experience, and *Galen* noteth it, that when in a disease the temperature and good disposition of the braine is impaired, many times the operations of the vnderstanding are thereby lost, and yet those of the memorie and the imagination remaine sound, which could not come to passe, if the vnderstanding enioyned not a particular instrument for it selfe, besides this which the other powers doe partake.

To this I know not what may be yeelded in answer, vnlesse it be by some metaphysicall relation, compounded of action and power, which neither themselues know what it meaneth; nor is there any other man that vnderstands it. Nothing more endammageth mans knowledge than to confound the sciences: and what belongs to the Metaphysicks, to entreat thereof in naturall Philosophie; and manners of naturall Philosophie in the Metaphysicks.

The reasons whereupon *Aristotle* grounded himselfe are of small moment, for the consequence followeth, not to say, that the vnderstanding, because it must know materiall things, should not therefore haue a bodily instrument: for the bodily qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument, make no alteration of the power; nor from them doe the faculties arise, even as the sensible, placed about the sence, tasteth not the selfe sence. This is plainly seene in touching; for notwithstanding that the same is compounded of foure materiall qualities: and that the same hath in it quantitie, and hardnesse of softnesse; for all this, the hand discerneth whether a thing be hot or cold, hard or soft, great

or little. And if you aske in what sort the naturall heat which is in the hand hindereth not the touching, that it may discern the heat which is in the stone; we answere, that the qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument, doe not alter the instrument it selfe, neither from them doe there issue any shapes whereby to know them. Euen as it appertaineth to the eye to know all figures and qualities of things, and yet we see that the eye it selfe hath his proper figure and quantitie; and of the humours and skins which goe to his composition, some haue colours, and some are *diaphane* and transparant, all which hindereth not, but that we with our sight may discern the figures and quantities of all the things which shall appeare before vs; and the reason is, for that the humours, the skins, the figure, and the quantitie, serue for the composition of the eye, and such things cannot alter the sightfull power, and therefore trouble not nor hinder the knowledge of the outward figures. The like we affirme of the vnderstanding, that his proper instrument (though the same be materiall and ioyned with it) cannot enlarge it, for from it issue no vnderstandable shapes, which haue force to alter it: and the reason is, For that the vnderstandable placed about the vnderstanding, causeth not the vnderstanding; and so it remaineth at libertie to vnderstand all the outward materiall things, without that it encounter ought to hinder the same. The second reason wherein *Aristotle* grounded himselfe, is of lesse importance than the former, for neither the vnderstanding nor any other accident can bee qualiti-like, for of themselues they cannot be the subiect of any qualitie. For which cause it little skilleth that the vnderstanding possesse the braine for an instrument together with the temperature of the foure first qualities, that  
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therefore it may be called qualitic-like, in as much as the braine and not the vnderstanding, is the subiect of the heat, the cold, the moist, and the drie.

To the third difficultie which the *Peripateticks* alleage, saying, That by making the vnderstanding an instrumentall power, we reauce one of those principles which serue to prooue the immortalitie of the reasonable soule: we answere, That there are other arguments of more soundnesse, whereby to prooue the same, whereof we will treat in the chapter following.

To the second argument we answere, that not euery difference of operations argueth a diuersitie of powers: for (as we will prooue hereafter) the imaginatiue performeth matter so strange, that if this *maxime* were true in sort as the vulgar Philosophers had it, or admitting the interpretation which they giue it, there should be in the braine ten or twelue powers more. But because all these operations are to be marshalled vnder one generall reason, they argue no more than one imaginatiue, which is afterwards deuided into many particular differences, by the meanes of the sundrie operations which it performeth: the composing of the shapes in the presence or the absence of the obiects, not onely argueth not a diuersitie of the generall powers (as are the common sense, and the imaginatiue) but euen not of the very particulars.

To the third argument we answere, that the memorie is nothing els but a tenderesse of the braine, disposed with a certaine kind of moisture, to receiue and preserue that which the imaginatiue apprehendeth: with the like proportion that white or blew paper holds with him who writeth: for as the writer writeth in the paper the things which he would not forget, and  
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after he hath written them, returnes to read them; euen so we ought to conceiue, that the imagination writeth in the memorie the figures of the things knowne by the five senses, and by the vnderstanding, as also some others of his owne framing: and when it will remember ought (saith *Aristotle*) it returneth to behold and contemplat them. With this maner of comparison *Plato* serued himselfe, when he said, That fearing the weake memorie of old age, he hastened to make another of paper (namely bookes) to the end his trauailes ought not to be lost, but that hee might haue that which might represent them vnto him, when he list to read them. This selfe doth the imaginative, of writing in the memorie, and returning to read it when it would remember the same. The first who vttered this point was *Aristotle*, and the second *Galen* who sayd thus, For as much as that part of the soule which imagineth, whatsoeuer the same be, seemeth to be the selfe that also remembreth. And so verely it seemeth to be, for the things which wee imagine with long thinking, are well fixed in the memorie, and that which we handle with light consideration, also soone we forget the same againe. And as the writer when he writeth faire, the better assurcth it to be read: so it befalls to the imaginative, that if it seale with force, the figure remaineth well imprinted in the braine; otherwise it can scarcely be discerned. The like also chanceth in old deedes, which being found in part, and in part perished by time, cannot well be read, vnlesse we gather much by reason and coniecture. So doth the imaginative, when in the memorie some figures remaine; and some are perished, where *Aristotles* errour had his originall; who for this cause conceiued, that remembrance was a different power from the memorie. Morcouer, he affirmed, that those

those who haue great remembrance, are likewise of great vnderstanding, which is also false: for the imagination, which is that that makes the remembrance, is contrarie to the vnderstanding: in sort, that to gather memorie of things, and to remember them after they are knowne, is a worke of the imagination: as to write and returne to read it, is a worke of the Sctiuener, and not of the paper. Whereby it falleth out that the memorie remaineth a power passive, and not active: euen as the blew and the white of the paper is none other than a commoditie whereby to write.

To the fourth doubt may be answered, That it maketh little to the purpose, as touching the wit, whether the flesh be hard or tender, if the braine partake not also the same qualitie, the which we see many times hath a distinct temperature from all the other parts of the body. But when they concur in one selfe tendernesse, it is an euill token for the vnderstanding, and no lesse for the imagination. And if wee consider the flesh of women and children, wee shall find that in tendernesse it exceedeth that of men, and this notwithstanding, commonly men haue a better wit than women: and the naturall reason hereof is, For that the humours, which make the flesh tender, are fleagme and bloud, because they are both moist (as wee haue aboue specified) and of them *Galen* said, That they make men simple and doltards: and contrariwise, the humours which harden the flesh, are choller and melancholy: and hence grow the prudence and sapience which are found in man. In sort, that it is rather an ill token to haue the flesh tender, than drie and hard. And so in men who haue an equall temperature throughout their whole bodie, it is an easie matter to gather the qualitie of their wit by the tendernesse or  
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hardnesse of their flesh: For if it be hard and rough, it giueth token either of a good vnderstanding or a good imagination; and if smooth and supple, of the contrarie, namely of good memorie, and small vnderstanding, and lesse imagination: and to vnderstand whether the braine haue correspondence, it behooueth to consider the haire, which being big, blacke, rough, and thicke, yeeldeth token of a good imagination or a good vnderstanding: and if soft and smooth, they are a signe of much memorie, and nothing els. But who so will distinguish and know, whether the same be vnderstanding or imagination (when the haire is of this sort) it must be considered of what forme the child is in the act of laughter: for this passion discouereth much, of what qualitie hee is in the imagination.

What the reason and cause of laughter should be, many Philosophers haue laboured to conceiue, and none of them hath deliuered ought that may well bee vnderstood: but all agree, that the bloud is an humour, which prouoketh a man to laugh, albeit none expresse with what qualitie this humour is indewed, more than the rest, why it should make a man addicted to laughter. The follies which are committed with laughing, are lesse dangerous: but those which are done with labour are more perillous: as if he should say, When the diseased become giddie and doting, doe laugh, they rest in more safetie, than if they were in toyle and anguish: for the former commeth of bloud, which is a most mild humour, and the second of melancholie: but we grounding vpon the doctrine whereof we intreat, shall easily vnderstand all that which in this case may bee desired to be knowne. The cause of laughter (in my indgement) is nought els but an approouing, which is made by the

imagination, seeing or hearing somewhat done or said, which accordeth very well : and this power remaineth in the braine, when any of these things giue it contentment, suddainly it mooueth the same, and after it all the muscles of the bodie, and so many times we doe allow of wittie sayings, by bowing downe of the head. When then the imagination is very good, it contents not it selfe with euery speech, but onely with those which please very well : and if they haue some little correspondence, and nothing els, the same receiueth thereby rather paine than gladnesse. Hence it groweth, that men of great imagination laugh very seldome, and the point most worthie of noting, is, that iesters and naturall counterfeiterers neuer laugh at their owne meriments, nor at that which they heare others to vtter : for they haue an imagination so delicat, that not euen their owne pleasures, can yeeld that correspondence which they require.

Hereto may bee added, that merriments (besides that they must haue a good proportion, and be vttered to the purpose) must be new, and not tofore heard or seene. And this is the propertie not onely of the imagination, but also of all the other powers which gouerne man : for which cause we see, that the stomacke when it hath twice fed vpon one kind of meat, straightwaies loatheth the same : so doth the sight one selfe shape and colour ; the hearing one concordance, how good soeuer ; and the vnderstanding one selfe contemplation. Hence also it proceedeth, that the pleasant conceiued man laugheth not at the iesters which himselfe vttereth : for before he send them forth from his lips, hee knew what he would speake. Whence I conclude, that those who laugh much, are all defective in their imagination,

nation, wherethrough whatsoeuer meriment and pleasure, (how cold soeuer) with them carrieth a verie good correspondencie: And because the bloud partaketh much moisture (wherof we said before, that it breedeth dammage to the imagination) those who are very sanguine, are also great laughers. Moisture holdeth this propertie, that because the same is tender and gentle, it abateth the force of heat, and makes that it burne not ouermuch. For which cause it partakes better agreement with driness, because it sharpeneth his operations. Besides this, where there is much moisture, it is a signe that the heat is remisse, seeing it cannot resolute nor consume the same: and the imagination cannot performe his operations with a heat so weake. Hence wee gather also, that men of great vnderstanding are much giuen to laughter, for that they haue defect of imagination, as we read of the great Philosopher *Democritus*, and many others whom my selfe haue seene and noted. Then by meanes of this laughter wee shall know, if that which men or boyes haue of flesh hard and tough, and of haire blacke, thicke, hard, and rough, betoken either the imagination or the vnderstanding. In sort, that *Aristotle* in this doctrine was somewhat out of the way.

To the fifth argument we answere, that there are two kinds of moisture in the braine, one which groweth of the aire (when this element predominateth in the mixture) and another of the water, with which the other elements are amassed. If the braine be tender by the first moisture, the memorie shall be verie good: easie to receiue, and mightie to retaine the figures for a long time. For the moisture of the aire is verie supple and full of fatnesse, on which the shapes are tacked with sure holdfast, as wee see in pictures which are lymned in oyle,

who being set against the sunne and the water, receiue thereby no dammage at all: and if we cast oyle vpon any writing, it will neuer bee wiped out, but marreth the same: and that which cannot be read, with oyle is made legible, by yeelding thereto a brightnesse and transparence. But if the difference of the braine spring from the second kind of moisture, the argument frameth very well: For if it receiue with facilitie, with the same readinesse it turneth againe to cancell the figure, because the moisture of the water hath no fatnesse, wherein the figures may fasten themselues. These two moistures are knowne by the haire: for that which springs from the aire, maketh them to proue vnctious, and full of oyle and fat, and the water maketh them moist and very supple.

To the sixth argument may be answered, that the figures of things are not printed in the braine, as the figure of the seale is in waxe, but they pearce thereinto, to remain there affixed, in sort as the sparrows are attached to birdlime, or the flies sticke in honnie: for these figures are bodilesse, and cannot be mingled, nor corrupt one the other.

To the seuenth difficultie we answer, that the figures amasse and mollifie the substance of the braine, in such sort as wax groweth soft by plying the same betweene our fingers: besides that, the vitall spirits haue vertue to make tender and supple the hard and drie members, as the outward heat doth the yron. And that the vitall spirits ascend to the braine, when any thing is learned by heart, we haue prooued heretofore. And euery bodily and spirituall exercise doth not drie: yea the Physicians affirme, that the moderat fatteneth.

To the eighth argument wee answer, that there are  
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two spices of melancholic: one naturall, which is the drosse of the bloud, whose temperature is cold and drie, accompanied with a substance very grosse, this setues not of any value for the wit, but maketh men blockish, sluggards, and grynners, because they want imagination. There is another sort which is called *choler adust*, or *atra bile*, of which *Aristotle* said, That it made men exceeding wise: whose temperature is diuers, as that of vinegar; sometimes it performeth the effects of heat, lightning the earth; and sometimes it cooleth, but alwaies it is drie and of a very delicat substance. *Cicero* confesseth that he was slow witted, because he was not melancholike adust, and he sayd true, for if he had beene such, he should not haue possessed so rare a gift of eloquence. For the melancholike adust want memorie, to which appertaineth the speaking with great preparation. It hath another qualitie which much aideth the vnderstanding, namely, that it is cleere like the Agat stone, with which cleerenesse it giueth light within to the braine, and maketh the same to discern well the figures. And of this opinion was *Heracitus* when he said, *A drie cleerenesse maketh a most wise mind*, with which cleerenesse naturall melancholic is not endowed, but his blacke is deadly: and that the reasonable soule there within the braine, standeth in need of light to discern the figures & the shapcs, we will prooue hereafter.

To the ninth argument we answer, that the prudence and readinesse of the mind which *Galen* speaketh of, appertaineth to the imagination, whereby we know that which is to come, whence *Cicero* said, *Memorie is of things passed, and Prudence of those to come*. The readinesse of the mind is that, which commonly they call a sharpnesse in imagining, and by other names, craftinesse,

subtiltie, cauelling, wilinessse: wherefore *Cicero* sayth, Prudence is a subtiltie, which with a certaine reason can make choice of good things and of euill. This sort of Prudence and readinesse, men of good vnderstanding do want, because they lacke imagination. For which reason we see by experience in great schollers in this sort of learning, which appertaineth to the vnderstanding, that taking them from their bookes, they are not woorth a rush to yeeld or receiue in trafficke of worldly affaires. This spice of Prudence, *Galen* said very well, that it came of choller: for *Hippocrates* recounting to *Damagetus* his friend, in what case he found *Democritus*, when he went to visit him for curing him, writeth, that he lay in the field vnder a plane tree, bare legged, and without breeches, leaning against a stone with a booke in his hand, and compassed about with brute beasts, dead and dismembred. Whereat *Hippocrates* maruailing, asked him whereto those beasts of that fashion serued? and he then answered, that he was about to search what humour it was which made a man to be headlong, craftie, readie, double, and cauillous, and had found (by making an anatomic of those wild beasts) that choller was the cause of so discommendable a propertie: and that to reuenge himselfe of craftie persons, he would handle them as hee had done the fox, the serpent, and the ape. This manner of Prudence is not only odious to men, but also *S. Paule* sayth of it, The wisdome of the flesh is enemy to God. The cause is assigned by *Plato*, who affirmeth, that knowledge which is remooued from iustice, ought rather to be termed subtiltie than prudence, as if he should haue sayd, It is no reason, that a knowledge which is seuered from iustice, should be called wisdome, but rather craft, or maliciousnesse: Of this the diuell euermore serueth himselfe

himselfe to do men dammage, and *S. James* said, that this wisdome came not from heauen, but is earthly, beastly, and diuelish.

There is found another spice of wisdome, conioyned with reason and simplicitie, and by this men know the good, and shun the euill: the which *Galen* affirmeth doth appertaine to the vnderstanding, for this power is not capable of maliciousnesse, doublenesse, and subtiltie, nor hath the skill how to doe naught, but is wholly vp-right, iust, gentle, and plaine. A man endowed with this sort of wit, is called vp-right and simple, wherethrough when *Demosthenes* went about to creepe into the good liking of the iudges in an oration which he made against *Eschines*, he tearmed them vp-right and simple, in respect of the simplicitie of their dutie: concerning which, *Cicero* sayth, Dutie is simple, and the only cause of all good things. For this sort of wisdome, the cold and drie of melancholie is a seruing instrument, but it behooueth that the same bee composed of parts very subtile and delicat.

To the last doubt may be answered, that when a man setteth himselfe to contemplate some truth, which hee would faine know, and cannot by and by find it out, the same groweth, for that the braine wanteth his conuenient temperature; but when a man standeth rauished in a contemplation, the naturall heat that is in the vitall spirits, and the arteriall bloud run soorthwith to the head, and the temperature of the braine enhaunceth it selfe, vtill the same arriue to the tearme behoofefull. True it is, that much musing, to some doth good, and to some harme: for if the braine want but a little to arriue to that point of conuenient heat, it is requisit that he make but small stay in the contemplation: and if it passe that point

straightwaies the vnderstanding is driven into a garboile, by the ouer-plentifull presence of the vitall spirits, and so he cannot attaine to the notice of the truth. For which cause, we see many men, who vpon the suddaine speake very wel, but with aduise ment are nothing worth. Others haue their vnderstanding so base, either through too much coldnesse, or too much drouth, that it is requisite the naturall heat abide a long time in the head, to the end the temperature may lift it selfe vp to the degrees which are wanting, wherethrough they speake better vpon deliberation then on the suddaine.

## CHAP. VII.

*It is shewed, that though the reasonable soule haue need of the temperature of the foure first qualities, as well for his abiding in the bodie, as also to discourse and syllogize: yet for all this, it followeth not that the same is corruptible and mortall.*



**T**was held by *Plato* for a matter very certaine, that the reasonable soule is a substance bodiless and spirituall: not subiect to corruption or mortalitie, as that of brute beasts: the which departing from the bodie, possesseth another better and more quiet life. But this is to be vnderstood (saith *Plato*) if a man haue led his life conformable to reason, for otherwise, it were better that the soule had remained still in the bodie, there to suffer the torments, with which God chastiseth the wicked. This conclusion is so notable and catholicke, that if he attained

ned the knowledge thereof by the happinesse of his wit, with a iust tide he came to be called the diuine *Plato*. But albeit the same is such as we see, yet for all this, *Galen* could neuer bring within his conceit, that it was true, but held it alwaies doubtfull, seeing a wise man through the heat of his braine, to dote, and by applying cold medicines vnto him, hee commeth to his wits againe. In respect whereof, he said he could wish that *Plato* were now liuing, to the end hee might aske him how it was possible that the reasonable soule should be immortall, seeing it altered so easily with heat, with cold, with moisture, and with drouth: and principally, considering that the same departs from the bodie through ouer much heat, or when a man giueth ouer himselfe excessiue to lasciuiousnesse, or is forced to drinke poyson, and such other bodily alterations, which accustomedly be- reauē the life? For if it were bodilesse and spirituall (as *Plato* affirmeth) heat, being a materiall qualitie, could not make the same to leefe his powers, nor set his operations in a garboile.

These reasons brought *Galen* into a confusion, and made him wish, that some *Platonist* would resolue him these doubts, and I belecue, that in his life time he met not with any, but after his death experience shewed him that which his vnderstanding could not conceiue. For it is a thing certaine, that the infallible certaintie of our immortall soule is not gathered from humane reasons, or from arguments which prooue that it is corruptible, for to the one and the other an answer may easily be shaped, it is onely our sayth which maketh vs certaine and assured, that the same endureth for euer. But *Galen* had small reason to intricate himselfe in arguments of so slight conse-

*Galen* dying, went to hell, and saw by experience that materiall fire burned the soules, and could not consume them. This Physitian had knowledge of that Euangelicall doctrine, and could not receiue it.

consequence, for the workes which seeme to be performed by meanes of some instrument, it cannot well be gathered in naturall Philosophie, that it proceedeth from a defect in the principall agent, if they take not perfection. That painter who portraieyth well when he hath a pensill requisit for his art, falleth not in blame, if with a bad pensill he draw ill fauoured shapes, and of bad delineation: and it is no good argument to say, that the writer had an imperfection in his hand, when through default of a well made penne he is forced to write with a stick. *Galen* considering the marvellous works which are in the vniuerse, and the wisdom and prouidence by which they were made and ordained, concluded thereof, That in the world there was a God, though wee behold him not with our corporall eyes, of whom hee vttered these words; God was not made at any time, in as much as he is euerlastingly vnbegotten. And in another place he sayth, That the frame and composition of mans bodie was not made by the reasonable soule, nor by the naturall heat, but by God, or by some very wise vnderstanding.

Out of which there may be framed an argument against *Galen*, and his false consequence be ouerthrowne, and it is thus: Thou hast suspected that the reasonable soule is corruptible, because if the braine be well tempered, it fitteth well to discourse and philosophise, and if the same grow hot or cold beyond due, it doteth, and vttereth a thousand follies; the same may be inferred, considering the workes which thou speakest of, as touching God: for if hee make a man in places temperat (where the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moist the drie) he produceth him very wittie and discreet, and if the country be vntemperate, he breedeth them all fooles  
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and doltish. For the same *Galen* affirmeth, that it is a miracle to find a wise man in *Scythia*, and in *Athens* they are all borne Philosophers. To suspect then that God is corruptible, because with one qualitie he performeth these workes well, and with the contrarie they proue ill, *Galen* himselfe would not confesse, for as much as he sayd before, that God was euerlasting.

*Plato* held another way of more certaintie, saying, That albeit God be euerlasting, almightie, and of infinit wisdom: yet hee proceedeth in his workes as a naturall agent, and makes himselfe subiect to the disposition of the foure first qualities: in sort, that to beget a man verie wise, and like to himselfe, it behooueth that he prouide a place the most temperate of the whole world, where the heat of the aire may not exceed the cold, nor the moist the drie, and therefore he said, But God as desirous of warre, and of wisdom, hauing chosen a place which should produce men like vnto himselfe, would that the same should be first inhabited: and though God would shape a man of great wisdom in *Scythia*, or in any other temperate countrey, and did not herein employ his omnipotencie, he should of necessitie yet proue a foole, through the contrarietie of the first qualities. But *Plato* would not haue inferred (as *Galen* did) that God was alterable and corruptible: for that the heat and coldnesse would haue brought an impediment to his worke. The same may be collected, when a reasonable soule, for that it is seated in a braine inflamed, cannot vse his discretion and wisdom; and not to thinke, that in respect thereof the same is subiect to mortalitie and corruption. The departure out of the bodie, and the not being able to support the great heate, nor the other alterations which are woont to kill men, sheweth

eth plainly, that the same is an act and substantiall forme of mans bodie, and that to abide therein, it requireth certaine materiall dispositions, fitted to the being which it hath of the soule, and that the instruments with which it must worke, be well composed, and well vnited, and of that temperature which is requisit for his operations, all which failing, it behooueth of force, that it erre in them, and depart from the bodie.

The error of *Galen* consisted, in that he would verifie by the principles of naturall Philosophie, Whether the reasonable soule, issuing out of the bodie, doe forthwith die or not: this being a question which appertaineth to another superiour science, and of more certaine principles; in which we will prooue, that it is no good argument, nor concludeth well, that the soule of man is corruptible, because the same dwelleth quietly in a bodie endowed with these qualities, and departeth when they doe faile. Neither is this difficult to be prooued: for other spirituall substances, of greater perfection than the reasonable soule, doe make choice of place, altered with materiall qualities, in which it seemeth they take abode with their content: and if there succeed any contrarie dispositions, forthwith they depart, because they cannot endure it: for it is a thing certaine, that there are to be found some dispositions in a mans bodie, which the diuine coueteth with so great eagerneffe, as to enioy them, he entereth into the man where they rested, where-through he becommeth possessed: but the same being corrupted and chaunged by contrarie medicines, and an alteration being wrought in these blacke, filthie, and stinking humours, he naturally comes to depart. This is plainly discerned by experience: for if there be in a house, great, darke, soule, putrified, melancholicke, and void.

void of dwellers to make abode therein, the diuels soone take it vp for their lodging: but if the same bee cleansed, the windowes opened, and the sunne-beames admitted to enter, by and by they get them packing, and specially if it be inhabited by much companie, and that there be meetings and pastimes, and playing on musically instruments. How greatly harmonie and good proportion offendeth the diuell, is apparantly seene by the authoritie of the diuine Scripture: where we find recounted, That *Dauid* taking a Harpe, and playing thereupon, straightwaies made the diuels runne away, and depart out of *Saule* his body. And albeit this matter haue his spirituall vnderstanding: yet I conceiue thereby, that musicke naturally molesteth the diuell, wherethrough he cannot in any sort endure it. The people of *Israell* knew before by experience, that the diuell was enemy to musicke, and because they had notice thereof, *Sauls* seruants spake these words: Behold, the euill spirit of the Lord tormenteth thee, let my Lord the king therefore commaund, that thy seruants who wait in thy presence search out a man who can play vpon the citherne, to the end that when the euill spirit of the Lord taketh thee, he may play with his hand, that thou thereby mayst receiue ease. In the selfe same manner as there are found out words and coniurations, which making the diuell to tremble, and not to heare them: hee abandoneth the place which he chose for his habitation. So *Ioseph* recounteth that *Salomon* left in writing certaine manners of coniuration, by which hee not only chased away the diuell for the present time, but hee neuer had the hardnesse to returne againe to that body from whence hee was once so expelled. The same *Salomon* shewed also a roote of so abhominable saueur in the diuels nose,

that

that if it were applied to the nostrils of the possessed, he would forthwith shake his cares and runne away. The diuell is so slouinly, so melancholike, and so much an enemy to things neat, cheerefull, and cleere, that when Christ entered into the region of *Genesaret*, *S. Matthew* recounteth, how certaine diuels met him in dead carcases, which they had caught out of their graues, crying and saying, *Iesu* thou sonne of *Dauid* what hast thou to doe with vs, that thou art come before hand to torment vs? we pray thee, that if thou be to driue vs out of this place where we are, thou wilt yet let vs enter into that Heard of swine which is yonder. For which reason, the holy Scripture tearmeth them vncleane spirits. Whence we plainly discern, that not onely the reasonable soule requireth such dispositions in the bodie, that they may informe it, and bee the beginning of all his operations, but also hath need to sojourne therein, as in a place befitting his nature.

The diuels then (being a substance of more perfection) abhorre some bodily qualities, and in the contrarie take pleasure and contentment. In sort, that this of *Galen* is no good argument, The reasonable soule through excessse of heat departs from the bodie, *ergo* it is corruptible, in as much as the diuell doth the like (as we haue said) and yet for all this is not mortall.

But that which to this purpose deserueth most note, is, that the diuell not onely coueteth places alterable with bodily qualities, to sojourne there at his pleasure: but also when he will worke any thing which much importeth him, he serues himselfe with such bodily qualities as are aidable to that effect. For if I should demaund now, wherein the diuell grounded himselfe, when minding to beguile *Eue*, he entered rather into a venemous serpent,

serpent, than into a horse, a beare, a wolfe, or any other beast, which were not of so ghastly shape? I wot not what might be giuen in answer: well I know that *Galen* admitteth not the sentences of *Moses*, nor of Christ our redeemer, because (saith hee) they both speake without making demonstration: but I haue alwaies desired to learne from some Catholike the solution of this doubt, and none hath yet satisfied me.

This is certaine (as alreadie we haue prooued) that burnt and inflamed choller, is an humour which teacheth the reasonable soule in what sort to practise treasons and trecheries; and amongst brute beasts, there is none which so much partaketh of this humour as the serpent, wherethrough more than all the rest (sayth the scripture) he is craftie and guilefull. The reasonable soule although it be the meanest of all the intelligences, partakes yet the same nature with the diuell and the angels. And in like manner, as there it takes the seruice of venomous choller, to make a man wily and subtil: so the diuell (being entered into the bodie of this cruell beast) made himselfe the more cunning and deceitfull. This manner of Philosophising will not sticke much in the naturall Philosophers stomackes, because the same carrieth some apparance that it may be so: but that which will breed them more astonishment, is, that when God would draw the world out of errour, and easily teach them the truth (a worke contrarie to that which the diuell went about) he came in the shape of a dove, and not of an eagle, nor a peacocke, nor of any other birds of fairer figure: and the cause knowne, is this, that the dove partaketh much of the humour which inclineth to vp-rightnesse, to plainnesse, to truth, and to simplicitie, and wanteth choller, the instrument of guile & maliciousnes.

None

None of these things are admitted by *Galen*, nor by the naturall Philosophers : for they cannot conceiue, how the reasonable soule and the diuell (being spirituall substances) can be altered by materiall qualities, as are heat, coldnesse, moisture, and drouth. For if fire bring in heat to the wood, it is because they both possesse a bodie and a quantitie, whereof they are the subiect : the which faileth in spirituall substances, and admit (as a thing yet impossible) that bodily qualities might alter a spirituall substance, what eyes hath the diuell or the reasonable soule, wherewith to see the colours and shapes of things ? or what smelling, to receiue sauiours ? or what hearing, for musicke ? or what feeling, to rest offended with much heat, seeing that for all these, bodily instruments are behooffull ? And if the reasonable soule, being seuered from the bodie, remaine agreed, and receiue anguish and sadnesse, it is not possible that his nature should rest free from alteration, or not come to corruption. These difficulties and arguments perplexed *Galen* and the other Philosophers of our times, but with me they conclude nothing. For when *Aristotle* affirmed, That the chiefeft propertie which substance had, was to be subiect to accidents, he restrained the same neither to bodily nor to spirituall : for the propertie of the generall is equally partaked by the speciall, and so he said, that the accidents of the bodie passe to the substance of the reasonable soule, and those of the soule to the bodie : on which principle he grounded himselfe, to write all that which he vttered as touching *Phisnomy*, especially, that the accidents by which the powers receiue alteration, are all spirituall, without bodie, and without quantitie or matter : and so they grow to multiplie in a moment, through their meane, and passe through a glasse-window with-

without breaking the same. And two contrarie accidents may be extended in one selfe subiect as much as possibly they can be. In respect of which selfe qualitie, *Galen* tearmeth them vndiuidable, and the vulgar Philosophers intentionall: and the matter being in this sort, they may bee very well proportioned with the spirituall substance.

I cannot forgoe to thinke, that the reasonable soule seuered from the bodie, as also the diuell, hath a power sightfull, smelling, hearing, and feeling. The which (me seemeth) is easie to be prooued: For if it be true, that their powers be knowne by meanes of their actions, it is a thing certaine, that the deuill had a smelling power, when he smelled that root which *Salomon* commaunded should be applied to the nostrils of the possessed: And likewise that he had a hearing power, seeing he heard the musicke which *Dauid* made to *Saule*. To say then, that the diuell receiued these qualities by his vnderstanding, it is a matter not auouchable in the doctrine of the vulgar Philosophers: For this power is spiritual, and the obiects of the five senses are materiall: and so it behooueth to seeke out some other powers in the reasonable soule, and in the diuell, to which they may carrie proportion. And if not, put case that the soule of the rich *Bartholomew* had obtained at the hands of *Abraham*, that the soule of *Lazarus* should returne to the world, to preach to his brethren, and persuaade them that they should become honest men, to the end they might not passe to that place of torments where himselfe abode: I demaund now, in what manner the soule of *Lazarus* should haue knowne to goe to the citie, and to those mens houses; and if the same had met them by the way, in companie with others, whether it could haue

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knowne them by sight, and been able to diuerfifie them from those who came with them? and if those brethren of the rich glutton, had inquired of the same who it was, and who had sent it: whether the same did partake anie power to heare their words? The same may be demanded of the diuell when he followed after Christ our redeemer, hearing him to preach, and seeing the myracles which he did, and in that disputation which they had together in the wildernesse, with what eares the diuell receiued the words and the answeres which Christ gaue vnto him.

Verily, it betokens a want of vnderstanding, to thinke that the diuell or the reasonable soule (sundered from the bodie) cannot know the objects of the five senses, albeit they want the bodily instruments. For by the same reason I will prooue vnto them, that the reasonable soule, seuered from the bodie, cannot vnderstand, imagine, nor performe the actions of memorie. For if whilst the same abideth in the bodie, it cannot see being deprived of eies: neither can it discourse or remember, if the braine be inflamed. To say then, that the reasonable soule, seuered from the bodie, cannot discourse, because it hath no braine, is a follie verie great, the which is proved by the selfe historie of *Abraham*: Son remember, that thou hast enioyed good things in thy life time, and *Lazarus* likewise euill, but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented; and besides all this, there is placed betwixt you and vs a great *Chaos*, in sort that those who would passe from hence to you, cannot, nor from you to vs. And he said, I pray thee then, O father, that thou wilt send to my fathers house, for I haue five brothers, that he may yeeld testimonie vnto them, so as they come not also to this place of torments.

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Whence I conclude, that as these two soules discoursed betweene themselves, and the rich glutton remembred, that he had siue brothers in his fathers house, and *Abraham* brought to his remembrance the delicious life which he had liued in the world, together with *Lazarus* penance, and this without vse of the braine: so also the soules can see without bodily eyes, heare without eares, tast without a tongue, smell without nostrils, and touch without sinewes and without flesh, and that much better beyond comparision. The like may bee vnderstood of the diuell, for he partaketh the same nature with the reasonable soule.

All these doubts the soule of the rich glutton will very well resolue: of whom *S. Luke* recounteth, That being in hell, he lifted vp his eyes, and beheld *Lazarus*, who was in *Abrahams* bosome, and with a loud voice said: Father *Abraham* haue mercie on me, send *Lazarus*, that he may dip the point of his finger in water, and coole my tongue, for I am tormented in this flame. Out of the passed doctrine, and out of that which is there read, we gather, that the fire of hell burneth the soules, and is materiall as this of ours, and that the same annoyed the rich glutton and the other soules (by Gods ordinance) with his heat, and that if *Lazarus* had carried to him a pitcher of fresh water, hee should haue taken great refreshment thereof: and the reason is very plaine, for if that soule could not endure to abide in the bodie, through excessive heat of the Feauer, and when the same dranke fresh water, the soule felt refreshment, why may not wee conceiue the like, when the soule is vnited with the flames of the fire infernall? The rich Gluttons lifting vp of his eyes, his thirstie tongue, and *Lazarus* finger, are all names of the powers of the soule, that so the Scriptures might

expresse them. Those who walke not in this path, and ground not themselves on naturall Philosophie, utter a thousand follies. But yet hence it cannot be concluded, that if the reasonable soule partake grieve and sorrow (for that his nature is altered by contrary qualities) therefore the same is corruptible or mortall: For ashes, though they be compounded of the foure elements, and of action and power, yet there is no naturall agent in the world which can corrupt them, or take from them the qualities that are agreeable to their nature. The naturall temperature of ashes, we all know to be cold and drie, but though wee cast them neuer so much into the fire, they will not leese their radicall coldnesse which they enioy : and albeit they remaine a hundred thousand yeares in the water, it is impossible that (being taken thence) they hold any naturall moisture of their owne : and yet for all this, we cannot but grant, that by fire they receiue heat, and by water moisture. But these two qualities are superficial in the ashes, and endure a small time in the subiect; for taken from the fire, forthwith they become cold, and from the water they abide not moist an houre.

But there is offered a doubt in this discourse and reasoning of the rich glutton with *Abraham*, and that is, How the soule of *Abraham* was indowed with better reason than that of the rich man : it being alleadged before, that all reasonable soules (issued out of the bodie) are of equall perfection and knowledge? whereto wee may answer in one of these two manners. The first is, that the Science and knowledge which the soule purchaseth, whilest it remaineth in the bodie, is not lost when a man dieth, but rather groweth more perfect, for he is freed from some errors. The soule of *Abraham*, departed out of this life, replenished with wisdom, and with

with many reuelations and secrets which God communicated vnto him, as his very friend: but that of the rich glutton, it behooued that of necessitie it should depart away ignorant: first, by reason of his sinne, which createth ignorance in a man: and next, for that riches herein worke a contrarie effect vnto pouertie: this giueth a man wit, as hereafter we may well prooue, and prosperitie reaueth it away. There may also another answere be giuen after our doctrine, and it is this, that the matter of which these two soules disputed, was schoole-diuintie: For, to know whether abiding in hell there were place for mercie, and whether *Lazarus* might passe vnto hell, and whether it were conuenient to send a deceased person to the world, who should giue notice to the liuing of the torments which the damned there indured, are all schoole-points; whose decision appertaineth to the vnderstanding, as hereafter I will make prooffe. And amongst the first qualities, there is none which so much garboileth this power, as excessiue heat, with which the rich Glutton was so tormented. But the soule of *Abraham* made his abode in a place most temperate, where it enioyed great delight and refreshment: and therefore it bred no great woonder, that the same was better able to dispute. I concluding then, that the reasonable soule and the diuell in their operations vse the seruice of materiall qualities, and that by some they rest agreed, and by other some they receiue contentment. And for this reason they couet to make abode in some places, and flie from some other, and yet notwithstanding are not corruptible.

## CHAP. VIII.

*How there may be assigned to euery difference of wit, his Science, which shalbe correspondent to him in particular: and that which is repugnant and contrarie, be abandoned.*



All artes (sayth *Cicero*) are placed vnder certaine vniuersall principles: which being learned with studie and trauaile, finally we so grow to attaine vnto them: but the art of Poesie is in this so speciall, as if God or Nature make not a man a Poet, little auailles it to deliuer him the precepts and rules of versifying. For which cause hee said thus, The studying and learning of other matters consisteth in precepts and in artes: but a Poet taketh the course of Nature it selfe, and is stirred vp by the forces of the mind, and as it were enflamed by a certaine diuine spirit. But herein *Cicero* swarued from reason: for verily, there is no Science or Art deuised in the commonwealth, which if a man wanting capacitie for himselfe to applie, he shall reape any profit thereof; albeit hee toile all the daies of his life in the precepts and rules of the same: but if he applie himselfe to that which is agreeable with his naturall abilitie, we see that he will learne in two daies. The like wee say of Poesie without any difference, that if he who hath any answerable nature, giue himselfe to make verses, hee performeth the same with great perfection, and if otherwise, he shall neuer be good Poet.

This being so, it seemeth now high time to learne by way

way of Art, what difference of Science is answerable in particular to what difference of wit, to the end, that euery one may vnderstand with distinction (after he is acquainted with his owne nature) to what Art hee hath a naturall disposition. The Arts and Sciences which are gotten by the memorie, are these following, *Latine, Grammar*, or of whatsoeuer other language, the *Theoricke* of the lawes, Diuinitie positiue, *Cosmographie*, and *Arithmeticke*.

Those which appertaine to the vnderstanding, are Shoole diuinitie, the *Theoricke of Phisicke, Logicke, naturall and morall Philosophie*, and the practicke of the lawes, which we tearme pleading. From a good imagination spring all the Arts and Sciences, which consist in figure, correspondencie, harmonie, and proportion: such are Poetrie, Eloquence, Musicke, and the skill of preaching: the practise of Phisicke, the Mathematical, Astrologie, and the gouerning of a Common-wealth: the art of Warfare, Painting, Drawing, Writing, Reading, to be a man gracious, pleasant, neat, wittie in managing, and all the engines and deuices which artificers make: besides a certaine speciall gift, whereat the vulgar matuelleth, and that is, to endite diuers matters, vnto foure, who write together, and yet all to be penned in good sort. Of all this we cannot make euident demonstration, nor proue euery point by it selfe: For it were an infinit peece of worke, notwithstanding by making prooffe thereof in three or foure Sciences, the same reason will afterwards prouaile for the rest.

In the catalogue of Sciences, which we said appertained to the memorie, we placed the Latine tongue, and such other, as all the nations in the world doe speake: the which no wise man will denie: for tongues were deuised

by men, that they might communicate amongst themselves, and expresse one to another their conceits, without that in them there lie hid any other mysterie or naturall principles: for that the first deuisers agreed together, and after their best liking (as *Aristotle* saith) framed the words, and gaue to euery each his signification. From hence arose so great a number of words, and so manie manners of speech so farre besides rule and reason, that if a man had not a good memorie, it were impossible to learne them with any other power. How little the vnderstanding and the imagination make for the purpose, to learne languages and manners of speech, is easily prooued by childhood: which being the age wherein man most wanteth these two powers, yet (saith *Aristotle*) children learne any language more readily than elder men, though these are endowed with a better discourse of reason. And without further speech, experience plainly prooueth this, for so much as we see, that if a Biscane of thirtie or fortie yeeres age come to dwell in *Castilia*, he will neuer learne this language: but if he be but a boy, within two or three yeares you would thinke him borne in *Toledo*. The same befalls in the Latine tongue, and in those of all the rest of the world: for all languages hold one selfe consideration. Then if in the age when memorie chiefly raigneth, and the vnderstanding and the imagination least, languages are better learned than when there growes defect of memorie, and an encrease of vnderstanding; it fals out apparant, that they are purchased by the memorie, and by none other power. Languages (saith *Aristotle*) cannot be gathered out by reason, nor consist in discourse or disputations, for which cause it is necessarie to heare the word from another, and the signification which it beareth, and to keepe the same

same in mind, and so he prooueth, that if a man be borne deafe, it followes of necessitie that hee bee also dumbe, for hee cannot heare from another the alteration of the names, nor the signification which was giuen them by the first deuiser.

That languages are at pleasure, and a conceit of mens braines, and nought else, is plainly prooued; for in them all may the sciences be taught, and in each is to be sayd and expressed that which by the other is inferred. Therefore none of the graue authors attended the learning of strange tongues, thereby to deliuer their conceits: but the Greekes wrot in Greeke; the Romanes in Latine, the Hebrues in the Hebrue language, and the Moores in Arabique, and so doe I in my Spanish, because I know this better than any other. The Romanes as lords of the world, finding it was necessarie to haue one common language, by which all nations might haue commerce together, and themselues be able to heare and vnderstand such as came to demaund iustice, and things appertaining to their gouernment, commaunded that in all places of their empire there should schooles be kept, where the Latine tongue might be taught, and so this vsage hath endured euen to our time.

Schoole diuinitie, it is a matter certaine that it appertaineth to the vnderstanding, presupposing that the operations of this power are to distinguish, conclude, discourse, iudge, and make choice; for nothing is done in this facultie, which is not to doubt for inconueniences, to answer with distinction, and against the answer to conclude that which is gathered in good consequence, and to returne to replication, vntill the vnderstanding find where to settle. But the greatest prooffe which in this case may bee made, is to giue to vnderstand with  
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how great difficultie the Latine tongue is ioyned with *Schoole diuinitie*, and how ordinarily it falleth not out, that one selfe man is a good Latinist and a profound scholler: at which effect, some curious heads, who haue lighted hereon, much maruelling, procured to search out the cause from whence the same might spring, and by their conceit found, that *Schoole diuinitie* being written in an easie and common language, and the great *Latinists* hauing accustomed their eare to the well sounding and fine stile of *Cicero*, they cannot applie themselves to this other. But well should it fall out for the Latinists, if this were the cause: for, forcing their hearing by vse, they should meet with a remedie for this infirmitie: but to speake truth, it is rather an head-ach than an eare-fore. Such as are skilfull in the Latine tongue, it is necessarie that they haue a great memorie: for otherwise, they can neuer become so perfect in a tongue which is not theirs: and because a great and happie memorie is as it were contrarie to a great and high raised vnderstanding, in one subiect, where the one is placed, the other is chased away.

Hence remaineth it, that he who hath not so deepe and loslie an vnderstanding. (a power whereto appertaineth, to distinguish, conclude, discourse, iudge, and chuse) cannot soone attaine the skill of *Schoole diuinitie*. Let him that will not allow this reason for currant payment, read *S. Thomas*, *Scot*, *Durand*, and *Caictane*, who are the principall in this facultie, and in them he shall find many excellent points endited and written, in a stile very easie and common. And this proceeded from none other cause, than that these graue authours had from their childhood a feeble memorie, for profitting in the Latine tongue. But comming to *Logicke*, *Metaphisick*, and  
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*Schoole diuinitie*, they reaped that great fruit which wee see, because they had great vnderstanding.

I can speake of a *Schoole diuine* (and many other can verifie the same, that knew and conuersed with him) who being a principall man in this facultie, not onely spake not finely, nor with well shaped sentences, in imitation of *Cicero*: but whilest he read in a chaire, his schollers noted in him, that he had lesse than a meane knowledge in the Latine tongue: Therefore they counselled him (as men ignorant of this doctrine) that he should secretly steale some houre of the day from *Schoole diuinitie*, and employ the same in reading of *Cicero*. Who knowing this counsell to proceed from his good friends, not onely procured to remedie it priuily, but also publickly, after he had read the matter of the trinitie, and how the diuine word might take flesh, he meant to heare a lecture of the Latine tongue: and it fell out a matter worthe consideration, that in the long time while he did so, hee not onely learned nothing of new, but grew well-neere to leese that little Latine which he had before, and so at last was driuen to reade in the vulgar. *Pius* the fourth enquiring what diuines were of most speciall note at the counsell of *Trent*, he was told of a most singular *Spanisb* diuine, whose solutions, answeres, arguments, and distinctions, were worthe of admiration: the Pope therefore desirous to see and know so rare a man, sent word vnto him that he should come to *Rome*, and render him account of what was done in the Councell. Hee came, and the Pope did him many fauours, amongst the rest commaunded him to be couered, and taking him by the hand, led him walking to *Castle S. Angela*, and speaking very good Latine, shewed him his deuice touching certaine fortifications which he was then about

about to make the Castle stronger, asking his opinion in some particulars: but he answered the Pope so intricately, for that he could not speake Latine, that the Spanish Embassadour, who at that time was *Don Lewes de Requesens*, great Commander of *Castilia*, was faine to step forth to grace him with his Latine, and to turne the Popes discourse into another matter. Finally, the Pope said to his Chamberlains, it was not possible that this man had so much skill in diuinitie, as they made report, seeing he had so little knowledge in the Latine tongue. But if as he proued him in this tounge, which is a worke of memorie, and in platforming, and building, which belong to the imagination, so he had tried him in a matter appertaining to the vnderstanding, he would haue vttered diuine considerations. In the Catalogue of Sciences, which appertaine to the imagination, we placed Poetrie amongst the first, and that not by chance nor for want of consideration, but thereby to giue notice, how farre off those who haue a speciall gift in poetrie, are from vnderstanding. For wee shall find, that the selfe difficultie which the Latine tongue holdeth in vniting with *Schoole diuinitie*, is also found (yea and beyond comparison farre greater) betweene this facultie and the art of versifying: and the same is so contrarie to the vnderstanding, that by the selfe reason for which man is likely to proue singular therein, hee may take his leaue of all the other sciences which appertaine to this power, and also to the Latine tongue, through the contrarietie which a good imagination beareth to great memorie.

For the first of these two, *Aristotle* found not the reason, but yet confirmed mine opinion by experience, laying: *Marke*, a citizen of *Siracusa*, was best Poet, when he lost his vnderstanding, and the cause is, for that  
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the difference of the imagination, to which Poetrie belongeth, is that which requireth three degrees of heat, and this qualitie so extended (as wee haue before expressed) breeds an vtter losse of the vnderstanding, the which was obserued by the same *Aristotle*. For he affirmeth, that this *Marke* the *Syracusane* growing to more temperature, enioyed a better vnderstanding, but yet he attained not to versifie so well, through default of heat, with which, this difference of the imagination worketh. And this *Cicero* wanted, when going about to describe in verse the heroicall actions of his Consulship, and the happie birth of Rome, in that she was gouerned by him, he said thus, *O fortunatam natam me consule Romam*. For which cause, *Iuuenall* not conceiuing, that to a man endowed with so rare a wit, as *Cicero*, poetrie was a matter repugnant, did Satirically nip him, saying, If thou hadst rehearsed the *Philippicks* against *Marke Antony*, answerable to the tune of so bad a verse, it should not haue cost thy life.

But worse did *Plato* vnderstand the same, when hee said, that Poetrie was no humane Science, but a diuine reuelation. For if the Poets were not rauished besides themselues, or full of God, they could not make nor vtter any thing worthie regard. And he prooueth it by a reason, auouching, that whilest a man abideth in his sound iudgement, he cannot versifie. But *Aristotle* reprooueth him, for affirming that the art of Poetrie is not an abilitie of man, but a reuelation of God: And he admitteth, that a wise man, and who is free possessed of his iudgement, cannot bee a Poet: and the reason is, because where there resteth much vnderstanding, it beho- ueth of force, that there befall want of the imagination, whereto appertaineth the Art of versifying: which may  
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the more apparently be prooued, knowing that *Socrates* after he had learned the art of Poetrie, for all his precepts and rules, could not make so much as one verse: and yet notwithstanding, he was by the oracle of *Apollo* adiudged the wisest man of the world.

I hold it then for certaine, that the boy who will prooue of a notable vaine for versifying, and to whom, ypon euerie sleight consideration, consonances offer themselves, shall ordinarily incurre hazard not to learne well the Latine tongue, Logicke, Philosophie, Phisicke, Schoole-diuitie, and the other artes and sciences, which appertaine to the vnderstanding, and to the memorie. For which cause wee see by experience, that if wee charge such a boy to forme a *nominative* without booke, he will not learne it in two or three daies: but if there be a leafe of paper written in verse, to be recited in any comedie, in two turnes he fixeth them in his memorie. These loose themselves by reading bookes of chiuallrie: *Orlando*, *Boccace*, *Diana of Monte maggior*, and such other devices: for all these are workes of the imagination. What shall we say then of the harmonie of the Organs, and of the singing men of the Chappell, whose wits are most vnprofitable for the Latine tongue, and for all other Sciences which appertaine to the vnderstanding and to the memorie? the like reason scructh in playing on instruments, and all sorts of musicke. By these three examples which wee haue yeelded, of the Latine, of Schoole-diuitie, and of Poetrie, we shall vnderstand this doctrine to be true, and that we haue duly made this partition, albeit we make not the like mention in the other arts.

Writing also discouereth the imagination, and so we see, that few men of good vnderstanding doe write a  
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faire hand, and to this purpose I haue noted many examples: and specially I haue knowne a most learned Schoole-diuiue, who shaming at himselfe to see how bad a hand he wrote, durst not write a letter to any man, nor to answere those which were sent to him: so as he determined with himselfe, to get a Scriuener secretly to his house, who should teach him to frame a reasonable letter that might passe, and hauing for many daies taken paines herein, it prooued lost labour, and he reaped no profit thereby. Wherefore, as tyred out, he forooke the practise: and the teacher, who had taken him in hand, grew astonished, to see a man so learned in his profession, to be so vntoward for writing. But my selfe, who rest well assured, that writing is a worke of the imagination, held the same for a naturall effect. And if any man bee desirous to see and note it, let him consider the Schollers, who get their livings in the Vniuersities, by copying out of writings in good forme; and he shall find, that they can little skill of Grammer, Logicke, and Philosophie, and if they studie Phisicke or Diuinitie, they fish nothing neere the bottome. The boy then, who with his pen can tricke a horse to the life, and a man in good shape, and can make a good paire of it serues little to employ him in any sort of learning, but will doe best, to set him to some painter, who by art may bring forward his nature.

To reade well and with readinesse, discovereth also a certaine spice of the imagination, and if the same be very effectuell, it booteth little to spend much time at his booke, but shall doe better to set him to get his living by reading of processees. Here a thing note-worthie of fereth it selfe, and that is, that the difference of the imagination, which maketh men eloquent and pleasant, is contrarie

contrarie to that which is behoofefull for a man to read with facilitie, wherethrough none who is prompt-witted can learne to read without stumbling, and putting too somewhat of his owne head.

To play well at *Primero*, and to face and vie, and to hold and giue ouer when time serueth, and by coniectures to know his aduersaries game, and the skill of discarding, are all workes of the imagination. The like wee say of playing at *Cent*, and at *Triumph*, though not so far forth as the *Primero* of *Almaigne*: and the same not only maketh prooffe and demonstration of the difference of the wit, but also discouereth all the vertues and vices in a man. For at euery moment there are offered occasions in this play, by which a man shall discotter, what he would doe in matters of great importance, if opportunitie serued.

Chesse-play is one of the things which best discouereth the imagination: for hee that makes ten or twelue faire draughts one after another on the Chesse-boord, giues an euill token of profiting in the Sciences which belong to the vnderstanding, and to the memorie, vnlesse it fall out, that he make an vnion of two or three powers, as we haue alreadie noted. And if a very learned Schoole-diuiue (of mine acquaintance) had been skilled in this doctrine, he should haue got notice of a matter, which made him very doubtfull. He vsed to play often with a seruant of his, and lighting mostly on the losse, told him, much mooued: Sirha, how comes it to passe, that thou who canst skill neither of Latine, nor Logicke, nor Diuinitie, though thou hast studied it, yet beatest me that am full of *Scot* and *S. Thomas*? Is it possible that thou shouldest haue a better wit than I? verily I cannot beleeue it, except the diuell reueale vnto thee what draughts

draughts thou shouldst make: and the misterie was, that he had great vnderstanding, with which he attained the delicacies of *Scot* and *Thomas*, but wanted that difference of imagination, which serueth for Chesse-play, whereas his seruant had an ill vnderstanding, and a bad memorie, but a good imagination. The Schollers who haue their bookes well righted, and their chamber well dressed, and cleane kept, euery thing in his due place and order, haue a certaine difference of imagination, very contrary to the vnderstanding, and to the memorie.

Such a like wit haue men who goe neat and handsomely apparelled, who looke all about their cape for a mote, and take dislike at any one wric plait of their garment, this (assuredly) springeth from their imagination. For if a man that had no skill in verifiying, nor towardlinesse thereunto, chance to fall in loue, sodainly (saith *Plato*) he becomes a Poet, and very trim and handsome: for loue heateth and drieth his braine, and these are qualities which quicken the imagination: the like (as *Iuuenall* noteth) anger doth effect, which passion heateth also the braine:

*Anger makes verse, if Nature but denie.*

Gracious talkers and imitaters, and such as can hold at bay, haue a certaine difference of imagination, vrie contrarie to the vnderstanding and to the memorie. For which cause they neuer prooue learned in Grammar, Logicke, Schoole-diuitie, Phisicke, or the lawes. If then they bee wittie in managing, toward for euery matter they take in hand, readie in speech, and answering to the purpose: these are fit to serue in Courts of iustice, for sollicitors, attornies, marchants, and factors to buy and sell, but not for learning. Herein the vulgar is much deceived, seeing them so readie at all hands, and them

seemeth, that if such gaue themselves to learning, they would proue notable fellows: but in substance there is no w<sup>ch</sup> more repugnant in matters of learning, than these. Children that are slow of speech, haue a moistnesse in their tongue, and also in their braine: but that wearing away, in proceſſe of time they become very eloquent, and great talkers, through the great memorie which they get when that moisture is tempered.

This we know by the things tofore rehearsed, befell that famous Orator *Demosthenes*, of whom we said, that *Cicero* marvelled, how being so blunt of speech when he was a boy, growing greater, he became so eloquent. Children also, who haue a good voice, and warble in the throat, are most vntoward for all Sciences, and the reason is, for that they are cold and moist. The which two qualities being vnited, we said before, that they breed a damage in the reasonable part. Schollers who learne their lesson in such manner as their maister deliuereth it, and so recite the same, it shewes a token of a good memorie, but the vnderstanding shall abie the bargain. There are offered in this doctrine some problemes and doubts: the answers whereunto will perhaps yeeld more light to conceine, than what we haue propounded doth carrie truth. The first is, whence it groweth that great Latinists are more arrogant and presumptuous on their knowledge, than men very well skilled in that kind of learning which appertaineth to the vnderstanding? in sort, that the proverbe, to let vs know what manner of fellow a Grammarian is, sayth; That a Grammarian is arrogancie it selfe. The second is, whence it commeth, that the Latine tongue is so repugnant to the Spanish capacities, and so naturall to the French, Italian, Dutch, English, and other Northernly nations, as we see in their  
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worker, which by their good Latine phrase straightwaies prooue the authour to haue beene a stranger, and by the barbarousnesse and ill composition wee know the same for a *Spaniards*. The third is, for what reason the things that are spoken and written in the Latine tongue, sound better, carrie a more loftinesse, and haue greater delicacie than any other language how good focuer? we ha- uing auouched before, that all languages are nought els, but a conceit at pleasure of those who first deuised them, without holding any foundation in nature. The fourth doubt is, seeing all Sciences, which appertaine to the vnderstanding, are written in Latin, how it can frame, that such as want memorie, may read and studie them in those bookes, whilst the Latine is (by this reason) so re- pugnant vnto them.

To the first problem we answere, that to know whe- ther a man haue defect of vnderstanding, there falls out no token more certaine, than to see him loose, big looked, presumptuous, desirous of honour, standing on tearmes, and full of ceremonies: And the reason is, for that all these be workes, of a difference of the imagina- tion, which requireth no more but one degree of heat, wherewith the much moisture (which is requisite for the memorie) accordeth very fitly: for it wanteth force to resolute the same. Contrariwise, it is an infallible token, that if a man be naturally lowly, despiser of himselfe, and his owne matters, and that not only he vaunteth not, nor praiseth himselfe, but feeles displeasure at the commen- dations giuen him by others, and takes shame of pla- ces and ceremonies pertaining to honour, such a one may well be pointed at for a man of great vnderstan- ding, but of small imagination and memorie. I said na- turally lowly: for if he be so by cunning, this is no certain

signe. Hence it cometh, that as the Grammarians are men of great memorie, and make an vnion with this differtence of the imagination: so it is of force, that they faile in vnderstanding, and be such as the prouerbe paints them forth.

To the second problemē may be answered, that *Galen* enquiring out the wit of men by way of the temperatūre of the region where they inhabit, sayth, That those who made abode vnder the North, haue all of them want of vnderstanding: but those who are seated betwene the North and the burned Zone, are of great wisdome: which situation answereth directly to our region. And verily so it is: for *Spain* is not so cold as the places subiected to the Pole, nor so hot as the burned Zone. The same sentence doth *Aristotle* produce, demanding, for what cause such as inhabit very cold regions partake lesse vnderstanding than those who are born in the hotter? and in the answer he verie homely handles the *Flemmish*, *Dutch*, *English*, and *French*, saying that their wits are like those of drunkards, for which cause they cannot search out nor vnderstand the nature of things: and this is occasioned by the much moisture wherewith their braine is replenished, and the other parts of the bodie: the which is knowne by the whitenesse of the face, and the golden colour of the haire, and by that it is a miracle, to find a Dutchman bald: and aboue this they are generally great, and of tall stature, through the much moisture, which breedeth encrease of flesh. But in the Spaniards we discern the quite contrarie: they are somewhat browne, they haue black haire, of mean stature, and for the most part we see them bald. Which disposition (saith *Galen*) groweth, for that the braine is hot and drie. And if this be true, it behooueth of force, that they  
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be endowed with a bad memorie, and a good vnderstanding, but the *Dutchmen* possesse a great memorie, and small vnderstanding: for which cause, the one can no skill of Latine, and the other easily learne the same. The reason which *Aristotle* alleaged, to proue the slender vnderstanding of those who dwell vnder the North, is, that the much cold of the countrey calleth backe the naturall heat inward by counterposition, and suffereth not the same to spread abroad: for which cause, it partaketh much moisture, and much heat, and these vnite a great memorie for the languages, and a good imagination; with which they make clockes, bring the water to Toledo, deuise engines, and workes of rare skill, which the *Spaniards* through defect of imagination cannot frame themselves vnto: But set them to Logicke, to Philosophie, to Schoole-diuinitie, to Phisicke, or to the Lawes, and beyond comparison a *Spanish* wit, with his barbarous tearmes, will deliuer more rare points than a stranger. For if you take from them this finesse and quaint phrase of writing, there is nothing in them of rare inuention or exquisite choice.

For confirmation of this doctrine, *Galen* said, that in *Scythia* one onely man became a Philosopher; but in *Athens* there were many such: as if he should say, that in *Scythia*, which is a Prouince vnder the North, it grew a myracle to see a Philosopher, but in *Athens* they were all borne wise and skilfull. But albeit Philosophie and the other Sciences rehearsed by vs, be repugnant to the Northren people; yet they profit well in the Mathematicals, and in Astrologie, because they haue a good imagination.

The answer of the third probleme dependeth vpon a question, much hammered betweene *Plato* and *Aristotle*:

the one saith that there are proper names, which by their nature carrie signification of things, and that much wit is requisit to deuise them. And this opinion is fauoured by the diuine Scripture, who affirmeth, that *Adam* gaue euery of those things which God set before him, the proper name that best was fitting for them. But *Aristotle* will not graunt, that in any tongue there can bee found any name, or manner of speech, which can signifie ought of it owne nature, for that all names are deuised and shaped after the conceit of men. Whence we see by experience, that wine hath about threescore names, and bread as many, in euery language his, and of none we can auouch that the same is naturall and agreeable thereunto, for then all in the world would vse but that. But for all this, the sentence of *Plato* is truer: for put case that the first deuisers fained the words at their pleasure and will, yet was the same by a reasonable instinct communicated with the eare, with the nature of the thing, and with the good grace and well sounding of the pronuntiation, not making the words ouer short or long, nor enforcing an vnseemely framing of the mouth in time of vtterance, setting the accent in his conuenient place, and obseruing the other conditions which a tongue should possesse, to be fine, and not barbarous.

Of this selfe opinion with *Plato*, was a *Spanish* gentleman; who made it his pastime to write bookes of chiuallrie, because he had a certaine kind of imagination, which entiseth men to faining and leasings. Of him it is reported, that being to bring into his workes a furious Giant, he went many daies deuising a name, which might in all points be answerable to his fiercenesse: neither could he light vpon any, vntill playing one day at cards in his friends house, he heard the owner of the house say, *Hó, sirha,*

firha, boy, *tra quitantos*; the Gentleman so soone as he heard this name *Traquitantos*, sodainly he tooke the same for a word of full sound in the eare, and without any longer looking arose, saying; gentleman I will play no more: for many daies are past sithence I haue gone seeking out a name, which might fit well with a furious Giant, whom I bring into those volumes which I now am making, and I could not find the same, vntill I came to this house, where euer I receiue all courtesie. The curiositie of this gentleman in calling the Giant *Traquitantos*, had also those first men, who deuised the Latine tongue, in that they found out a language of so good sound to the eare. Therefore wee need not maruell, that the things which are spoken and written in Latine, doe sound so well, and in other tongues so ill: for their first inuenters were barbarous.

The last doubt I haue been forced to alleage, for satisfying of diuers who haue stumbled thereon, though the solution be very easie: for those who haue great vnderstanding, are not vtterly depriued of memorie, in as much as if they wanted the same, it would fall out impossible that the vnderstanding could discourse or frame reasons; for this power is that which keepeth in hand the matter and the fantasies, whereon it behoueth to vse speculation. But for that the same is weake of three degrees of perfection, whereto men may attaine in the Latine tongue (namely, to vnderstand, to write, and to speake the same perfectly) it can hardly passe the first without fault and stumbling.

## CHAP. IX.

*How it may be prooued, that the eloquence and finenesse of speech cannot find place in men of great understanding.*



One of the graces by which the vulgar is best persuaded, and thinketh that a man hath much knowledge and wisdom, is, to heare him speake with great eloquence, to haue a smooth tongue, plentie of sweet and pleasant words, and to alleage many examples fit for the purpose that is in hand: but this (verily) springeth from an vnion which the memorie maketh with the imagination, in a degree and measure of heat, that cannot resolve the moisture of the braine, and serueth to lift vp the figures, and cause them to boile, wherethrough are discovered many conceits and points to be vttered. In this vnion it is impossible that discourse may bee found; for we haue already said and prooued heretofore, that this power greatly abhorreth heat, and moisture cannot support it. Which doctrine if the *Athenians* had knowne, they would not so much haue marvelled to see so wise a man as *Socrates* not to haue the gift of vtterance; of whom, those who vnderstood how great his knowledge was, said, that his words and his sentences were like a wodden chest knobbie and nothing trimmed on the outside, but that in opening the same, within it held lineamentes and portraictures of rare admiration. In the same ignorance rest they, who attempting to render a reason of *Aristotles* bad stile and obscurenesse, said:  
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That of set purpose, and because he would that his works should carrie authoritie, he wrot vnder riddles, and with so slender ornament of words, and simple manner of deliuerance. And if we consider also the so harsh proceeding of *Plato*, and the breeseffenesse with which he writeth, the obscuritie of his reasons, and the ill placing of the parts of his tale, we shall find, that nought else saue this occasioned the same. For such also we find the workes of *Hippocrates*, the thefts which he committeth of *Nownes* and *Verbes*, the ill disposition of his sentences, and the weake foundation of his reasons, to stuffe out the emptie places of his doctrine: What will you more? vnlesse, that when he would yeeld a verie particular reckoning to his friend *Damagetus*, how *Artaxerxes* king of *Persia* had sent for him, promising him as much gold and siluer as he list himselfe, and to make him one of the great ones of his kingdome: hauing plentie of answeres to so many demaunds, he writ onely thus; The king of *Persia* hath sent for me, not knowing that with me the respect of wisdom is greater than that of gold. Farewell.

Which matter if it had passed through the hands of any other man of good imagination and memorie, a whole leafe of paper would not haue sufficed to set it forth.

But who would haue beene so hardie to alleage for the purpose of this doctrine, the example of *S. Paule*, and to affirme, that he was a man of great vnderstanding and little memorie, and that with these his forces, he could not skill of tongues, nor deliuer his mind in them polishedly and with gracefulness, if himselfe had not so said; I reckon not my selfe to haue done lesse than the greatest Apostles, for though I be ignorant of speech, yet I am not so in vnderstanding: as if he should say; I confesse that I haue not the gift of vtterance, but for sci-

ence:

ence and knowledge, none of the greatest Apostles goeth beyond me. Which difference of wit was so appropriate to the preaching of the Gospell, that choice could not be made of a better, for, that a preacher should bee eloquent, and haue great furniture of queint tearmes, is not a matter conuenient : for the force of the Oratours of those daies, appeared in making the hearers repute things false for true ; and what the vulgar held for good and behoofesfull, they, vsing the precepts of their art, perswaded the contrarie, and maintained, that it was better to be poore than rich, sicke than whole, fond than wise, and other points manifestly repugnant to the opinion of the vulgar . For which cause the Hebrues tearmed them *Geragnin*, that is to say, Deceiuers. Of the same opinion was *Cato* the more, and held the abode of these in Rome for very dangerous, in as much as the forces of the Romane empire were grounded on armes : and they began then to perswade, that the Romane youth should abandon those, and giue themselues to this kind of wisdom ; therefore (in breefe) he procured them to be banished out of Rome , forbidding them euer to returne againe. If God then had sought out an eloquent preacher, who should haue vsed ornament of speech, and that he had entered into Athens or Rome , auouching that in Hierusalem the Iewes had crucified a man, who was very God , and that he died of his owne accord to redeeme sinners, and rose againe the third day, and ascended into heauen, where he now sitteth ; what would the hearers haue thought, saue that these things were some of those follies and vanities which the Oratours were wont to perswade by the force of their art ? For which cause, *S. Paul* said : For Christ sent me not to baptise, but to preach the gospell, and that not in wisdom of words,

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least the crosse of Christ might proue in vaine. The wit of *S. Paule* was appropriat to this seruice, for he had a large discourse to proue in the synagogues and amongst the Gentils, That Iesus Christ was the Messias promised in the law, and that it was bootlesse to looke for any other: and herewithall he was of slender memorie, and therefore he could not skill to speake with ornament and sweet and well relished tearmes, and this was that which was behoofesfull for preaching of the Gospell. I will not maintaine (for all this) that *S. Paule* had not the gift of tongues, but that he could speake all languages as he did his owne: neither am I of opinion, that to defend the name of Christ, the forces of his great vnderstanding sufficed, if there had not beene ioyned therewithall the meane of grace, and a speciall ayd which God to that purpose bestowed vpon him: it sufficeth me only to say, That supernaturall gifts worke better, when they light vpon an apt disposition, than if a man were of himselfe vntoward and blockish. Hereto alludeth that doctrine of *S. Hierome*, which is found in his Proeme vpon *Esay* and *Hieremie*; where asking what the cause is, that it being one selfe holy ghost which spake by the mouth of *Hieremie* and of *Esay*, one of them propounded the matters which he wrot with so great elegancie, and *Hieremie* scarcely wist how to speake: to which doubt he answereth, That the holy-ghost applieth it selfe to the naturall manner of proceeding of each Prophet, without that his grace varieth their nature, or teacheth them the language wherein they are to publish their prophesie. Therefore we must vnderstand, that *Esay* was a noble gentleman brought vp in court, and in the citie of *Hierusalem*, and for this cause had ornament and polishednesse of speech: But *Hieremie* was born and reared in a village of *Hierusalem*.

lem, called *Anathochites*, blunt and rude in behaviour, as a countrey person, and of such a stile the holy ghost vsed the seruice in the prophetic which he commanded vnto him. The same may be said of *S. Pauls* Epistles, that the holy Ghost dwelled in him, when he wrote them, to the end he might not erre, but the language and manner of speech was *S. Pauls* naturall, applied to the doctrine which he wrote; for the truth of Schoolediuinitie abhorreth many words. But the practise of languages, and the ornament and polishment of speech may very well be ioyued with positie diuinitie: for this facultie appertaineth to the memorie, and is nought els saue a masse of words and catholicke sentences, taken out of the holy doctors, and the diuine Scripture, and preserved in this power, as the *Grammarians* doth with the flowers of the Poets, *Virgill*, *Horace*, *Terence*, and other Latine authors whom he readeth: who meeting occasion to rehearse them, he comes out straightwaies with a shred of *Cicero*, or *Quintilian*, whereby he makes his hearers know what he is able to doe.

Those that are endowed with this vnion of the imagination and of the memorie, and trauaile in gathering the fruit of whatsoever hath been said or written in their profession, and serue themselves therewith at conuenient occasions, with great ornament of words and gracious fashions of speech, for that so many things are already found out in all the Sciences, it seemeth to them who know not this doctrine, that they are of great profoundesse; whereas in truth they hold much of the Ass: for if you grow to trie them in the foundations of that which they alleadge and affirme, they then discover their wants. And the reason is, because so great a flowing of speech cannot be vnited with the vnderstanding, whereto appertaineth

pertaineth to search out the bottome of the truth. Of these the diuine scripture said, Where there is plentie of words, there reigneth great scarcitie: as if he had said, that a man of many words ordinatily wanteth vnderstanding and wilsdome.

Those who are endowed with this vnion of the imagination and memorie, enter with great courage to interpret the diuine scripture, it seeming to them, that because they vnderstand well the Hebrew, Greeke, and Latine tongues, they haue the way made smooth to gather out the very spirit of the letter: but verily they ruinate themselves; first, because the words of the diuine text and his manners of speech haue many other significations, besides those which *Cato* vnderstood in Latine. And then because their vnderstanding is defectiue, which power verifieth whether a sence be Catholicke or depraued: and this is it which may make choice by the grace supernaturall, of two or three senses, that are gathered out of the letter, which is most true and catholicke.

Beguilings (saith *Plato*) neuer befall in things vnlike and very different, but when many things meet which carrie neere resemblance. For if wee set before a sharpe sight, a little salt, sugar, meale, and lyme, all well pounded and beaten to powder, and each one severally by it selfe: what should hee doe who wanted tast, if with his eyes he should be set to discerne every of these powders from other without erring, saying, this is salt, this sugar, this meale, and this lyme? For my part I belecue he would be deceiued through the great resemblance, which these things haue betweene themselves. But if there were a heape of salt, one of sugar, one of corne, one of earth, and one of stones, it is certaine he would not be deceiued in giuing each of these heapes his name, though his sight

fight were dimme, for each is of a diuers figure. The same we see befallerh euery day in the senses and spirits, which the diuines giue to the holy Scripture, of which two or thre being looked on, at first sight they all carrie a shew to be Catholicke, and to agree well with the letter, but yet in the truth are not so, neither the holy Ghost so meant. To chuse the best of these senses, and to refuse the bad, it is a thing assured, that the diuine employeth not his memorie nor his imagination, but his vnderstanding. Wherefore I auouch, that the positie diuine ought to conferte with the Schoole-man, and to enquire at his hands, that of these senses he may chuse that which shall appeare to be soundest, ylesse he will be sent to the holy house. For this cause doe heretickes so much abhorre Schoole diuinitie, and learne to banish it out of the world: for by distinguishing, inferring, framing of reasons, and iudging, we attaine to vnderstand the truth, and to discouer falshood.

## CHAP. X.

*How it is proued, that the Theoricke of Diuinitie appertaineth to the vnderstanding: and preaching (which is his practise) to the imagination.*

**I**T is a problem often demanded, not only by folke learned and wise, but also the vulgar will put in their oare, and euery day bring in question, For what cause a diuine being a great man in the Schooles, sharpe in disputing, readie in answering, and in writing and lecturing of rare learning; yet getting

getting vp into the pulpit, cannot skill of preaching; and contrariwise, if one proue a gallant preacher, eloquent, gracious, and that drawes the people after him, it seemes a myracle, if he be deeply scene in Schoole diuinitie. Wherefore they admit not for a sound consequence, such a one is a great Schoole-diuiue, therefore he will proue a good preacher: and contrariwise, they will not graunt: he is a good preacher, therefore he hath skill in Schoole-diuitie. For to reuerse the one and other of these consequences, there may be alleaged for ech, more instances than are haire on our head.

No man hitherto hath bene able to answer this demand, saue after the ordinarie guise, *scilicet* to attribute the whole to God; and to the distribution of his graces: and to my liking they doe very well, in as much as they know not any more particular occasion thereof. The answer of this doubt (in some sort) is giuen by vs in the foregoing chapter, but not so particularly as is sequit; and it was, that Schoole-diuitie appertaineth to the vnderstanding: but now we affirme and will proue, that preaching and his practise, is a worke of the imagination. And as it falls out a difficult matter, to ioyne in one selfe braine a good vnderstanding and much imagination: so likewise it will hardly fall, that one selfe man be a great Schoole-diuiue and a famous preacher; and that Schoole-diuitie is a worke of the vnderstanding, hath before been proued, when we proued the repugnancie which it carried to the Latine tongue. For which cause it shall not now be necessarie to proue the same anew, onely it shall suffice to giue to vnderstand, that the grace and delightfullnesse which good preachers haue, whereby they draw their audience vnto them, and hold them well pleased, is altogether a worke of the imagination,

and

and part thereof of a good memorie, and to the end I may better expound my selfe, and cause it as it were to be felt with the hand, it behooueth first to presuppose that man is a liuing creature, capable of reason, of compaignie, and of ciuilitie, and to the end that his nature might be the more abled by art, the ancient Philosophers deuised Logicke to teach him how he might frame his reasons with those precepts and rules, how hee should define the nature of things, distinguish, denie, conclude, argue, iudge, and chuse, without which workes it growes impossible, that the Artist can goe forward: and that he might be compaignable and ciuile, it behooued him to speake, and to giue other men to weet the conceits which he framed in his mind. And for that he should not deliuer them without disposition and without order, they deuised another art which they teamed Rhethoricke, which by his precepts and rules might beautifie the speech with polished words, with fine phrases, and with stirring affections and gracious colours. But as Logicke teacheth not a man to discourse and to argue in one science alone, but without difference in all alike: so also Rhethoricke instructeth how to speake, in Diuinitie, in Physicke, in skill of the Lawes, and in all other Sciences and conuersations which men entermedled withall. In sorte, that if wee will frame a perfect Logician, or an accomplished Oratour, he cannot fall into due consideration, vntil he be seene in all the Sciences, for they all appertaine to his iurisdiction, and in which soeuer of them he may exercise his rules without distinction: not as Physicke, which hath his matter limited whereof it must intreat: and so likewise naturall Philosophie, and morall, Metaphisick, Astrologic, and the rest: and therefore *Cicero* said, The Oratour wheresoeuer he abideth,

dwelleth

dwelleth in his owne. And in another place he affirmeth, in a perfect Oratour is found all the knowledge of the Philosophers, and therefore the same *Cicero* auouched, That there is no art more difficult than that of a perfect Oratour: and with more reason he might so haue said, if he had known with how great hardnesse all the Sciences are vnited in one particular subiect.

Anciently the doctors of the law were adorned with the name of Oratour: for the perfection of pleading required the notice & furniture of all the arts in the world, for the lawes doe iudge them all. Now to know the defence reserved for euery art by it selfe, it was necessarie to haue a particular knowledge of them all; for which cause *Cicero* said, No man ought to be reputed in the number of Oratours, who is not well scene in all the arts. But seeing it was impossible to learne all Sciences (first, through the shortnesse of life, and then because mans wit is so bounded) they let them passe, and of necessitie held themselues contented to giue credit to the skilfull in that art whereof they made profelson, and no farther.

After this manner of defending causes, straightwaies succeeded the Euangelicall doctrine, which might haue been perswaded by the art of Oratorie, better than all the Sciences of the world besides, for that the same is the most certaine and truest: but Christ our redeemer charged *S. Paule*, That he should not preach it with wisdome of words, to the end the Gentiles should not think it was a well couched leasing, as are those which the Oratours vse to perswade by the force of their art. But when the faith had beene receiued, many yeares after it was allowed to preach with places of Rhetoricke, and to vse the seruice of eloquent speech; for that then the incon-

uenience fell not in consideration; which was extant  
 when *S. Paul* preached. Yea we see that the preacher reapeth  
 more fruit; who hath the conditions of a perfect  
 Orator, and is more haunted than he that wanteth them:  
 and the reason is very plaine. For if the antient Oratours  
 gaue the people to vnderstand things false for true (vsing  
 those their preceptes and rules) more easily shall the  
 Christian auditorie be drawne, when by art they are per-  
 suaded to that which already they vnderstand and be-  
 lieue. Besides that, the holy Scripture (after a sort) is all  
 things; and to yeeld the same a true interpretation, it be-  
 hooueth to haue all the Sciences conformable to that so  
 oft said saw, He sent his damfels to call to the Castle.  
 This fitteth not to be remembred to the preachers of  
 our time, nor to aduise them, that now they may doe it:  
 for their particular studie (besides the fruit which they  
 pretend to bring with their doctrine) is to seeke out a  
 good text, to whose purpose they may applie many fine  
 sentences taken out of the diuine Scripture, the holy  
 Doctors, Poets, Historians, Phisicians, and Lawyers,  
 without forbearing any Science, and speaking copiou-  
 sly with quietnesse and pleasant words; and with all these  
 things they goe amplifying and stuffing their matter  
 an houre or two if need be. Of this saith *Cicero* the Ora-  
 tours of his time made profession: The force of an Ora-  
 tout (saith he) and the selfe art of well speaking, seemeth,  
 that it vndertaketh and promiseth to speake with copi-  
 ousnesse and ornament of whatsoever matter that shall  
 be propounded. Then if we shall proue, that the graces  
 and conditions which a perfect Oratour ought to haue,  
 doe all appertaine to the imagination and to the memo-  
 rie; we shall also know, that the diuine who is endowed  
 with them, will be an excellent preacher: but being set to  
 the

the doctrine of *S. Thomas* and *Scotus* can little skill thereof, for that the same is a science belonging to the vnderstanding, in which power of necessitie it holdeth little force.

What the things be which appertaine to the imagination, and by what signes they are to be knowne, we haue heretofore made mention: now we will returne to a replication of them, that they may the better be refreshed to the memorie. All that which may be tearmed good figure, good purpose and prouision, comes from the grace of the imagination, as are merrie icasts, resemblances, quips, and comparisuns.

The first thing which a perfect Orator is to go about (having matter vnder hand) is to seeke out arguments and conuenient sentences, whereby he may dilate and proue, and that not with all sorts of words, but with such as giue a good consonance to the eare: and therefore *Cicero* sayd: I take him for an Orator, who can vse in his discourses, words well tuning with the eare, and sentences conuenient for prooffe. And this (for certaine) appertaineth to the imaginations, sithens therein is a consonance of well pleasing words, and a good direction in the sentences.

The second grace which may not be wanting in a perfect Orator, is to possesse much inuention, or much reading, for if he rest bound to dilate and confirme any matter whatsoeuer with many speeches and sentences applied to the purpose, it behooueth, that he haue a very swift imagination, and that the same supplie (as it were) the place of a breach, to hunt and bring the game to his hand, and when he wants what to say, to deuise somewhat as if it were materiall. For this cause we said before, that heat was an instrument with which the ima-

gination worketh, for this qualitie lifteth vp the figures, and maketh them to boile. Here is discovered all that which in them may be seene, and if there fell out nought else to be considered, this imagination hath force not onely to compound a figure possible with another, but doth ioyne also (after the order of nature) those which are vnpossible, and of them growes to shape mountaines of gold, and calues that flie. In lieu of their owne inuention, Oratours may supplie the same with much reading, for as much as their imagination faileth them: but in conclusion, whatsoeuer bookes teach, is bounded and limited; and the proper inuention is a good fountaine which alwaies yeeldeth forth new and fresh water. For retaining the things which haue beene read, it is requisite to possesse much memorie; and to recite them in the presence of the audience with readinesse, cannot be done without the same power. For which cause *Cicero* said, He shall (in mine opinion) be an Oratour worthie of so important a name, who with wisdom, with copiousnesse, and with ornament, can readily deliuer euerie matter that is worth the hearing. Heretofore wee haue said and prooued, that wisdom appertaineth to the imagination, copiousnesse of words and sentences to the memorie, ornament and polishment to the imagination: to recite so many things without faltring or stopping, for certaine it is archieued by the goodnesse of the memorie. To this purpose *Cicero* auouched, that the good Oratour ought to rehearse by heart, and not by booke. It falleth not besides the matter to let you vnderstand, that *M. Antony* of Lebrissa through old age grew to such a decay of memorie, that he read his Rhetoricke lecture to his schollers out of a paper, and for that he was so excellent in his profession, and with good proofes confir-

med his points propounded, it passed for currant ; but that which might be no way tollerated, was, that where he died sodainly of an apoplexie, the Vniuersitie of *Alcala* recommended the making of his funerall Oration to a famous preacher, who inuented and disposed what hee had to say the best he could : but time so pressed him, as it grew impossible for him to con the same without booke : Wherefore getting vp into the pulpit with his paper in his hand, he began to speake in this sort . That which this notable man vsed to do whilest he read to his schollers, I am now also resolu'd to doe in his imitation ; for his death was so sodaine, and the commaundement to me of making his funerall sermon so late , as I had neither place nor time to studie what I might say, nor to con it by heart. Whatsoeuer I haue been able to gather with the trauell of this night , I bring here written in this paper, and beseech your maisterships, that you will heare the same with patience, and pardon my slender memorie.

This fashion of rehearsing with paper in the hand, so highly displeased the audience, as they did nought els than smile and murmure : Therefore very well said *Cicero*, that it behooued to rehearse by heart and not by booke. This preacher verily was not endowed with any inuention of his owne, but was driuen to fetch the same out of his bookes ; and to performe this, great studie and much memorie were requisite . But those who borrow their conceits out of their owne braine, stand not in need of studie, time, or memorie : for they find all readie at their finger ends . Such will preach to one selfe audience all their life long , without repeating any point touched in twentie yeares before ; whereas those that want inuention, in two Lents cull the flowers out of all

the books in a whole world, and ransacke to the bottome all the writings that can be gotten; and at the third Lent must goe and get themselues a new auditorie, except they will heare cast in their teeth, This is the same which you preached vnto vs in the yeare before.

The third property that a good Orator ought to haue, is, that he know how to dispose his matter, placing euery word and sentence in his fit roome, in sort that the whole may carrie an answerable proportion, and one thing bring in another. And to this purpose *Cicero* said: Disposition is an order and distribution of things, which sheweth, what ought in what places to be bestowed; which grace when it is not naturall, accustomably breedeth much cumber to the preachers, For after they haue found in their books many things to deliuer, all of them cannot skill to applie this prouision readily to euery point. This propertie of ordering and distributing, is for certaine a worke of the imagination, since (in effect) it is nought els but figure and correspondence.

The fourth propertie wherewith good Oratours should be endowed, and the most important of all, is action, wherewith they giue a being and life to the things which they speake, and with the same doe moue the hearers, and supple them to beleue how that is true which they go about to persuaide. For which cause *Cicero* said, Action is that which ought to be gouerned by the motion of the bodie, by the gesture, by the countenance, and by the confirmation and varietie of the voice. As if hee should say: Action ought to be directed in making the motions and gestures, which are requisite for the things that are spoken, lifting vp and falling with the voice, growing passionate, and suddainly turning to appeasement; one while speaking fast, another while leisurely, reproouing

reproouing, and cherishing, moouing the bodie, sometimes to the one side, sometimes to the other, plucking in the armes, and stretching them out, laughing and weeping: and vpon some occasions beating the hands together. This grace is so important in preachers, that by the same alone (wanting both inuention and disposition) of matters of small value and ordinarie, they make a sermon which filleth the audience with astonishment, for that they haue this action, which otherwise is tearmed spirit or pronuntiation. Herein falleth a thing worth the marking, whereby is discourred, how much this grace can preuaile; and it is, that the sermons which through the much action and much spirit doe please much, when they be set downe in writing, are nothing worth, nor will any welneere vouchsafe their reading: and this groweth, because with the pen it is impossible to pourtray those motions and those gestures, which in the pulpit so far wau mens likings. Other sermons shew very well in paper; but at their preaching no man listeth to giue eare, because that action is not giuen them, which is requisite at euery close. And therefore *Plato* said, that the stile wherewith we speake, is far different from that which we write well, wherethrough we see many men who can speake very well, do yet endite but meanely, and others contrariwise, endite very well, and discourse but harshly: all which is to be reduced to action, and action (for certaiue) is a worke of the imagination, for all that which we haue vttered thereof, maketh figure, correspondence, and good consonance.

The fift grace, is, to know how to assemble and alleage good examples and comparisons, which better contenteth the hearers humour than any thing els: For by a fit example they easily vnderstand the doctrine, and with-

out the same it soone slippeth out of their mind : whereon *Aristotle* propoundeth this question, Whence it riseth, that men (in making speeches) are better pleased with examples and fables than with conceits, as if he should say, For what occasion doe such as come to heare Oratours, make more reckoning of the examples and fables which they alleage, to proue the things that they striue to persuade, than of the arguments and reasons which they frame? and to those he answereth, That by examples and fables men learne best, because it is a prooffe which appertaineth to the sence, but arguments and reasons hold not the like reason, for that they are a worke whereto is requisit much vnderstanding. And for this cause Christ our redeemer in his sermons vsed so many parables and comparisons, because by them he gaue to vnderstand many diuine secrets. This point of deuising fables and comparisons, it is a thing certaine, that the same is performed by the imagination, for it is figure, and denoteth good correspondence and similitude.

The sixth proprietie of a good Oratour, is, to haue a readie tongue of his own, and not affected, choice words, and many gracious sorts of vtterance: of which graces we haue entreated oftentimes heretofore, prouing, that the one part of them appertaineth to the imagination, and the other to a good memorie.

The seventh proprietie of a good Oratour, is that which *Cicero* speaketh of: furnished with voice, with action, and with comelineffe, the voice full and ringing, pleasing to the hearers, not harsh, not hoarse, nor sharpe: and although it be true, that this springeth from the temperature of the breast and the throat, and not from the imagination; yet sure it is, that from the same temperature from which a good imagination groweth, namely,  
hear,

heat, a good voice also fetcheth his originall, and to know this, importeth much for our purpose: For the Schoole-divines in that they are of a cold and drie complexion, cannot haue their voice a good instrument: and this is a great defect in a pulpit.

This same *Aristotle* also proueth, alleaging the example of old men, by reason of their coldnesse and drinessse. To haue a full and cleare voice, much heat is requisite to enlarge the passages and measurable moisture, which may supple and soften them. And also *Aristotle* demaundeth why all who by nature are hot, are also big voiced? For which cause we see the contrarie in women and Eunuchs, who through the much coldnesse of their complexion (saith *Galen*) haue their throat and voice very delicat, in sort, that when we heare a good voice, we can straightwaies say, it comes of much heat and moisture in the breast: which two qualities, if they passe so far as the braine, make the vnderstanding to decay, and the memorie and imagination to increase, which are the two powers wherof the good preacher serueth himselfe to content his auditorie.

The eight propertie of a good Oratour (sayth *Cicero*) is to haue tounge at will, ready, and well exercised: which grace cannot befall men of great vnderstanding, for, that it may be readie, it behooueth the same to partake much heat, and much drouth; and this cannot light in the melancholicke, either naturall, or by adustion. *Aristotle* proueth it, by asking this question, Whence cometh it, that such as haue an impediment in their speech, are reputed to be of complexion melancholicke? To which problem he answereth very vntowardly, saying, That the melancholicke haue a great imagination, and that the tongue cannot hast to vter so fast as the imagination concei-

conceiueth, wherethrough they stammer and stumble : which yet proceedeth from nought else, saue that the melancholicke haue euer their mouth full of froath and spittle, through which disposition their tongue is moist and slipper; which thing may euidently bee discerned, considering the often spitting of such. This selfe reason did *Aristotle* render, when he demaunded, Whence it groweth, that some are so slow tongued: and he answereth, That such haue their tongue very cold and moist, which two qualities breed an impediment therein, and make it subiect to the palsie; and so you see his conceit of the imagination cannot follow: for this he yeeldeth a profitable remedie, *vz.* to drinke a little wine, or at first to hallow somewhat lowd, before they speake in the presence of their audience; for thereby the tongue getteth heat, and drieth.

But *Aristotle* sayth further, That not to speake plaine, may grow from hauing the tongue very hot and very drie, and voucheth the example\* of chollericke persons; who growing in choller, cannot speake, and when they are void of persion and choller, they are very eloquent: the contrarie betideth to the flegmaticke, who being quiet, cannot talke, and when they are angered, vtter speeches of great eloquence. The reason of this is very manifest, for although it is true, that heat aideth the imagination, and the tongue also, yet the same may also breed them damage: first, for that they want supplie of replies and wittie sentences, as also because the tongue cannot pronounce plainely, through ouer-much drinesse; wherethrough we see, that after a man hath drunke a little water, he speaketh better.

The chollericke (being quiet) deliuer very well, for they then retaine that point of heat which is requisit for the

the tongue, and the good imagination; but in anger, the heat groweth beyond due, and turneth the imagination topsie turvie: The Slegmaticke vnincensed, haue their braine very cold and moist, and therefore are set a ground what to say, and their tongue is ouer slipper through too much moisture; but when they are set on fire and in choller, the heat forthwith getteth vp, and so listeth vp the imagination; by which meanes there comes to their mind much what to deliuer, and the tongue giueth no hinderance, for that it is heated: these haue no great vaine in verisifying, for that they are cold of braine, who yet (once angred) doe then make verses best, and with most facilitie, against such as haue stirred them: and to this purpose *Iuuenall* sayd:

*Anger makes verse, if Nature but denie.*

Through the defect of tongue, men of great vnderstanding cannot be good Orators or preachers, and specially for that action requireth a speech sometimes high, and sometimes low, and those who are slow tongued, cannot pronounce but with loud voice, and in a manner crying out, and this is one of the things which soonest cloyeth the hearers: whereon *Aristotle* moueth this doubt: Whence it springeth, that men of slow tongue cannot speake lost? To which problem he answereth very well, saying, That the tongue which is fastened to the roose of the mouth, by reason of much moisture, is better loosened with a force, than if you put thereto but little might: as if one would lift vp a lance, taking the same by the point, he shall sooner raise it at one push and with a force, than taking it vp by little and little.

Me seemeth, I haue sufficiently proued, that the good naturall qualities which a perfect Orator ought to haue, spring for the most part from a good imagination, and  
some

some from the memorie. And if it be true that the good preachers of our time content their audience, because they haue these gifts; it followeth very well, that whoso, euer is a great preacher, can small skill of Schoole-di- uinitie, and a great scholler will hardly away with preaching, through the contrarietie which the vnder- standing carrieth to the imagination and to the memo- rie. Well knew *Aristotle* by experience, that although the Oratour learned Naturall and Morall Philosophie, Phisicke, Metaphisicke, the Lawes, the Mathematics, Astrologie, and all the arts and sciences; notwithstanding he was scene of all these but in the flowers and choice sentences, without piercing to the root of the reason and occasion of any of them: But he thought, that this not knowing the Diuinitie, nor the cause of things, which is tearmed *Propter quid*, grew, for that they bent not themselues thereunto, and therefore propounded this demand: Why do we imagine, that a Philosopher is dif- ferent from an Oratour? To which problem he answer- eth, that the Philosopher placeth all his studie in know- ing the reason and cause of euery effect, and the Oratour in knowing the effect, and no farther. And verily it pro- ceedeth from nought els, than for that naturall Philoso- phie appertaineth to the vnderstanding, which power the Orators do want; and therefore in Philosophie they can pierce no farther than into the vpper skin of things. This selfe difference there is betweene the Schoole-di- uine and the positiue, that the one knoweth the cause of whatsoeuer importeth his facultie; and the other, the pro- positions which are verified, and no more. The case then standing thus, it falleth out a dangerous matter, that the preacher enioyeth an office and authoritie to instruct Christian people in the truth, and that their auditorie is bound

bound to beleue them, and yet they want that power, through which the truth is digged vp from the root, we may say of them (without lying) those words of Christ our redeemer, Let them go, they are blind, and doe guide the blind; and if the blind guide the blind, both fall into the ditch. It is a thing intollerable to behold, with how great audacitie such set themselves to preach, who cannot one iot of Schoole diuinitie, nor haue any naturall abilitie to learne the same.

Of such *S. Paul* greatly complaineth, saying; But the end of the commandement is charitie from a pure heart and good conscience, and faith vnfained, from which (verily) some straying, haue turned aside to vaine babling: who would be doctors in the Law, and yet vnderstand not the things which they speake, nor which they auouch.

Besides this, we haue proued tofore, that those who haue much imagination, are cholericke, subtille, malignant, and cauillers, and alwaies enclined to euill, which they can compasse with much readinesse and craft. Touching the Oratours of his time, *Aristotle* propoundeth this demand, Why we vse to call an Oratour craftie, and giue not this name to a musitian, nor to a comickall poet? And more would this difficultie haue growne, if *Aristotle* had vnderstood, that musicke and the stage appertaine to the imaginatiō. To which problem he answereth, That Musicians and stage-players shooe at none other Butte, than to delight the hearers; but the Oratour goes about to purchase somewhat for himselfe, and therefore it behooueth him to vse rules and readinesse, to the end the hearers may not smell out his fetch and beite.

Such properties as these be, had those false preachers, of whom *S. Paul* spake, writing to the Corinthians: But I feare, that as the serpent beguiled *Eue* with his subtiltie;

so their senses are led astray: for these false Apostles are guilefull workemen, who transformed themselves into the Apostles of Christ; and this is no wonder: for Satan transformed himselfe into an Angell of light, and therefore it is no great matter for his ministers to transforme themselves as ministers of iustice, whose end shall be their worke: as if he should say, I have great feare (my brethren) that as the serpent beguiled *Eve* with his subtiltie and mallice, so they also intricate their judgement and perseuerance: for these false Apostles are like potage made of a foxe. Preachers who speake vnder wiles, represent very perfectly a kind of holinesse, seeme the Apostles of Iesus Christ, and yet are disciples of the diuell, who can skill so well to represent an Angell of light, that there needeth not a supernaturall gift to discover what he is: and since the maister can play his part so well, it is not strange, that they also who have learned his doctrine, practise the semblable, whose end shall be none other than their workes. All these properties are well knowne to appertaine to the imagination, and that *Aristotle* said very well, That Orators are subtil and readie, because they are euer in hand to get somewhat for themselves.

Such as possesse a forcible imagination, we said before, that they are of complexion very hote, and from this qualitie spring three principall vices in a man; Pride, Gluttonie, and Letherie: for which cause the Apostle said: Such serued not our Lord Iesus Christ, but their bellie.

And that these three euill inclinations spring from heat, and the contrarie vertues from cold, *Aristotle* pro-ueth, saying thus: And therefore it holdeth the same force to shape conditions, for heat and cold (more than any thing

thing els which is in the bodie) doe season manners, and therefore printeth and worketh in vs the qualities of manners: as if he should say, from heat and cold spring all the conditions of man: for these two qualities doe more alter our nature than any other: For which cause, men of great imagination are ordinarily bad and vicious: for they abandon themselves to be guided by their naturall inclination, and haue wit and abilitie to doe lewdly. For which cause the same *Aristotle* asketh, Whence it groweth, that a man being so much instructed, is yet the most vniust of all liuing creatures? To which problem he maketh answer, that man hath much wit, and a great imagination, and for this he findeth many waies to doe ill, and (as by his nature he coueteth delights, and to be superiour to all, and of great happinesse) it is of force that he offend; for these things cannot be atchieued, but by doing wrong to many: but *Aristotle* wilt not how to frame this problem, nor to yeeld a fitting answer.

Better might hee haue enquired, for what cause the worst people are commonly of greatest wit, and amongst those, such as are best furnished with abilitie, commit the lewdest prancks: whereas of due, a good wit and sufficiencie should rather encline a man to vertue and godlinesse, than to vices and misdoing. The answer hereto is, for that those who partake much heat, are men of great imagination, and the same qualitie which maketh them wittie, traineth them to be naughtie and vicious. But when the vnderstanding ouerruleth, it ordinarily inclineth a man to vertue, because this power is founded on cold and drie. From which two qualities bud many vertues, as are Continencie, Humilitie, Temperance: and from heat the contrarie. And if *Aristotle* had knowne this point of Philosophie, he should haue been.

been able to answer this problem, which saith; *W* hence may it proceed, that that sort of men whom we call craftsmen of *Butcher*, or stage-players, are for the most part ill conditioned: as if he should say: for what cause are such as gaine their liuing on the stage, *Inne-keepers*, and *Butchers*, and those whose seruice is vsed about feasts and banquets to order the cates, ordinarily naught and vitious? To which problem he answereth, saying; That such by being occupied in these belly cheare offices, leaue themselves no leisure to studie, and therefore passe ouer their life in incontinencie. And hereto is pouertie also aiding, which accustomably bringeth with it manie euils: but (verely) this is not the reason; but playing on the stage and ordering of feasts springeth from the difference of the imagination, which inuitheth a man to this manner of life. And because this difference of imagination consisteth in heat, all of them haue very good stomackes and great appetite to eat and drinke. These although they gaue themselves to learning, should thereby reape little fruit; and had they beene neuer so wealthie, yet would they (howsoeuer) haue cast their affection to these seruices, were they euen baser than they are: for the wit and abilitie draweth euery one to that art, which answereth it in proportion.

For this cause *Aristotle* demaunded, what the reason was, why there are men who more willingly addiect themselves to the profession of which they haue made choice, (though somwhiles vnworthie) than to the more honourable? As for example, to be rather a iugler, a stage-player, or a trumpeter, than an *Astrologer* or an *Orator*? To which problem he answereth very well, saying; That a man soone discerneth to what art he is disposed and inclined of his owne nature, because hee hath somewhat within

within that teacheth him, and Nature can doe so much with her pricks, that albeit the art and office be vnseemly for the calling of the learner, yet he cleaueth vnto that, and not to others of great imagination. But since we haue put by this manner of wits from the function of preaching, and that we are bound to giue and bestow vpon euery difference of abilitie, that sort of learning which is answerable thereto in particular: we must likewise determin what sort of wit he ought to be endowed withall, vnto whose charge the function of preaching is to be committed, which is the thing that most importeth the Christian commonwealth: For we must conceiue, that albeit we haue proued heretofore, that it is a matter repugnant in nature, to find a great wit accompanied with much imagination and memorie. Notwithstanding, this rule holdeth not so vniuersally in all arts, but that it admitteth his exceptions, and sometimes cometh short.

In the last chapter of this worke saue one, we will proue at full, that if Nature be possessed of her due force, and haue no impediment cast athwart to stop her, she maketh so perfect a difference of wit, as the same vniteth in one selfe subiect a great vnderstanding, with much imagination and memorie, as if they were not contrarie, nor held any naturall opposition.

This should be a fitting abilitie, and conuenient for the function of preaching, if there could be found many subiects to be endowed therewith; but (as we will shew in the place alleaged) they are so few, that of 100000 whom I haue measured, I can meet but with one of the size. Therefore it behooueth to seeke out another more familiar difference of wit, though not so far stept in perfection as the former. We must then weete, that between

the Physicians and Philosophers riseth a great diuersitie in opinions, for resolving the temperature and the quality of vinegar, of choller adust, and of ashes; in as much as these things sometimes worke the effect of heat, and sometimes of cold; and thereon they deuided themselves into diuers sects: but the truth is, that all these things which suffer adustion, and are consumed and burned by the fire, haue a variable temperature. The greater part of the subiect is cold and drie, but there are also other parts entermingled, so subtile and delicate, and of such seruencie and heat, that albeit they containe little in quantity, yet they carie more efficacie in working than all the rest of the subiect.

So we see that vinegar and melancholic through adustion open and leauen the earth by meanes of the heat, and close it not, though the more part of these humours be cold. Hence is gathered, that the melancholicke by adustion, accompanie great vnderstanding with much imagination; but they are all weake of memorie, for the much adustion much also drieth & hardeneth the braine. These are good preachers, or (at least) the best that may be found, sauing those perfect ones of whom we speake: for although memorie faile them, they enioy of themselves such inuention, that the very imagination sequeth them in stead of memorie and remembrance; and minisreth vnto them figures and sentences to deliuer, without that they stand in need of ought besides. Which these cannot bring about, who haue conned bosome-sermons, and swaruing from that byas, are straight set a ground, without hauing the furniture of any second meanes, to bring themselves afloat againe. And that melancholic by adustion hath this varietie of temperature; namely, cold and drie for the vnderstanding, and heat for

for the imagination, *Aristotle* declareth in these words : Melancholicke men are variable and vnequall : for the force of choller adust is variable and vnequall ; as if the same might be greatly both hot and cold, and as if he had said, Melancholike men by adustion are variable and vnequall in their complexion : for that choller adust is very vnequall, in as much as sometimes it is exceeding hot, and sometimes cold beyond measure.

The signes by which men of this temperatūre may be knowne, are very manifest : they haue the colour of their countenance a darke greene, or fallow, their eies very fierie ; of whom it was sayd, he is a man that hath blood in his eyes, their haire blacke and bald, their flesh leane, rough and hairie, their veines big, they are of very good conuersation, and affable, but lecherous, proud, stately, blasphemers, wily, double, iniurious, friends of ill doing ; and desirous of reuenge : this is to be vnderstood when melancholie is kindled, but if it be cooled, soorthwith there grow in them the contrarie vertues, chastitie, humilitie, feare and reuerence of God, charitie, mercie, and great acknowledgement of their sins, with sighings and teares, for which cause they liue in continuall warre and strife, without euer enioying ease or rest. Sometimes vice preuaileth in them, sometimes vertue : but with all these defects, they are wittiest, and most able for the function of preaching, and for all matters of wisdom which befall in the world ; for they haue an vnderstanding to know the truth, and a great imagination to be able to persuaade the same.

Wherethrough we see that which God did when he would fashion a man in his mothers wombe, to the end that he might be able to discouer to the world, the coming of his son, and haue the way to prooue and per-

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surade, That Christ was the Messias, and promised in the law. For making him of great vnderstanding, & of much imagination, it fell out of necessitie (keeping the naturall order) that hee should also make him cholericke and adust. And that this is true, may easily be vnderstood by him, who considereth the great fire and furie with which he persecuted the church, the griefe conceived by the synagogues, when they saw him conuerted, as they who had forgone a man of high importance, and of whom the contrarie,partie had made a gainefull purchase. It is also knowne by the tokens of the reasonable choller, with which he spake and answered the deputie, Consuls, and the Iudges who had arrested him : defending his owne person and the name of Christ with so great art and readinesse, as he conuincd them all : yet he had an imperfection in his tongue, and was not very prompt of speech, which *Aristotle* affirmeth to be a property of the melancholicke by adustion. The vices whereto he confessed himselfe to be subiect before his conuersion, shew him to haue been of this temperature : he was a blasphemer, a wrong doer, and a persecutor : all which springeth from abundance of heat. But the most euident signe which shewed that he was cholericke adust, is gathered from that battaile which himselfe confesseth hee had within himselfe, betwixt his part superiour and inferiour, saying; I see another law in my members struiuing against the law of my mind, which leadeth me into the bondage of sinne. And this selfe contention haue we prooued (by the mind of *Aristotle*) to be in the melancholicke by adustion.

True it is that some expound (very well) that this battaile groweth from the disorder which originall sinne made betweene the spirit and the flesh ; albeit being such  
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and so great, I belecue also that it springs from the choller adust, which he had in his naturall constitution : for the roiall prophet *David* participated equally of originall sin, and yet complained not so much as did *S. Paul*; but saith, That he found the inferiour portion accorded with his reason, when he would reioice with God: My heart (saith he) and my flesh ioyed in the liuing God. And (as we will touch in the last chapter saue one) *David* possessed the best temperature that Nature could frame : and hereof we will make prooffe by the opinion of all the Philosophers, that the same ordinarily enclineth a man to be vertuous without any great gaine-striving of the flesh. The wits then which are to be sorted out for preachers, are first these who vnite a great vnderstanding with much imagination and memorie, whose signs shall be expressed in the last chapter saue one. Where such want, there succeed in their roome the melancholick by adustion. Those vnite a great vnderstanding with much imagination, but suffer defect of memorie ; wherethrough they are not stored with copie of words, nor can preach with full store in presence of the people.

In the third rancke succeed men of great vnderstanding; but defectiue in their imagination and memorie. These shall haue but a bad grace in preaching; yet will preach sound doctrine. The last whom I would not charge with preaching at all, are such as vnite much memorie with much imagination, and haue defect of vnderstanding. These draw the auditorie after them, and hold them in suspence and well pleased : but when they least misdoubt it, they fetch a turne to the holy house : for by way of their sweet discourses and blessings they beguile the innocent.

## CHAP. XI.

*That the Theoricke of the lawes appertaineth to the memorie, and pleading and iudging (which are their practise) to the understanding, and the governing of a common-wealth to the imagination.*

**I**N the Spanish tongue, it is not void of a mysterie, that this word (Lettered) being a common tearme for all men of letters or learning, as well Diuines, as Lawyers, Phisitions, Logicians, Philosophers, Orators, Mathematicians, and Astrologers, yet in saying that such a one is learned, we all vnderstand it by common sence, that he maketh profession of the lawes, as if this were their proper and peculiar title, and not of the residue.

The answer of this doubt, though it be easie, yet to yeeld the same such as is requisit, it beliooueth first to be acquainted what law is, and whereunto they are bound, who set themselues to studie that profession, that afterwards they may employ the same to vse, when they are iudges or pleaders. The law (who so well considereth thereof) is nought else, but a reasonable will of the law-maker, by which he declareth, in what sort he will that the cases which happen dayly in the common-wealth, be decided, for preseruing the subiects in peace, and directing them in what sort they are to liue, and what things they are to restraints.

I sayd, a reasonable will, because it sufficeth not, that the king or emperour (who are the efficient cause of the lawes) declaring his will in what sort fouer, doth thereby

by make it a law, for if the same be not iust, and grounded vpon reason, it cannot be called a law, neither is it: euen as he cannot be termed a man who wanteth a reasonable soule. Therefore it is a matter established by common accord, that kings enact their lawes with assent of men very wise and of sound iudgement, to the end they may be right, iust, and good, and that the subiects may receiue them with good will, and be the more bound to obserue and obey them. The materiall cause of the law is, that it consist of such cases as accustomably befall in the commonwealth, according to the order of nature, and not of things impossible, or such as betide very sildome. The finall cause is, to order the life of man and to direct him what he is to do, and what to forbear, to the end that being conformed to reason, the commonwealth may be preserved in peace. For this cause we see, that the lawes are written in plaine words, not doubtfull, nor obscure, nor of double vnderstanding, without ciphers, and without abbreviations, and so easie and manifest, that whosoeuer shall read them, may readily vnderstand and retaine them in memorie. And because no man should pretend ignorance, they are publickely proclaimed, that whosoeuer afterward breaketh them, may be chastised.

In respect therefore of the care and diligence which the good lawmakers vse, that their lawes may be iust and plaine, they haue giuen in charge to the iudges and pleaders, that in actions or iudgements none of them follow his owne sence, but suffer himselfe to be guided by the authoritie of the lawes: as if they should say, We commaund, that no iudge or aduocat imploy his conceit, nor intermeddle in deciding whether the law be iust or vniust, nor yeeld it any other sence than that that

is contained in the text of the letter. So it followeth, that the Lawyers are to construe the text of the law, and to take that sence which is gathered out of the construction thereof, and none other.

This doctrine thus presupposed, it falleth out a matter very manifest, for what reason the Lawyers are termed lettered, and other men of learning not so, for this name is deriued from the word letter, which is to say, a man who is not licenced to follow the capacitie of his owne vnderstanding, but is enforced to ensue the sence of the very letter. And for that the well practised in this profession haue so construed it, they dare not denie or affirme any thing which appertaineth to the determination of any case whatsoeuer, vnlesse they haue lying before them some law, which in expresse termes decideth the same. And if sometimes they speake of their owne head, interlacing their conceit and reason, without grounding vpon some law, they doe it with feare and bashfulnesse: for which cause is a much worn prouerbe, VVe blush when we speake without law. Diuines cannot call themselues lettered in this signification, for in the holy Scripture the letter killeth, and the spirit giueth life; it is full of mysteries, replenished with figures and cyphers, obscure, and not vnderstood by all readers, the vowels and phrases of speech hold a very different signification from that which the vulgar and three-tongued men doe know. Therefore whosoever shall set himselfe to construe the letter, and take the sence which riseth of that Grammaticall construction, shall fall into many errors.

The Physitions also haue no letter whereto to submit themselues, for if *Hippocrates* and *Galen*, and the other graue authors of this facultie, say and affirme one thing, and that experience and reason approue the contrarie, they

they are not bound to follow them: for in Phisicke, experience beareth more sway than reason, and reason more than authoritie: but in the lawes it betideth quite contrarie, for their authoritie and that which they determine, is of more force and vigour than all the reasons that may be alleaged to the contrarie. Which being so, we haue the way layed open before vs, to assigne what wit is requisit for the lawes. For if a Lawyer haue his vnderstanding and imagination tied to follow that which the law auouched, without aiding or diminishing, it falleth out apparant, that this facultie appertaineth to the memorie, and that the thing wherein they must labour, is, to know the number of the lawes, and of the rules which are in the text, and to call to remembrance each of them in particular, and to rehearse at large his sentence and determination, to the end, that when occasion is ministred, we may know there is a law which giueth decision, and in what forme and manner. Therefore to my seeming, it is a better difference of wit for a lawyer to haue much memorie and litle vnderstanding, than much vnderstanding and litle memorie. For if there fall out no occasion of employing his wit and abilitie, and that he must haue at his fingers ends so great a number of lawes as are extant, and so far different from the other, with so many exceptions, limitations, and enlargements; it serues better to know by heart what hath beene determined in the lawes for euery point which shall come in question, than to discourse with the vnderstanding in what sort the same might haue beene determined: for the one of these is necessarie, and the other impertinent, since none other opinion than the very determination of the law must beare the stroke.

So it fals out for certaine, that the Theoricke of the law

law appertaineth to the memorie and not to the vnderstanding, nor to the imagination: for which reason, and for that the lawes are so positiue, and that because the Lawyers haue their vnderstanding so tied to the will of the law-maker, and cannot entermingle their owne resolution, saue in case where they rest vncertaine of the determination of the law, when any client seeketh their iudgement, they haue authoritie and licence to say, I will looke for the case in my booke: which if the Phisition should answere when he is asked a remedie for some disease, or the Diuine in cases of conscience; we would repute them for men but simply seene in the facultie whereof they make profession. And the reason hereof is, that those sciences haue certaine vniuersall principles and definitions, vnder which the particular cases are contained; but in the law facultie euery law containeth a seuerall particular case, without hauing any affinitie with the next, though they both be placed vnder one title. In respect whereof, it is necessarie to haue a notice of all the lawes, and to studie each one in particular, and distinctly to lay them vp in memorie. But here against *Plato* noteth a thing worthie of great consideration; and that is, how in his time a learned man was held in suspicion that he knew many lawes by heart, seeing by experience that such were not so skilfull iudges and pleaders, as this their vaunt seemed to pretend. Of which effect it appeareth he could not find out the cause, seeing in a place so conuenient he did not report the same; onely he saw by experience, that Lawyers endowed with good memorie, being set to defend a cause, or to giue a sentence, applied not their reasons so well as was conuenient.

The reason of this effect may easily be rendered in my doctrine, presupposing that memorie is contrarie to the

the vnderstanding, and that the true interpretation of the lawes, to amplifie, reſtraine, and compound them, with their contraries and compositions, is done by diſtinguiſhing, concluding, arguing, iudging, and chuſing: which workes we haue often ſaid heretofore belong to diſcourſe, and the learned man poſſeſſing much memorie, cannot by poſſibilitie enioy them.

We haue alſo noted heretofore, that memorie ſupplieth none other office in the head, than faithfully to preſerue the figures and fantasies of things: but the vnderſtanding and the imagination, are thoſe which worke therewithall.

And if a learned man haue the whole art of memory, and yet want vnderſtanding and imagination, hee hath no more ſufficiencie to iudge or plead, than the verie *Code* or *Digeſt*, which compaſſing within the all the laws and rules of reaſon, for all that cannot write one letter. Moreouer, albeit it be true that the law ought to be ſuch as we haue mentioned in his definition; yet it falleth out a miracle to find thinges with all the perfections, which the vnderſtanding attributeth vnto them. That the law be iuſt and reaſonable, and that it proceed fully to all that which may happen, that it be written in plaine termes, void of doubt and oppoſitions, and that it receiue not diuerſe conſtructions, we ſee not alwaies accompliſhed: for in conſequence, it was eſtabliſhed by mans counſell, and that is not of force ſufficient to giue order for all that may betide: and this is daily ſeene by experience, for after a law hath been enacted with great aduiſement and counſell, the ſame (in ſhort ſpace) is abrogated againe; for when it is once publiſhed and put in practice, a thouſand inconueniences diſcouer themſelues: whereof (when it was perſuaded) no man tooke regard: and therefore

fore kings and emperours are aduised by the same lawes, that they shame not to amend and correct their lawes: for, in a word, men they are, and manuell there is none if they commit an error, so much the rather, for that no law can comprehend in wordes and sentences all the circumstances of the case which it decideth: for the craft of bad people is more wily to find holes than that of good men to foresee how they are to be gouerned; and therefore it was said, Neither the lawes nor the resolutions of the Senate can be set downe in writing in such sort, that all the cases which feuerally chance, may be comprised therein; but it sufficeth to comprehend the things which fall out ofteneft: and if other cases succeed afterward, for which no law is enacted, it decideth them in proper tearmes.

The law facultie is not so bare of rules and principles, but that if the iudge or pleader haue a good discourse, to know how to applie them, they may find their true determination and defence, and whence to gather the same. In sort, that if the cases be more in number than the lawes, it behooueth, that in the iudge and in the pleader there be much discourse to make new lawes, and that not at all aduentures: but such as reason (by his consonance) may receiue them without contradiction. This the Lawyers of much memorie cannot doe: for if the cases which the law thrusteth into their mouth, bee not squared and chewed to their hands, they are to seeke what to doe. We are woont to resemble a Lawyer, who can rehearse many lawes by heart, to a regrater or hosier that hath many paires of hosen readie made in his shop, who, to deliuer you one that may fit you, must make you to assay them all: and if none agree with the buiers measure, he must send him away hoselesse. But a  
learned

learned man of good vnderstanding, is like a good tailor, who hath his sheeres in his hand, and his peece of cloth on the table, and taking measure, cutteth his hosen after his stature that demandeth them.

The sheeres of a good pleader is his sharpe vnderstanding, with which he taketh measure of the case, and apparelleth the same with that law which may decide it: and if he find not a whole one that may determine it in expresse tearmes, he maketh one of many peeces, and therewith vseth the best defence that he may. The lawyers who are endowed with such a wit and abilitie, are not to be tearmed lettered: for they construe not the letter, neither bind themselues to the formall words of the law; but it seemeth they are law-makers, or counsellors at law, of whom the lawes themselues enquire and demaund how they shall determine: for if they haue power and authority to interpret them, to reauce, to adde, and to gather out of them exceptions, and fallacies, and that they may correct and amend them; it was not vnfitly said, That they seeme to be law-makers.

Of this sort of knowledge it was spoken: By the knowledge of the lawes it is not meant to con their words by rote; but to take notice of their force and power: as if he should say, Let no man thinke, that to know the lawes, is to beare in mind the formall words with which they are written; but to vnderstand how far their forces extend, and what the point is which they may decide: for their reason is subiect to many varieties, by meanes of the circumstances as well of time as of person, of place, of manner, of matter, of cause, and of the thing it selfe. All which breedeth an alteration in the decision of the law, and if the iudge or pleader bee not endowed with discourse, to gather out of the law, or to take

take away or adioine that which the law selfe doth not expresse in words, he shall commit many errors in following the letter: for it hath been said, that the words of the law are not to be taken after the Iewish manner, that is, to construe onely the letter, and so take the sence thereof.

On the things alreadie alleaged, we conclude, that pleading is a worke of discourse, and that if the learned in the lawes possesse much memorie, he shall be vntoward to iudge or plead through the repugnancie of these two powers. And this is the cause for which the learned of so ripe memorie (whom *Plato* mentioneth) could not defend well their clients causes, nor applie the lawes. But in this doctrine there presents it selfe a doubt, and that (in mine opinion) not of the lightest: for if the discourse be that which putteth the case in the law, and which determineth the same by distinguishing, limiting, amplifying, inferring, and answering the arguments of the contrarie partie, how is it possible that the discourse may compasse all this, if the memorie set not downe all the lawes before it? for (as we haue aboue remembered) it is commanded, that no man in actions or iudgements shall vse his owne sence, but leaue himselfe to be guided by the authoritie of the lawes. Conformable hereunto, it behooueth first to know all the lawes and rules of the law facultie, ere we can take hold of that which maketh to the purpose of our case. For albeit we haue said, that the pleader (of good vnderstanding) is lord of the lawes: yet it is requisit that all his reasons and arguments be grounded on the principles of this facultie, without which they are of none effect or valure. And to be able to doe this, it behooueth to haue much memorie that may preferue and retaine so great a number of lawes which

which are written in the bookes.

This argument prooueth it to be necessarie, to the end a pleader may be accomplished, that there bee vnited in him a great discourse and much memorie. All which I confesse, but that which I would say, is, that since we cannot find great discourse vnited with much memorie, through the repugnancie which they carrie ech to other, it is requisit that the pleader haue much discourse and little memory, rather than much memory & little discourse: for to the default of memorie are found many remedies; as bookes, tables, alphabets, and other things deuised by men: but if discourse faile, there can nothing bee found to remedie the same.

Besides this, *Aristotle* saith, that men of great discourse though they haue a feeble memorie, yet they haue much remembrance, by which they retaine a certaine diffuse notice of things they haue seene, heard, and read: wherevpon discoursing, they call them to memorie. And albeit they had not so many remedies to present vnto the vnderstanding the whole bodie of the ciuile law: yet the lawes are grounded on so great reason, as *Plato* reporteth, that the antients termed the law Wisdom and Reason. Therefore the iudge or pleader, of great discourse, though iudging or counselling he haue not the law before him; yet seldome shall he commit an error: for he hath with him the instrument, with which the Emperours made the lawes. Whence oftentimes it falleth out, that a Iudge of good wit giueth a sentence, without knowing the decision of the law; and afterwards findeth the same so ruled in his books: and the like we see sometimes betideth the pleaders when they giue their iudgement in a case without studying. The lawes and rules of reason, whosoeuer well marketh them, are the fountaine

taine and originall, whence the pleaders gather their arguments and reasons, to prooue what they vndertake. And this worke (for certaine) is performed by the discourse: which power if the pleader want, he shall neuer skill to shape an argument, though he haue the whole ciuill law at his fingers ends. This we see plainly to befall in such as studie the art of Oratorie, when the aptnesse thereunto is failing: for though they learne by art the Topicks of *Cicero*, being the spring from which flow the arguments that may be inuented to prooue euery problem, both on the affirmatiue and the negatiue part: yet they cannot thereout shape a reason. Again, there come others of great wit and towardnesse; who without looking in booke, or studying the Topicks, make a hundred arguments seruing for the purpose, as occasion requireth.

This selfe falleth out in the Lawyers of good memorie, who will recite you a whole text very perfectly, and yet of so great a multitude of lawes as are comprised therein, cannot collect so much as one argument to prooue their inuention. And contrariwise, others who haue studied simply without bookes, and without allowance, worke miracles in pleading of causes. Hence we know, how much it importeth the common-wealth, that there may be such an election and examination of wits for the sciences; in as much as some without art know and vnderstand what they are to effect: and others laden with precepts and rules, for that they want a conuenient towardlinesse for practise, commit a thousand absurdities, which very ill beseeme them. So then, if to iudge and plead, be effected by distinguishing, inferring, arguing, and chusing, it standeth with reason, that whosoever setteth himselfe to studie the lawes, enioy a good vnder-

vnderstanding, seeing that such actions appertaine to this  
 power, and not to the memorie or to the imagination.  
 How we may finde whether a child be endowed with  
 this difference of wit or no, it would doe well to vnder-  
 stand: but first it behooueth to lay downe what are the  
 qualities of discourse, and how manie differences it com-  
 priseth in it selfe, to the end we may likewise know with  
 distinction, to which of these the lawes appertaine: for  
 the first, we must weet, that albeit the vnderstanding be  
 the most noble power, and of greatest dignitie in man:  
 yet there is none which is more easily led into errour  
 (as touching the trueth) then the vnderstanding. This  
*Aristotle* attempted to prooue when he said, That the  
 sense is euer true, but the vnderstanding (for the most  
 part) discourseth badly: the which is plainly seen by ex-  
 perience: for if it were not so amongst the Diuines, the  
 Phisitions, the Philosophers, and the Lawyers, there  
 would not fall out so many weightie dissensions, so di-  
 uers opinions, and so many judgements and conceits  
 vpon euery point, seeing the truth is neuer more than  
 one. Whence it groweth, that the senses hold so great  
 a certaintie in their objects, and the vnderstanding is so  
 easily beguiled in his; may well be conceiued, if we con-  
 sider that the objects of the five senses, and the species by  
 which they are knowne, haue their being reall, firme, and  
 stable by nature, before they are knowne: but that truth  
 which is to be contemplated by the vnderstanding, if it  
 selfe doe not frame and fashion the same, it hath no for-  
 mall being of his owne; but is wholly scattered and lose  
 in his materials, as a house conuerted into stones, earth,  
 timber & tiles, with which so many errors may be com-  
 mitted in building, as there shall men set themselves to  
 build with ill imagination.

The like befalleth in the building which the vnderstanding raiseth when it frameth a truth : for if the wit be not good, all the residue will worke a thousand follies with the selfesame principles . Hence springs it that amongst men there are so sundrie opinions touching one selfe matter : for euery one maketh the composition and figure such as is his vnderstanding.

From these errours and opinions are the five senses free: for neither the eyes make the colour, nor the tast the saours, nor the feeling the palpable qualities ; but the whole is made and compounded by nature before anie of them be acquainted with his obiekt . Men because they carrie not regard to this bad operation of the vnderstanding , take hardinesse to deliuer confidently their owne opinion, without knowing (in certaintie) of what sort their wit is, and whither it can fashion a truth well or ill. And if we be not resolu'd herēin, let vs aske some of these learned men, who after they haue set down in writing , and confirmed their opinions with manie arguments and reasons, and haue another time changed their opinions and conceit, when or how they can assure themselves, that (now at last) they haue hit the naile on the head? themselves will not denie, but that they erred the first time, seeing they vsay what they said before.

Secondly, I auouch, that they ought to haue the lesse confidence in their vnderstanding , because the power which once ill compoundeth the truth, whilest his patrone placed so much assurance in his arguments and reasons, should therefore the sooner take suspect, that he may once againe slide into error whilest he worketh with the selfesame instrument of reason; and so much the rather, for that it hath beene seene by experiences, that the  
first

first opinion hath borne most truth, and afterwards he hath relied vpon a worse, and of lesse probabilitie. They hold it for a sufficient token, that the vnderstanding compoundeth well a truth, when they see it enamoured of such a figure; and that there are arguments and reasons which moue it to conclude in that sort: and verily they misse their cushion, for the same vnderstanding carrieth the same proportion to his false opinions, that the inferior powers haue ech with the differences of their object: for if we demand of the Phisitions, what meat is best and most sauourie of all that men accustomably feed vpon? I beleue they will answer, that for men who are distempered and of weake stomacke, there is none absolutely good or euill, but such as the stomacke is that shall receiue it: for there are stomacks (saith *Galen*) which better brooke beefe then hennes or cracknels, and others abhorre egges and milke: and others againe haue a longing after them: and in the maner of vsing meates, some like rost, and some boild: and in rost, some loue to haue the bloud run in the dish, and some to haue it browne and burned. And (which is more worthie of consideration) that meat which this day is sauourly eaten, and with good appetite, to morrow will be lothed, and a farre worse longed for in his roome. All this is vnderstood when the stomacke is good and sound: but if it fall into a certaine infirmitie, which the Phisitions call *Pica*, or *Malacia*, then arise longings after things which mans nature abhorreth: so as they eat earth, coales, and lime, with greater appetite than hennes or trouts. If we passe on to the facultie generatiue, we shall find as many appetites & varieties: for some men loue a foule woman and abhorre a faire: others cast better liking to a foole than her that is wise: a fat wench is fulsome, and a leane

haue their liking, silkes and braue attire offend some mens fancies, who leese themselues after one that totters in her ragges. This is vnderstood, when the genitall parts are in their soundnesse: but if they fall into their infirmitie of stomacke, which is termed Malacia, they couet detestable beastlinesse. The same befalleth in the facultie sensitiue: for of the palpable qualities, hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, moist and drie, there is none of them which can content euery ones feeling: for there are men who take better rest on a hard bed than a soft, and other some better on a soft than a hard. All this varietie of strange tastes and appetites is found in the compositions, framed by the vnderstanding: for if we assemble a hundred men of learning, and propound a particular question, each of them deliuereth a seuerall iudgement, and discourseth thereof in different manner. One selfe argument to one seemeth a sophisticall reason, to another probable; and some you shall meet with, to whose capacitie it concludeth as if it were a demonstration. And this is not onely true in diuerse vnderstandings, but we see also by experience, that one selfe reason concludeth to one selfe vnderstanding, at one time thus-wise, and at another time otherwise: so much, that euery day men varie in opinion; some by processe of time purging their vnderstanding, know the default of reason, which first swayed them, and others leeing the good temperature of their braine, abhorre the truth, and giue allowance to a leasing. But if the braine fall into the infirmitie, which is termed Malacia, then we shall see strange iudgements and compositions, arguments false and weake, to prooue more forcibly than such as carrie strength and truth; to good arguments, an answer shaped, and to bad a condescending; from the premisses, whence a right conclu-

conclusion may be collected, they gather a wrong, and by strange arguments, and fond reasons, they prooue their bad imaginations. This, graue and learned men duely aduising, labour to deliuer their opinion, concealing the reasons whereon they ground : for men persuade themselves, that so farre mans authoritie auaileth, as the reason is of force on which he buildeth, and the arguments resting so indifferent, for concluding through the diuersitie of vnderstandings, euerie man giueth a iudgement of the reason conformably to the wit which he possesseth : for which cause it is reputed greater grauitie to say, *This is mine opinion*, for certaine reasons which moue me so to thinke ; than to display the arguments whereon he relieth. But if they bee enforced to render a reason of their opinion, they ouerslip not anie argument, how slight soeuer : for that which they least valued, with some concludeth and worketh more effect, than the most vrgent. Wherein the great miserie of our vnderstanding is discouered, which compoundeth and diuideth, argueth and reasoneth, and at last (when it is growne to a conclusion) is void of prooffe or light, which may make it discern whether his opinion be true or no.

This selfe vncertainetic haue the diuines in matters which appertaine not to the faith : for after they haue argued at full, they cannot then assure themselves of anie infallible prooffe or euident successe that may discouer, which reasons carried greatest weight ; and so euerie diuine casteth how he may best ground himselfe, and answer with most apparence to the aduerse parties arguments ; his owne reputation saued, and this is all whereabouts he must bestow his endeouour. But the charge of a Phisition, and a Generall in the field, after he hath well

discourfed and refuted the grounds of the contrarie partie, is to marke the fucceffe, which if it be good, he fhall be held for difcreet; if bad, all men will know that he relied vpon guilefull reasons.

In matters of faith propounded by the Church, there can befall none error: for God, beft weeting how vncertaine mens reasons are, and with how great facilitie they runne headlong to be deceiued, consenteth not, that matters fo high and of fo weightie importance, fhould reft vpon our onely determination: but when two or three are gathered together in his name, with the folemnitie of the Church, he forthwith entreth into the midft of them, as president of the action, and fo giueth allowance to that which they fay well, and reaueth their errors, and of himfelfe reuealeth that, to whose notice  
 • by humane forces we cannot attaine. The prooffe then which the reasons formed in matters of faith muft receiue, is to aduife well whether they prooue or inferre the fame, which the Catholicke church faith and declarerh: for if they collekt ought to the contrarie, then (without doubt) they are faultie: but in other questions where the vnderftanding hath libertie of difcourfe, there hath not yet any maner bin aduifed to know what reasons conclude, nor when the vnderftanding doth well compound a truth: onely we relie vpon the good confonance which they make, and that is an argument which may erre: for many falfe points carrie better appearance and likelier prooffe of truth, than the true themfelues.

Phifitions, and fuch as commaund in martiall affaires, haue fucceffe and experience for prooffe of their reasons. For if ten captains prone by many reasons, that it is beft to ioyne battaile, and fo many (on the other fide) defend  
 the

the contrarie, that which succeedeth, will confirme the one opinion, and conuince the other. And if two Phisitions dispute, whether the patient shall die or liue; after he is cured or deceased, it will appeare whose reason was best. But for all this, the successe is yet no sufficient prooffe: for whereas an effect hath many causes, it may very well betide happily for one cause, and yet the reasons (perhaps) were grounded on a contrarie. *Aristotle* moreouer affirmeth, That to know what reasons conclude, it is good to ensue the common opinion; for if many wise men say and affirme one selfe thing, and all conclude with the same reasons, it is a signe (though topically) that they are concludiue, and that they compound well the truth. But who so taketh this into due consideration, shall find it a prooffe subiect also vnto beguiling; for in the forces of the vnderstanding, waight is of more preheminance than number: for it fareth not in this, as in bodily forces, that when many ioyne together to lift vp a waight, they preuaile much, and when few, but little: but to attaine to the notice of a truth deeply hidden, one high vnderstanding is of more value than a hundred thousand which are not comparable thereunto; and the reason is, because the vnderstandings helpe not each other, neither of many make one, as it fals out in bodily powers. Therefore well sayd the wise man, Haue many peace-makers, but take one of a thousand to be thy counsellour; as if he should say, Keepe for thy selfe many friends, who may defend thee when thou shalt bee driuen to come to hand-strokes, but to aske counsell, chuse onely one amongst a thousand. Which sentence was also expressed by *Heraclitus*, who sayd, One with me is worth a thousand. In contentions and causes, euery learned man bethinketh how he may best ground himselfe

on reason, but after he hath well reuolued every thing, there is no art which can make him know with assurance whether his vnderstanding haue made that composition which in iustice is requisit: for if one pleader prooue with law in hand, That reason standeth on the demandants side; and another by way also of the law, prooueth the like for the defendant: what remedie shall we deuise, to know which of the two pleaders hath formed his reasons best? The sentence of the Iudge maketh no demonstration of true iustice, neither can the same be termed a successe, for his sentence (also) is but an opinion, and he doth none other than cleaue to one of the two pleaders: and to increase the number of learned men in one selfe opinion, is no argument to persuaide, that what they resolute vpon, is therefore true: for we haue already affirmed and prooued, that many weake capacities (though they ioyne in one, to discouer some darke conceiued truth) shall neuer arrive to the power and force of some one alone, if the same be an vnderstanding of high reach. And that the sentence of the Iudge maketh no demonstration, is plainly seene, in that at another higher seat of iustice they reuerse the same and giue a diuerse iudgement: and (which is worst) it may so fall, that the inferior iudge was of an abler capacitie than the superiour, and his opinion more conformable vnto reason. And that the sentence of the superiour iudge, is not a sufficient prooue of iustice neither, it is a matter very manifest; for in the same actions, and from the same iudges, without adding or reauing any one jot, we see daily contrarie sentences to issue. And he that once is deceiued by placing confidence in his owne reasons, falleth duly into suspect, that he may be deceiued of new. Where-through we should the lesse relie vpon his opinion, For

he that is once naught (sayth the wise man) chase him from thee. Pleaders seeing the great varietie of vnderstandings which possesse the iudges, and that each of them is affectionate to the reason which best squareth with his wit, and that sometime they take satisfaction at one argument, and sometimes assent to the contrary, they thereupon boldly thrust themselues forth to defend euery cause in controuersie, both on the part affirmatiue and the negatiue; and this so much the rather, because they see by experience, that in the one manner and the other, they haue a sentence in their fauour, and so that comes very rightly to be verified, which wisdom sayd, The thoughts of mortall men are timorous, and their foresights vncertaine. The remedie then which we haue against this, seeing the reasons of the Lawyer faile in prooffe and experience, shall be, to make choice of men of great vnderstanding, who may be iudges and pleaders; For the reasons and arguments of such (sayth *Aristotle*) are no lesse certaine and firme, than experience it selfe. And by making this choice, it seemeth, that the commonwealth resteth assured, that her officers shall administer iustice. But if they giue them all scope to enter without making triall of their wit, as the vse is at this day, the inconueniences (which we haue noted) will euermore befall.

By what signes it may be knowne, that he who shall studie the lawes, hath the difference of wit requisite to this facultie, heretofore (after a sort) we haue expressed: but yet, to renew it to the memorie, and to prooue the same more at large, we must know, that the child who being set to read, soone learneth to know his letters, and can pronounce euery one with facilitie, according as they be placed in the *A B C*, giueth token, that he shall be  
endowed

endowed with much memorie, for such a worke as this (for certaine) is not performed by the vnderstanding, nor by the imagination, but it appertaineth vnto the office of the memorie, to preserue the figures of things, and to report the natures of each, when occasion so requireth: and where much memorie dwelleth, we haue prooued before, that default of vnderstanding also raig-  
neth.

To write also with speed, and a faire hand, we sayd, that it bewraied an imagination, wherethrough the child who in few daies will frame his hand, and write his lines right, and his letters euē, and with good forme and figure, yeeldeth signe of meane vnderstanding: for this worke is performed by the imagination, and these two powers encounter in that contrarietie which wee haue already spoken of and noted.

And if being set to Grammer, he learne the same with little labour, and in short time make good Latines, and write fine epistles, with the well ruled closes of *Cicero*, he shall neuer be good iudge nor pleader, for it is a signe that he hath much memorie, and (saue by great miracle) he will be of slender discourse. But if such a one wax obstinat in plodding at the lawes, and spend much time in the schooles, he will prooue a famous reader, and shall haue a stint of many hearers; for the Latine tongue is very gracious in chaires, and to read with great shew, there are requisit many allegations, and to fardell vp in euery law, whatsoeuer hath beene written touching the same; and to this purpose, memorie is of more necessitie than discourse. And albeit it is true, that in the chaire hee bee to distinguish, inferre, argue, iudge, and chuse, to gather the true sence of the law; yet in the end he putteth the case as best liketh himselfe, he mooues doubts, maketh  
obiections,

objections, and giueth sentence after his owne will, without that any gaineſay him: for which a meane diſcourſe is ſufficient. But when one pleader ſpeaketh for the plaintife, and another for the defendand, and a third Lawyer ſupplieth the iudges place; this is a true controuerſie, and men cannot ſpeake ſo at randon, as when they ſkirmiſh without an aduerſarie. And if the child profit ſlenderly in Grammer, we may thereby gather, that he hath a good diſcourſe: I ſay we may ſo coniecture, becauſe it followeth not of neceſſitie, that whoſoeuer cannot learne Latine, hath therefore ſtraightwaies a good diſcourſe, ſeeing we haue prooued tofore, that children of great imagination neuer greatly profit in the Latine tongue; but that which may beſt diſcouer this, is Logicke: for this ſcience carrieth the ſame proportion with the vnderſtanding, as the touchſtone with gold. Wherethrough it falleth out certaine, that if he who taketh leſſon in the arts, begin not within a moneth or two to diſcourſe and to caſt doubts; and if there come not in his head arguments and anſweres in the matter which is treated of, he is void of diſcourſe: but if he prooue towardly in his ſcience, it is an infallible argument, that he is endued with a good vnderſtanding for the lawes, and ſo he may forthwith addiect himſelfe to ſtudie them without longer tarrying. Albeit I would hold it better done, firſt to run through the arts, becauſe Logicke, in reſpect of the vnderſtanding, is nought els than thoſe ſhackles which we clap on the legs of an vntrained Mule, which going with them many daies, taketh a ſteddie and ſeemly pace. Such a march doth the vnderſtanding make in his diſputations, when it firſt bindeth the ſame with the rules and precepts of Logicke: but if this child, whom we goe thus-wiſe examining, reape no profit in the Latine

time tongue, neither can come away with Logicke as were requisite, it behooueth to trie whether he possesse a good imagination, ere we take him from the lawes; for herein is lapped vp a very great secret, and it is good that the commonwealth be done to ware therof; and it is, that there are some Lawyers, who getting vp into the chaire, worke miracles in interpreting the texts, and others in pleading: but if you put the staffe of iustice into their hands, they haue no more abilitie to gouerne, than as if the lawes had neuer beene enacted to any such end: and contrariwise, some other there are, who with three misvnderstood lawes, which they haue learned at all aduentures; being placed in any gouernment, there cannot more be desired at any mans hands than they will performe. At which effect, some curious wits take wonder, because they sincke not into the depth of the cause, from whence it may grow: and the reason is, that gouernment appertaineth to the imagination, and not to the vnderstanding nor the memorie. And that this is so, the matter may verie manifestly be prooued, considering that the commonwealth is to be compounded with order and concert, with euery thing in his due place, which al put together, maketh good figure and correspondence. And this (sundrie times heretofore) we haue prooued to be a worke of the imagination: and it shall prooue nought els to place a great Lawyer to be a gouernour, than to make a deafe man a Iudge in musicke; but this is ordinarily to be vnderstood, and not as an vniuersall rule: for we haue already prooued, it is possible that Nature can vnite great vnderstanding with much imagination; so shall there follow no repugnancie to be a good pleader and a famous gouernour: and we heretofore discovered, that Nature being endowed with all the forces  
which

which she may possesse, and with matter well seasoned, will make a man of great memorie, and of great vnderstanding, and of much imagination; who studying the lawes, will prooue a famous reader, a great pleader, and no lesse gouernour: but Nature makes so few such, as this cannot passe for a generall rule.

CHAP. XII.

*How it may be prooued, that of Theoricall Phisicke, part appertaineth to the memorie, and part to the vnderstanding, and the practise to the imagination.*

**W**Hat time the *Arabian* Phisicke flourished, there was a Phisition very famous, as well in reading, as in writing, arguing, distinguishing, answering, and concluding; who, men would thinke (in respect of his profound knowledge) were able to reuiue the dead, and to heale any disease whatsoeuer, and yet the contrarie came to passe: for hee neuer tooke anie patient in cure, who miscarried not vnder his hand. Whereat greatly shaming, and quite out of countenance, hee went and made himselfe a Friar, complaining on his euill fortune, being not able to conceiue the cause how hee came so to misse. And because the freshest examples affoord surest prooffe, and doe most sway the vnderstanding, it was held by many graue Phisitions, that *John Argentier*, a Phisition of our time, farre surpassed *Galen*, in reducing the art of Phisicke to a better method: and yet for all this, it is reported of him, that he was so infortunate in practise, as no patient of his countrey durst take Phisicke

at his hands, fearing some dismall successe. Hereat it seemeth the vulgar haue good reason to maruell, seeing by experience (not onely in those rehearsed by vs, but also in many others with whom men haue dayly to deale) that if the Phisition be a great clearke, for the same reason he is vnfit to minister.

Of this effect *Aristotle* procured to render a reason, but could not find it out. He thought, that the cause why the reasonable Phisitions of his time failed in curing, grew, for that such men had onely a generall notice, and knew not euerie particular complexion; contrarie to the Emperickes, whose principall studie bent it selfe to know the properties of euery seuerall person, and let passe the generall: but he was void of reason, for both the one and the other exercised themselves about particular cures, and endeououred (so much as in them lay) to know each ones nature singly by it selfe. The difficultie then consisteth in nothing els, than to know for what cause so well learned Phisitions, though they exercise themselves all their life long in curing; yet neuer grow skilfull in practise, and yet other simple soules with three or foure rules, learne very soone: and the schollers can more skill of ministring than they.

The true answere of this doubt holdeth no little difficultie, seeing that *Aristotle* could not find it out, nor render (at least in some sort) any part thereof. But grounding on the principles of our doctrine, we will deliuer the same: for we must know, that the perfection of a phisition consisteth in two things, no lesse necessarie to attaine the end of his art, than two legs are to goe without halting. The first is, to weet by way of method, the precepts and rules of curing men in generall, without descending to particulars. The second, to be long time exercised

exercised in practise, and to haue visited many patients: for men are not so different each from other, but that in diuers things they agree; neither so conioyned, but that there rest in them particularities of such condition, as they can neuer bee deliuered by speech, nor written, nor taught, nor so collected, as that they may be reduced into art: but to know them, is onely granted to him, who hath often seene and had them in handling. Which may easily be conceiued, considering that mans face, being composed of so small a number of parts, as are two eyes, a nose, two cheekes, a mouth, and a forehead, Nature shapeth yet therein so many compositions and combinations, as if you assemble together a hundred thousand men, each one hath a countenance so different from other, and proper to himselfe, that it falleth out a miracle to find two who do altogether resemble. The like betideth in the foure elements, and in the foure first qualities, hot, cold, moist, and drie, by the harmonie of which, the life and health of man is compounded: and of so slender a number of parts, Nature maketh so many proportions, that if a hundred thousand men be begotten, each of them comes to the world with a health so peculiar and proper to himselfe, that if God should on the sudden miraculously change their proportion of these first qualities, they would all become sick, except some two or three, that by great disposition had the like consonance & proportion. Whence two conclusions are necessarily inferred. The first is, that euetic man who falleth sicke, ought to be cured conformable to his particular proportion; in sort, that if the Physition restore him not to his first consonance of humours, he cannot recouer. The second, that to performe this as it ought, is requisit, the Physition haue first seene and dealt with the patient sundry times in his health,

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by feeling his pulse, perusing his state, and what manner countenance and complexion he is of, to the end that when he shall fall sicke, he may iudge how farre he is from his health, and in ministring vnto him, may know to what point he is to restore him. For the first, (namely to weet and vnderstand the Theoricke and composition of the art) saith *Galen*, it is necessarie to be endowed with great discourse and much memorie: for the one part of Phisicke consisteth in reason, and the other in experieence and historie. To the first is vnderstanding requisite, and to the other memorie, and it resting a matter of so great difficultie, to vnite these two powerts in a large degree; it followeth of force, that the Phisition become vnapt for the Theoricke. Wherethrough we behold many Phisitions, learned in the Greeke and Latine tongue, and great Anotomists and Simplificists (all workes of the memorie) who brought to arguing or disputation, or to find out the cause of anie effect that appertaineth to the vnderstanding, can small skill thereof.

The contrarie befallerh in others, who shew great wit and suffiencie in the Logicke and Philosophie of this art, but being set to the Latine and Greeke tongue, touching simples and anotomies, can doe little, because memorie in them is wanting: for this cause *Galen* said very well, That it is no maruell, if among so great a multitude of men, who practise the exercise and studie of the art of Phisicke and Philosophie, so few are found to profit therein, and yeelding the reason, he saith, It requires a great toile to find out a wit requisite for this Science; or a maister who can teach the same with perfection, or can studie it with diligence and attention. But with all these reasons *Galen* goeth groping, for he could not hit the cause whence it comes to passe, that few persons profit

in Phisick. Yet in saying it was a great labour to find out a wit requisit for this science, he spake truth; albeic he did not so far-forth specifie the same, as we will: namely, for that it is so difficult a matter to vnite a great vnderstanding with much memorie, no man attaineth to the depth of Theoricall Phisick. And for that there is found a repugnancie betweene the vnderstanding and the imagination (whereunto we will now prooue, that practise and the skill to cure with certaintie, appertaineth) it is a miracle to find out a Phisition, who is both a great Theorist, and withall a great practitioner, or contrariwise a great practitioner, and very well seen in Theorick. And that the imagination, and not the vnderstanding, is the power wherof the physition is to serue himselfe in knowing and curing the diseases of particular persons, may easily be prooued.

First of all presupposing the doctrine of *Aristotle*, who affirmeth, That the vnderstanding cannot know particulars, neither distinguish the one from the other, nor discern the time and place, and other particularities which make men different ech from other: and that every one is to be cured after a diuers maner; and the reason is (as the vulgar Philosophers auouch) for that the vnderstanding is a spirituall power, and cannot be altered by the particulars, which are replenished with matter. And for this cause *Aristotle* said, That the sence is of particulars, and the vnderstanding of vniuersals.

If then medicines are to worke in particulars, and not in vniuersals (which are vnbegotten, and vncorruptible) the vnderstanding falleth out to be a power impertinent for curing. Now the difficultie consisteth in discerning why men of great vnderstanding cannot possesse good outward senses for the particulars, they be-

ing powers so repugnant: and the reason is verie plain, and this is it, That the outward senses cannot well performe their operations, vnlesse they be assisted with a good imagination: and this we are to prooue by the opinion of *Aristotle*, who going about to expresse what the imagination was, saith it is a motion caused by the outward sence, in sort, as the colour which multiplieth by the thing coloured, doth alter the eie. And so it fareth that this selfe colour, which is in the christallin humour, passeth farther into the imagination, and maketh therein the same figure which was in the eie. And if you demand of which of these two kinds the notice of the particular is made, all Philosophers auouch (and that verie truely) that the second figure is it which altereth the imagination, and by them both is the notice caused, conformable to that so common speech, From the obiect, and from the power the notice springeth. But from the first which is in the christallin humour, and from the sightfull power, groweth no notice, if the imagination be not attentue thereunto, which the Phisitions doe plainly prooue, saying, That if they lance or seare the flesh of a diseased person, who for all that feeleth no pain, it shews a token that his imagination is distracted into some profound contemplation: whence we see also by experience in the sound, that if they be raught into some imagination, they see not the things before them, nor heare though they be called, nor tast meat sauorie or vnsauorie, though they haue it in their mouth. Wherefore it is a thing certaine, that not the vnderstanding or outward senses, but the imagination, is that which maketh the iudgement, and taketh notice of particular things.

It followeth then, that the Phisition who is well scene in Theoricke, for that hee is indowed with great vnderstanding

standing, or great memorie, must of force prooue a bad practitioner, as hauing defect in his imagination. And contrariwise, he that prooueth a good practitioner, must of force be a bad Theorist: for much imagination cannot be vnited with much vnderstanding and much memorie. And this is the cause for which so few are thoroughly seene in phisicke, or commit but small errors in curing: for, not to halt in the worke, it behooueth to know the art, and to possesse a good imagination, for putting the same in practise, and we haue prooued that these cannot sticke together.

The Phisition neuer goeth to know and cure a disease, but that secretly to himselfe he frameth a *Syllogisme in Darij*, though he be neuer so well experienced, and the prooue of his first proportion belongeth to the vnderstanding, and of the second to the imagination: for which cause, the great Theorists doe ordinarily erre in the *minor*, and the great practitioners in the *maior*: as if we should speake after this manner, Euerie feauer which springeth from cold and moist humours, ought to bee cured with medicines hot and drie. (Taking the tokening of the cause) this feauer which the man endureth, dependeth on humors cold and moist: therefore the same is to bee cured with medicines hot and drie. The vnderstanding will sufficiently prooue the truth of the *maior*, because it is an vniuersall, saying; That cold and moist require for their temperature hot and drie: for euerie qualitie is abated by his contrarie. But comming to prooue the *minor*, there the vnderstanding is of no value: for that the same is particular and of another iurisdiction, whose notice appertaineth to the imagination, borrowing the proper and particular tokens of the disease from the siue outward senses.

And if the tokening is to be taken from the seauer, or from his cause, the vnderstanding cannot reach thereunto: onely it teacheth the tokening is to be taken from that which sheweth greatest perill; but which of those tokenings is greatest, is only knowne to the imagination, by counting the damages which the seauer produceth, with those of the *Syntones* of the euill, and the cause, and the small or much force of the power. To attaine this notice, the imagination possesseth certaine vnutterable properties, with which the same cleereth matters that cannot bee expressed nor conceiued, neither is there found any art to teach them. Wherethrough we see a Physition enter to visit a patient, and by meanes of his sight, his hearing, his smelling, and his feeling, he knoweth things which seeme impossible. In sort, that if we demaund of the same Physition, how he could come by so readie a knowledge, himselfe cannot tell the reason: for it is a grace which springeth from the fruitfulnessse of the imagination, which by another name is tearmed a readinesse of capacitie, which by common signes, and by vn-certaine coniectures, and of small importtance, in the twinckling of an eye knoweth a hundred differences of things, wherein the force of curing and prognosticating with certaintie consisteth.

This spice of promptnesse, men of great vnderstanding doe want, for that it is a part of the imagination; for which cause, hauing the tokens before their eyes (which giue them notice how the disease fareth) it worketh no manner alteration in their senses, for that they want imagination. A Physition once asked me in great secrecie, What the cause was, that he hauing studied with much curiositie all the rules and considerations of the art prognosticatiue; and being therein thoroughly instructed, yet

yet could neuer hit the truth in any prognostication which he made. To whom (I remember) I yeelded this answer that the art of Phisick is learned with one power, and put in execution with another. This man had a verie good vnderstanding, but wanted imagination: but in this doctrine there ariseth a difficultie very great, and that is, how Phisitions of great imagination can learne the art of Phisicke, seeing they want that of vnderstanding: and if it be true, that such were better than those who were well learned, to what end serueth it to spend time in the schooles? to this may be answered, that first to know the art of Phisicke, is a matter verie important: for in two or three yeares a man may learn all that which the ancients haue bin getting in two or three thousand. And if a man should herein ascertaine himselfe by experience, it were requisit that he liued some thousands of yeeres, and in experimenting of medicines, hee should kill an infinit number of persons, before he could attaine to the knowledge of their qualities: from whence we are freed, by reading the bookes of reasonable experienced Phisitions, who giue aduertisement of that in writing, which they found out in the whole course of their liues; to the end that the Phisitions of these daies may minister some receits with assurance, and take heed of other some as venomous.

Besides this, we are to weet, that the common and vulgar points of all arts are very plain and easie to learne, and yet the most important of the whole worke. And contrariwise, the most curious and subtile, are the most obscure, and of least necessitie for curing. And men of great imagination, are not altogether deprived of vnderstanding, nor of memorie. Wherethrough, by hauing these two powers in some measure, they are able to learne the

most necessarie points of Phisicke : for that they are plainest, and with the good imagination which they haue, can better looke into the disease and the cause thereof, than the cunningest doctors . Besides that, the imagination is it which findeth out the occasion of the remedie that ought to be applied, in which grace the greatest part of practise consisteth: for which cause *Galen* said, That the proper name of a Phisition, was, The finder out of occasion.

Now to be able to know the place, the time, and the occasion, for certaine, is a worke of the imagination, since it toucheth figure and correspondence ; but the difficultie consisteth in knowing (amongst so many differences as there are of the imagination) to which of them the practise of Phisicke appertaineth , for it is certaine, that they all agree not in one selfe particular reason: which contemplation hath giuen me much more toile and labour of spirit than all the residue ; and yet for all that, I cannot as yet yeeld the same a fitting name , vnlesse it spring from a lesse degree of heat, which partaketh that difference of imagination, wherewith verses and songs are endited. Neither doe I relie altogether on this, for the reason whereon I ground my selfe, is, that such as I haue marked to be good practitioners, do all piddle somewhat in the art of versifying, and raise not vp their contemplation very high, and their verses are not of any rare excellencie, which may also betide, for that their heat exceedeth that tearme which is requisit for poetrie : and if it so come to passe for this reason, the heat ought to hold such qualitie , as it somewhat drie the substance of the braine, and yet much resolue not the naturall heat, albeit (if the same passe further) it breeceeth no euill difference of the wit for Phisicke , for it vniterh the vnderstanding

standing to the imagination by aduſtion. But the imagination is not ſo good for curing, as this which I ſeek, which inuitheth a man to be a witch, ſuperſtitious, a magician, a deceiuſer, a palmiſter, a fortune-teller, and a calker: for the diſeaſes of men are ſo hidden, and deliuer their motions with ſo great ſecrecie, that it behooueth alwaies to goe calking what the matter is.

This difference of imagination may hardly be found in Spaine, for tofore we haue proued, that the inhabitants of this region want memorie and imagination, and haue good diſcourſe: neither yet the imagination of ſuch as dwell towards the North, is of auaille in Phiſicke, for it is very ſlow and ſlacke, onely the ſame is towardly to make clockes, pictures, poppers, and other ribaldries which are impertinent for mans ſeruiſe.

*Ægypt* alone is the region which ingendereth in his inhabitants this difference of imagination, wherthrough the Hiſtorians neuer make an end of telling, how great enchaunters the *Ægyptians* are, and how readie for obtaining things, and finding remedies to their neceſſities. *Ioſeph* to exaggerat the wiſedome of *Salomon*, ſayd in this manner, So great was the knowledge and wiſedome which *Salomon* receiued of God, that he outpaſſed all the ancients, and euen the very *Ægyptians*, who were reputed the wiſeſt of all others. And *Plato* alſo ſayd, that the *Ægyptians* exceeded all the men of the world in ſkill how to get their liuing; which abilitie appertaineth to the imagination. And that this is true, may plainly appeare, for that all the ſciences belonging to the imagination, were firſt deuifed in *Ægypt*, as the Mathematickes, *Aſtrologie*, *Arithmeticke*, *Perspective*, *Iudiciarie*, and the reſt. But the argument which moſt ouerruleth me in this behalfe, is, that when *Francis* of *Valois* king of France,

was molested by a long infirmitie, and saw that the Phisitions of his household and court, could yeeld him no remedie, he would say every time when his feauer increased, It was not possible that any Christian Phisition could cure him, neither at their hands did he euer hope for recouerie: wherethrough one time agreed to see himselfe thus vexed with this feauer, he dispatched a post into Spaine, praying the emperour *Charles* the fifth, that he would send him a Iew Phisition, the best of his court, touching whom he had vnderstood, that he was able to yeeld him remedie for his sicknesse, if by art it might be effected. At this request the Spaniards made much game, and all of them concluded it was an humorous conceit of a man, whose braines were turmoiled with the feauer. But for all this, the Emperour gaue commandement, that such a Phisition should be sought out, if any there were, though to find him, they should be driuen to send out of his dominions: and when none could be met withall, he sent a Phisition newly made a Christian, supposing that he might serue to satisfie the kings humour. But the Phisition being arriued in France, and brought to the kings presence; there passed betweene them a gracious discourse, in which it appeared, that the Phisition was a Christian: and therefore the king would receiue no phisicke at his hands. The king with opinion which he had conceiued of the Phisition, that he was an Hebrue, by way of passing the time, asked him whether he were not as yet wearie in looking for the Messias promised in the law? The Phisition answered; Sir I expect not any Messias promised in the Iewes law. You are verie wise in that (replied the king:) for the tokens which were deliuered in the diuine Scripture, whereby to know his comming, are all fulfilled many daies agoe.

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This number of daies (reioyned the Phisition) we Christians doe well reckon: for there are now finished 1542 yeares, that hee came and conuerfed in the world 33 yeares; in the end of which he died on the crosse, and the third day rose againe, and afterwards ascended into heauen, where he now remaineth. Why then (quoth the king) you are a Christian? yea Sir, by the grace of God I am a Christian (quoth the Phisition:) then (answered the king) return you home to your own dwelling in good time: for in mine owne house and court I haue Christian Phisitions very excellent, and I held you for a Jew, who (in mine opinion) are those that haue best naturall abilitie to cure my disease. After this manner he licenced him to depart, without once suffering him to feele his pulse, or see his state, or telling him one word of his grieffe. And forthwith he sent to Constantinople for a Jew, who healed him with the onely milke of a shee Asse.

This imagination of king *Francis* (as I thinke) was very true, and I haue so conceiued it to be, for that in the great hot distemperatures of the braine, I haue prooued tofore, how the imagination findeth out that, which (the partie being sound) could neuer haue done. And because it shall not seeme that I haue spoken in ieast, and without relying herein vpon a materiall ground, you shall vnderstand, that the varieties of men, as well in the compositions of the boadie, as of the wit and conditions of the soule, spring from their inhabiting countries of different temperature, from drinking diuers waters, and from not vsing all of them one kind of food. Wherein *Plato* said, Some through variable windes and heats, are amongst themselues diuers in manner and kinds: others through the waters and food which spring of the earth,  
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who not onely in their bodies, but in their minds also can skill to doe things better and worse: as if he should say, some men are different from others, either by reason of the contrarie aire, or through drinking severall waters, or for that they feed not all vpon one kind of meat, and this difference is discerned not onely in the countenance and demeanure of the bodie, but also in the wit of the soule.

If I then shall now prooue, that the people of Israell dwelt many yeares in *Ægypt*, and that departing from thence, they did eat and drinke waters and meats, which are appropriat to make this difference of imagination; I shall then yeeld a demonstration for the opinion of the king of France, and by consequence we shall vnderstand what wits of men are in Spaine to be made choice-of, for studying the art of Phisicke: As touching the first, we must know, that *Abraham* asking tokens whereby to be assured, that he or his descendents should possesse the land of promise; the text sayth, that whilest he slept, God made him answer, saying, Know that thy seed shall be a stranger in a countrey not his owne, and they shall make them vnderlings in bondage, and afflict them for 400 yeares, notwithstanding I will iudge that nation whom they serue, and after this, they shall depart from thence with great substance; which prophesie was accomplished: albeit God for certaine respects, added thereunto 30 yeares more, for which cause the Scripture sayth, But the abode of the children of Israell in *Ægypt*, was 430 yeares, which being finished, that very day the whole armie of the Lord departed out of the land of *Ægypt*. But although this text say manifestly, that the people of Israell abode in *Ægypt* 400 yeares, a glosse declareth, that these yeares were the whole time which Israell went on  
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pilgrimage, vntill he possessed his owne countrey. In as much as he remained in *Ægypt* but 210 yeares, which declaration agreeth not well with that which *S. Stephen* the Prothomartyr made in his discourse to the Iewes, namely, that the people of *Israel* was 430 yeares in the bondage of *Ægypt*.

And albeit the abode of 210 yeares sufficed, that the qualities of *Ægypt* might take hold in the people of *Israel*, yet the times whiles they liued abroad, was no lost season, in respect of that which appertaineth to the wit: for those who liue in bondage, in miserie, in affliction, and in strange countries, engender much choller adust, because they want libertie of speech, and of reuenging their iniuries: and this humour, when the same is growne drie, becommeth the instrument of subtiltie, of craft, and of mallice: whence we see by experience, that if a man rake hell for bad manners and conditions, he cannot find worse than in a slaue, whose imagination alwaies occupieth it selfe, in deuising how to procure dammage to his maister, and freedome to himselfe. Moreouer, the land which the people of *Israel* walked through, was not much estranged nor different from the qualities of *Ægypt*: for in respect of the miserie thereof, God promised *Abraham* to giue him another, much more abundant and fruitfull. And this is a matter greatly veresied, as well in good naturall Philosophie, as in experience, that barraine and beggerly regions, not fat, nor plentifull of fruit, engender men of very sharpe wit. And contrariwise, abundant and fertile soiles bring forth persons big limmed, courageous, and of great bodily forces, but verie slow of wit.

Touching Greece, the Historians neuer make an end to recount, how appropriat that region is to breed men  
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of great habilitie, and particularly *Galen* auoucheth, that it is held a miracle for a man to find a foole in Athens. And we must note, that this was a citie the most miserable and most barren of all the rest in Greece. Whence we collect, that through the qualities of Egypt, and of the prouinces where the Hebrue people liued, they grew very quick of capacitie. But it behooueth likewise to vnderstand, for what cause the temperature of *Ægypt* produceth this difference of imagination. And this will fall out a plaine matter when you are done to ware, that in this region the Sunne yeeldeth a feruent heat: and therefore the inhabitants haue their braine dried, and choller adust, the instrument of willnesse and aptnesse. In which sence, *Aristotle* demandeth, why the men of *Æthyopia* & *Ægypt* haue their feet crooked, and are commonly curle-pated and flat nosed? to which problem he answereth, That the much heat of the country rosteth the substance of these members, and wryeth them, as it draweth together a peece of leather set by the fire; and for the same cause their haire curleth, and themselues also are wily. And that such as inhabit hot countries, are wiser than those who are borne in cold regions, we haue already prooued by the opinion of *Aristotle*: who demandeth whence it growes, that men are wiser in hot climats than in cold? But he wist not to answer this problem, nor make distinction of wisdom: for we haue prooued heretofore, that in man there rest two sorts of wisdom; one whereof *Plato*. said, Knowledge which is seuered from Iustice, ought rather to be tearmed craft than wisdom: another there is found accompanied with iustice and simplicitie, without doublenesse, and without wiles; and this is properly called Wisdom: for it goeth alwaies guided by iustice and dutie. They who inhabit  
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very hot countries, are wise in the first kind of wisdom, and such as are those of *Egypt*.

Now let vs see when the people of *Israel* was departed out of *Egypt*, and come into the desert, what meat they did eat, what water they dranke, and of what temperature the aire was where they travelled? that we may know whether vpon this occasion, the wit with which they issued out of bondage, tooke exchange; or whether the same were more confirmed in them? Fortie years (saith the text) God maintained this people with Manna, a meat so delicat and sauourie, as any might be that euer men tasted in the world. In sort, that *Moses* seeing the delicacie and goodnesse thereof, commanded his brother *Aaron* to fill a vessell, and place the same in the Arke of confederacie, to the end the descendents of this people, when they were settled in the land of promise, might see the bread with which God had fed their fathers, whiles they liued in the wildernesse, and how bad payment they yeelded him in exchange of such cherisshments. And to the end that we, who haue not scene this meat, may know of what manner the same was: it will do well that we describe the Manna which Nature maketh; and so adioyning thereunto the conceit of a great delicacie, we may wholly imagine his goodnesse. The materiall cause of which Manna is engendered, is a very delicat vapour, which the Sunne, with the force of his heat, draweth vp from the earth; the which taking stay aloft, is concocted and made perfect: and then the cold of the night comming on, it congealeth, and through his weightinesse, turneth to fall vpon the trees and stones, where men gather the same, and preserue it in vessels to serue for food. It is called Deawy, and Airy honny, through the resemblance which it beareth to the deaw, and for that

that it is made in the aire: His colour is white, his savour sweet as honny: his figure like that of Coriander, which signes the holy Scripture placeth also in the Manna, which the people of Israel did eat: and therefore I carry an imagination, that both were semblable in nature. But if that which God created were of more delicat substance, so much the better shall we confirme our opinion. But I am euer of opinion, that God applied himselfe to naturall meanes, when with them he could performe what he meant; and where nature wanted, his omnipotencie supplied. This I say, because to giue them Manna to eat in the desert (besides that which hereby he would signifie) me seemeth was founded in the selfe disposition of the earth, which (euen at this day) produceth the best Manna in the world: through which *Galen* affirmeth, That on Mount Libanus (which is not far distant from this place) there is great and very choice abundance: in sort, that the countrey people are wont to sing in their pastimes, That *Jupiter* raineth honny in that region. And though it be true, that God miraculously created that Manna in such quantitie, at such time, and on speciall daies: yet it may be that it partaked the same nature with ours, as had also the water which *Moses* drew forth of the rocke; and the fire which *Elias* with his word caused to raine from heauen; all of them naturall things, though miraculously brought to passe.

The Manna described by the holy Scripture, it saith was as dew, and as the seed of Coriander, white, and in tast like honny, which conditions are also in the Manna produced by nature. The temperature of this meat, the Physicians say, is hot, and consisting of subtile and verie delicat parts, which composition the Manna eaten by the Iews, should also seeme to haue: whereon (complai-

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ning of his tenderneſſe) they ſaid in this manner, Our ſoule hath a fullſomneſſe at this ſlight meat; as if they ſhould ſay, that they could no longer endure nor brooke ſo light a meat in their ſtomacke: and the Philoſophie of this was, that their ſtomacks had been made ſtrong by onions, chibals, and leeks; and coming to eat a meat of ſo ſmall reſiſtance, it wholly with them turned into choler. And for this cauſe, *Galen* gaue the charge, that men endowed with much naturall heat, ſhould forbear to eat honny or other light meats: for they would turne to corruption, and in ſteed of digeſtion, would partch vp like ſoot.

The like heereof befell to the Hebrues, as touching Manna, which with them wholly turned into choller a-duſt, and therefore they were altogether dry and thin: for this meat had no corpulencie to fatten them. Our ſoule (ſaid they) is drie, and our eies ſee nothing but Manna. The water which they dranke after this meat, was ſuch as they would deſire; and if they could not find any ſuch, God ſhewed to *Mofes* a wood of ſo diuine vertue, that dipping the ſame in groſſe and ſalt waters, it made them to become delicat and of good ſauor: and when they had no ſort of water at all, *Mofes* took the rod with which he had parted the red Sea, and ſtriking therewith the rocks, there iſſued ſprings of waters ſo delicat and ſauoury, as their taſt could deſire. In ſort, that *S. Paule* ſaith, The rocke followed them: as if he ſhould ſay, The water of the rocke ſeconded their taſt, iſſuing delicat, ſweet, and ſauourie. And they had accuſtomed their ſtomacks before, to drinke waters thicke and briniſh: for in *Aegypt* (ſaith *Galen*) they boiled them ere they could ſerue for drinke, for that they were naughty and corrupt, ſo as afterwards drinking waters ſo delicat,

it could not fall out otherwise, but that they should turne into choller, for that they found small resistance. Water requireth the same qualities, to digest well in our stomack (saith *Galen*) and not to corrupt, that the meat hath wheron we accustomedly feed. If the stomack be strong, it behooveth to giue the same strong meat, which may answer in proportion: if the same be weake and delicate, such also the meat ought to be. The like regard is to be held as touching the water: where-through we see by experience, that if a man vse to drinke grosse water, he neuer quencheth his thirst with the purer, neither feelth it in his stomacke. Rather the same encreaseth his thirst: for the excessiue heat of the stomacke burneth and resolueth it so soone as it is receiued, because therein is no resistance.

The aire which they enioyed in the desert, wee may also say, that it was subtile and delicat: for iourneying ouer mountaines, and through vninhabited places, they had the same alwaies fresh, cleansed, and without anie corruption: for they neuer made long stay in any one place. So did it alwaies carrie a temperature: for by day a cloud was set before the Sun, which suffered him not to scorch ouer vehemently; and by night, a pillar of fire, which moderated the same. And to enioy an aire of this manner (*Aristotle* affirmeth) doth much quicken the wit. We may consider then, that the men of this folke must needs haue a seed very delicat and adust, eating such meat as Manna was, and drinking the waters aboue specified, and breathing and enioying an aire so cleansed and pleasant: as also that the Hebrew women bred flowers very subtile and delicat.

Againe, let vs call to mind, that which *Aristotle* said, That the flowers being subtile and delicat, the child who

is bred of them, shall be a man of great capacitie. How much it importeth, that for begetting children of great sufficiencie, the fathers do feed on delicat meate, we will prooue at large in the last chapter of this worke. And because all the Hebrues did eat of one selfe so spirituall and delicat meate, and dranke of one selfe water, all their children and posteritie prooued sharpe and great of wit in matters appertaining to this world.

Now then, when the people of Israell came into the land of promise, with so great a wit as we haue expressed, there befell vnto them afterwards so many trauails, dearths, sieges of enemies, subiections, bondages, and ill intreatings: that though they had not brought from *Ægypt* and the wilderness, that temperature, hot, drie, and adust before specified, they would yet haue made it so by this dismall life: for continuall sadnesse and toile vniterh the vitall spirits and the arteriall blood in the brain, in the liuer, and in the heart: and there staying one about another, they grow to drinesse and adustion. Where through, oft times they procure the feuer, and their ordinarie is to make melancholie by adustion, wherof they (in maner) do all partake euen to this day, in respect of that (which *Hippocrates* saith) Feare and sadnesse continuing a long time, signifieth melancholie. This choler adust (we said before) to be the instrument of promptnesse, craftinesse, sharpnesse, subtiltie, and maliciousnesse. And this is applied to the coniectures of *Phisicke*, and by the same a man getteth notice of the diseases their causes and remedies. Wherefore king *Francis* vnderstood this maruellous well, and it was no lightnesse of the braine or inuention of the diuell which he vttered. But through his great feuer, lasting so manie daies, and with the sadnesse to find himselfe sicke and

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without

without remedie, his braine grew dry, and his imagination rose to such a point, of which we made prooffe before, that if it haue the temperature behooffull, a man will on a sodaine deliuer that which he neuer learned. But there presents it selfe a difficultie very great against all these things rehearsed by vs, and that is, that if the children or nephewes of those who were in Ægypt, and enioyed the Manna, the waters, and the subtile aire of the wildernesse, had been made choice of for Phisitions, it might seeme, that king *Francis* opinion were in some part probable, for the reasons by vs reported. But that their posteritie should preferue till our daies those dispositions of the Manna, the water, the aire, the afflictions, and the trauailes, which their anceltours endured in the prison of Babylon, it is a matter hard to be conceiued: for if in 430 yeares, during which the people of Israell liued in Ægypt, and 40 in the desert, their seed could purchase those dispositions of abilitie, better and with more facilitie could they leese it againe in 2000 yeares, whilst they haue beene absent. And specially sithence their comming into Spaine, a region so contrarie to Ægypt, and where they haue fed vpon different meats, and drinke waters of nothing so good temperature and substance as those other.

This is agreeable to the nature of man, and what so other liuing creature and plant, which forthwith partaketh the conditions of the earth where they liue, and leese those which they brought with them from elsewhere. And whatsoeuer instance they can alleage, the like will betide it within few daies beyond all gainesaying.

*Hippocrates* recounteth of a certaine sort of men, who to be different from the vulgar, chose for a token of their nobilitie, to haue their head like a sugar-loose. And to

shape

shape this figure by art, when the child was borne, the midwives tooke care to bind their heads with sweaths and bands, vntill they were fashioned to the forme. And this artificialnesse grew to such force, as it was conuerted into nature: for in proceſſe of time, all the children that were borne of nobilitie, had their head ſharpe from their mothers wombe. So from thenceforth, the art and diligence of the midwives hetein, became ſuperfluous. But ſo ſoone as they left nature to her libertie, and her owne ordering, without oppreſſing her any longer with art, ſhe turned by little and little to recouer againe the figure which ſhe had before.

In like ſort might it befall the children of Iſrael, who notwithstanding the region of *Ægypt*, the *Manna*, the delicat waters, and their ſorrowfulneſſe, wrought thoſe diſpoſitions of wit in that ſeed: yet thoſe reaſons and reſpects ſurceaſing, and other contrarie growing on, it is certain, that by little and little the qualities of the *Manna* would haue worrie away, and other far different therefrom haue growne on, conformable to the countrey where they inhabited, to the meats which they fed vpon, to the waters which they drank, and to the aire which they breathed. This doubt in naturall Philoſophie holdeth little difficultie: for there are ſome accidents to be found, which are brought in at a moment, and afterwards endure for euer in the ſubieſt, without poſſibilitie of corrupting. Others there are, which waſt as much time in vndoing, as they occupied in engrafting, and ſome more, ſome leſſe, according to the action of the agent, and the diſpoſition of the patient. For example of the firſt, we muſt know, That a certaine man through a great feare whereinto he was driuen, reſted ſo transformed and changed in colour, that he ſeemed dead; and the ſame

lasted not onely during all the time of this owne life, but also the children which he begat had the same colour: without that he could find any remedie to take it away. Conformable hereunto it may be, that in 430 yeares, whilst the people of Israel led their liues in Egypt 40 in the wildernesse, and 60 in the bondage of Babylon, there needed more than 3000 yeares, that this seed of *Abraham* should take a full losse of their disposition of wit, occasioned by this Manna, seeing to reforme the bad colour, setled vpon a sodaine through feare, more than 100 yeares were requisit. But because the truth of this doctrine may be vnderstood from the root, it beho- ueth to resoluue two doubts which serue to the purpose, and as yet I haue not cleered. The first is, whence it commeth, that meats, by how much the more delicat and saourie they are, as hennes, and partridge, so much the sooner the stomacke doth abhorre and loath them? and contrariwise, we see that a man eateth beefe all the yeare long, without receiuing any annoyauce thereby, and if he eat hennes flesh but three or foure daies togi- ther, the fifth he cannot abide the saueur thereof; but that it will turne his stomacke vpside downe. The se- cond is, whence it commeth, that bread of wheat, and flesh of mutton, not being of substance so good and sa- uourie, as hen and partridge; yet the stomacke neuer loa- theth them, though we feed thereon all our liues long? But wanting bread, we cannot eat other meats, neither doe they content vs.

He that can shape an answer to these two doubts, shall easily vnderstand for what cause the descendents of the people of Israell haue not yet lost the dispositions and ac- cidents which Manna brought into that seed: neither will the promptnesse of wit, and subletie whereof they then

them possessed themselves, so soone take an end. Two certaine and very true principles there are in naturall philosophie, on which the answer and resolution of these doubts dependeth. The first is, That all powers (whatsoever) which gouerne man, are naked and deprived of the conditions and qualities which rest in their object, to the end that they may know and giue iudgement of all the differences. The eyes partake this propertie, who being to receiue into themselves all figures and colours, it was of necessitie, vterly to deprive them of figures and colours. For if they were pale, as in those who are overcome with the yellow iauundize, all things whereon they looked, would appear to them of the same colour. So the tongue, which is the instrument of tast, ought to be void of all sauiours: and if the same be sweet or bitter, wee know by experience, that whatsoever we eat or drinke hath the like tast. And the same may be auouched of hearing, of smelling, and of feeling. The second principle is, that all things created, naturally couet their preservation, and labour to endure for ever, and that the being which God and Nature haue giuen them, may neuer take end: notwithstanding that afterward they are to possesse a better nature. By this principle, all naturall things endowed with knowledge and sence, abhorre and flie from that which altereth and corrupteth their naturall composition.

The stomacke is naked and deprived of the substance and qualities of all meats in the world, as the eye is of colours and figures, and when wee eat of, though the stomacke overcome it, yet the meat turneth against the stomacke, for that the same is of a contrarie principle, and altereth and corrupteth his temperature and substance: for no agent is of such force, but that in doing, it

also suffereth. Meats that are very delicat and pleasing, doe much alter the stomacke; first, because it digesteth and embraceth them with great appetite and liking, and then, through their being so subtile and void of excrements, they pierce into the substance of the stomacke, from whence they cannot depart againe: the stomacke then feeling that this meat altereth his nature, and taketh away the proportion which he carrieth to other meats, groweth to abhorre the same, and if he must needs feed thereon, it behoueth to vse many sallets and seasonings, thereby to beguile him.

All this Manna had euen from the beginning: for though the same were a meat of such delicacie and pleasing relish, yet in the end, the people of Israell found it fustome, and therefore sayd, Our soule loatheth this ouer light meat. A complaint far vnworthie of a people so specially fauoured by God, who had pretended a remedie in that behalfe, which was, that Manna had those relishes and tastes which well agreed with them, to the end they might eat thereof. Thou sentest them bread from heaven, which had in it all pleasingnesse; for which cause, many amongst them fed thereon with good appetite, for they had their bones, their sinewes, and their flesh, so imbewed with Manna and his qualities, that by meanes of the resemblance from each to other, they longed after nothing else. The like befalleth in bread of wheat, and weathers flesh, whereon we accustomably feed.

Grosse meats and of good substance, as beefe, haue much excrements, and the stomacke receiueth them not with such desire, as those that are delicat and of good relish, and therefore is longer ere the same take alteration by them. Hence commeth it, that to corrupt the alteration

on which Manna made in one day, it behooveth to feed a whole moneth vpon contrarie meats. And (after this reckoning) to deface the qualities that Manna brought into the seed in the space of 40 yeares, there need 4000 and vpwrd. And if any man will not herewith rest satisfied, let vs say, that as God brought out of *Ægypt* the 12 tribes of *Israell*, so he had taken then 12 male, and 12 female Moores of *Æthyopia*, and had placed them in our countrey, in how many yeares thinke we, would these Moores and this posteritie linger to leaue their native colour, not mixing themselues the while with white persons? to me it seemeth a long space of yeares would be requisit. For though 200 yeares haue passed ouer our heads, sithens the first *Ægyptians* came out of *Ægypt* into *Spaine*, yet their posteritie haue not forsorne that their delicacie of wit and promptnesse, nor yet that rosted colour which their aunccestors brought with them from *Ægypt*. Such is the force of mans seed, when it receiue threinto any well rooted qualitie. And as in *Spaine* the Moores communicat the colour of their elders, by means of their seed, though they be out of *Æthyopia*, so also the people of *Israel* comming from thence, may communicate to their descendents their sharpnesse of wit, without remaining in *Ægypt*, or eating Manna: for to be ignorant or wise, is as well an accident in man, as to be blacke or white. True it is, that they are not now so quicke and prompt, as they were a thousand yeares since: for from the time that they left to eat Manna, their posteritie haue euer lessened hitherto, because they vied contrarie meats, and inhabited countries different from *Ægypt*: neither dranke waters of such delicacie as in the wilderness. As also by mingling with those who descended from the Gentiles, who wanted this difference

of wit: but that which cannot be denied them, is, that as yet they haue not lost it altogether.

## CHAP. XIII

By what meanes it may be shewed, to what difference of abilitye the art of warfare appertaineth, and by what signes the man may be knowne, who is endowed with this manner of wit.

**W**Hat is the cause (saith *Aristotle*) that seeing Fortitude is not the greatest of all vertues, but Iustice and Prudence are greater than it: yet the commonwealth, and in a manner all men with a common consent do make greater account, and within themselves do more honour a valiant man than either the iust or wise; though placed in neuer so high callings or offices? To this problem *Aristotle* answereth, saying; there is no king in the world who doth not either make war, or maintaine war against some other: and for so much as the valiant procure them glorie and empire, take reuenge on their enemies, and preserve their estate; they yeeld chiefest honour, not to the principall vertue, which is Iustice, but to that by which they reape most profit and aduantage. For if they did not in this wise intreat the valiant, how were it possible, that kings should find captaines and souldiours, who would willingly ieopard their liues to defend their goods and estates?

Of the Asiaticans it is recounted, that there was a people inhabiting a part thereof, who bare themselves very courageously: and being asked why they had neither king nor law: they made answer, That lawes made

men cowards: and seeing it was necessarie to vndergoe the hazard of the warres, for depriviing another of his estate, they made choice to fight for their owne behoofe, and themselves to reape the benefit of the victorie. But this was an answer rather of barbarous men than reasonable people, who well know, that without a king, without a commonwealth, and without lawes, it is impossible to preferue men in peace. That which *Aristotle* said, serueth very well to the purpose, though there be a better answer to be framed, namely, That when Rome honoured her captaines with those triumphs and solemnities, she did not onely reward the courage of the triumpher, but also the iustice with which he maintained his armie in peace and concord, the wisdom with which he performed his enterprises, and their temperancie vsed in abstaining from wine, women, and meat, which trouble the iudgement, and turne counsels into errour. Yea wisdom is more highly to be regarded and rewarded in a Generall, than courage and manlinesse: for as *Vegetius* well said, Few ouer-couragious captaines bring their enterprises to luckie passe. Which groweth, for that wisdom is more necessarie in warre, than courage in bickering. But *Vegetius* could neuer attaine to the notice what maner of wisdom this is, neither could plot down, with what difference of wit he ought to be endowed, who taketh charge in war: neither doe I ought maruell thereat, for the manner of Philosophie whereon this dependeth, was not then deuised. True it is, that to verifie this point, answereth not our first intear, which purporteth to make choice of apt wits for learning. But martiall affaires are so dangerous, and of so deep counsell, and it falleth out a matter so important for a king to know well vnto whom he credit his power and state, that we shall

shall performe no lesse thanks worthie a part of seruice to the commonwealth, to teach this difference of wit and his signes, than in the other which we haue already described. For which cause we must note, that *malitia* and *militia*, viz. martiall matters, and malice, haue as it were one selfe name, and likewise one selfe definition. For changing *s* into *i*, of *malitia* you make *militia*, and of *militia*, *malitia*, with great facilitie. What the nature and proper tie of malice is, *Cicero* teacheth, saying, Malice is a way of hurting, craftie, and full of guile. In warre (likewise) nothing falleth so much into consideration, as how to offend the enemy, and defend our selues from his entrappings. Therefore the best proper tie whereof a General can be possessed, is to be malicious with his enemy, and neuer to construe any his demeanures to a good sence, but to the worst that may be, and to stand on his guard.

Beleeue not (sayth *Ecclesiasticus*) thine enemy, with his lips he sweeteneth, and in his heart he betrayeth thee, to make thee fall into the dike: he weepeth with his eyes, and if he light vpon a fit occasion, he will not be satisfied with thy blood. Hereof we find a manifest example of the holy Scripture: for the people of Israel being besieged in Bethulia, and straightened with hunger and thirst, that famous ladie *Indith* issued out with a resolution to kill *Holofernes*, and going towards the armie of the Assyrians, she was taken by the sentinels and guards, and being asked whether she was bound, made answer with a two-fold mind; I am a daughter of the Hebrewes, whom you hold besieged, and flie vnto you, for I haue learned that they shall fall into your hands, and that you shall euill intreat them, because they would not yeeld themselves to your mercie: therefore I determined to flie vn-

to *Holofernes*, and to discover vnto him the secrets of this obstinat people, shewing him how he may enter without the losse of any one souldior.

So *Judith* being brought to *Holofernes* presence, threw her selfe downe to the ground, and with closed hands began to worship him and vtter words full of deceit, the most craftily that might be, in sort that *Holofernes* and all his counsell verely beleecued, she sayd nothing but truth: but she not forgetfull what in heart she had purposed, found a conuenient occasion, and chopped off his head.

Contrarie hereunto are the conditions of a friend, and therefore it behooueth euer to yeeld him credit, whetethrough *Holofernes* should haue done better to belecue *Achior*, seeing he was his friend, and on zeale that he should not leaue the siege with dishonour, sayd vnto him: Sir, first informe your selfe whether this people haue sinned against God, for if it be so, himselfe will deliuer them into your hands, without that you shall need to conquer them; but if he hold them in grate, know for certaine, that he will defend them, and we shall not be able to vanquish them. *Holofernes* conceived displeasure at this aduertisement, as a man confident, lasciuious, and a wine-bibber, which three things turne topsie turuie that counsell which is requisite for the art of war. For which cause *Plato* sayd, he liked very well of a law which the Carthaginians had, by which they commaunded, that the Generall whilest he had charge of the armie, should drinke no wine, for this licour (as *Aristotle* affirmeth) maketh a man of wit be quite burned vp with choler (as *Holofernes* shewed in those so furious words which he spake to *Achior*.)

Now that wit which is requisit for ambushes and stratagems,

tagems, as well to prepare them as to perceiue them, and to find out such remedie as appertaineth, *Cicero* describeth, drawing his descent from this nowne *versutia*, which he saith is deriued from this verbe *versor*: for those who are winding, craftie, double, and cauillers, vpon a suddaine contriue their wiles, and employ their conceit with facilitie: and so the same *Cicero* exemplified it, saying; *Chrisippus* a man doublesse winding and craftie. I call those winding, whose mind is suddainely winded about. This propertie to attaine suddainely the meanes, is *solertia* (quicknesse) and appertaineth to the imagination: for the powers which consist in heat, performe speedily their worke: And for this cause, men of great vnderstanding are little worth for the war, for this power is very slow in his operation, and a friend of vprightnesse, of plainenesse, of simplicitie and mercie: all which is woont to breed much dammage in warre. These are good to treat with friends, with whom the wisdom of the imagination is not needfull; but onely the rightfulness and singleness of the vnderstanding, which admitteth no doublenesse, nor doth any wrong: therefore with the enimie it booteth nothing; for he alwaies studieth to offend with wiles, and such wit is requisit wherewith to countergard our selues. And so Christ our redeemer aduised his disciples, saying, Behold I send you as sheepe amongst woolues: be you therefore wise as serpents, and simple as doves. With our enemies we must practise wisdom, and with our friends plainenesse and simplicitie.

Now if the captain be not to giue credit to his enimie, but is alwaies to misdoubt that he will goe beyond him, it is necessarie that he hold a difference of imagination, forecastfull, warie, and which can skill to discern the wiles

wiles which come veiled with anie couerture : for the selfe power which finds them out can onely deuise the remedies which are behoofefull in that behalfe : that seemeth to be another difference of the imagination which deuiseth the engines and warlike instruments, whereby vnuincible fortresses are woon, which pitcheth the camp and marshalleth euery Squadron in his due place, and which knoweth the occasions of ioyning and retiring ; which plotteth treatjes, consortments and capitulations with the enemye : for all which the vnderstanding is impertinent, as are the cares to see withall. And therefore I nothing doubt, but that the art of warre appertaineth to the imagination, for all whatsoeuer a good capitaine is to performe, importeth consonance, figure and correspondence.

Now the difficultie resteth to set downe with what difference of the imagination in particular, war is to be managed. And in this I cannot resolue with certaintie, because the knowing thereof is very nice : yet I coniecture, that it requireth a degree more of heat than the practise of Physicke, and that it allay choller, but not vterly quench it.

This is very manifest : for those capitaines who are full of promptnesse and subletie, are not verie couragious, nor desirous of bickering, neither couet to come to handystrokes ; but by stratagems and fetches, without aduenturing a broken pate, doe bring their purposes to passe. Which property better pleased *Vegetius* than any other. Good captains (saith he) not by open war, in which the petill is common, but by secret practises, euer assay with the safetie of their owne souldiors, to cut their enemies in peeces, or at least to make them afraid. The fruit of this manner of wit, the Roman Senat very wisely looked into :

into: for though they had many famous captaines, who achieved sundrie warres, yet returning to Rome to receive the triumph and glorie due to their enterprise, so great were the plaints which the parents made for their children, the children for the parents, the wiues for their husbands, and brothers for brethren, that through the sorrow for them who perished in the warres, they could take little pleasure in the sports and pastimes. Wherefore the Senatooke a resolution, not to seeke out so courageous captaines, wholly desirous to come to handystrokes: but men somewhat timorous, and very ready, as *Q. Fabius*, of whom it is written, that it was a wonder to see him offer a pitched battaile in the open field, and specially when he was far from Rome, whereby in ill successes he could not readily be relieved, and he did nought els but giue way to the enemy, and deuise stratagems and wiles, with which he exploited great enterprises, and obtained many victories, without the losse of any one souldiour. He was receiued into Rome with great ioy of all men: for if he carried forth a hundred thousand souldiours, he returned with as many, vnlesse some perhaps miscarried by sickness. The shout which the people gaue at his returne, was (as *Ennius* reporteth) of this tenour.

*One man by lingering, onely vs releu'd.*

As if they had said, This man with giuing way to our enemies, hath made vs lords of the world, and brought backe our souldiours to their houses in safetie. Some captaines haue since that time endeououred to imitate him: but because they wanted his wit and readinesse, they sundry times let slip many fit occasions of fighting, whence greater dammages and inconueniences arose, than if they had speedily ioynd battaile. We may also take example of that famous Carthaginian captaine, of whom

whom *Plutarch* writeth these words, *Annibal* after he had attained this so great a victorie, commanded that many Italian prisoners should freely be set at libertie without ranfome, to the end the fame of his courtesie and pardoning might be dispersed among the people; albeit of disposition he were very wide from this vertue: for of his owne nature he was fell and ynnmercifull, and in such sort was trained vp from the tender yeares of his youth, that he neuer learned laws or ciuile conditions, but wars, slaughters, and betrayings of the enimie. VVherethrough he grew to be a captaine very cruell, and malicious in be-guiling men, and alwaies deuising how he might entrap his enimie. And when he saw he could not preuaile by open war, he sought to get the vpper hand by policies, as was plainly seene in this deed of arms by vs rehearsed, and by the battaile which he found against *Sempronius*, neere the riuer Trebia. The tokens to know a man that is possessed of this difference of wit, are very strange and well worthie of contemplation. VVherethrough *Plato* saith, That the man who is very wise (in this sort of abilitie which we trace out) cannot be couragious nor well conditioned: for *Aristotle* saith, That wisdom consisteth in cold, and stomacke and manlinesse in heat. Therefore these two qualities being repugnant and contrarie, it is impossible that a man be very full of hardinesse, and also of wisdom therewithall. For which cause it is necessa-rie that choller be burned, and become choller adust, to the end that a man may prooue wise: but where this spice of melancholie is found, in as much as the same is cold, feare and cowardize are straightwaies entertained. In sort, that craft and readinesse require heat, for that the same is a worke of the imagination, but not in such de-gree as courage, wherethrough they repugne each to o-ther

ther in extension. But hertin befallerh a matter worth the noting, that of the foure morall vertues, Iustice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance; the two first require a wit and good temperature, to the end that they may be put in practise: for if a Iudge be not endowed with vnderstanding, to make himselfe capable of the point of iustice, little auailles it that he carrie a good will to tender euery man his due. Since this his good meaning may wander out of the way, and wrong the true proprietarie. The like is to be vnderstood of wisdome: for if the onely will sufficed to set things in good order, then in no work, good or euill, should any error be committed. There is no theefe whatsoeuer who seeketh not to rob in such manner as he may not bee espied, and there is no captaine, who desireth not to be owner of so much wisdome, as may serue to vanquish his enemy. But a theefe that is not his craftmaister in filching, soone falleth to be discovered; and the captaine that wanteth imagination, ere long is ouercome. Fortitude and Temperance are two vertues, which men carrie in their fist, though they want a naturall disposition: for if a man be disposed to set little of his life, and shew hardinesse, he may well do it: but if he be courageous of his owne naturall disposition, *Aristotle* and *Plato* affirme very truly, it is not possible that he can be wise though he would. In sort, that by this reason there groweth no repugnancie to vnite the wisdome of the mind with courage: for a wise and skilfull man hath the vnderstanding to hazard his honour in respect of his soule, and his life in respect of his honour, and his goods in respect of his life, and so he doth. Hence it comes, that gentlemen for that they are so much honoured, are so courageous; and there is none who will endure more hardnesse in the wars, for  
that

that they are brought vp in so many pleasures, to the end they may not be termed ribalds. Hereon is that by-word grounded, God keepe me from a Gent. by day, and a theefe by night; for the one, because he is seene, and the other that he may not be knowne, do fight with double resolution: on this selfe reason is the religion of *Malta* grounded, who knowing how much it importeth nobilitie, to be a man of valure, haue a firme law, that all those of their order shall be issued from gentilitie, both on the fathers side and the mothers: for so each of them must in the combat shew himselfe worth two of a baser progenie. But if a gentleman had the charge giuen him, to encampe an armie, and the order whereby he should put the enemie in rout, if he had not a wit appropriat hereunto, he would commit and vtter a thousand disorders: for wisdom lieth not in mens disposition. But if there were recommended vnto him the guard of a gate, they might soundly sleepe on his eyes, although by nature he were a baggage. The sentence of *Plato* is to be construed, when a wise man followeth his owne naturall inclination, and doth not correct the same by reason. And in that sort it is true, that a very wise man cannot of his naturall disposition be couragious: for choler adust (which maketh him wise) maketh him also, saith *Hippocrates*, timorous and fearefull. The second proprietie, wherewith a man possessed of this difference of wit, cannot be endowed, is to be pleasant and of quaint behaviour: for with his imagination he frameth many plots, and weeteth, that whatsoever error or negligence, are the way to cast away an armie, wherethrough he ever carieth an eye to the maine chance. But people of little worth call carefulnesse a toile, chastisement crueltie, and mercie softnesse, suffering and dissembling of leud parts a good

disposition. And this verily springeth, because men are fots, who pierce not into the true value of things, nor in what sort they ought to be managed: but the wise and skilfull cannot hold patience, nor beare to see matters ill handled, though they nothing appertaine vnto themselves, and therefore liue a small while, and with much trouble of spirit. Whence *Salomon* said, I gaue also my mind to vnderstand wisdom, doctrine, errors, and follie; and found that in these also, there is wearinesse and affliction of spirit: for into much wisdom entreth much displeasure, and who so attaineth Science, getteth sorrow. In which words it seemeth that *Salomon* gaue vs to vnderstand, that he liued better contented being ignorant, than after he had receiued wisdom. And so verily it came to passe: for the ignorant liue most carelesse, in as much as nothing giueth them paine and vexation, and they little recke who haue a better capcase than themselves. The vulgar accustometh to call such the Angels of heaven: for they see how they take nothing at heart; neither find fault with any thing ill done, but let all passe: but if they considered the wisdom and condition of the Angels, they should see it were a word that carried euill consonance, and a case for the inquisition house: for from the day when we receiue the vse of reason, vntill that of our death, they doe nought els saue reprocue vs for all our euill doings, and aduise vs to that which we ought to doe. And if as they speake to vs in their spirituall language, by mouing our imagination, so they should deliuer vs their opinion in materiall words, wee would hold them importunate and vmannerly brought vp. And he that beleeueth not this, let him marke that the Angel (of whom *S. Mathew* maketh mention) seemed such a one to *Herod*, and to the wife of his brother

brother *Philip*, seeing (because they would not heare his fault findings) they faire and well chopped off his head. Better were it, that these men, who by the vulgar are fondly termed Angels of heauen, were called Asses of the earth : for amongst brute beasts (saith *Galen*) there is none more blunt, or of lesse wit than the Ass; although in memorie he outreach all the rest. He refuseth no burden, he goeth whither he is driuen without any gaine-striving, he winceth not, he biteth not, hee is not fugitive, nor iadish conditioned ; if he be laboured with a cudgell, he setteth not by it, he is wholly made to the well liking and seruice of him that is to vse him : these selfe properties do those men partake, whom the vulgar terme Angels of heauen ; which sport-making springeth in them, for that they are blockheads and void of imagination, and haue their wrathfull power verie remisse, which tokeneth a great defect in a man, and argueth that he is ill compounded.

There was neuer Angell nor man in the world better conditioned than Christ our redeemer, and he entering one day into the temple, belaboured wellsauredly those whom he found there selling of marchandize : and this he did, because the irascible is the chastice giuer, and sword of reason, and the man who reprooueth nor things ill done, either sheweth himselfe but a foole, or is deprived of the wrathfull power. In sort, that it fals out a miracle to see a wise man of that gentlenesse or conditions, which are best liking to lewd mens fancies : where-through such as set downe in writing the actions of *Iulius Caesar*, maruelled to see how his souldiors could support a man so rough and seuer, and this grew in him, because he lighted vpon a wit requisit for the warres. The third propertie of those who are endowed with this difference

of wit is, to be recklesse touching the attiring of their person, and in a manner all of them are flouinly, homely, with their hosen hanging about their heeles, full of wrinckles, their cap sitting vpon the one side, with some thredbare gabberdine on their backe, and neuer long to change suits.

This propertie, *Lucius Florus* recounteth, had that famous captaine *Viriatius*, by nation a Portuguise, of whom (exaggerating his great humilitie) he saith and affirmeth, that he despised so much all ornament of his person, as there was no priuat souldior in his army that went worse apparelled than himselfe. And verily this was no vertue, neither did he the same artificially, but it is a natural effect of those, who are possessed with that difference of imagination after which we enquire.

This rechelesse in *Iulius Caesar* greatly deceiued *Cicero*: for being asked (after the battell) the cause which mooued him to follow the partie of *Pompey*; he answered (as *Macrobius* recounteth) His girding deceiued me: as if he had said, It was my beholding of *Iulius Caesar* to be a man somewhat flouinly, and who neuer wore his girdle handsomely, whom his souldiors in scoffe called, Loose-coat. But this should haue mooued and made him to know, that he was endowed with a wit requisit to the counsell of warre. Rightly did *Silla* hit the naile on the head, who (as *Suetonius Tranquillius* reporteth) seeing the rechelesse of *Iulius Caesar* in his apparrelling himselfe when he was a boy, aduertised the Romanes, saying, Take heed of this ill girded yong fellow. The Historians busie themselves much, in recounting how carelesly *Hanniball* bare him touching his apparell, and how little he reaked to goe neat and handsome. To grow in great dislike at moles on the cape, to take much care that his stockings

stockings sit cleane, and his cloke handsome, without plaits, appertaineth to a difference of the imagination of very base alloy, and gaine sayth the vnderstanding, and that imagination which the war requireth. The fourth signe is, to haue a bald head, and the reason hereof may soone be learned: for this difference of imagination resideth in the forepart of the head, as doe all the rest, and excessiue heat burneth the skin of the head, and closeth the poares, through which the haire is to passe. Besides that the matter whereof the haire is engendered (as the phisitions auouch) are those excrements which the brain expelleth in time of his nourishing, and by the great fire that there is, they are consumed and burned vp, and so the matter faileth whereof they may breed. And if *Iulius Caesar* had beene seene in this point of Philosophie, he would not so much haue shamed at his bald head, as that to couer the same, he caused the hinder part of his haire which should hang downe on his necke, to be featly turned towards his forehead. And *Suetonius* maketh mention, that nothing so much contented him, as when the Senat enacted, that he might weare a Lawrell garland on his head, and that on none other ground, than because thereby he might couer his badnesse. Another sort of baldnesse groweth from hauing the haire hard and earthly, and of a grosse composition, but that betokeneth a man void of vnderstanding, imagination, and memorie. The fifth signe, whereby those are known who haue this difference of imagination, is, that such are spare in words and full of sentences, and the reason importeth, because the braine being hard, it followeth of necessitie, that they suffer a defect in memorie, to which copie of words appertaineth. To find much what to say, springeth from a coniunction which the memorie maketh with the ima-

ination, in his first degree of heat. Such as haue this conioyning of both powers, are ordinarily great liers, and neuer want words and tales, though you stand hearkening vnto them a whole day together.

The sixt proprietie of those who haue this difference of imagination, is, to be honest, and to take great dislike at filthie and baudie talke : and therefore *Cicero* saith, that men very reasonable doe imitate the honestie of nature, who hath hidden the vnseemely and shamefull parts, which she made to prouide for the necessitie of mankind, and not to adorne it ; and she consenteth not to fasten the eyes on these, nor that the eares should once heare them named. This we might well attribute to the imagination, and say that the same resteth offended at the euill representation of these parts, but in the last chapter wee rendered a reason of this effect, and reduced the same to the vnderstanding, and we adiudged him defective in this power, who tooke not offence at such dishonestie. And because to the difference of imagination, appurtenant to the art militarie, there is ioyned this discourse, therefore are good captains very honest. Wherethrough in the historie of *Iulius Caesar* wee find an action of the greatest honestie that might be, and that is, whilst they murdered him with daggers in the Senate-house, he (perceiuing it was impossible to escape death) gaue himselfe to fall to the ground, and so fitted his imperiall robe about him, that after his death they found him couched with great honestie, with his legs and other parts covered, that might any way offend the sight.

The seuenth proprietie, and of greatest importance, is, that the Generall haue good fortune and be luckie : by which signe we shall perfectly find, that he is seized of the wit and habilitie behooffull for the art martiall, for in  
substance

substance and truth, there is nothing which ordinarily maketh men vnfortunat, and that their enterprises doe not alwaies take successe after their desire, saue that they are deprivied of wisdome, and lay not hold on the convenient meanes for archieuing their exploits. For that *Julius Caesar* shewed such wisdome in the affaires which he managed, he bare away the bell (in respect of fortunate-nesse) from all other captaines of the world, so as in perils of importance he encouraged his souldiours, saying; Feare not, for you haue *Caesars* good fortune to fight on your partie.

The Stoickes held opinion, that as there was a first cause, euerlasting, almightie, and of infinit wisdome, knowne by the order and concert of his maruellous workes; so also there was another vnwise and vnconcerted, whose workes prooued without order, without reason, and void of discretion: for with an affection no way reasonable, it giueth and reaueth from men riches, dignitie, and honour. This they tearmed Fortune, seeing her a friend to men who performe their businesse by hap hazard, without forecating, without wisdome, and without submitting themselves to the gouernment of reason. They pourtraied her (the better to make her manners and mallice knowne) in forme of a woman, a roiall scepter in her hand, her eyes veiled, her feet vpon a round ball, accompanied with persons sottish and void of all trade of liuing. By painting her like a woman, they noted her great lightnesse and little discretion; by her royall scepter, they acknowledged her soueraigntie ouer riches and honour; her veiled eyes, gaue to vnderstand the ill fashion which she held in distributing her gifts; her feet standing on the round ball, betokened the small firmenesse in the fauours which she imparted, for she snatcheth

cheth them away with the like facilitie that she reacheth them forth, without keeping stedfastnesse in ought whatsoeuer: but the worst part they found in her, was, that she fauoureth the wicked, and persecuteth the vertuous; loueth the foolish, and abhorreth the wise; abaseth the noble, and aduanceth the base: what is foule, pleaseth her, and what is faire, worketh her annoiance. Many men placing confidence in these properties, because they know their owne good fortune, take hardinesse to vndertake fond and headlong enterprises, which yet prosper with them very luckily: and yet other men, very wise and aduised, dare not aduenture to execute those enterprises which they haue begun with great discretion, finding by experience that such find worst successe. How great a friend Fortune sheweth her selfe to bad people, *Aristotle* maketh knowne by this probleme, Whence groweth it, that riches (for the most part) are possessed rather by the wicked than by men of worth? Whereto he shapeth answer, Perhaps because Fortune being blind cannot know nor make choice of what is best. But this is an answer vnworthie of so great a Philosopher: for it is not Fortune that bestoweth wealth on men, and though it were, yet he yeeldeth no reason, why she alwaies cherisheth the bad, and abandoneth the good. The true solution of this demaund is, that the lewd sort are very wittie, and haue a gallant imagination to beguile in buying and selling, and can profit in batgaining, and employing their stocke where occasion of gaine is offered. But honest men want this imagination: many of whom had endeouored to imitate these bad fellowes, and by trafficking and trucking, within few daies haue lost their principall.

This, Christ our redeemer pointed at, considering the

the sufficiencie of that steward, whom his maister called to account, who reseruing a good portion of the goods to his owne behoofe, salued vp all his reckonings, and got his *quietus est*. Which wisdom (though it were faultie) yet God commended, saying; The children of this world are more wise in their kind than the children of light. For these ordinarily enioy a good vnderstanding, with which power they place their affection on their law, and haue want of imagination, whereto the knowledge how to liue in this world appertaineth; wherethrough many are morally good, because they lacke the wit how to be naught. This manner of answering is more easie and apparent. The naturall Philosophers, because they could not reach so far, deuised so fond and ill iointed a cause, as ladie Fortune, to whose power they might impute good and bad successses, and not to the vnskillfulnesse and little knowledge of men.

Fourē sorts of people there are in euerie commonwealth, if a man list to marke them; For some men are wise, and seeme not so; others seeme so, and are not; others neither are, nor seem; and some both are, and seem so. Some men there are silent, slow in speech, staied in answering, not curious not copious of words: yet they retaine hidden within them, a naturall power appertaining to the imagination, whereby they know the fit time and occasion to bring their purpose to passe, and how they are therein to demean themselves, without communicating or imparting their mind to any other. These by the vulgar are called happie and luckie, them seeming that with little knowledge and lesse wit euery thing falleth into their lap.

Others contrariwise are of much eloquence in words and discourse, great conuersers, men that take vpon them

to gouerne the whole world, who goe about hunting how with small expence they may reape great gains, and therein (after the vulgars conceit) no man in iudgement can step an ace beyond them, and yet, comming to the effect, all falleth to the ground betweene their hands. These crie out vpon fortune, and call her blind buzzard, and iade; for the matters which they disseigne and worke with much wisdom, she suffereth not to take good effect: but if there were a Fortune who might plead her owne defence, she would tell them; Your selues are the buzzards, the sots, and the doe-noughts, whom you speake of, that being vnskilfull, hold your selues wise, and vsing vnfit meanes, would yet reape good successes. This sort of people haue a kind of imagination which decketh vp and setteth forth their words and reasons, and maketh them seeme to be what indeed they are not. Whereon I conclude, that the Generall who is endowd with a wit requisit for the art militarie, and doth duly forecast what he is to exploit, shall be fortunate and happy, otherwise it is lost labour to looke that he ever preuaile to victorie, vnlesse God doe fight for him, as he did for the armies of Israell, and yet withall, they chose the wisest and skilfullest amongst them to be commanders, for we must not leaue all vpon Gods hands, neither yet may a man wholly affie on his owne wit and sufficiencie, but it will doe best to ioine both together; for there is no other Fortune, saue God and a mans owne good indeuour.

He who first deuised Chesse-play, made a modell of the art militarie, representing therein all the occurrents and contemplations of war, without leauing any one behind: and as in this game Fortuue beareth no stroke, neither can the plaier who beateth the aduerse partie be termed

med fortunat, nor he who is beaten vnfortunat. So the captain, that ouercommeth ought to be called wise, and the vanquished, ignorant; and not the one happie, or the other unhappie. The first thing which he ordained in this play, was, that when the king is mated, the contrarie partie is vanquisher: thereby to let vs vnderstand, that the chiefe force of an armie, consisteth in a good commaunder to gouerne and direct the same: and for prooffe hereof, he lotted as many chiefe men to the one side as to the other, to the end, that whosoeuer lost, might be ascertained, it so fell out through default of his owne knowledge, and not of fortune. And this is more apparently seene, if we consider, that a skilfull plaier will spare halfe his men to the other partie, and yet for all that get the game. And this was it which *Vegetius* noted, that often few souldiors and weake, vanquish many and valiant, if they be gouerned by a generall who can skill in ambushes and stratagems. He ordained also, that the pawnes might not turne backe, thereby to aduise the commaunder, that he duly forecast all chanches, ere he send forth his souldiors to the seruice, because if any mischaunce alight, it behooues rather that they be cut in peeces where they were placed, than to turne their backs, for the souldior is not to know when time serueth to flie or to fight, saue by direction of his captaine, and therefore so long as his life lasteth, he is to keepe his place, vnder paine of becomming infamous. Hereunto he adioyned another law, that the pawne which had made seuen draughts without being taken, should be made a queene, and might make any draught at pleasure, and be placed next the king, as one set at libertie, and endowed with nobilitie; whereby he gaue vs to vnderstand, how in the warre it importeth greatly for making the souldior valiant, to pro-

proclaime aduantages, free campes, and preferments, for such as shall haue done any speciall peece of seruice. And principally, that the honour and profit passe to their posteritie: for then they will exploit with greater courage and gallantnesse. For which cause *Aristotle* affirmeth that a man maketh more reake to be chiefe of his linage, than of his owne proper life. This *Saule* well perceiued when he caused to be proclaimed in the army, Whosoeuer shall strike that man (meaning kill the Giant *Goliath*) shall be made rich by the king, and shall haue his daughter to wife, and his house shall be enfranchised in *Israell* from all manner tribute. Conformable vnto this proclamation, there was a court in *Spaine*, which ordained, that whatsoeuer souldior, by his good vsage, deserued to receiue for his pay 500 Soldi (this was the greatest stipend allowed in the warres) should himselfe and his posteritie, be discharged for euer from all taxes and seruices. The *Moore*s (as they are great plaiers at chesse) haue in their plaies set seven degrees in imitation of the seven draughts, which the pawne must make to be a queene, and so they enlarge the play from one to the second, and from the second to the third, vntill they arriue to seven, answerable to the prooffe that the souldior shall giue of himselfe: and if he be so gallant as to enlarge his pay to the seventh, they yeeld him the same: and for this cause they are termed *Septerniers*, or *Seuensteers*. These haue large liberties and exemptions, as in *Spaine* those gentlemen who are called *Hidalgos*. The reason hereof, in naturall Philosophie is very plaine: for there is no facultie of all those that gouerne man, which will willingly worke, vnlesse there be some interest to mooue the same: which *Aristotle* proueth in the generatiue power, and the selfe reason swayeth in the residue. The obiect of the wrath-  
full

full facultie (as we haue aboue specified) is honour and aduantage; and if this cease, straightwaies courage and stomacke decay: by all this may be conceiued the great signification which it carrieth to make that pawne a queene, who hath made seuen draughts without taking: for whatsoeuer the greatest nobilitie in the world, that hath been or shall be, hath sprung and shall spring from pawnes, and priuat men, who by the valour of their person haue done such exploits, as they deserued for themselves and their posteritie, the title of gentlemen, knights, noblemen, earles, marquesses, dukes and kings. True it is, that some are so ignorant and void of consideration, as they will not graunt, that their nobilitie had a beginning; but that the same is euerlasting, and growne into their blood, not by the grace of some particular king, but by the supernaturall and diuine reason. To the bent of this purpose (though we shall thereby somewhat lengthen our matter) I cannot but recount a very wittie discourse, which passed betweene our Lord the Prince *Don Carlos*, and the Doctor *Suares* of Toledo, who was iudge of the Court in *Alcala* of *Heuares*. Prince? Doctor what thinke you of this people? Doctor. Very well (my Lord) for here is the best aire, and the best soile of any place in *Spaine*. P. For such the Physicians made choice of to recouer my health: haue you seene the Vniuersitie? D. No my L. P. See it then: for it is very speciall; and where they tell me the Sciences are very learnedly read. D. Verily, for a colledge and particular studie, it carrieth great fame, and should be such in effect, as your highnesse speaketh of. P. Where did you studie? D. In *Salamanca*, my lord. P. And did you proceed doctor in *Salamanca*? D. My lord, no. P. That me seemeth was euill done, to studie in one Vniuersitie, and  
take

take degree in another. *D.* May it please your highnesse, that the charges of taking degrees in Salamanca, are excessive; and therefore we poore men flie the same, and get vs to some other Vniuersitie, knowing that we receiue our sufficiencie and learning not from the degree, but from our studie and paines, albeit my parents were not so poore, but if them listed might haue borne the charge of my proceeding in Salamanca: but your highnesse well knoweth, that the doctors of this Vniuersitie haue the like franchises as the gentleman of Spaine, and to vs who are such by nature, this exemption doth harm, at least to our posteritie. *P.* Which of the kings mine ancestors gaue this nobilitie to your linage? *D.* None. And to this end your highnesse must vnderstand, there are two sorts of gentlemen in Spain; some of blood, and some by priuiledge: those in blood (as my selfe) haue not receiued their nobilitie at the kings hand, but those by priuiledge haue. *P.* This matter is very hard for me to conceiue, and I would gladly that you expressed it in plainer tearmes: for if my blood roy all, reckoning from my selfe to my father, and from him to my grandfather, and so by order from each to other, commeth to finish in *Pelagius*: to whom by the death of the king *Don Rodericke*, the kingdome was giuen, before which time he was not king. If we reckon vp after this sort your pedigree, shall we not come at last to end in one who was no gentleman? *D.* This discourse cannot be denied, for all things haue had a beginning. *P.* I aske you then, from whence that first man had his nobilitie, who gaue beginning to your nobilitie? he could not enfranchise himselfe, nor plucke out his owne necke from the yoke of tributes and seruices, which before time hee paid to the kings my predecessors: for this were a kind of theft, and a preferring

ring himfelfe by force with the kings patrimonie, and it foundeth not with reason, that gentlemen of bloud should haue fo bad an originall as this: therefore it falleth out plaine, that the king gaue him freedome, & yeelded him the grace of that nobilitie. Now tell me from whom he had it. D. Your highnesse concludeth verie well, and it is true, that there is no true nobilitie faue of the kings grant: but we tearme those noble of blood, of whose originall there is no memorie, neither is it specified by writing, when the same began, nor what king yeelded them this fauour: and this obscurenesse is receiued in the common-wealth for more honourable, than distinctly to know the contrarie. The common-wealth also maketh gentlemen: for when a man groweth valorous, of great vertue, and rich, it dareth not to challenge such a one, as seeming thereby to doe him wrong, and that it is fit a man of that worth doe liue in all franchise. This reputation passing to the children, and to the nephewes, groweth to nobilitie, and so they get a pretence against the king. These are not therefore gentlemen, because they receiue 500 Soldi of pay; but when the contrarie cannot be prooued, they passe for such. That Spaniard, who deuised this name of a gentleman, *Hispodalgos*, gaue verie well to vnderstand this doctrine which we haue set downe; for by his opinion men haue two kinds of birth, the one naturall, in which all are equall, the other spirituall. When a man performeth any heroicall enterprise, or any vertue or extraordinarie worke, then is he new borne, and procureth for himfelfe other new parents, and leeseeth that being which hee had tofore. Yesterday he was called the sonne of *Peter*, and nephew of *Sanchius*, and now he is named the sonne of his owne actions. Hence had that Castilian prouerbe  
his

his originall, which saith, Euery man is the son of his own workes. And because the good and vertuous workes, are in the holy scripture termed somewhat, and in the Spanish tongue it signifieth *algo*, and vices & sins nothing, which in the Spanish is tearmed *nada*. This Spaniard compounded this word *hijo dalgo* therof, which importeth nought els, but that such a one is descended of him, who performed some notorious and vertuous action: for which he deserued to be rewarded by the king or commonwealth, together with all his posteritie for euer. The law of the *Partita* sayth, That *hijo dalgo* signifieth the sonne of goods: But if we vnderstand the same of temporall goods, the reason was not good; for there are infinit gentlemen poore, and infinit rich men, who are no gentlemen: but if he meane the sonne of goods, that is to say, of good qualities, it carrieth the same sence which we before expressed.

Of the second birth which men ought to haue besides their naturall, there is affoorded vs a naturall example in the Scripture, where Christ our redeemer reprehendeth *Nicodemus*, because he (being a doctour of the law) wist not yet, it was necessarie that a man should be borne of new, thereby to obtain a better being, and more honourable parents than his naturall: for which cause, all the time that a man performeth no heroicall enterprise, in this sence he is called *hijo de nada*, to weet the sonne of nothing; although by his auncestors he beare the name of *hijo dalgo*, that is the sonne of somewhat, or a gentleman. To the purpose of this doctrine, I will recite vnto you a discourse which passed betweene a very honourable Captaine and a Cavaliero, who stood much on the pantophles of his gentilitie. Whereby shall be discouered, in what the honour of this second birth consisteth.

sisteth. This captaine then falling in companie with a knot of Caualleros, and discoursing of the largesse and libertie, which souldiors enioy in Italie, in a certaine demaund, which one of them made him, he gaue him the *you*, because he was natie of that place, and the sonne of meane parents, borne in a village of some few houses: but the captain (aggreeued thereat) answered, saying; Signor, your signorie shall vnderstand, that souldiors who haue enioyed the libertie of Italie, cannot content themselves to make abode in Spaine, because of the many laws which are here enacted against such as set hand to their sword.

The other Caualleros hearing him vse the tearme of *Signoria*, could not forbear laughter. The Cauallero blushing hereat, vsed these words, Your *mercede* may weet, that in Italie, to say *Signoria*, importeth so much as in Spaine to say *mercede*, and this Signor Capitano, being accustom'd to the vse and manner of that country, giueth the tearme of *Signoria*, where he should doe that of *mercede*. Hereto the captaine answered, saying; Let not your Signorie hold me to be a man so simple, but that I know when I am in Italie, to applie my selfe to the language of Italie, and in Spain, to that of Spain: but he that in Spain talking with me, may giue me the *you*, it behooueth at least that he haue a Signorie in Spain; & yet so I can scarce take it wel: the Cauallero somewhat affronted made reply, saying; why Signor Capitano, are you not natie in such a place, and sonne to such a man? And know you not againe who I am, and what mine ancestors haue been? Signor (answered the captaine) I know right well, that your Signorie is a good Cauallero, and such haue been your elders: but I and my right arme (which now I acknowledge for my father) are better than you and all your  
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linage. This captain meant to allude to the second birth, when hee said I and my right arme, which now I acknowledge to be my father; and that not vnduly: for with his right arme, and with his sword he had performed such actions, as the valour of his person was equall to the nobility of that Cavaliero. For the most part, the laws and nature (saith *Plato*) are contrary: for a man sometimes issueth out of natures hands, with a minde verie wise, excellent, noble, franke, and with a wit apt to command a whole world: yet because his hap was to be borne in the house of *Amiclas*, a base peasant, by the laws he remaineth depriued of that honour and libertie wherein nature placed him. And contrariwise we see others, whose wit and fashions were ordained to be slaues; and yet for that they were borne in noble houses, they come by force of the lawes to be great Lords. But one thing hath been noted many daies ago, which is worthe of consideration, that those who are born in villages and thatched houses, prooue more sufficient men, and of greater towardnesse for the Sciences and armes, than such as haue great Cities for their birth-place. Yet is the vulgar so subiect to ignorance, as they gather a consequence to the contrarie, from birth in meane places: hereof the sacred Scripture affoordeth vs an example, where it is read, that the people of Israel much wondering at the great workes of our Sauour Christ, said; Is it possible, that out of Nazareth can come ought that is good? But to return to the wit of this captain, of whom we haue discoursed: he ought to bee endowed with much vnderstanding, and with the difference of imagination, which is requisit for the art of war. Wherethrough, in this treatise we deliuer much doctrine, whence we may gather wherein the valour of men consisteth, that they may reap estimation

estimation in the commonwealth.

Six things (me seemeth) a man ought to haue, to the end he may be tearmed honourable, and which of them soeuer want, his being is thereby impaired: but yet all of them are not placed in one selfe degree, nor partake a like value, or the selfe qualities.

The first and principall, is the valour of a mans owne person, as touching his wisdome, iustice, mind, and courage. This maketh riches and birth-right, from hence grow honourable titles; from this beginning all the nobilitie in the world fetcheth his originall. And if any be settled in a contrarie opinion, let him go to the great houses in Spaine, and he shall find, that they all deriue their originall from particular men, who by the valour of their persons attained to that, which now by their successions is possessed.

The second thing which honoureth a man, next to the valour of his person, is substance, without which we find not, that any man carrieth estimation in the commonwealth.

The third is, the nobilitie and antiquitie of his ancestors, to be well borne, and of honourable bloud, is a thing very precious; but yet retaineth in it selfe a great defect: for by it selfe alone it yeeldeth a slender auaille, as well in regard of the gentleman himselfe, as of others who stand in need thereof: for a man can neither eat nor drinke the same, nor apparrell himselfe therewithall, nor giue nor bestow the same: but it maketh a man to liue as dying, by depriuing him of the remedies which he might otherwise procure to supplie his necessities; but let him vnite the same with riches, and by no degree of honour it can be counteruailed. Some are wont to resemble nobilitie to a cypher in numbring, which of it

selfe beareth no value, but vnited with another number, multiplieth the same.

The fourth point which maketh a man to be of account, is to haue some dignitie or honourable office, and contrariwise nothing so much abaseth a man, as to get his liuing by some handycraft.

The fift thing which honoureth a man, is to be called by a good surname, and a gracious Christian name, which may deliuer a pleasing consonance to the eare, & not to be termed pasty, or pestell, as some that I know. We read in the generall historie of Spaine, that there came two embassadours out of France vnto king *Alphonse* the ninth, to demaund one of his daughters in marriage for their soueraigne king *Philip*: one of which ladies was very faire, and named *Vrraca*; the other nothing so gracious, and called *Blanche*. They both coming in presence of the embassadours, all men held it as a matter resolued, that the choice would light vpon *Vrraca*, as the elder, and fairer, and better adorned: but the embassadours enquiring each of their names, tooke offence at the name of *Vrraca*, and made choice of the ladie *Blanche*: saying, that her name would be better receiued in France than the other.

The sixt thing which honoureth a man, is the seemely ornament of his person, and his going well apparelled, and attended with many waiters. The good discent of the Spanish nobilitie, is of such as through the valour of their person, and through their honourable enterprises atchieued, grew in the wars to the pay of 500 Soldi. The originall whereof our late writers cannot verifie: for if they find not their matter laid downe in writing, and expressed to their hands by others, they are vnable to supplie the same with any inuention of their owne. The difference

ference which *Aristotle* placeth betwixt memory and remembrance is, that if the memorie haue lost anie of those things which at first it knew, it cannot call the same to mind, without new learning thereof : but remembrance enioyeth this speciall grace, that if it forget ought, by stopping a while to discourse thereupon, it turneth to find out that which was before lost. Which may be the Court that speaketh in fauour of good souldiours, we find at this day recorded neither in bookes, nor in the memorie of men, but there are left as reliques these words, *hijo dalgo*, in those that receiue 500 Soldi of pay, after the Court of Spain, and their known wages. By making discourse, and arguing whereon, it will fall out an easie matter to find out their associats. *Antony* of Lebrissa giuing the signification of this verbe, *vendico, cas* : saith, the same signifieth, to draw vnto it that which is due for pay, or by reason, as we say now adaies by a new phrase of speech, or to take pay from the king. And it is a thing so vsed in Castilia the old, to say such a one hath well impaid his trauaile, when he is well paid, that amongst the ciuiller sort there is no manner of speech more ordinarie.

From this signification, the word *vindicare* fetched his originall, namely, when any one would stirre at the wrong offered him by another : for iniurie metaphorically is tearmed debt. After this sort when we now say, such a one is *hijo dalgo, de vengar quinceutos sueldos*, that is, a gentleman of the pay of 500 Soldi : we meane that he is descended from a souldior so valiant, as for his prowesse he deserued to receiue so large a pay, as is that of 500 Soldi : who by the court of Spaine was (with all his posteritie) enfranchised from paying any tallages or seruitices to the king. This knowne pay is nought els, saue the

entrance which such a souldiour made into the number of those, whose stipend was 500 Soldi: for then were registred in the kings booke the name of the souldiour, the countrey where he was borne, and who were his parents and progenitors, for the more certaintie to him who receiued this benefit and stipend. Euen as at this day we read in the booke of *Bezerro*, which is kept at *Salamanca*, where are found written the beginning of well-neere all the Spanish nobilitie. The semblable diligence vsed *Saul*, when *Dauid* slew *Goliath*: for forthwith he sent *Abner* his captaine, to take information of what stocke the young man was descended. Antiently they termed *Solaro* the house of the villaine, as well as of the gentleman.

But sithens we haue stepped aside into this digression, it behooueth to make returne to our purpose from whence we parted, and to know whence it groweth, that in play at Chesse, which we tearmed a counterfeite of warre, a man shameth more to loose, than at any other game, albeit the same turne him to no dammage, neither is the play for money: and whence it may spring, that the lookers on see more draughts than the players themselves, though they are lesse scene in the play? and that which most importeth, is, that some gamesters play best fasting, and some better after meat? The first doubt holdeth like difficultie, for we haue auouched, that in warre and in Chesse-play fortune hath nought to doe, neither may we be allowed to say, Who would euer haue thought this? but all is ignorance and carelesnesse in him that leeseeth, and wisdom and cunning in him that getteth. And when a man is ouercome in matters of wit and sufficiencie, and is cut off from all allegations of excuse or pretence, other than his owne ignorance, it follow-

followeth a matter of necessitie, that he wax ashamed: for man is reasonable, and a friend to his reputation, and cannot brooke that in the workes of this power any other should step a foot before him. For which cause *Aristotle* demandeth, What the reason may be, why the antients consented not, that speciall rewards should be assigned to those, who surpassed the rest in the Sciences, & yet ordained some for the best leaper, runner, thrower of the barre, and wrestler? To which he frameth answere, That in wrestling and bodily contentions, it is tollerated that there be Iudges assigned, who shall censure how far one man exceedeth another, to the end they may iustly yeeld prize to the vanquisher, it falling out a matter of no difficultie, for the eye to discern who leapeth most ground, or runneth with greatest swiftnesse: but in matters of science it prooueth very hard to trie by the vnderstanding which exceedeth other, for that it is a thing appertaining to the spirit, and of much queintnesse; and if the iudge list to giue the prize maliciously, all men cannot looke thereunto, for it is a iudgement much estranged from the sence of the beholders. Besides this answere, *Aristotle* giueth another which is better, saying, That men make no great recke to be overcome in throwing, wrastring, running, and leaping, for that they are graces wherein the very brute beasts outpasse vs. But that which we cannot endure with patience, is, to haue another adiudged more wise and aduised than our selues, wherethrough they grow in hatred with the iudges, and seeke to be reuenged of them, thinking that of malice they went about to shame the. Therefore to shun these inconueniences, they would not yeeld consent, that in workes appertaining to the reasonable part, men should be allowed either iudges or rewards.

Whence is gathered, that the Vniuersities doe ill, who assigne iudges and rewards of the first, second, and third degree, in licencing those that pꝛooue best at the examinations.

For besides that the inconueniences alleaged by *Aristotle* doe betide, it is repugnant to the doctrine of the Gospell, that men grow into contention who should be cheefe. And that this is true, we see manifestly, for that the disciples of our Sauour Christ comming one day from a certaine voiage, treated amongst themselues, who should be the greatest, and being now arriued at their lodging, their maister asked them, whereof they had reasoned vpon the way? but they (though somewhat blunt) well vnderstood, how this question was not allowable; wherethrough the text saith, that they durst not tell him: but because from God nothing can be concealed, he spake vnto them in this manner: If any will be chiefe amongst you, he shall be the last of all, and seruant to the rest. The Pharisies were abhorred by Christ our redeemer, because they loued the highest seats at feasts, and the principall chaires in the Synagogues. The chiefe reason whereon they relie who bestow degrees after this manner, is, that when schollers know ech of them shall be rewarded according to the triall which they shall giue of themselues, they will scantly affoord themselues time from their studie, to sleepe or eat: which would cease, were there not a reward for him that taketh pains, or chastisement for him that addiecth himselfe to loosenesse and loitering. But this is a slender reason, and so onely in apparence, and presupposeth a great falshood, which is, that knowledge may be gotten by continuall plodding at the booke, and by hearing of good maisters, and neuer leeing a lesson. And they marke not, that if a scholar

let want the wit and abilitie requisit for the learning which he applieth, it falleth out a lost labour, to beat his head day and night at his bookes. And the error is such, that if differences of wits, so far distant as these, doe enter into competencie, the one through his quicke capacitie, without studying or poring in bookes, getteth learning in a trice, and the other, for that he is block-headed and dull, after he hath toiled all his life long, can small skill in the matter.

Now the Iudges come, as men to giue the first price to him who was enabled by nature and tooke no trauell, and the last to him who was borne void of capacitie, yet neuer gaue ouer studying; as if the one had gotten learning by turning ouer his bookes, and the other lost the same through his owne sluggishnesse. And it fareth as if they ordained prices for two horses, of which the one had his legs sound and nimble, and the other halted downeright. If the Vniuersities did admit to the studie of the Sciences, none but such as had a wit capable thereof, and were all equall, it should seeme a thing well done to ordaine reward and punishment: for whosoever knew most, it would therby appeare that he pained himselfe most, and who knew least, had giuen himselfe more to his ease.

To the second doubt we answer, that as the eyes stand in need of light and cleerenesse, to see figures and colours, so the imagination hath need of light in the braine, to see the fantasies which are in the memorie. This cleerenesse the Sunne giueth not, nor any lampe or candle, but the vitall spirits which are bred in the heart, and dispersed throughout the bodie. Herewithall it is requisit to know that feare gathereth all the vitall spirits to the heart, and leaueth the braine darke, and all the other parts of the  
bodie

bodie cold. Wherupon *Aristotle* maketh this demaund, Whence commeth it, that who so feareth, his voice, his hands, and his nether lip doe tremble? whereto he answereth, That through this feare the naturall heat hieth to the heart, and leaueth all the residue of the bodie a-cold, and the cold (as is before touched) by *Galens* mind, hindereth all the powers and faculties of the soule, and suffereth not them to worke.

Hence beginneth the answer of this second doubt, and it is, that those who play at Chess, conceiue feare to loose, because the game standeth vpon tearmes of reputation and disgrace, and for that Fortune hath no stroke therein; so the vitall spirits assembling to the heart, the imagination is foreflowed by the cold, and the fantasmes in the darke: for which two reasons, he who playeth, cannot bring his purpose to effect. But the lookers on, in as much as this no way importeth them, neither stand in feare of loosing through want of skill, do behold more draughts, for that their imagination retaineth his heat, and his figures are enlightened by the light of the vitall spirits. True it is, that much light reaueth also the light of the imagination, and it befalleth what time the player waxeth ashamed and out of countenance to see his aduersarie beat him; then through this aggreuednesse the naturall heat encrease, and enlighteneth more than is requisit, of all which he that standeth by is deuoid. From hence issueth an effect very vsuall in the world, that what time a man endeuoureth to make the best muster of himselfe, and his learning and sufficiencie most knowne, it prooueth worst with him: with others againe the contrarie betideth, who being brought to their triall, make a great shew, and passed out of the lists, appeare of little woorth: and of all this the reason is very manifest, for he  
whose

whose head is filled with much naturall heat, if you appoint him to doe an exercise of learning or disputation, within foure and twentie houres after, a part of that excessiue heat which he hath flieth to the heart, and so the braine remaineth temperat, and in this disposition (as we will prooue in the chapter ensuing) many points woorth the vtterance, present themselves to a mans remembrance. But he who is very wise and endowed with a great vnderstanding, being brought to triall, by meanes of feare cannot retaine the naturall heat in his head, whereon through default of light, he findeth not in his memorie what to deliuer.

If this fell into their consideration, who take vpon them to controll the Generals of armies, blaming their actions, and the order which they set downe in the field, they should discerne how great a difference resteth betweene the giuing a looking on the fight out at a window, or the breaking of a launce therein, and the feare to leese an armie, whose charge their soueraigne hath committed to their hands.

No lesse dammage doth feare procure the Physition in curing, for his practise (as we haue prooued heretofore) appertaineth to the imagination, which resteth more annoyed by cold than any other power, for that his operation consisteth in heat. Whence we see by experience, that Physitians can sooner cure the vulgar sort, than princes and great personages. A counsellor at law one day asked me (knowing that I handled this matter) what the cause might be, that in the affaires where he was well payed, many cases and points of learning came to his memorie, but with such as yeelded not to his trauell what was due, it seemed that all his knowledge was shrunke out of his braine: whom I answered, that mat-

ters of interest appertained to the wrathfull facultie, which maketh his residence in the heart, and if the same receiue not contentment, it doth not willingly send forth the vitall spirits, by whose light the figures which rest in the memorie may be discerned. But when that findeth satisfaction, it cheerefully affoordeth naturall heat: Wherethrough the reasonable soule obtaineth sufficient cleerenesse to see whatsoeuer is written in the head. This defect doe men of great vnderstanding partake, who are pinching, and relie much on their interest, and in such is the propertie of that counsellor best discerned. But who so falleth into due consideration hereof, shall obserue it to be an action of Iustice, that he who laboureth in another mans vineyard bee well paid his wages.

The like reason is currant for the Phisition, to whom (when they are well hired) many remedies present themselves: otherwise the art (as well in them as the Lawyer) slippeth out of their fingers. But here a matter very important is to be noted; namely, that the good imagination of the Phisition discouereth on a suddaine what is necessarie to be done. And if he take leisure and farther consideration, a thousand inconueniences come into his fancie, which hold him in suspence, and this while the occasion of the remedie passeth away. Therefore it is neuer good, to aduise the Phisition to consider well what he hath in hand, but that he forthwith execute what first he purposed. For we haue prooued heretofore, that much speculation maketh the naturall heat to auoid out of the head, and againe the same may encrease so far forth, as to turmoile the imagination. But the Phisition, in whom it is slacke, shall not doe amisse to vse long contemplation: for the heat aduancing it selfe vp

to the braine, shall come to attaine that point, which to this power is behooffull.

The third doubt in the matters alreadie rehearsed, hath his answer very manifest: for the difference of the imagination, with which we play at chesse, requireth a certaine point of heat, to see the draughts, and he that plaieth well fasting, hath then the degree of heat requisit thereunto: but through the heat of the meat, the same exceedeth that point which was necessarie, and so he plaieth worse. The contrarie befalleth to such as play well after meales, for the heat rising vp together with the meat and the wine, arriueth to the point, which wanted whiles he was fasting. It is therefore needfull to amend a place in *Plato*, who saith, That Nature hath with great wisdom disioyned the liuer from the braine, to the end, the meat with his vapours should not trouble the contemplation of the reasonable soule. But here if he meane those operations which appertaine to the vnderstanding, he speaketh very well, but it can take no place in any of the differences of the imagination. Which is scene by experience in feasts and banquets: for when the guests are come to mid meale, they begin to tell pleasant tales, merriments, and similitudes; where at the beginning none had a word to say; but at the end of the feast their tongue faileth them, for the heat is passed beyond the bound, requisit for the imagination. Such as need to eat and drinke a little, to the end the imagination may lift vp it selfe, are melancholicke by adustion: for such haue their braine like hot lime, which taken vp into your hand, is cold and drie in feeling; but if you bath the same in any liquor, you cannot endure the heat which groweth thereof.

We must also correct that law of the Carthaginians,  
which

which *Plato* alleageth, whereby they forbad their Capitaines to drinke wine, when they went to their wars, and likewise their gouernours, during the yeare of their office. And albeit *Plato* held the same for a verie iust law, and neuer maketh an end of commending the same; yet it behooueth to make a distinction. We haue alleaged heretofore, that the worke of iudging appertaineth to discourse, and that this power abhorreth heat, and therefore receiueth much damage by wine: but to gouerne a commonwealth (which is a distinct matter from taking into your hand a processe, and giuing sentence therevpon) belongeth to the imagination, and that requireth heat: and the gouernour not arriuing to the point which is requisit, may well drinke a little wine, so to attaine the same. The like may be said touching the generall of an armie, whose counsell partaketh also with the imagination. And if the naturall heat be by any hot thing to be aduanced, none performeth it so well as wine; but it is requisit, that the same be temperatly taken, for there is no nourishment which so giueth and recaueth a mans wit, as this liquor. Wherefore it behooueth the Generall, to know the manner of his imagination, whether the same be of those which need meat and drinke to supplie the heat that wanteth, or to abide fasting: for in this onely, consisteth how to mannage his affaires well or euill.

### CHAP. XIII.

*How we may know to what difference of abilitie the office of a king appertaineth, and what signes he ought to haue who enioyeth this manner of wit.*

When



When *Salomon* was chosen king and head of so great and numberfull a people, as that of *Israell*; the text saith, that for governing and ruling them, hee craued wisdome from heauen, and nothing besides. Which demaund so much pleased God, as in reward of hauing asked so well, he made him the wisest king of the world: and not so contented, he gaue him great riches and glorie, euermore holding his request in better price. Whence is manifestly gathered, that the greatest wisdome and knowledge which may possibly be in the world, is that foundation, vpon which the office of a king relieth. Which conclusion is so certaine and true, as it were but lost labour to spend time in the prooffe thereof. Only it behooueth to shew to what difference of wit the art of being a king, and such a one as is requisit for the commonwealth, appertaineth: and to vnfold the tokens, whereby the man may be knowne who is indowed with this wit and abilitie. Wherethrough it is certaine, that as the office of a king exceedeth all the arts in the world; so the same requireth a perfection of wit in the largest measure that nature can deuise. What the same is, we haue not as yet defined: for we haue beene occupied in distributing to the other arts, their differences & maners. But since we now haue the same in handling, it must be vnderstood, that of nine temperatures which are in mankind, one onely (saith *Galen*) maketh a man so surpassing wise, as by nature he can be. Wherein the first qualities are in such waight and measure, that the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moist the drie, but are found in such equalitie and conformitie, as if really they were not contraries, nor had any naturall opposition. Whence resulteth an instrument.

strument so appliable to the operations of the reasonable soule, that man commeth to possesse a perfect memorie of things passed, and a great imagination to see what is to come, and a great vnderstanding, to distinguish, inferre, argue, iudge, and make choice. The other differences of wit (by vs recounted) haue not any one amongst them of sound perfection: for if a man possesse great vnderstanding, he cannot (by meanes of much drittneffe) comprise the sciences which appertaine to the imagination and the memorie; and if he be of great imagination, by reason of much heat, he remaineth vn sufficient for the sciences of the vnderstanding and the memorie, and if he enioy a great memorie, we haue tofore expressed, how vn able those of much memorie (through their excessiue moisture) doe prooue for all the other sciences. Onely this difference of wit which we now are a searching, is that which answereth all the arts in proportion. How much dammage the vnablenesse of adioyning the rest, breedeth to any one knowledge, *Plato* noteth, saying; That the perfection of ech in particular, dependeth on the notice and knowledge of them all in generall.

No sort of knowledge is found so distinctly and seuered from another, but that the skill in the one much aideth to the others perfection. But how shall we doe, if hauing sought for this difference of wit with great diligence in all Spaine, I can find but one such? Whereby I conceiue, that *Galen* said very well, That out of Greece, nature not so much as in a dreame maketh any man temperat, or with a wit requisit for the sciences. And the same *Galen* alleageth the reason hereof, saying; That Greece is the most temperat region of the world: where the heat of the aire exceedeth not the cold, nor the moist

moist the drie. Which temperature maketh men very wise and able for all the Sciences, as appeareth, considering the great number of famous men who thence haue issued, as *Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hippocrates, Galen, Theophrastus, Demosthenes, Homer, Thales Milesius, Diogenes Cynicus, Solon*, and infinit other wise men mentioned in histories, whose workes we find replenished with all sciences: not as the writers of other prouinces, who if they treat of Phisicke, or any other Science, it prooues a miracle for them to alleage any other sort of science in their aid or fauour. All of them are begerly and without furniture, as wanting a wit capable of all the arts. But which we may most maruell at in Greece, is, that whereas the wit of women is found so repugnant vnto learning (as hereafter we will prooue) yet there haue been so many the Greekes, so specially seene in the sciences, as they haue growne into competencie with the sufficientest men: as namely *Leontia*, a most wise woman, who wrote against *Theophrastus*, the greatest Philosopher of his time, reproouing him for many errors in Philosophie. But if we looke into other prouinces of the world, hardly shall we find sprung vp any one wit that was notable. Which groweth, for that they inhabit places distempered, where men become brutish, slow of capacitie, and ill conditioned.

For this cause *Aristotle* moueth a doubt, saying; What meaneth it, that those who inhabit a countrey, either ouer cold, or ouer hot, are fierce and fell in countenance and conditions: to which problem he answereth verie well, saying; That a good temperature not only maketh a good grace in the bodie, but also aideth the wit and abilitie. And as the excesses of heat and cold do hinder nature, that she cannot shape a man in good figure;

so (also for the like reason) the harmonie of the soule is turned topsie turvie, and the wit prooueth slow and dull.

This the Greekes well wist, in as much as they termed all the nations of the world Barbarians, considering their slender sufficiencie and little knowledge. Whence we see, that of so many that are borne and studie out of Greece, if they be Philosophers, none of them arriue to the perfection of *Plato* and *Aristotle*: if Phisitions, to *Hippocrates* and *Galen*: if orators, to *Demosthenes*: if Poets to *Homer*: and so in the residue of the sciences parts, the Greeks haue euer held the formost ranke beyond all contradiction. At least the probleme of *Aristotle* is very well verified in the Greekes: for verily they are the men of most sufficiencie and loftiest capacitie in the world: were it not that they liue in disgrace, oppressed by force of armes in bondage, and all hardly intreated by the coming of the Turkes, who banished all learning, and caused the Vniuersitie of Athens to passe vnto Paris in France, where at this day the same continueth. And (thus through want of manurance) so many gallant wits (as we haue before reported) are vtterly perished. In the other regions out of Greece, though schools and exercise of learning are planted, yet no man hath proved in them of any rare excellencie.

The Phisition holdeth he hath waded very far, if with his wit he can attaine to that which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* deliuered, and the naturall Philosopher reckoneth himselfe so full of knowledge, as he can be capable of no more, if he once grow to the vnderstanding of *Aristotle*. But this notwithstanding, it goeth not for an vniuersall rule, that all such as haue Greece for their birth-place, must of force be temperat and wise, and all the residue distem.

distemperat and ignorant : for the same *Galen* recounteth of *Anacharsis*, who was borne in Scythia, that he carried the reputation of a rare wit amongst the Grecians, though himselfe a Barbarian. A Philosopher borne in Athens falling in contention with him, said vnto him; Get thee hence thou Barbarian. Then *Anacharsis* answered, My countrey is to me a shame, and so art thou to thine : for Scythia, being a region so distemperat, and where so many ignorant persons liue, my selfe am grown to knowledge, and thou being borne in Athens, a place of wit and wisdom, wert neuer other than an Ass. In sooth, that we need not vterly despaire in regard of the temperature ; neither thinke it a case of impossibilitie, to meet herewithall out of Greece, and especially in Spaine, a region not very distemperat : for as I haue found one of these differences in Spaine, so it may well be, that there are many others not yet come to knowledge, and which I haue not been able to find out. It shall doe well therefore, to intreat of the tokens, by which a temperat man may be discerned, to the end where such a one is, he may not be hidden.

Many signes haue the Phisitions laid downe to discover this difference of wit, but the most principall, and which affoord best notice, are these following.

The first (saith *Galen*) is to haue his haire aboutie, a colour betweene white and red ; and that passing from age to age, they euer become more golden. And the reason is very cleere : for the materiall cause wherof the haire consisteth, the Phisitions say, is a grosse vapour which ariseth from the digestion that the braine maketh at the time of his nourishment ; and looke what colour is of the member, such also is that of his excrements. If the braine in his composition partake much of fleagme,

the haire in growth is white, if much choller, saffron coloured : but if these two humours rest equally mingled, the braine becommeth temperat, hot, cold, moist, and drie; and the haire aboutne partaking both the extremes. True it is *Hippocrates* saith, that this colour in men, who liue vnder the North, as are the English, Flemmish, and Almaines, springeth, for that their whitenesse is parched vp with much cold, and not for the reason by vs alleaged. Wherefore in this token it behooueth to be well aduised : otherwise we may soone slip into error.

The second token which a man, who shalbe endowed with this difference of wit, must haue, is (saith *Galen*) to be well shaped, of good countenance, of seemely grace, and cheerefull : in sort, that the sight may take delight to behold him, as a figure of rare perfection. And the reason is very plaine : for if nature haue much force, and a seed well seasoned, she alwaies formeth of things possible, the best and most perfect in his kind : but being putueied of forces, mostly she placeth her studie in fashioning the braine, for that amongst all other parts of the bodie, the same is the principall seat of the reasonable soule : whence we see many men to be great and foule, and yet of an excellent wit.

The quantitie of bodie which a temperat man ought to haue (saith *Galen*) is not resolutely determined by nature, for he may be long, short, and of meane stature, conformable to the quantitie of the temperat seed, which it had when it was shaped. But as touching that which appertaineth to the wit in temperat persons, a meane stature is better than either a great or little. And if we must leane to either of the extreames, it is better to encline to the little than to the great : for the bones and superfluous flesh (as wee haue prooued heretofore by the opinion  
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of *Plato* and *Aristotle*) bring great dammage to the wit. Agreeable hereunto, the naturall Philosophers are wont to demand, whence it proceedeth, that men of small stature are ordinarily more wise than those of long stature. And for prooffe hereof, they cite *Homer*, who saith, that *Ulysses* was very wise, and little of bodie; and contrariwise *Ajax* very foolish, and in stature tall. To this question they make very simple answers, saying, that the reasonable soule gathered into a narrow roome, hath thereby more force to worke conformable to that old saw, Vertue is of more force vntited than dispersed: and contrariwise making abode in a bodie long and large, it wanteth sufficient vertue to moue and animate the same. But this is not the reason thereof: for we should rather say, That long men haue much moisture in their composition, which extendeth out their flesh, and ableth the same to that increase which the naturall heat doth euer procure. The contrarie betideth in little bodies: for through their much drinesse, the flesh cannot take his course, nor the naturall heat enlarge or stretch it out, and therefore they remaine of short stature. And we haue earst proued, that amongst the first qualities, none bringeth so great dammage to the operations of the reasonable soule, as much moisture, and that none so farre quickeneth the vnderstanding, as drinesse.

The third signe (saith *Galen*) by which a temperat man may be knowne, is, that he be vertuous and of good conditions: for if he be lewd and vitious, *Plato* affirmeth it groweth, for that in man there is some distemperat qualitie, which yrgeth him to offend: and if such a one will practise that which is agreeable to vertue, it behooueth, that first he renounce his owne naturall inclination. But whosoeuer is absolutely temperat, standeth not in need

of any such diligence, for the inferiour powers require nothing at his hands that is contrarie to reason. Therefore *Galen* saith, That to a man who is possessed of this temperature, we need prescribe no diet what he shall eat and drinke: for he neuer exceedeth the quantitie and measure which Phisicke would asigne him. And *Galen* contenteth not himselfe to tearme them most temperat: but moreouer aroucheth, that it is not necessarie to moderate their other passions of the soule: for his anger, his sadnesse, his pleasure, and his mirth, are alwaies measured by reason. Whence it followeth, that they are euermore healthfull and neuer diseased, and this is the fourth figure.

But herein *Galen* swarveth from reason: for it is impossible to frame a man, that shall be perfect in all his powers, as the bodie is temperat, and that his wrathfull and concupiscentiall power get not the soueraigneticke ouer reason, and incite him to sinne. For it is not fitting to suffer any man (how temperat soeuer) to follow alwaies his owne naturall inclination, without gaine-setting and correcting him by reason. This is easily vnderstood, considering the temperature which the braine ought to haue, to the end the same may be made a conuenient instrument for the reasonable facultie: and that which the heart should hold, to the end the wrathfull power may couet glorie, empire, victorie, and soueraigneticke ouer all: and that which the liuer ought to haue for digesting the meats, and that which ought to rest in the cods, to be able to preserve mankind, and to increase the same. Of the braine, we haue said sundry times tofore, that it should retaine moisture for memorie, drinesse for discourse, and heat for the imagination: But for all this, his naturall temperature is cold and moist; and by reason of the

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more or lesse of these two qualities, sometimes we terme it hot, and sometimes cold, now moist, then drie; but the cold and moist grow to predominat. The liuer, wherein the facultie of concupiscence resideth, hath for his naturall temperature heat and moisture to predominate; and from this it neuer altereth, so long as a man liueth: and if sometimes we say it is cold, it groweth, for that the same hath not all the degrees of heat requisit to his owne operations. As touching the heart, which is the instrument of the wrathfull facultie, *Galen* affirmeth it of his owne nature to be so hot, as if (while a creature liueth) wee put our finger into his hollownesse, it will grow impossible to hold the same there one moment without burning. And albeit sometime we terme it cold; yet we may not conceiue, that the same doth predominate, for this is a case impossible, but that the same consisteth not in such degree of heat as to his operations is behoofull.

In the cods, where the other part of the concupiscible maketh abode, the like reason taketh place, for the predomination of his naturall temperature is hot and drie. And if sometimes we say, that a mans cods are cold, we must not absolutely so vnderstand the same; neither to predominat: but that the degree of heat requisit for the generatiue vertue is wanting. Hereon we plaine-ly inferre, that if a man be well compounded and instrumentalized, it behooueth of force, that hee haue excessive heat in his heart; for otherwise the wrathfull facultie would grow very remisse: and if the liuer be not exceeding hot, it cannot digest the meat, nor make blood for nourishment: and if the cods haue not more heat than cold, a man will prooue impotent, and without power of begetting. Wherefore these two members

(being of such force as we haue said) it followeth of necessitie, that the braine take alteration through much heat, which is one of the qualities that most paineth reason; and which is worst, the will being free, inciteth and enclineth it selfe to condescend to the appetites of the lower portion.

By this reckoning it appeareth, that nature cannot fashion such a man as may be perfect in all his powers, nor produce him enclined to vertue. How repugnant it is vnto the nature of man, that he become inclined to vertue, is easily prooued, considering the composition of the first man; which though the most perfect that euer mankind enjoyed, sauing that of Christ our redeemer, and shaped by the hands of so great an artificer; yet if God had not infused into him a supernaturall qualitie, which might keepe downe his inferiour part, it was impossible (abiding in the principles of his owne nature) that he should not be enclined to euill. And that God made *Adam* of a perfect power to wrath and concupiscence, is well to be vnderstood, in that he said and commaunded him, Encrease and multiplie, and to replenish the earth. It is certaine, that he gaue them an able power for procreation, and made them not of a cold complexion, in as much as he commaunded him, that he should people the earth with men; which worke cannot be accomplished without abundance of heat. And no lesse heat did he bestow vpon the facultie nutritiue: with which he was to restore his consumed substance, and renew another in lieu thereof. Seeing that he said to the man and the woman: Behold, I haue given you euery hearbe that bringeth forth seed vpon the earth, and whatsoeuer trees haue seed of their kind, to the end they may serue you for food. For if God had giuen them a sto-

make and liues; cold and of little heat; for certaine they could not haue digested their meat, nor preserued themselves 990 yeares alieue in the world. He fortified also the heart, and gaue the same a wrathfull facultie, which might yeeld him apt to be a king and lord, and to command the whole world, and said vnto them, Do you subdue the earth; and command ouer the fishes of the sea, and the fowles of the aire, and all the beasts that moue on the face of the earth. But if he had not giuen them much heat, they had not partaken so much viuaine; nor authoritie of soueraignie, of commandement, of glorie, of maiestie, and of honour.

How much it endamageeth a prince, to haue his wrathfull power remisse, cannot sufficiently be expressed: for through this only cause it befallerh, that he is not feared nor obeyed, nor reuerenced by his subiects. After hauing fortified the wrathfull and concupiscible powers, giuing vnto the forementioned members so much heat, he passed to the facultie reasonable, and shaped for the same a braine cold and moist, in such degree, and of a substance so delicat, that the soule might with the same discourse and philosophise, and vse his infused knowledge. For we haue already auouched and heretofore prooued, that God to bestow a supernaturall knowledge vpon men, first ordereth their wit, and maketh them capable; by way of the naturall dispositions deliuered by his hand, that they may receiue the same: for which cause, the text of the holy Scripture affirmeth, that he gaue them a heart to conceiue, and replenished them with the discipline of vnderstanding. The wrathfull and concupiscentiall powers, being then so mightie through great heat, and the reasonable so weake and remisse to resist, God made provision of a supernaturall qualitie, and

and this is termed by the Divines, Originall Iustice, by which they come to expresse the bright of the inferiour partion; and the part reasonable remaineth superiour, and beclined to better. But when our first parents offended, they lost this qualitie, and the irascible and concupiscible remained in their nature, and superiour to reason, in respect of the strength of the three members that we spake of, and manifested readie, even from his youth, unto euill.

Adam was created in the age of youth, which (after the Physicians) is the most temperat of all the residue, and from that age soorth, he was enclined to euilnesse, sauing that little time whilst he preserved himselfe in grace by originall iustice. From this doctrine we gather in good naturall Philosophie, that if a man be so perforce any action of vertue to the gaine saying of the flesh, it is impossible that he can put the same in execution, without outward aid of grace; for the qualities with which the inferiour power worketh, are of greater efficacie. I said, with gaine saying of the flesh, because there are many vertues in man, which grow, for that he hath his powers of wrath and concupiscence feeble, as chastitie in a cold person; but this is rather an impotencie of operation, than a vertue: for which cause, had not the catholicke church taught vs, that without the speciall aid of God, we could not haue overcome our owne nature, Philosophie naturall would so haue learned vs; namely, that grace comforteth our will. That then which *Galen* would haue sayd, was, that a temperat man exceedeth in vertue all others who want this good temperance, for the same is lesse prouoked by the inferiour part.

The fifth propertie which those of this temperature possesse, is to be very long liued, for they are strong to

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resist the causes and occasions which engender diseases; and this was that which the roiall prophet *Dauid* meant, The daies of our age in themselves are fourscore yeares, but if in the potentates there be eightie or more, it is their paine and sorrow: as if he should say, The number of yeares which men ordinarily do liue, arriue vnto fuentie, and if potentates reach vnto eightie, those once passed, they are dead on their feet. He tearmeth those men potentates, who are of this temperature, for more than any other they resist the causes which abridge the life. *Galen* layeth downe the last token, saying, that they are very wise, of great memorie for things passed, of great imagination to foresee those to come, and of great vnderstanding to find out the truth of all matters. They are not malicious, not wily, not cauillers, for these spring from a temperature that is vicious. Such a wit as this assuredly was not framed by nature to addiect it selfe vnto the studie of the Latine tongue, Logicke, Philosophie, Phisicke, Diuinitie, or the Lawes: for put case he might easily attaine these sciences, yet none of them can fully replenish his capacitie; onely the office of a king is in proportion answerable therunto, and in ruling and gouerning ought the same solely to be imploied. This shall easily be seene, if you run ouer the tokens and properties of a temperat man, which we haue laid down, by taking into consideration, how fiedly ech of them squareth with the roiall scepter, and how impertinent they shew for the other arts and sciences.

That a king be faire and gracious, is one of the things which most inuiceth his subiects to loue him and wish him well; For the obiect of loue (saith *Plato*) is beaurtie and a seemely proportion: and if a king be hardly fauoured, and badly shaped, it is impossible that his subiects

can beate him affection, rather they reake it a shame, that a man vnperfect and void of the gifts of nature, should haue sway and commandement ouer them. To be virtuous and of good conditions, easily may we gather how greatly it importeth; for he who ought to order the liues of his subiects, and deliuer vnto them rules and lawes to liue conformably to reason, it is requisite that he performe the same also in his owne person: for as the king is, such are the great, the meane, and the inferiour persons.

Moreouer, by this means he shall make his commandements the more authentick, and with the better title may chastise such as doe not obserue them. To enioy a perfection in all the powers which gouerne man, namely, the generative, nutritiue, wrathfull, and reasonable, is more necessarie in a king, than in any artist whatsoever. For (as *Plato* deliuereth) in a well ordered commonwealth, there should be appointed certaine surueyours, who might with skill looke into the qualities of such persons as are to be married, and giue to him a wife answerable vnto him in proportion, and to euery wife a conuenient husband. Through this diligence, the principall end of matrimonie should not become vaine; for we see by experience, that a woman who could not conceiue of her first husband, marrying another, straightwaies beareth children; and many men haue no children by their first wife, taking another, speedily come to be fathers.

Now this skill (saith *Plato*) is principally behooffull in the marriage of kings: for it being a matter of such importance, for the peace and quiet of the kingdome, that the prince haue lawfull children to succeed in the estate, it may so fall, that the king marrying at all aduentures,  
shall

shall take a bartaine woman to wife, with whom he shall be combred all daies of his life, without hope of issue. And if he decease without heires of his bodie, straightwaies it must be decided by ciuile wars, who shall commaund next after him. But *Hippocrates* saith, this art is necessarie for men that are distemperat, and not for those who partake this perfect temperature by vs described. These need no speciall choice in their wife, nor to search out which may answere them in proportion; for whom soeuer they marry withall (saith *Galen*) forthwith they beget issue: but this is vnderstood, when the wife is sound, and of the age wherein women by order of nature may conceiue and bring forth: in sort, that fruitfulnessse is more requisit in a king than in any artist whatsoeuer, for the reasons tofore alleaged.

The nutritiue power (saith *Galen*) if the same be gluttonous; greedie, and bibbing, it springeth, for that the liuer and stomack want the temperature which is requisit for their operations: and for this cause men become riotous and short lined. But if these members possesse their due temperature and composition, the selfe *Galen* affirmeth, that they couet no greater quantitie of meat and drinke than is conuenient for preservation of life. Which propertie is of so great importance for a king, that God holdeth that land for blessed, to whose lot such a prince befalleth. Blessed is the land (saith he in *Ecclesiasticus*) whose king is noble, and whose princes feed in due times for their refreshment, and not for riotousnesse. Of the wrathfull facultie, if the same be extended or remisse, it is a token (saith *Galen*) that the heart is ill composed, and partaketh not that temperature which is requisit for his operations. From which two extreames a king ought to be farther distant than any other artist: for to ioyne wrath-

wrathfulnesse with much power maketh finally for the subiects auaille. And as illy fitteth it for a king to haue his wrathfull power remisse: for if he slightly slip ouer bad parts and attempts in his kingdome, he groweth out of awe and reuerence amongst his subiects: whence great dammages and verie difficult to be remedied, doe accustomably arise in the common wealth. But the man who is temperat, groweth displeased vpon good ground, and can pacifie himselfe as is requisit: which propertie is as necessarie to be settled in a king, as anie of these which we haue before remembred. How much it importeth, that the facultie reasonable, the imagination, the memorie, and the vnderstanding, be of greater perfection in a king than in any other, is easily to be prooued: for the other arts and sciences (as it seemeth) may be obtained and put in practise by the force of mans wit: but to gouern a kingdome, and to preserue the same in peace and concord, not onely requireth, that the king be endowed with a naturall wisdom to execute the same: but it is also necessarie, that God particularly asist him with his vnderstanding, and aid him in gouerning: whence it was well noted in the Scripture, The heart of the king is in the hand of God. To liue also many yeares, and to enioy continuall health, is a propertie more conuenient for a good king than for any other artisan. For his industrie and trauell, breedeth an vniuersall good to all: and if he faile to hold out in healthfulnesse, the commonwealth falleth to ruine.

All this doctrine here laid downe by vs, will be evidently confirmed, if we can find in any historie, that at any time there was any king chosen, in whom any of those tokens and conditions by vs recited, were not wanting. And truth hath this as peculiar to her nature,  
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that she neuer lacketh arguments, wherby to be confirmed.

The diuine Scripture recounteth, that God falling in dislike with *Saul*, for that he had spared *Amalecks* life; commanded *Samuel*, that he should go to Bethleem, and annoint for king of Israel one of the eight sonnes of *Iesse*. Now the holy man presuming, that God had a liking to *Eliab*, for that he was tall of stature, demanded of him; Is this man, here in the presence of my Lord, his Christ? to which question he was answered in this manner, Take not regard to his countenance, nor to the tallnesse of his stature, for I haue refused him: I iudge not man by his looke, for man seeth the things outwardly apparent, but the Lord discerneth the heart. As if God should say: Marke not (O *Samuel*) the high stature of *Eliab*, nor that manly countenance which thou beholdest: for I haue tried that in *Saul*. You men iudge by the outward signes, but I cast mine eye vpon the iudgement and wisdom, wherewith a people is to be gouerned.

*Samuel* mistrusting his owne skill in chusing, passed on farther in the charge which was commanded him; asking still of God, vpon every one, which of them he should annoint for king: and because God held himselfe contented with none of them, he said vnto *Iesse*; hast thou yet no more sonnes but those who stand before vs? Who answered, saying; That he had yet one more, who kept his beasts, but he was of little growth: him seeming, that therefore he was not sufficient to weeld the royall scepter. But *Samuel* now wisted, that a great stature was no sure token, caused him to be sent for. And it is a point worth the noting, that the holy Scripture before it expessed how he was annointed king, said in this manner; But he was aboutne haired, and of a faire count-

countenance, and a visage well shaped; arise and annoint him, for this is he. In sort, that *David* had the two first tokens, of those which we recounted, aboutne haired, handsome shaped, and of meane stature. To bee vertuous and well conditioned, which is the third signe, easily we may coniecture, that he was therewithall endowed, seeing that God said; I haue found a man after my heart: for albeit he sinned sundry times, yet for all that, he lost not the name and habite of vertue. Euen as one by habite vicious, though he performe some good morrall workes, doth not therefore leese the name of lewd and vicious. That he led all the course of his life in health, it should seeme may be prooued; because in his whole historie mention is made of his sicknesse but once (and this is a naturall disposition of all such as are long liued.) Now because his naturall heat was resolved, and that he could not take heat in his bed; to remedie this, they couched a very faire ladie by his side, who might foster him with heat. And herethrough he liued so manie yeares, that the text saith, he deceased in a good age, full of daies, of riches, and of glorie: as if it should say, *David* died in a good old age, full of daies, of riches, and of glorie; hauing endured so many trauailes in the wars, and vndergone great penance for his transgressions. And this grew, for that he was temperat, and of a good complexion: for he refused the occasions, which accustomedly breed infirmitie and shortening of mans life. His great wisdom and knowledge was noted by that seruant of *Saul*, when he said; My lord, I know a cunning musician, the son of *Iesse*, born in *Bethleem*, couragious in fight, wise in discourse, and of seemely countenance. By which tokens (aboue specified) it is manifest, that *David* was a temperat man, and to such is the royall scepter belonging,

ging: for his wit is of the best mould that nature could fashion. But there presenteth it selfe a verie great difficultie against this doctrine, namely; seeing God knew all the wits and abilities of Israel, and likewise wist, that temperat men are seized of the wisdom and knowledge requisit to the calling of a king: for what cause in the first election that he made, he sought not out a man of this sort? Nay the text auoucheth, that *Saul* was so tall of stature, as he passed all the residue of Israel, by the head and shoulders. And this signe is not only an euill token of wit in naturall Philosophie, but euen God himselfe (as wee haue proued) reprobued *Samuel*, because (mooued by the high growth of *Eliab*) he thereupon would haue made him king. But this doubt declareth that to be true, which *Galen* said, that out of Greece we shall not (so much as in a dreame) find out a temperat man, Seeing in a people so large (as that of Israel) God could not find one to chuse for a king: but it behooued him to tarric till *Danid* was growne vp, and the while made choice of *Saul*. For the text saith, that he was the best of Israel: but verely it seemed he had more good nature than wisdom, and that was not sufficient to rule and gonerne. Teach me (saith the Psalme) goodnesse, discipline, and knowledge. And this the royall Prophet *Danid* spake, seeing that it auaieth not for a king to be good and vertuous, vnlesse he ioine wisdom and knowledge therewithall. By this example of king *Danid*, it seemeth we haue sufficiently approoued our opinion.

But there was also another king borne in Israel, of whom it was said, Where is he that is borne king of the Jewes? And if we can prooue, that he was aboutne haired, towardly, of meane bignesse, vertuous, healthfull, and of great wisdom and knowledge, it will be no way

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damageable to this our doctrine. The Euangelists busied not themselves, to report the disposition of Christ our redeemer: for it serued not to the purpose of that which they handled, but is a matter which may easily be vnderstood, supposing that for a man to be temperat, as is requisit, compriseth all the perfection wherewith naturally he can be endowed. And seeing that the holy spirit compounded and instrumentalized him, it is certaine, that as touching the materiall cause, of which he formed him, the distemperature of Nazareth could not resist him, nor make him erre in his worke, as doe the other naturall agents: but he performed what him best pleased: for he wanted neither force, knowledge, nor will, to frame a man most perfect, and without any defect. And that so much the rather, for that his comming (as himselfe affirmed) was to endure trauels for mans sake, and to teach him the truth. And this temperature (as we haue before prooued) is the best naturall instrument that can be found for these two things. Wherethrough I hold that relation for true, which *Publius Lentulus*, vice-Confull, wrote from Hierusalem vnto the Roman Senat after this manner.

There hath beene scene in our time, a man who yet liueth, of great vertue, called Iesus Christ, who by the Gentiles is tearmed the Prophet of truth, and his disciples say, that he is the sonne of God. He raiseth the deceased, and healeth the diseased, is a man of meane and proportionable stature, and of very faire countenance, his looke carrieth such a maiestie, as those who behold him, are enforced both to loue and feare him. He hath his haire coloured like a nut full ripe, reaching downe to his eares; and from his eares to his shoulders they are of wax colour, but more bright: he hath in the middle

of his forehead a locke, after the manner of Nazareth: his forehead is plaine, but very pleasing: his face void of spot or wrinkle, accompanied with a moderat colour: his nostrils and mouth cannot by any with reason bee reprooued, his beard thicke, and resembling his haire, not long, but forked: his countenance very gracious and graue, his eyes gracefull and cleere; and when he rebuketh, he daunteth; and when he admonisheth, he pleaseth: he maketh himselfe to be beloued, and is cheerefull with grauitie: he hath neuer beene seene to laugh, but to weepe diuers times: his hand and armes are very faire: in his conuersation he contenteth very greatly, but is seldom in companie: but being in companie, is very modest: in his countenance and port hee is the seemeliest man that may be imagined. In this relation are contained three or foure tokens of a temperat person.

The first, that he had his haire and beard of the colour of a nut fully ripe: which to him that considereth it well, appeareth to be a browne abourne: which colour God commaunded the heifer should haue, which was to be sacrificed as a figure of Christ. And when he entred into heauen with that triumph and maiestie which was requisite for such a prince: some Angels who had not been enformed of his incarnation, said, *Who is this that commeth from Edon, with his garments dyed in Bozra?* as if they had said, *Who is he that commeth from the red Land, with his garment stained in the same dye?* in respect of his haire and his red beard, and of the blood with which he was tainted. The same letter also reporteth him to be the fairest man that euer was seene, and this is the second token of a temperat person, and so was it prophesied by the holy scripture as a signe whereby to know him. Of faire shape aboue all the children of men. And

in another place he saith, His eyes are fairer than the wine, and his teeth whiter than milke. Which beautie and good disposition of bodie imported much to effect, that all men should beare him affection, and that there might be nothing in him worthie to be abhorred. For which cause, the letter deliuereth, that all men were enforced to loue him. It reciteth also, that he was meane of personage, and that not because the holy Ghost wanted matter to make him greater, if so it had seemed good: but (as we tofore haue prooued by the opinion of *Plato* and *Aristotle*) because when the reasonable soule is burdened with much bones and flesh, the same incurreth great dammage in his wit.

The third signe, namely, to be vertuous and well conditioned, is likewise expressed in this letter, and the Iewes themselues with all their false witnesses, could not proue the contrarie, nor replie when he demanded of them, Which of you can reprocue me of sinne? And *Ioseph* (through the faithfulnessse which he owed to his historie) affirmed of him, that he partaked of another nature aboue man, in respect of his goodnesse and wisdome. Only long life could not be veriefied of Christ our redeemer, because they put him to death being yong; whereas if they had permitted him to finish his naturall course, the same would haue reached to 80 yeares and vpwards. For he who could abide in a wildernesse 40 daies and 40 nights without meat or drinke, and not be sicke nor dead therewithall, could better haue defended himselfe from other lighter things, which had power to breed alteration or offence. Howbeit this action was reputed miraculous, and a matter which could not light within the compasse of nature.

These two examples of kings, which we haue allea-  
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ged, sufficeth to make vnderstood, that the scepter royall is due to men that are temperate; and that such are endowed with the wit and wisdom requisite for that office. But there was also another man, made by the proper hands of God, to the end he should be king and Lord of all things created, and he made him faire, vertuous, sound, of long life, and very wise: and to prooue this, shall not be amisse for our purpose. *Plato* holdeth it for a matter impossible, that God or Nature can make a man temperat in a countrey distemperat: wherethrough he affirmeth, that God to create a man of great wisdom & temperature, sought out a place where the heat of the aire should not exceed the cold, nor the moist the drie. And the diuine Scripture, whence he borrowed this sentence, sayth not, that God created *Adam* in the earthly paradise, which was that most temperat place whereof he speaketh; but that after he had shaped him, there he placed him. Then our Lord God (saith he) tooke man, and set him in the paradise of pleasure, to the end he might there worke and take it in charge. For the power of God being infinit, and his knowledge beyond measure, when he had a will to giue him all the naturall perfection that might be in mankind; we must thinke, that neither the peece of earth of which he was framed, nor the distemperature of the soile of *Damascus* where he was created, could so gaine say him, but that he made him temperat. The opinion of *Plato*, of *Aristotle*, and of *Galen*, take place in the works of nature: and euen she also can sometimes (euen in distemperat regions) engender a person that shall be temperat. But that *Adam* had his haire and his beard aboutne, which is the first token of a temperat man, manifestly appeareth. For in respect of this so notorious signe, he had that name *Adam*, which is to say (as

*S. Hierom* interpreteth it) a red man. That he was faire and well fashioned, which is the second token, cannot in him be denied: for when God created him, the text saith; God saw all things which he had made, and they were very good. Then it falleth out certaine, that he issued not from the hands of God soule and ill shaped: for the workes of God are perfect. And so much the more, for that the trees (as the text saith) were faire to behold. Then what may we thinke of *Adam*, whom God created to this principall end, that he might be Lord and president of the world? That he was vertuous, wise, and well conditioned (which are the third and sixth signes) is gathered out of these words, Let vs make a man after our owne image and likenesse: for by the auntient Philosophers, the foundation on which the resemblance that man hath with God is grounded, are vertue and wisdom. Therefore *Plato* auoucheth, that one of the greatest contentments which God receiued in heauen, is to see a vertuous and wise man praised and magnified vpon earth: for such a one is his liuely pourtraiture. And contrariwise, he groweth displeased, when ignorant and vicious persons are held in estimation and honor: which springeth from the vnlikenesse betweene God and them. That he liued healthfull and a long space (which are the fourth and fifth tokens) is nothing difficult to prooue, in as much as his daies were 930 yeares. Wherethrough I may now conclude, that the man who is aboutn haired, faire, of meane stature, vertuous, healthfull, and long lyued, must necessarily be very wise, and endowed with a wit requisite for the scepter royall.

We haue also (as by the way) disclosed, in what sort great vnderstanding may bee vnited with much imagination, and much memorie, albeit this may also come to passe;

pasſe, and yet the man not be temperat. But nature ſhapeth ſo few after this modell, that I could neuer find but two amongſt all the wits that I haue tried: but how it can come to paſſe, that great vnderſtanding may vnite with much imagination and much memorie, in a man not temperat, is a thing which eaſily may be conceiued, if you preſuppoſe the opinion of ſome Phiſitions, who affirme, that the imagination reſideth in the forepart of the braine, the memorie in the hinder part, and the vnderſtanding in that of the middle. And the like may be ſaid in our imagination, but it is a worke of great labour, that the braine, being (when nature createth the ſame) of the bigneſſe of a graine of pepper, it ſhould make one ventricle of ſeed very hot, another very moiſt, and the middlemoſt of very drie: but in fine this is no impoſſible caſe.

(Your king and  
your ſelfe.)

CHAP. XV.

*In what manner Parents may beget wiſe children, and of a wit fit for learning.*

**T** falleth out a matter worthie of maruaile, that nature being ſuch as we all know her, wiſe, wittie, and of great art, iudgement, and force; and mankind a worke of ſo ſpeciall regard, yet for one whom ſhe maketh ſkilfull and wiſe, ſhe produceth infinite deprived of wit. Of which effect my ſelfe ſearching the reaſon and naturall cauſes, haue found (in my iudgement) that parents apply not themſelues to the act of generation with that order and concert which is by nature eſtabliſhed,

established : neither know the conditions which ought to be obserued, to the end their children may prooue of wisdom and iudgement . For by the same reason, for which in any temperat or distemperat region a man should be borne very wittie (hauing alwaies regard to the selfe order of causes) there will 100000 prooue of slender capacitie : now if by art we may procure a remedie for this, we shall haue brought to the common-wealth the greatest benefit that she can receiue. But the knot of this matter consisteth, in that we cannot entreat hereof with tearmes so seemely and modest, as to the naturall shamesfastnesse of man is requisit : and if for this reason I should forbear to note any part or contemplation that is necessarie, for certaine the whole matter would be marred, in sort that diuers graue Philosophers hold opinion, how wise men ordinarily beget foolish children, because in the act of copulation, for honesties sake, they abstaine from certaine diligences which are of importance, that the sonne may partake of his fathers wisdom. Some antient Philosophers haue laboured to search out the naturall reason of this naturall shame, which the eyes conceiue when the instruments of generation are set before them ; and why the eares take offence to heare them named : and they manuell to see, that nature hath framed those parts with such diligence and carefulnesse, and for an end of such importance, as the immortalizing of mankind, and yet the wiser a man is, the more he groweth in dislike to behold or heare them spoken of. Shame and honestie (sayth *Aristotle*) is the proper passion of the vnderstanding, and who so re- steth not offended at those tearmes and actions of generation, giueth a sure token of his wanting that power, as if we should say, that he is blockish, who putting his  
hand

hand into the fire, doth not feele the same to burne. By this token *Cato* the elder discovered, that *Manilius* (a noble man) was deprived of vnderstanding, because it was told him, that the other kissed his wife in presence of his daughter; for which cause he displaced him out of the Senat, and *Manilius* could neuer obtaine at his hands to be restored.

Out of this contemplation, *Aristotle* frameth a probleme, demanding whence it grew, that men who desire to satisfie their venerous lusts, doe yet greatly shame to confesse it, and yet coueting to liue, to eat, or to performe any other such action, they stagger not to acknowledge it? to which probleme he shapeth a very vntoward answer, saying; Perhaps it cometh; because the couetings of diuers things are necessarie, and some of them kill, if they be not accomplished, but the lust of venerous acts floweth from excesse, and is token of abundance. But in effect this probleme is false, and the answer none other: for a man not onely shameth to manifest the desire he carrieth to companie with a woman, but also to eat, to drinke, and to sleepe; and if a will take him to send foorth any excrement, he dares not say it or doe it, but with cumber and shamefastnesse, and so gets him to some secret place out of sight. Yea, we find men so shamefast, as though they haue a great will to make water, yet cannot doe it if any looke vpon them, whereas if we leaue them alone, straightwaies the vrine taketh his issue. And these are the appetites to send foorth the superfluous things of the bodie, which if they were not effected, men should die, and that much sooner, than with forbearing meat or drink. And if there be any (saith *Hippocrates*) who speaketh or actuateth this in the presence of another, he is not maister of his sound iudgement. *Galen* affirmeth, that

that the seed holdeth the semblable proportion with the seed vessels, as the vrine doth with the bladder: for as much vrine annoyeth the bladder, so much seed endammagereth the seed vessels. And the opinion which *Aristotle* held, in denying that man and woman incur no infirmities or death by retaining of seed, is contrarie to the iudgement of all Physicians, and especially of *Galen*, who saith and auoucheth, that many women remaining widowes in their youth, haue therethrough lost their sence, motion, breathing, and finally their life. And the selfe *Aristotle* reckoneth vp many diseases whereunto continent persons are subiect in that behalfe. The true answer of this problem cannot be yeilded in naturall Philosophie, because it is not marshalled vnder her iurisdiction; for it behooueth to passe to an higher, namely Metaphisicke, wherein *Aristotle* saith, That the reasonable soule is the lowest of all the intelligences, and for that it partaketh of the same generall nature with the Angels, it shammeth to behold it selfe placed in a bodie which hath fellowship with brute beasts: wherethrough the diuine Scripture noteth it as a mysterie, that the first man being naked, was not ashamed, but so soone as he saw himselfe to be so, forthwith he got a couering. At which time he knew, that through his owne fault he had lost immortalitie, and that his bodie was become subiect to alteration and corruption, and those instruments and parts giuen him for that of necessitie he must die and leaue another in his roome, and that to preserue himselfe in life that small space which rested, it behooued him to eat and drinke, and to expell those noisome and corrupt excrements. And principally he shamed, seeing that the Angels, with whom he had competence, were immortal, and stood not in need of eating, drinking, or sleeping:

ping, for preservation of their life : neither had the instruments of generation, but were created all at once, without matter, and without feare of corrupting. Of all these points were the eyes and the eares naturally done to ware. Wherethrough the reasonable soule groweth displeased and ashamed, that these things given man to make him mortall and corruptible, are thus brought to his memorie. And that this is a well fitting answer, we evidently perceiue : for God to content the soule after the vniuersall iudgement, and to bestow vpon him entire glorie, will cause that her bodie shall partake the properties of an Angell, bestowing thereupon sublenesse, lightness, immortalitie, and brightnesse : for which reason, he shall not stand in need to eat or drink as the brute beasts. And when men shall thus wise dwell in heauen, they will not shame to behold themselves clothed with flesh, euen as Christ our redeemer, and his mother, nothing shamed thereat. But it will breed an accidentall glorie, to see that the vse of those parts which were wont to offend the hearing and the eyes, is now surceased. I therefore making due reckoning of this naturall modestie of the eare, haue endeouored to salue the hard and rough tearmes of this matter, and to fetch certain, not ill pleasing biasses of speech; and where I cannot thoroughly performe it, the honest reader shall affoord me pardon. For to reduce to a perfect manner the art which must be obserued, to the end men may prooue of rare capacities, is one of the things most requisit for the commonwealth. Besides that, by the same reason they shall proue vertuous, prompt, sound, and long lyued.

I haue thought good to sciet the matter of this chapter into foure principall parts, that thereby I may make plaine what shall be deliuered; and that the reader may

Note here a signe  
which sheweth  
the immortalitie  
of the soule.

not rest in confusion. The first is, to shew the naturall qualities and temperature which man & woman ought to possesse, to the end they may vse generation. The second, what diligence the parents ought to employ, that their children may be male and not female. The third, how they may become wise and not fooles. The fourth, how they are to be dealt withall after their birth, for preservation of their wit.

To come then to the first point we haue alreadie alleaged, that *Plato* laieth downe, how in a well ordered commonwealth there ought to be assigned certaine surveyors of marriages, who by art might skill, to looke into the qualities of the persons that are to be married, and to giue each one the wife which answereth him in proportion, and to euery wife her conuenient husband. In which matter, *Hippocrates* & *Galen* began to take some pains, and prescribed certaine precepts and rules, to know what woman is fruitfull, and who can beare no children; and what man is vnable for generation, and who able and likely to beget issue. But touching all this, they vttered verie little, and that not with such distinction as was behooffull, at least for the purpose which I haue in hand. Therefore it falleth out necessarie, to begin the art euen from his principles, and briefly to giue the same his due order and concert, that we so may make plaine and apparant, from what vnion of parents wise children issue; and from what, fooles and do-noughts: To which end it behooueth first to know a particular point of Philosophie; which although in regard of the practises of the art it be very manifest and true, yet the vulgar make little reake thereof. And from the notice of this dependeth all that, which as touching this first point, is to be deliuered: and that is, that man (though it seeme other-  
wife

wife in the composition which wee see) is different from a woman in nought els (saith *Galen*) than only in hauing his genitall members without his bodie. For if we make anatomic of a woman, we shall find that she hath within her two stones, two vessels for seed, and her bellie of the same frame as a mans member, without that any one part is therein wanting. And this is so very true, that if when Nature hath finished to forme a man in all perfection, she would conuert him into a woman, there needeth nought els to be done, saue onely to turne his instruments of generations inward. And if she haue shaped a woman, and would make a man of her, by taking forth her belly and her cods, it would quickly be performed. This hath chanced many times in nature, as well whiles the creature hath been in the mothers wombe, as after the same was borne, whereof the histories are full; but some haue held them only for fables, because this is mentioned in the Poets, yet the thing carrieth meere truth: for diuers times nature hath made a female child, and she hath so remained in her mothers bellie for the space of one or two months: and afterwards, plentie of heat growing in the genitall members, vpon some occasion they haue issued forth, and she become a male. To whom this transformation hath befallen in the mothers wombe, is afterwards plainly discovered, by certaine motions which they retaine, vnfitting for the masculine sex, being altogether womanish, & their voice shrill & sweet. And such persons are enclined to perform womens actions, and fall ordinarily into vncouth offences. Contrariwise, Nature hath sundrie times made a male with his generatories outward, and cold growing on, they haue turned inward, and it became female. This is knowne after she is borne, for she retaineth a mannish fashion, as well

well in her words, as in all her motions and workings. This may seeme difficult to be prooued, but considering that which many authentick Historians affirme, it is a matter not hard to be credited. And that women haue beene turned into men, after they were borne, the verie vulgar doe not much maruell to heare spoke of: besides that which sundrie our elders haue laid downe for truth, it befell in Spaine but few yeares since; and that whereof we find experience, is not to be called in question or argument. What then the cause may be, that the genitall members are engendred within or without, and the creature becommeth male or female, will fall out a plaine case, if we once know that heat extendeth and enlargeth all things, and cold retaineth and closeth them vp. Wherethrough it is a conclusion of all Philosophers and Phisitions, that if the seed be cold and moist, a woman is begotten, and not a man; and if the same be hot and drie, a man is begotten and not a woman. Whence we apparantly gather, that there is no man, who in respect of a woman, may be termed cold; nor woman hot, in respect of a man.

*Aristotle* saith, it is necessarie for a woman to be cold and moist, that she may be likewise fruitfull: for if she were not so, it would fall out impossible, that her monthly course should flow, or she haue milke to preserue the child nine moneths in her bellie, and two yeares after it is borne; but that the same would soone wast and consume.

All Philosophers and Phisitions auouch, that the bellie holdeth the same proportion with mans seed, that the earth doth with corne, and with any other graine. And we see, that if the earth want coldnesse and moisture, the husbandmen dareth not sow therein, neither will the  
seed

seed prosper. But of soiles, those are most fruitfull and fertile in rendering fruit, which partake most of cold and moist. As we see by experience in the regions towards the North: as England, Flanders, and Almaine, whose abundance of all fruits worketh astonishment in such as know not the reason thereof. And in such countries as these, no married woman was euer childlesse; neither can they there tell what barrenesse meaneth, but are all fruitfull, and breed children through their abundance of coldnesse and moisture. But though it is true, that the woman should be cold and moist for conception, Yet she may abound so much therein, that it may choke the seed; euen as we see excessse of raine spoileth the corne, which cannot ripen in ouermuch coldnesse. Whereon we must conceiue, that these two qualities ought to keepe a certaine measurablenesse, which when they exceed, or reach not vnto, the fruitfulness is spoiled. *Hippocrates* holdeth that woman for fruitfull, whose wombe is tempered in such sort, as the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moist the drie. Wherethrough he saith, that those women who haue their bellie cold, cannot conceiue, no more than such as are very moist, or very cold and drie. But so, for the same reason that a woman and her genitall parts should be temperat; it were impossible that she could conceiue, or be a woman. For if the seed, of which she was first formed, had been temperat, the genitall members would haue issued forth, and she haue been a man. So should a beard grow on her chin, and her floures surcease, and she become as perfect a man, as nature could produce. Likewise the wombe in a woman cannot be predominately hot: For if the seed whereof she was engendred had been of that temperature, she should haue bene borne a man, and not a woman.

You are much  
mistaken.

man. This is past all exception, that the qualities which yeeld a woman fruitfull, are cold and moisture: for the nature of man standeth in need of much nourishment, that he may be able to vse procreation, and continue his kind. Wherethrough we see, that amongst all the females of brute beasts, none haue their monthly courses as a woman. Therefore it was requisit to make her altogether cold and moist, and that in such a degree, as that she might breed much flegmaticke blood, and not be able to waist or consume the same. I said flegmaticke blood, because this is seruiceable to the breeding of milke; by which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* auouch, the creature is relieued all the time it remaineth in the mothers bellie. Now if the same should be temperat, it would produce much blood, vnfit for the engendering of milke, and would wholly resolue, as it doth in a temperat man, and so nothing be left for nourishing the babe. Therefore I hold it for certaine, and verily it is impossible that a woman can be temperat or hot; but they are all cold and moist. And if this be not so, let the Philosopher or Physition tell me, for what cause all women are beardless, and haue their sicknesse whiles they are healthfull, and for what cause the seed of which she was formed, being temperat or hot, she was borne a woman, and not a man? Howbeit, though it be true that they are all cold and moist: yet it followeth not, that they are all in one degree of coldnesse and moisture. For some are in the first, some in the second, and some in the third; and in each of these they may conceiue, if a man answere them in proportion of heat, as shall hereafter be expressed. By what tokens we may know these three degrees of coldnesse and moisture in a woman, and likewise weet who is in the first, who is in the second, and who in the third:  
there

there is no Philosopher or Phisition, that as yet hath unfolded. But considering the effects which these qualities doe worke in women, we may part them, by reason of their being extended, and so wee shall easily get notice hereof. The first, by the wit and habilitie of the woman. The second, by her manners and conditions. The third, by her voice big or small. The fourth, by her flesh, much or little. The fifth, by her colour. The sixth, by her haire. The seventh, by her fairenesse or foulnesse. As touching the first, we may know, that though it be true (as tofore we haue prooued) that the wit and abilitie of a woman followeth the temperature of the brain, and of none other member: yet her wombe and cods are of so great force and vigour, to alter the whole bodie, that if these be hot and drie, or cold and moist, or of whatsoever other temperatüre, the other parts (saith *Galen*) will be of the same tenour: but the member which most partaketh the alterations of the bellie, all Phisitions say, is the braine, though they haue not set downe the reason whereon they ground this correspondencie: True it is, *Galen* prooueth by experience, that by speying a Sow, she becommeth faire and fat, and her flesh very sauourie: and if she haue her cods, shee tasteth little better than dogs flesh. Whereby we conceiue, that the belly and the cods, carrie great efficacie, to communicat their temperature to all the other parts of the bodie; especially to the brain, for that the same is cold and moist like themselves. Betweene which (through the resemblance) the passage is easie: *zomom llamunboul zinol yd zout zomuo*

Now if we conclude, that cold and moist are the qualities which worke an impairment in the reasonable part; and that his contraries, namely, hot and drie, giue the same perfection and encrease, we shall find, that

the woman who sheweth much wit and sufficiency, partaketh of cold and moist in the first degree; and if she be very simple, it yeeldeth a signe that she is in the third, the partaking betweene which two extreames, argueth the second degree; for to thinke that a woman can be hot and drie, or endowed with a wit and abilitie conformable to these two qualities, is a very great errour; because if the seed of which she was formed, had been hot and drie in their domination, she should have been borne a man, and not a woman. But in that it was cold and moist, she was borne a woman, and not a man. The truth of this doctrine may cleerely be discerned, if you consider the wit of the first woman who liued in the world: for God hauing fashioned her with his owne hands, and that very accomplished, and perfect in her sex, it is a conclusion infallibly true, that she was possessed of much lesse knowledge than *Adam*: which the diuell well weeting, got him to tempt her, and durst not fall into disputation with the man, fearing his great wit and wisdom. Now to say, that *Eue* for her offence, was rest that knowledge which she wanted, cannot be auouched, for as yet she had not offended.

So then this defect of wit in the first woman grew, for that she was by God created cold and moist: which temperature, is necessarie to make a woman fruitfull and apt for childbirth, but enemy to knowledge: and if he had made her temperat like *Adam*, she should haue beene very wise, nothing fruitfull, nor subiect to her monthly courses, saue by some supernaturall meanes. On this nature *S. Paul* grounded himselfe, when he said, Let a woman learne in silence, with all subiection: neither would he allow the woman to teach, or gouerne the man, but to keepe silence. But this is true, when a wo-

man

man hath not a spirit or greater grace than her owne naturall disposition: but if she obtaine any gift from aboue, she may well teach and speake, for we know that the people of Israel being oppressed and besieged by the Assyrians; *Indith* (a very wise woman) sent for the priests of the *Cabeitz* and *Carmitz*, and reprooued them, saying: How can it be endured, that *Osai* should say, if within sixe daies there come no succour, he will yeeld the people of Israel to the Assyrians? See you not, that these words rather prouoke God to wrath than to mercie? how may it be, that men should point out a limited time for the mercie of God, and in their mind assigne a day, at which he must succour and deliuer them? And in the conclusion of this reproofe, she told them in what sort they might please God, and obtaine their demaund. And no lesse *Elhora* (a woman of no lesse wisdom) taught the people of Israell, how they should render thanks vnto God for the great victories which she had attained against their enemies. But whilest a woman abideth in her naturall disposition, all sorts of learning and wisdom carrieth a kind of repugnancie to her wit. And for this cause, the Catholicke Church vpon great reason hath forbidden, that no woman doe preach, confesse, or instruct: for their sex admitteth neither wisdom nor discipline.

It is discovered also by the manners of a woman, and by her condition, in what degree of cold and moist her temperature consisteth: for if with a sharpe wit she be forward, curst, and wayward, she is in the first degree of cold and moist, it being true (as we haue prouoed tofore) that an ill condition euermore accompanieth a good imagination. She who partaketh this degree of cold and moist, suffereth nothing to escape her hands, noteth all things,

findeth fault with all things, and so is vnsupportable. Such are accustomably of amiable conuersation, and feare not to looke men in the face, nor hold him ill mannered who maketh loue vnto them. But on the other side, to be a woman of good conditions, and to be aggrieved at nothing, to laugh vpon euery small occasion, to let things passe as they come, and to sleepe soundly, describeth the third degree of cold and moist: for much pleasantnesse of conceit is ordinarily accompanied with little wit. She who partaketh of these two extreames, standeth in the second degree. A voice hoarse, big, and sharpe (saith *Galen*) is a token of much heat and drouth, and we haue also prooued it heretofore by the opinion of *Aristotle*, wherethrough we may gaine this notice, that if a woman haue a voice like a man, she is cold and moist in the first degree, and if very delicate, in the third; and partaking betwixt both the extreames, she shall haue the naturall voice of a woman, and be in the second degree.

How much the voice dependeth on the temperature of the coods, shall shortly hereafter bee prooued, where we entreat of the tokens appertaining to a man. Much flesh also in women, is a signe of much cold and moist: for to bee fat and big (sayth the *Philosophers*) groweth in liuing creatures from this occasion. And contrariwise, to be leane and drie, is a token of little coldnesse and moisture. To be meanelly fleshed, that is, neither ouermuch, nor very little, giueth euidence, that a woman holdeth her selfe in the second degree of cold and moist. Their pleasantnesse and courtesies sheweth the degrees of these two qualities: much moisture maketh their flesh supple and liue, rough and hard. The meane is the commendablest part: the colour also of the face,

and

and of the other parts of the bodie, discovereth the extended or remisse degrees of these two qualities. When the woman is very white, it boadeth (saith *Galen*) much cold and moist : and contrariwise, she that is swart and browne, is in the first degree thereof; of which two extreames is framed the second degree of white and well coloured.

To haue much haire, and a little shew of a beard, is an euident signe to know the first degree of cold and moist; for all Physicians affirme, that the haire and beard are engendred of heat and drinesse: and if they be blacke, it greatly purporteth the same. A contrarie temperature is betokened, when a woman is without haire. Now she whose complexion consisteth in the second degree of cold and moist, hath some haire, but the same reddish and golden. Foulness moreouer and faireness helpe vs to iudge the degrees of cold and moist in women. It is a miracle to see a woman of the first degree very faire: for the seed whereof she was formed, being drie, hindereth that she cannot be fairely countenanced. It behooueth that clay be seasoned with conuenient moisture, to the end vessels may be well framed, and serue to vse; but when that same is hard and drie, the vessel is foule and vnhandsome.

*Aristotle* farther auoucheth, that ouermuch cold and moist maketh women by nature foule: for if the seed be cold and very moist, it can take no good figure, because the same standeth not together, as we see, that of ouer soft clay ill shaped vessels are fashioned. In the second degree of cold and moist, women prooue verie faire; for they were formed of a substance well seasoned, and pleasant to nature: which token of it selfe alone asoordeth an euident argument, that the woman is fruit-

full: for it is certaine that nature could do it, and wee may iudge, that she gaue her a temperature and composition, fit for bearing of children. Wherthrough she answers in proportion (welneere) to all men, and all men doe desire to haue her.

In man there is no power which hath tokens or signs to descric the goodnesse, or malice of his obiekt. The stomacke knoweth the meat by way of tast, of smelling, and of sight, wherthrough the diuine scripture saith, That *Eue* fixed her eies on the tree forbidden, and her seemed that it was sweet in tast. The facultie of generation, holdeth for a token of fruitfulnessse, a womans beautie; and if she be foule, it abhorreth her, conceiuing by this signe, that nature erred, and gaue her not a fit temperature for bearing of children.

*By what signes we may know, in what degree of hot and dry tot every man resseth.*

S. I.



Man hath not his temperature so limited as a woman, for he may be hot & drie (which temperature *Aristotle & Galen* held, was that which best agreed with his sex) as also hot and moist and temperat: but cold & moist, and cold and drie, they would not admit whilst a man was sound and without impairment: for as you shall find no woman hot and drie, nor hot and moist, or temperat: so shall you find no man cold, and moist, nor cold and drie, in comparison of women, vnlesse in case as I shall now expresse A man hot and drie, and hote and moist, and temperat, holdeth the same degrees in his temperature, as doth a woman in cold and moist: and so it behooueth to haue certain to-

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kens, whereby to discerne what man is in what degree, that we may asigne him a wise answerable vnto him in proportion. We must therefore weet, that from the same principles, of which we gathered vnderstanding what woman is hot and drie, and in what degree, from the selfe we must also make vse to vnderstand what man is hote and drie, and in what degree: and because we sayd, that from the wit and manners of a man wee coniecture the temperature of his cods, it is requisit that we take notice of a notable point mentioned by *Galen*, namely, that to make vs vnderstand the great vertue which a mans cods possesse to giue firmnesse and temperature to all the parts of the body, he affirmeth that they are of more importance than the heart: and he rendereth a reason, saying, that this member is the beginning of life, & nought else, but the cods are the beginning of liuing soundly and without infirmities. How much it endamageth a man to be deprivied of those parts (though so smal) there need not many reasons to prooue, seeing we see by experience, that forthwith the haire and the beard fall away, and the big and shrill voice becommeth small, and herewithall a man leese his forces and naturall heat, and resteth in far woorse and more miserable condition than if he had bene a woman. But the matter most worth the noting is, that if a man before his gelding had much wit and habilitie, so soone as his stones be cut away, he groweth to leese the same, so far forth as if he had receiued some notable dammage in his very braine. And this is a manifest token, that the cods giue & reauce the temperature from all the other parts of the body, and he that will not yeeld credit hereunto, let him consider (as my selfe haue done oftentimes) that of 1000 such capons who addiect themselues to their booke, none attaineth

taineth to any perfection, and euen in musicke (which is their ordinarie profession) we manifestly see how blockish they are; which springeth, because musicke is a worke of the imagination, and this power requireth much heat, whereas they are cold and moist. So it falleth out a matter certaine, that from the wit and habilitie we may gather the temperature of the cods: for which cause, the man who sheweth himselfe prompt in the workes of the imagination, should be hot and drie in the third degree. And if a man be of no great reach, it tokeneth, that with his heat much moisture is vnited, which alwaies endamageth the reasonable part, and this is the more confirmed, if he be good of memorie. The ordinarie conditions of men hot and drie in the third degree, are courage, pride, liberalitie, audacitie, and cheerefulnesse, with a good grace and pleasantnesse, and in matter of women such a one hath no bridle nor ho. The hot and moist are merry, giuen to laughter, louers of pastime, faire conditioned, very courteous, shamefast, and not much addicted to women.

The voice and speech, much discouereth the temperature of the cods. That which is big and somewhat sharpe, giueth token, that a man is hot and drye in the third degree: and if the same be pleasant, amiable, and very delicat, it purporteth little heat and much moisture, as appeareth in the guelled. A man who hath moist vnited with heat, will haue the same high, but pleasant and shrill. Who so is hot and drie in the third degree, is slender, hard and rough fleshed, the same composed of sinewes and arteries, and his veines big: contrariwise, to haue much flesh, smooth and tender, is shew of much moisture; by means whereof, it extendeth and enlargeth out the naturall heat. The colour of the skin, if the same be  
brown,

browne, burned, blackish Greene, and like ashes, yeeldeth signe, that a man is in the third degree of hot and drie : but if the flesh appeareth white, and well coloured, it argueth litle heat and much moisture. The haire and beard are a marke also not to be ouerslipped, for these two approach very neere to the temperature of the cods. And if the haire be very blacke and big, and specially from the ribs downe to the nauell, it deliuereth an infallible token that the cods partake much of hot and drie : and if there grow some haire also vpon the shoulders, the same is so much the more confirmed. But when the haire and beard are of chesse-nut colour, soft, delicat, and thin : it inferreth not so great plentie of heat and driness in the cods.

Men very hot and drie, are neuer faire, saue by miracle, but rather hard fauoured, and ill shaped : for the heat and driness (as *Aristotle* affirmeth of the Ethiopians) wryeth the proportion of the face, and so they become disfigured. Contrariwise, to bee seemely and gracious, proueth a measurable hot and moist : for which cause, the matter yeelded it selfe obedient whereto nature would employ it. Whence it is manifest, that much beautie in a man is no token of much heat. Touching the signes of a temperat man, we haue sufficiently discoursed in the chapter foregoing, and therefore it shall not be needfull to replie the same againe. It sufficeth onely to note, that as the Phisitions place in euery degree of heat three degrees of extention, so also in a temperat man we are to set downe the largeness and ampleness of three other. And he who standeth in the third, next to cold and moist, shall be reputed cold and moist : for when a degree passeth the meane, it resembleth the other, and that this is true, we manifestly find : for the  
signes.

signes which *Galen* deliuereth vs to know a man cold and moist, are the selfesame of the temperat man, but somewhat more remisse: so he is wise, of good conditions, and vertuous, he hath his voice cleare and sweet, is white skinned; of flesh good and supple, and without haire, and if it haue any, the same is little and yellow; such are very well fauoured and faire of countenance, but *Galen* affirmeth that their seed is moist and vnfit for generation: these are no great friends to women, nor women vnto them.

*What women ought to marry with what man, that they may haue children.*



O a woman who beareth not children when she is married, *Hippocrates* commaundeth that two points of dilligence be vsed, to know whether it bee her defect, or that it grow because the seed of her husbände is vnable for generation.

The first is, to make her suffumigations with incense, or Storax, with a garment close wrapped about her, which may hang downe on the ground, in fort that no vapor or fume may issue out: and if within a while after shee feele the fauour of the incense in her mouth, it yeeldeth a certaine token that the barrennesse commeth not through her defect, in as much as the same found the passages of the belly open, wherethrough it pierceth to the nostrils and the mouth. The second is, to take a garlicke head cleane pilled, and put the same into the bellie what time the woman goeth to sleepe, and if the next day shee feele

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in her mouth the sent of the garlick; shee is of her selfe  
fruitfull without any default.

But albeit these two proofs performe the effect which  
*Hippocrates* speaketh of, namely, that the vapour pierce  
from the inner part vp to the mouth, yet the same argu-  
eth not an absolute barrenesse in the husband; nor an  
intire fruitfulness of the wife, but an vnapt correspon-  
dence of both, wherethrough shee proueth as barren for  
him, as hee for her: which we see to fall out in dayly ex-  
perience, for the man taking another wife begetteth chil-  
dren, and (which encreaseth the maruell, in such as are  
not seene in that point of naturall Philosophie) is, that if  
these two separat each from other, vpon pretence of im-  
potencie, and so hee take another wife, and shee another  
husband, it hath bene found that both of them haue had  
children. And this groweth because there are some men  
whose generatiue facultie is vnable; and not alterable for  
one woman, and yet for another is apt & begetteth issue:  
euen as wee see by experience in the stomach, that to one  
kinde of meat a man hath a great appetite, and to ano-  
ther (though better) it is as dead. What the correspon-  
dence should be which the man and wife ought to beare  
each to other, to the end they may bring forth children,  
is expressed by *Hippocrates* in these words, If the hot an-  
swer not the cold, and the drie the moist, with measure  
and equalitie, there can be no generation: as if hee should  
say, that if there vnite not in the womans wombe two  
seeds, the one hote and the other cold, and the one moist  
and the other drie, extended in equall degree, they can-  
not beget children. For a worke so maruellous as is the  
shaping of a man, standeth in need of such a temperature  
where the hot may not exceed the cold, nor the moist  
the drie. For if a mans seed bee hot, and the womans seed

hot

not likewise, there will no engendring succeed: This doctrine thus presupposed, let vs now fit by way of example a woman cold and moist in the first degree, whose signes we said were, to be wily, ill conditioned, shrill voiced, spare fleshed, and blacke and greene coloured, hairie and euill fauoured, she shall easily conceiue by a man that is ignorant of good conditions, who hath a well sounding and sweet voice, much white and supple flesh, little haire, and well coloured, and faire of countenance. She may also be giuen for wife to a temperat man, whose seed (following the opinion of *Galen*) we said was most fruitfull and answerable to whatsoeuer woman: Prouided, that she be sound and of age conuenient; but yet with all their incidents it is very difficult for her to conceiue child: and being conceiued (saith *Hippocrates*) within two moneths the same miscarrieth: for she wanteth blood wherewith to maintain her selfe and the babe, during the nine months. Howbeit this will find an easie remedie, if the woman doe bath her selfe before she companie with her husband, and the bayne must consist of water fresh and warme: the which (by *Hippocrates*) righteth her temperature to a good sort: for it looseth and moisteneth her flesh, euen as the earth ought to be alike disposed that the graine may therein fasten it selfe and gather root.

Moreouer, it worketh a farther effect: for it encreaseth the appetite to meat, it restraineth resolution, and causeth a greater quantitie of naturall heat, wherethrough plentie of flegmaticke blood is increased; by which the little creature may those nine months haue sustenance. The tokens of a woman cold and moist in the third degree, are to be dull witted, well conditioned, to haue a very delicat voice, much flesh, and the same soft and white, to  
want

want haite and downe, and not to be ouer faire: Such a one should be wedded to a man hot and drie in the third degree: for his seed is of such furie and sensencie, as it behoueth the same to fall into a place very cold and moist, that it may take hold and roote: This man is of the qualitie of Cresses, which will not grow saue in the water, and if he partaked lesse hot and drie, his sowing in so cold a bellie were nought else than to cast graine into a pool.

Hippocrates giueth counsell, that a woman of this sort should first lessen her selfe, and lay aside her flesh and her fat before she marrie, but then she need not to take to husband a man so hot and dry: for such a temperature would not serue, nor she conceiue. A woman cold and moist in the second degree, retaineth a meane in all the tokens which I haue specified, saue onely in beautie, which she enioyeth in an high degree. Which yeldeth an euident signe, that she will be fruitfull, and beare children, and prooue gracious and cheerefull. She answereth in proportion welneere to all men.

First to the hot and drie in the second degree, and next to the temperat, and lastly to the hot and moist. From all these unions and conioyntings of men and women, which we haue herelaid downe, may issue wise children, but from the first are the most ordinarie. For our cause, that the seed of a man endure to cold and moist, yet the continual driness of the mother, and the giuing her so little meat, doth not amend the defect of the father. For that this saying of Philo sophizing neuer before came to light, it was not possible that all the naturall Philosophers could shapen answere to this problem, which asketh, Whence proceedeth it, that many fooler haue begotten wise children? Whence they answer,

first, that foolish persons apply themselves affectionately to the carnall act, and are not carried away to any other contemplation. But contrarily, men very wise, even in the copulation goe imagining upon matters nothing pertinent to that they have in hand; and therethrough weaken the seed, and make their children defective, as well in the powers reasonall, as in the naturall. In the other coniunctions it is requisite to take heed that the woman be cleansed, and dried by a ripe age, and marrie not over young: for hence it cometh, that children prooue simple and of little wit. The seed of young parents is very moist: for it is but a while since they were borne, and if a man be formed of a matter endowed with excessive moisture, it followeth of force, that he prooue dull of capacitie.

*But diligence ought to be used, the children male, and not female may be borne.*

and.

**H**ose parents who seeke the comfort of having wise children, and such as are towardsly for learning, must endeavor that they may be borne male: for the female, through the cold and moist of their sex, cannot be endowed with any profound iudgement. Only we see, that they talke with some appearance of knowledge, in slight and easie matters, with termes ordinarie, and long studied, but being set to learning, they reach no farther than to some smacke of the Latine tongue, and this only through the helpe of memorie. For which dulnesse, themselves are not in blame, but that cold and moist which made them women,

men, and these selfe qualities (we haue prooued heretofore) gaineſay the wit and abilitie *Salomon* conſidering how great ſcarcitie there was of wiſe men, and that no woman came to the world with a wit apt for knowledge, ſaid in this manner; I found one man amongst 1000; but I haue not found one woman amongst the whole rout: as if he ſhould ſay, that of a 1000 men he had found one wiſe; but throughout the race of women, he could neuer light vpon one that had iudgement. Therefore we are to ſhun this ſex, and to procure that the child be borne male: for in ſuch onely reſteth a wit capable of learning. It behooueth therefore firſt to take in to conſideration, what inſtruments were ordained by nature in mans bodie to this effect, and what order of cauſe is to be obſerued, that we may obtaine the end which we ſeek for. We muſt then vnderſtand, that amongſt many excrements and humours which reſide in a mans bodie: nature (ſaith *Galen*) vſeth onely the ſeruiſe of one, to worke that mankind may be preſerued. This is a certaine excrement which is termed whey, or wheyiſh bloud, whoſe engendring is wrought in the liver and in the veines, at ſuch time as the foure humours, bloud, ſlegme, choler, and melancholie, do take the forme and ſubſtance which they ought to haue.

Of ſuch a licour as this, doth nature ſerue her ſelfe, to reſolue the meat, and to worke, that the ſame may paſſe through the veines and through the ſtrait paſſages, carrying nourishment to all the parts of the body. This worke being finiſhed, the ſame nature provideth the veines, whoſe office is nought els, but to draw vnto them this whey, and to ſend it through their paſſages to the bladder, and from thence out of the bodie: and this to free man from the offence which an excrement might breed him.

him. But seeing advising that hee had certaine qualities  
conuenient for generation, provided two veines, which  
should carry part thereof to the cords and vessels of seed,  
together with some small quantitie of bloud; whereby  
such seed might be formed, as was requisite for mankind.  
Wherethrough shee planted one veine in the reins on  
the right side, which endeth in the right cord; and of the  
same is the right seed vessel framed; and another on the  
left side, which likewise taketh his issue at the left cord, and  
of that is shaped the left seed vessel.

The requisite qualities of this excrement, that the same  
may be a conuenient matter for engendering of seed, are  
(saith *Galen*) a certaine tartnesse and biting which grow-  
eth, for that the same is salt, wherethrough it stirreth vp  
the seed vessels, and moueth the creature to procure gene-  
ration, and not to abandon this thought. And therefore  
persons very lecherous are by the Latinists termed  
*Saltus*, that is to say, men who haue much saltnesse in  
their seed.

Next to this, nature did another thing worthe of  
great consideration, namely, that to the right side of the  
reins, and to the right cord shee gaue much heat and dri-  
nesse; and to the left side of the reins, and to the left cord  
much cold and moisture; wherethrough the seed which  
laboureth in the right cord, issueth out hot and drie; and  
that of the left cord, cold and moist. What nature pre-  
tended by this varietie of temperature, as well in the reins  
as in the cords and seed vessels, is very manifest, we know-  
ing by histories very true, that at the beginning of the  
world, and many yeares after, a woman brought forth  
two children at a birth, whereof the one was born male,  
the other female; the end whereof tended, that for every  
man, there should be a wife, that mankind might take

the speedier increase. She prouiderh then, that the right side of the reines should yeeld matter hot and drie to the right cod, and that the same with his heat and drie-nesse should make the seed hot and dry for generation of the male. And the contrary shee ordained for the forming of a woman, that the left side of the reines should send forth seede cold and moist to the left cod, and that the same with his coldnesse and moisture, should make the seed cold and moist, whence it ensued of force, that a female must be engendred. But after that the earth was replenished with people, it seemeth that this order and concert of nature was broken off and this double child-bearing surceased, and which is worst, for one man that is begotten, 6 or 7 women are borne to the world ordinarily. Whence we comprize, that either nature is growne weary, or some error is thwarted in the mids, which beareth her from working as she would. What the same is, a litle hereafter we wil expresse, when we may lay downe the conditions, which are to be obserued, to the end a male child (without misling) may be borne. I say then, that if parents will attaine the end of their desire in this behalfe, they are to obserue 6 points. One of which is, to eat meates hot and drie. The second, to procure that they make stood digestion in the stomacke. The third, to vse much exercise. The fourth, not to apply themselves vnto the act of generation, vntill their seed be well ripened and seasoned. The fifth, to companie with the wife foure or fiae dayes before the naturall course is to runne. The sixth, to procure, that the seede fall in the right side of the wombe, which being obserued (as we shall prescribe) it will growe impossible, that a female should be engendred. As touching the first condition, we must weet, that albeit a good stomacke doe parboile

and alter the meate, and spoile the same of the former qualitie, yet it doth neuer utterly deprive it selfe of them: for if we eate lettice (whose qualitie is cold and moist) the blood engendred thereof, shalbe colde and moist, the whey cold and moist, and the seed cold and moist. And if we eat honny (whose quality is hot and dry) the blood which we breede, shalbe hot and drie, the whey hot and dry, and the seed hot and drie: for it is impossible (as *Galen* toucheth) that the humours should not attaine the substances and the qualities, which the meate had, before such time as it was eaten. Then it being true, that the male sex consisteth in this, that the seede be hot and dry at the time of his forming, for certaine it behooueth parents to vse meats hot and drie, that they may engender a male child. I grant well, how in this kind of begetting, there befalleth a great perill: for the seede being hot and drie, we haue often heretofore affirmed, it followeth of force, that there be borne a man, malicious, wily, cauil-ling, and addicted to many vices and evils, and such persons as these (vnlesse they be straightly curbed) bring great danger to the common-wealth. Therefore it were better, that they should not be begotten at all: but for all this there will not want parents, who will say, Let me haue a boy, and let him be a theefe and spare not, for the iniquitie of man is more allowable, than the wel-doing of a woman. Howbeit this may find an easie remedie, by vsing temperate meates, which shall pertake but meanelly of hot and dry: or by way of preparation, seasoning the same with some spice. Such (saith *Galen*) are Hennes, Partridges, Turtles Doues, Thrushes, Blackbirds, and Goates, which (by *Hippocrates*) must be eaten roasted, to heat and drie the seede.

The bread with which the same is eaten, should bee white,

white, of the finest meale, seasoned with Salt and Annis seedle: for the browne is cold and moist (as wee will proue hereafter) and very dammageable to the wit. Let the drinke bee White-wine, watered in such proportion, as the stomacke may allow thereof: and the water with which it is tempered, should bee very fresh and pure.

The second diligence which we spake of, is, to eat these meates in so moderate quantitie, as the stomacke may overcome them: for albeit the meate bee hot and drie of his proper nature, yet the same becommeth cold and moist, if the naturall heate cannot digest it: Therefore though the parents eat honny, and drinke White wine, these meates, by this meanes will turne to colde-seede, and a female child be brought forth. For this occasion, the greater part of great and rich personages, are afflicted by having more daughters than meaner folke: for they eat and drinke that which their stomacke cannot digest: and albeit their meate bee hot and drie, sauced with Sugar, Spices, and Honny: yet through their great quantitie, they waxe raw, and cannot be digested. But the rawnesse which most endamageth generation, is that of Wine: for this colour, in being so vaporous and subtile, occasioneth, that the other meates together therewith passe to the seede vessels raw, and that the seede falsly provoked, cannot be digested and seasoned.

Whereon, *Plato* commendeth a lawe, enacted in the Carthaginean Common-wealth, which forbade the married couple, that they should not tast of any Wine that day, when they meant to performe the rites of the marriage bed, as well wate, that this liquor alwayes bred much hurt and dammage to the

chick bodily health, and might yeeld occasion that hee should prooue vicious and of ill conditions. Notwithstanding, if the same be moderately taken, so good seed is not engendred of any meate (for the end which wee seeke after) as of white wine: and especially, to giue wit and abilitie, which is that wherre we pretend. The 3 diligence which we spake of, was, to vse exercise somewhat more than meanely: for this fretteth and consumeth the excessive moisture of the seed, and heateth and drieth the same. By this means a man becommeth most fruitful and able for generation: and contrariwise to giue our selues to our ease, and not to exercise the body, is one of the things which breedeth most coldnes and moisture in the seed. Therefore rich and dainty persons are lesse charged with children than the poore, who take pains. Whence *Hippocrates* recounteth, that the principall persons of Scythia were very effeminate, womanish, delicious, and enclined to doe womens seruises; as to sweepe, to rub, & to bake: and by this meanes were impotent for generation. And if they begot any male child, he prooueth either an Eunuch, or an Hermaphrodite. Whereat, they shaming, & greatly agreed, determined to make sacrifices to their God, and to offer him many gifts; beseeching him not to entreat them after that maner, but to yeeld them some remedy for the defect, seeing it lay in his power so to do. But *Hippocrates* laughed them to scorne, saying, That none effect betideth, which seemes not miraculous and diuine, if after that sort they fall into consideration thereof: for reducing which soeuer of them to his naturall causes, at last we come to end in God, by whose vertue all the agents of the world doe worke. But there are some effectes, which must bee imputed to God immediatly, (as are those which come besides the

the order of nature) and others by the way of meanes, reckoning first as a meane, the causes which are ordained to that end. The countrey which the Scythians inhabited (sayth *Hippocrates*) is seated vnder the North, a region moist and cold beyond measure, where, through abundance of clouds, it seemes a miracle if you see the sunne. The rich men sit euer on horsebacke, neuer vse any exercise, eat and drink more than their naturall heat can consume: all which things make the seed cold and moist: And for this cause thy beget many females: and if anie male were borne, they prooued of the condition which we haue specified. Know you (said *Hippocrates* to them) that the remedie hereof consisteth, not in sacrificing to God, neither in doing ought like that; but it behooueth withall, that you walke on foot, eat little, and drinke lesse, and not so wholly betake your selues to your pleasures. And that you may the more plainly discern it, looke vpon the poore people of this countrie, & your very slaues, who not onely make no sacrifices to your God, neither offer him gifts (as wanting the meanes) but euen blaspheme his blessed name, and speake iniuriously of him, because he hath placed them in such estate. And yet (though so leaud and sacrilegious) they are very able for procreation, and the most part of their children proue males, and strong; not cocknies, not eunuchs, not hermaphrodits, as doe those of yours. And the cause is, for that they eat litle and vse much exercise, neither keep the selues alwaies on horsback, like their masters. By which occasion they make their seed hot and drie, and therethrough engender males and not females. This point of philosophie was not vnderstood by *Pharao*, nor by his counsell, seeing that he sayd in this manner: Come, let vs keepe them downe with oppression, that they may not

multiply, nor ioyne with our encmie, if warre be raised against vs. And the remedie which he vsed, to hinder that the people of Israell should not encrease so fast, or at least that so many male children might not be borne (which he most feared) was to keepe them vnder with much toile of body, and to cause them for to eat leeks, garlike, and onions, which remedie tooke but a bad effect, as the holy scripture expresseth: for the harder he held them oppressed, the more did they encrease and multiply. Yet he making reckoning, that this was the surest way he could follow, doubled this their affliction of body. Which preuailed so little, as if to quench a great fire, he should throw thereinto much oile or grease: but if he or any of his counsellors, had been seen in this point of naturall Philosophy, he should haue giuen them barley bread, lettice, melons, cucumbers, & citrons to eat, and haue kept them well fed and well filled with drinke, and not haue suffered them to take anie paine. For by this meanes, their seed would haue become cold and moist, & therof more women than men bin begotten; and in short time their life haue been abridged. But feeding them with much flesh boiled with garlick, with leeks, & with onions, and tasking them to work so hard, he caused their seed to wax hot and drie, by which two qualities, they were the more incited to procreation, and euer bred issue male. For confirmation of this veritie, *Aristotle* propoundeth a probleme, which saith, What is the cause, that those who labor much and such as are subiect to the feuer Ecticke, suffer many pollutions in their sleepe? whereto (verely) he wist not to shape an answer: for he telleth many things, but none of them hit the truth. The right reason hereof is, that the toile of the body, and the actiue feuer, do heat and dry the seed;

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and these two qualities, make the same tart & pricking; and for that in sleep all the naturall powers are fortified, this betideth which the problemes speaketh of. How fruitfull and pricking the hot and drie seed is, *Galen* noteth in these words: The same is moist, fruitfull, and soon inciteth the creature to copulation, and is lecherous and prone to lust. The fourth condition was, not to accompany in the act of generation, vntill the seed were settled, concocted, and duly seasoned: for though the three former diligences haue gone before, yet we cannot thereby know whether it haue attained that perfection which it ought to haue. Principally it behoueth, for 7 or 8 daies before, to vse the meats which we haue prescribed, to the end the cods may haue time to consume in their nourishment, the seed which all that time was engendered of the other meats, and that this which we thus go describing may succeed.

The like diligence is to be vsed touching mans seed, that the same may be fruitfull and apt for issue, as the gardiners doe with the seeds which they will preserue: for they attend till they ripen, and cleanse, and wax drie: for if they pluck them from the stalke, before they are deeply seasoned, and ariued to the point which is requisite, though they lie in the ground a whole yeare they will not grow at all. For this reason I haue noted that in places where much carnall copulation is vsed, there is lesse store of children, than where people are more enclined to continencie. And common harlots neuer conceiue, because they stay not till the seed be digested and ripened,

It behoueth therefore to abide for some daies, that the seed may settle, concoct, and ripen, and be duly seasoned: for by this meanes, is hot and drie, and the good

substance which it had lost, the better recovered. But how shall we know the seed to be such, as is requisite it should be, seeing the matter is of so great importance; This may easily be known, if certaine daies haue passed since the man companied with his wife, and by his continuall incitement, and great desire of copulation; all which springeth, for that the seed is grown fruitfull and apt for procreation. The fifth condition was, that a man should meddle with his wife in the carnall act, six or seuen daies before she haue her naturall course: for that the child straightwaies standeth in need of much food to nourish it. And the reason hereof is, that the hot and drie of his temperature, spendeth and consumeth not onely the good blood of the mother, but also the excrements. Wherethrough *Hippocrates* said, that the woman conceiued of a male, is well coloured and faire. Which groweth, because the infant, through his much heat, consumeth all those excrements which are wont to disfigure the face, leauing the same as a washed cloth. And for that this is true, it is behoofull, that the infant be supplied with blood for his nourishment. And this experience manifesteth, for it is a miracle that a male child should be engendered saue vpon the last daies of the month. The contrarie befalleth, when a woman goeth with a female: for through the much cold and moist of her sex, she eateth little, and yeeldeth store of excrements, wherethrough the woman conceiued of a girle, is ill fauoured and full of spots, and a thousand sluttishnesses sticke vnto her; and at the time of her deliuerie, she must tarric so many more daies to purge her selfe, than if she had brought a manchild to the world. On the naturall reason whereof, God grounded himselfe, when he commanded *Moses*, that the woman, who brought forth

forth a male, should remaine in her bed a weeke, and not enter into the temple vntill 33 daies were expired. And if she were deliuered of a female, she should be vncleane for the space of two weekes, and not enter into the temple, vntill after 66 daies, in sort, that when the birth is of a female, the time is doubled. Which so falleth out, because in the nine moneths (during which the child remained in the mothers wombe) through the much cold and moist of her temperature, she doubly encreased excrements, and the same of very malignant substance and qualitie, which a male infant would not haue done. Therefore *Hippocrates* holdeth it a matter verie perillous, to stop the purgation of a woman who is deliuered of a wench.

All this is spoken to the purpose, that we must well aduise our selues of the last day of the moneth, to the end the seed may find sufficient nourishment wherewith to relieue it selfe. For if the act of procreation bee committed so soone as the purgation is finished, it will not take holde through defect of blood. Whereon it beho- ueth the parents bee done to vnderstand, that if both seedes ioyne not together at one selfe time, (namely that of the woman and of the man) *Galen* saith there will ensue no conception, although the seed of the man be neuer so apt for procreation. And hereof we shall render the reason to another purpose. This is very certaine, that all the diligences by vs prescribed, must also be performed on the womans behoofe, otherwise, her seed (euill imploied) will mar the conception. Therefore it is requisit they attend ech to other, so as at one selfe instant, both their seedes may ioyne together.

This, at the first coming, importeth very much for the  
right

right cod, and his seed vessell (as *Galen* affirmeth) is first stirred vp, and yeeldeth his seed before the left, and if the generation take not effect at the first comming, it is a great hap hazard, but that at the second a female shalbe begotten. These two seeds are knowne, first by the heat and coldnesse, then by the quantitie of being much or little, and finally by the issuing forth speedily or slowly. The seed of the right cod commeth forth boiling, and so hot that it burneth the womans bellie, is not much in quantitie, and passeth out in hast: Contrariwise, the seed of the left cod taketh his way more temperat, is much in quantitie: and for that the same is cold and grosse, spendeth longer space in comming forth. The last consideration was, to procure that both the seeds of the husband and the wife fall into the right side of the wombe: for in that place (sayth *Hippocrates*) are males engendered, and females in the left. *Galen* alleageth the reason hereof, saying, that the right side of the wombe is very hot, through the neighborhood which it holdeth with the liuer, with the right side of the reins, and with the right seed vessell: which members, we haue affirmed and approoued to be very hot. And seeing all the reason of working that the issue may become male, consisteth in procuring, that at the time of conception it partake much heat; it falleth out certaine, that it greatly importeth to bestow the seede in this place. Which the woman shall easily accomplish by resting on her right side when the act of generation is ended, with her head downe and her heeles vp: but it behooueth her to keep her bed a day or two, for the womb doth not straight waies embrace the seed, but after some hours space.

The signs whereby a woman may know whether she be with child or no, are manifest and plain to euery ones vnder-

vnderstanding : for if when she ariseth vpon her feet, the seed fall to the ground, it is certain (saith *Galen*) that she hath not conceiued, albeit herein one point requireth consideration, that al the seed is not fruitfull or apt for issue: for the one part therof is very waterish, whose office serueth to make thin the principal seed, to the end it may fare through the narrow passages, and this is that which nature sendeth forth, and it resteth, when she hath conceiued, with the part apt for issue. It is knowen by that it is like water, and of like quantitie. That a woman rise vp straightwaies on her feet, so soon as the act of generation hath passed, is a matter verie perillous. Therefore *Aristotle* compelleth that she beforehand make euacuation of the extrements, and of her vrine, to the end she may haue no cause to rise. The second token whereby we may know the same, is, that the next day following, the woman will feele her belly empty, especially about the nauell. Which groweth, for that the womb, when it desireth to conceiue, becommeth verie large and stretched out: for verely it suffereth the like swelling vp and stiffnesse, as doth a mans member, and when it fareth thus wise, the same occupieth much roome. But at the point when it conceiueth (saith *Hippocrates*) sodainly the same draweth together, and maketh as it were a purse to draw the seed vnto it, and will not suffer it to go out, and by this meanes leaueth many emptie places, the which women do declare, saying, that they haue no tripes left in their belly as if they were sodainly become leane. Moreouer, forthwith they abhorre carnall copulation, and their husbands kindnesse, for the belly hath now got what it sought; but the most certain token (saith *Hippocrates*) is, when their naturall course faileth, & their breasts grow, and when they fall in loathing with meat.

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wittie and wise.*

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**I**F we doe not first know the cause, whence it procedeth that a man of great wit and sufficiencie is begottē, it is impossible that the same may be reduced to art, for through conioyning and ordering his principles and causes, we grow to attaine this end, and by none other meanes. The Astrologers hold; that because the child is borne vnder such an influence of the starres, he commeth to be discrete, wittie, of good or ill maners, fortunat, and of those other conditions and properties which we see and consider every day in men. Which being admitted for true, it would folow a matter of impossibilitie, to frame the same to any art: for it should be wholly a case of fortune, and no way placed in mens election. The natural Philosophers, as *Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Galen* hold, that a man receiueth the conditions of his soule, at the time of his forming, and not of his birth: for then the starres do superficially alter the child, giuing him heat, coldnesse, moisture, and drouth; but not his substance, wherein the whole life relieth, as do the foure elements, fire, aire, earth, and water, who not only yeeld to the party composed, heat, cold, moisture, and drinesse, but also the substance which may maintain and preserue the same qualities, during all the course of life. Wherethrough, that which most importeth in the engendring of children, is, to procure that the elements wherof they are compounded, may partake the qualities which are  
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requisite for the wit. For these according to the waight and measure, by which they enter into the composition, must alwayes so indure in the mixture, and not the alterations of heaven. What these elements are, and in what sort they enter into the womans wombe, to forme the creature, *Galen* declareth and affirmeth them to bee the same which compound all other naturall things: but that the earth cometh lurking in the accustomed meates which we eat, as are flesh, bread, fish, and fruits: the water in the liquors which we drinke. The aire and fire (he saith) are mingled by order of nature, and enter into the body by way of the pulse, and of respiration. Of these foure elements, mingled and digested by our naturall heate, are made the two necessary principles of the infants generation, to witte the seede, and the monthly course. But that whereof we must make greatest reckoning for the end which we enquire after, are the accustomed meates whereon we feede: for these shut vp the foure elements in themselves, and from these the seede fetcheth more corpulencie and qualitie, than from the water which we drinke, or the fire and aire which wee breath in. Whence *Galen* saith that the parents who would beget wise children, should read three bookes which he wrot, of the facilitie of the elements: for there they should find, with what kinds of meate they may effect the same. And he made no mention of the water, nor of the other elements, as materials, and of like moment. But herein he swarued from reason: for the water altereth the body much more than the aire, and much lesse than the sound meates wheron we feede, And as touching that which concerneth the engendring of the seed, it carrieth as great importance as all the other elements together. The reason is (as *Galen* himselfe affirmeth) because

because the cods drawe from the veines (for their nourishment) the wheyish part of the blood, and the greatest part of this whey, which the veins receiue, partaketh of the water which we drinke. And that the water worketh more alteration in the body, than the aire, *Aristotle* prooueth, where he demandeth; what the cause is, that by changing of waters, wee breede so great an alteration in our health, whereas if we breath a contrarie aire, we perceiue it not. And to this hee answereth, that water yeeldeth nourishment to the body, and so doth not the aire. But he had little reason to answer after this manner: for the aire also (by *Hippocrates* opinion) giueth nourishment and substance, as well as the water. Where-through *Aristotle* deuised a better answer, saying, that no place nor country hath his peculiar aire; for that which is now in Flanders, when the North wind bloweth, passeth within two or three dayes into Affricke, and that in Affricke, by the South is carried into the North; and that which this day is in Hierusalem, the East wind driueth into the West Indies: The which cannot betide in the waters: for they doe not all issue out of the same soile, where-through euery people hath his particular water conformable to the Mine of the earth where it springeth, and whence it runneth. And if a man bee vsed to drinke one kind of water, in tasting another, he altereth more than by meate or aire. In sort, that the parents who haue a will to beget very wise children, must drinke waters, delicate, fresh, and of good temperature; otherwise they shall commit error in their procreation. *Aristotle* saith, that at the time of generation, we must take heede of the South-west wind: for the same is grosse, and moistneth the seede, so as a female and not a male is begotten. But the westwind he highly commendeth, and aduanceth it with

with names and titles very honourable. He calleth the same temperate, fatter of the earth, and saith; that it cometh from the Elisian fields. But albeit it bee true that it greatly importeth, to breath an aire very delicate, and of good temperature, and to drinke such waters: yet it standeth much more vpon to vse fine meats applicable to the temperature of the wit: for of these is engendred the blood and the seede, and of the seede the creature. And if the meate be delicate and of good temperature, such is the blood made; and of such blood, such seede; and of such seede, such braine. Now, this member being temperate, and compounded of a substance subtile and delicate, *Galen* saith, that the wit will be like therunto: for our reasonable soule, though the same be incorruptible, yet goeth alwayes vnited with the dispositions of the braine, which being not such as it is requisite they should be, for discourfing and philosophizing, a man saith and doth 1000 things, which are very vnfitting. The meates then which the parents are to feede on, that they may engender children of great vnderstanding (which is the ordinarie wit for Spaine) are, first, White bread made of the finest meale, and seasoned with salt: this is cold and dry, and of parts very subtile and delicate. There is another sort made (saith *Galen*): of reddish graine, which though it nourish much, and make men big limmed, and of great bodily forces; yet for that the same is moist and of grosse parts, it bettereth a losse in the vnderstanding. I said, seasoned with salt, because none of all the aliments which a man vseth, it breedeth so much the vnderstanding, as doth this minerall. It is cold, and of more drinessse than any other thing; and if I remember well the sentence of *Heracitus*, he said after this maner: A drie brighnesse, the wisest minde. Then seeing that  
salt:

It is so drie, and so appropriat to the wit, the scripture had good reason to ascribe it by the name of Prudence and Sapience. *Parmidges* and *Francoisins* haue a like substance, and the selfe temperature with bread of white meale, and Kid, and Muskadel wine. And if parents vse these meates (as we haue aboue specified) they shall breed children of great vnderstanding. And if they would haue a child of great memorie, let them eight or nine dayes before they breake themselues to the act of generation, eate Trouts, Salmones, Lampreis, and Eccles, by which meat, they shall make their seede very moitt and clammye.

These two qualities (as I haue said before) make the memorie easie to receiue, and very fast to proserue the figures a long time. By Pigeons, Goats, Garlick, Onions, Leekes, Rapes, Pepper, Vineger, White-wine, Honny, and all other sorts of spices, the food is made hot and drie, and of parts very subtile and delicate. The child who is engendred of such meate, shalbe of great imagination, but not of like vnderstanding, by meanes of the much heate, and he shall want memorie through his abundance of drinessse. These are woont to bee very prejudiciall to the common-wealth: for the heate enclineth them to many vices and euils, and giueth them a wit and mind, to put the same in execution: howbeit if we doe keepe them vnder, the common-wealth shall receiue more seruice by these mens imagination, than by the vnderstanding and memorie of the others. Hens, capons, veale, weathers of Spaine, are all meates of moderat substance; for they are neither delicat nor grosse. I said weathers of Spaine: for *Galen*, without making any distinction, saith, that their flesh is of a grosse and noisome substance, which straieth from reason: for put case that in Italie, (where

(where he wrot) it be the worst of all others; yet in this our country, through the goodnesse of the pastures, we may reckon the same among the meates of moderate substance. The children who are begotten on such food, shall haue a reasonable discourse, a reasonable memory, and a reasonable imagination. Wherethrough they will not be very profoundly teene in the Sciences, nor deuise ought of new.

Of these we haue said heretofore, that they are pleasant conceited, and apt, in whom may be imprinted all the rules and considerations of art, cleare, obscure, casie, and difficult: but doctrine, argument, answering, doubting, and distinguishing, are matters wherewith their braines can in no sort endure to be cloied. Cowes flesh, Manzo, bread of red graine, cheese, oliues, vineger, and water alone, will breed a grosse seede, and of faultie temperature: the sonne engendred vpon these, shall haue strength like a bull, but withall, bee furious and of a beastly wit. Hence it proceedeth, that amongst vpland people, it is a miracle to find one quicke of capacitie, or towardly for learning: they are all borne dull and rude; for that they are begotten on meates of grosse and euill substance. The contrary hereof befalleth in Citizens, whose children we finde to bee endowed with more wit and sufficiencie. But if the parents carie in very deede, a will to beget a sonne, prompt, wise, and of good conditions, let them, fixe or seuen daies before their companying, feed on Goats milke; for this aliment (by the opinion of all Phisitions) is the best, and moit delicate that any man can vse, provided that they be sound, and that it answere them in proportion: but *Galen* saith, it behooueth to eate the same with hony, without which it is dangerous, and easily corrupteth. The reason hereof

is, for that the milke, hath no more but three elements in his composition, cheefe, whey, and butter. The cheefe answereth the earth; the whey, the water; and the butter the aire. The fire, which minglet the other elements, and preserueth them being mingled, issuing out of the teats, is exhaled, for that it is very subtile: but adioyning thereunto a little honny, which is hot and dry, in lieu of fire, the milke wil so partake of all the 4 elements. Which being mingled, and concocted by the operation of our naturall heat, make a seede very delicat, and of good temperature. The sonne thus engendred, shall at least wise possesse a great discourse; and not be deprived of memorie and imagination. In that *Aristotle* wanted this doctrine, he came short to answer a problem, which himselfe propounded, demanding what the cause is, that the yong ones of brute beasts, carry with them (for the most part) the properties and conditions of their fires and dammes; and the children of men and women not so? And we find this by experience to be true: for of wise parents, are borne foolish children; and of foolish parents, children very wise; of vertuous parents, lewd children; and of vicious parents, vertuous children; of hard fauoured parents, faire children; and of faire parents, foule children; of white parents, browne children; and of browne parents, white and well couloured children. And amongst children of one selfe father and mother, one prooueth simple, and another wittie: one foule, and another faire: one of good conditions, and another of bad: one vertuous, and another vicious. Whereas if a mare of a good harrage, be couered with a horse of the like, the colt which is foaled, resembleth them aswell in shape and colour, as in their properties. To this problem, *Aristotle* shaped a very vntowardly answer, saying

ing, that a man is caried away with many imaginations, during the carnall act : and hence it proceedeth that the children prooue so diuers. But brute beastes, because in time of procreation they are not so distraughted, neither possesse so forcible an imagination as man doth, make alwayes their yong ones after one selfe sort, and like to themselues. This answere hath euer hitherto gone for currant amongst the vulgar phylosophers : and for confirmation hereof, they alleage the history of *Iacob*, which recounteth, that he hauing placed certaine rodes at the watering places of the beastes, the lambes were yeaned party coulored. But little auails it them to handfast holy matters : for this historie recounteth a miraculous action, which God performed, therein to hide some sacrament. And the answere made by *Aristotle*, sauoreth of great simplicity. And who so will not yeeld me credit, let him (at his day) cause some shepheards to try this experiment, and they shall find it to be no naturall matter. It is also reported in these our partes, that a ladie was deliuered of a sonne, more browne than was due, because a blacke visage, which was pictured, fell into her imagination. Which I hold for a ielt : and if perhaps it be true that she brought such a one to the world, I say that the father who begat him, had the like coulour to that figure. And because it may be the better knowne, how from-shapen this phylosophie is, which *Aristotle* bringeth in, together with those that follow him, it is requisite wee hold it for a thing certaine, that the worke of generation appertaineth to the vegetatiue soule, and not to the sensitiue, or reasonable : for a horse engendreth without the reasonall, and a plant without the sensitiue. And if we doe but marke a tree loden with fruite, we shall find on the same a greater variety, than in the children of any

man. One apple will be green, another red; one little, another great; one round, another ill shaped; one sound, another rotten; one sweet, and another bitter. And if we compare the fruit of this yeare with that of the last, the one will be verie different and contrary to the other: which cannot be attributed to the varietie of the imagination, seeing the plants doe want this power. The error of *Aristotle*, is very manifest in his owne doctrine: for he saith, that the seede of the man, and not of the woman, is that which maketh the generation: and in the carnal act, the man doth nought els but scatter his seede without forme and figure, as the husbandman soweth his corne in the earth. And as the graine of corne doth not by and by take roote, nor formeth a stalke and leaues, vntill some daies beene expired: so (saith *Galen*) the creature is not formed all so soone as the mans seede falleth into the womans wombe: But affirmeth that thirrie or fortie dayes are requisite, ere the same can bee accomplished. And if this be so, what auaileth it that the father goe imagining of diuers things in the carnall act, when as the forming beginneth not vntill some dayes after? especially, when the forming is not made by the soule of the father or the mother, but by a third thing which is found in the seede it selfe. And the same being onely vegetatiue, and no more, is not capable of the imagination, but followeth onely the motions of the temperature, and doth nothing els. After my mind, to say that mens children are borne of so diuers figures, through the variable imagination of the parents, is none other, than to auouch, that of grains, some grow big, and some little, because the husband man (when he sowed them) was distraught into fundry imaginations. Vpon this so vnsound opinion of *Aristotle*, some curious heads argue, that the children of  
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the adulterous wife resemble her husband, though they be none of his. And the reason which leadeth them, is manifest: for during the carnall &c, the adulterers setle their imagination vpon the husband, with feare least he come and take them napping. And for the same consideration, they conclude that the husbands children resemble the adulterer though they be not his, because the adulterous wife, during the copulation with her husband, alwaies busieth her selfe in contemplation of the figure of her louer. And those who say, that the other woman brought forth a blacke sonne, because she held her imagination fixed on the picture of a blacke man, must also graunt this, which by these queint braines is inferred: for the whole carrieth one selfe reason, and is in my conceit a starcke leasing, and verie mockerie, though it be grounded on the opinion of *Aristotle*. *Hippocrates* answered this probleme better, when he said, that the Scythians are all alike conditioned, and shaped in visage, and rendereth the reason of this resemblance to be, for that they all fed of one selfe meat, and dranke of one selfe water, went apparelled after one selfe manner, and kept one selfe order in all things. For the same cause, the brute beastes engender yong ones after their particular resemblance, because they alwaies vse the same food, and haue therethrough an vniforme seede. But contrariwise man, because he eateth diuers meates, euerie day maketh a different seede aswell insubstance, as in temperature. The which the naturall Philosophers doe approoue, in answering to a probleme, that saith, What is the cause, that the excrements of brute beastes haue not so vnpleasant a verdure, as those of mankind? And they affirme, that brute beastes vse alwaies the selfe meates, and much exercise therewithall:

but a man eateth so much meate, and offso diuers substance, as he cannot come away with them, and so they grow to corrupt. Mans seed, and that of beasts, hold one selfe reason and consideration, for that they are both of them excrements of a third concoction. As touching the varietie of meats which man vseth, it cannot be denied, but must be graunted, that of euery aliment there is made a different and particular seede. Where it falleth out apparent, that the day on which a man eateth beefe or bloudings, he maketh a grosse seede, and of bad temperature; and therefore, the sonne begotten thereof, shalbe disfigured, foolish, blacke, and ill conditioned. And if he eat the carcas of a capon, or of a henne, his seed shall be white, delicat, and of good temperature. Wherethrough the sonne so engendred, shalbe faire, wise, and very gentle conditioned. From hence I collect, that there is no child borne, who partaketh not of the qualities and temperature of that meate, which his parents fed vpon a day before he was begotten. And if any would know of what meate he was formed, let him but consider, with what meate his stomacke hath most familiaritie, and without all doubt that it was. Moreouer, the naturall philosophers demand what the cause is, that the children of the wisest men, doe ordinatily prooue blockish and void of capacitie? To which problemes they answered very fondly, saying; that wise men are very honest and shamefast, and therefore in companying with their wiues, doe abstaine from some diligences, necessarie for effecting that the child prooue of that perfection which is requisite. And they confirme this, by example of such parents, as are foolish and ignorant, who because they employ all their force and diligence at the time of generation, their children doe all prooue wise and wittie; but

but this answer tokeneth they are slenderly scene in naturall Philosophie. True it is, that for rendring an answer convenient, it behooueth first to presuppose and prooue certaine points; one of which purporteth, that the reasonable facultie is contrarie to the wrathfull and the concupiscible, in sort, that if a man bee very wise, he cannot be very couragious; of much bodily forces, a great feeder, nor very able for procreation: for the naturall dispositions, which are requisite, to the end the reasonable soule may performe his operations, carrie a contrarietie to those, which are necessarie for the wrathfull and the concupiscible. *Aristotle* saith, (and it is true) that hardinesse and naturall courage consist in heate: and Prudence and Sapience in cold and drie. Whence wee see by plaine experience, that the valientest persons are void of reason, spare of speech, impatient to be iested withall, and very soone ashamed; for remedie whereof, they straightwayes set hand on their sword, as not weeting what other answer to make. But men endowed with wit, hath many reasons and quick answers and quippes, with which they entertaine the time, that they may not come to blowes. Of such a manner of wit, *Salust* noteth that *Cicero* was, telling him, that hee had much tongue, and feete verie light: wherein hee had reason, for so great a wisdom, in matters of armes, could not end but in cowardise. And hence tooke a certaine nipping proverbe his originall, which saith; He is as valiant as *Cicero*; and as wise as *Hector*: Namely, when we will note a man to be a buzzard, and a cow-babie. No lesse doth the naturall facultie gaine say the vnderstanding; for if a man possesse great bodily forces, he cannot enioy a good wit; and the reason is, for that the force of the armes and

the legges, springeth from hauing a braine hard and earthly, and though it be true, that by reason of the cold and drie of the earth, hee might partake a good vnderstanding, yet in that it hath his composition of a grosse substance, it ruinateth and endammageth the same. For through his coldnesse the courage and hardinesse are quenched: where through, wee haue seene some men of great forces to bee very cowardes. The contrarietie which the vegetatiue soule hath with the reasonable, is most manifest of all others, for his operations, namely, to nourish, and engender, are better performed with heate and moisure, than with the contrarie qualities: Which experience cleerely manifesteth, considering how powerfull the same is in the age of childhoode, and how weake and remisse in olde age. Againe, in boyes estate the reasonable soule cannot vse his operations; whereas in old age, which is vtterly void of heate and moisure, it performeth them with great effect. In sort, that by how much the more a man is enabled for procreation, and for digestion of foode, so much hee lesseth of his reasonable facultie. To this alludeth that which *Plato* affirmeth, that there is no humour in a man, which so much disturbeth the reasonable faculty, as abundance of seede, only (saith he) the same yeedeth helpe to the art of versifying. Which wee behold to be confirmed by daily experience: for when a man beginneth to entreate of amorous matters, sodainely he becommeth a Poet: and if before he were greasie and loutish, forthwith he takes it at heart, to haue a wrinkle in his pompe, or a mote on his cape. And the reason is, because these workes appertaine to the imagination, which encreaseth and lifteth it selfe vp from this point, through the much heat, occasioned in him by this amorous passion. And that loue is an

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hot alteration, sheweth apparently, through the courage and hardinesse, which it planteth in the louver, from whom the same also reaueth all desire of meate, and will not suffer him to sleepe. If the common-wealth bare an eye to these tokens, she would banish from publicke studies, lusty scholars, and great fighters, inamoured persons, Poets, and those who are very neare and curious in their apparrell: for they are not furnished with wit or ability for any sort of study. Out of this rule, *Aristotle* excepteth the melancholicke by aduersion, whose seede (though fruitfull) beaueth not the capacitie. Finally, all the faculties which gouern man, if they be very powerful, set the reasonable soule in a garboile. Hence it proceeds, that if a man be very wise, he proueth a coward, of small strength of bodie, a spare feeder, and not very able for procreation. And this is occasioned by the qualities which make him wise, namely, coldnesse and dimesse. And these selfe, weaken the other powers, as appeareth in old men, who (besides their counsell and wisdom) are good for nothing els. This doctrine thus presupposed, *Galen* holdeth opinion, that to the ende the engendering of whatsoever creature may take his perfect effect, two seedes are necessary, one, which must be the agent and former; and another which must serue for nourishment: for a matter so delicate as generation, cannot straightwaies overcome a meate so grosse, as is the blood, vnless the effect be greater. And that the seede is the right aliment of the seede members, *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Galen* doe all accord, for by their opinion, if the blood be not conuerted into seede, it is impossible that the sinewes, the veines, & the arteries can be maintained. Wherethrough *Galen* affirmed, the difference betweene the veines and the cods to be, that the cods doe speedily make much seede,

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seeds, and the veines a little, and in long space of time: In sort, that nature provided for the same, an aliment so like, which with light alteration, and without making any excrements, might maintain the other seed. And this could not be effected, if the nourishment thereof had bin made of the blood. The selfe provision (saith *Galen*) was made by nature, in the engendering of mankind, as in the forming of a chick, and such other birds, as come of eggs. In which we see there are two substances, one of the white, and an other of the yolke, of one of which, the chick is made; and by the other maintained all the time whilst the forming endureth. For the same reason are two seeds necessarie in the generation of the man, one, of which the creature may bee made, and the other by which it may be maintained whilst the forming endureth. But *Hippocrates* mentioneth one thing worthy of great consideration, namely: that it is not resolved by nature, which of the two seeds shall be the agent and formour, and which shall serve for aliment. For many times, the seede of the woman is of greater efficacy than that of the man, and when this becometh, she maketh the generation, and that of the husband serveth for aliment. Otherwhiles, that of the husband is more mightie, and that of the wife doth nought els than nourish. This doctrine was not considered by *Aristotle*, who could not understand, whereto the womans seede served; and therefore offered a thousand follies, and that the same was but a little water, without vertue or force for generation. Which being graunted, it would follow impossible, that a woman should euer counter the conuersion of man, or consent thereunto, but would shun the carnall act, as being her selfe so honest; and the worke so vncleane and filthy; wherethrough, in short space mankind would decay,

decay, and the world lost deprived of the fairest creature that euer nature formed. To this purpose *Aristotle* demandeth, what the cause is, that fleshly copulation should bee an action of the greatest pleasure, that nature euer ordained for the solace of liuing things. To which problem hee answereth, that nature hauing so desirously procured the perpetuities of mankind, did therefore place so great a delight in his worke, to the end, that they being moued by such interest, might gladly apply themselues to the act of generation; and if these incitements were wanting, no woman or man would condescend to the bands of marriage, inasmuch as the woman should reape none other benefite, than to beare a burden in her belly the space of nine monethes, with so great trauaile and sorowes, and at the time of her child-birth, to vndergo the hazard of forgoing her life. So would it bee necessarie, that the commonwealth should through feare enforce women to marrie, to the ende mankind might not come to nothing. But because nature doth her things with pleasing, shee gaue to a woman, all the instrumentes necessarie for making a seede, inciting, and apt for issue, whereby shee might desire a man, and take pleasure in his conuersation. But if it were of that qualitie which *Aristotle* expresth, shee would rather flie and abhorre him, than euer loue him. This selfe *Galen* prooueth, alleadging an example of the brute beastes, where through hee saith, that if a Sow be spayed, she neuer desireth the Boare, nor will consent that hee approach vnto her.

The like we doe evidently see in a woman, whose temperature partaketh more of coldnesse than is requisite: for if wee tell her that shee must bee married, there:

there is no word which soundeth worse in her eare. And the like befallerh to a cold man, for he wanteth the fruitfull seed. Moreouer, if a womans seed were of that maner which *Aristotle* mentioneth, it could be no proper aliment: for to attain the last qualities of a ctuall nutriment, a totall seed is necessarie, whereby it may be nourished. Wherthrough, if the same come not to be concted and semblable, it cannot performe this point: for womans seed wanteth the instruments and places, as are the stomatke, the liuer, and the cods, where it may be concocted. Therefore nature provided, that in the engendering of a creature, two seedes should concurre; which being mingled, the mightier should make the forming, and the other serue for nourishment. And this is seen evidently so to be: for if a blackamore beget a white woman with child, and a white man a *negro* woman, of both these vnions, wil be borne a creature, partaking of either qualitie. Out of this doctrin I gather that to be true, which many authentickall histories affirme, that a dog carnally companying with a woman, made her to conceiue; and the like did a beare with another woman, whom he found alone in the fields. And likewise, an ape had two yong ones by another. We read also one, who walking for recreation alongst a riuers side, a fish came out of the water, and begat her with child. The matter herein of most difficulty for the vulgar to conceiue, is, how it may be, that these women should bring forth perfect men, and partakers of the vse of reason, seeing the parents who engendred them, were brute beasts. To this I answer, that the seed of euery of these women, was the agent & former of the creature, as the greater in force, whence it figured the same, with his accidents of mans shape. The seed of the brute beast (as not equall in strength) serued for aliment, & for  
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nothing els. And that the seede of these vnreasonable beasts, might yeeld nourishment to mans seede, is a matter easie to be conceiued. For if any of these women had eaten a peece of beares flesh, or of a dog, boyled or roasted, she should haue receiued nourishment thereout, though not so good as if shee had eaten mutton or partridges. The like befalleth to mans seede, that his true nourishment (in the forming of the creature) is another mans seede, but if this be wanting, the seede of some brute beast may supply the roome: but a thing which these histories specific, is, that children borne of such copulations giue token in their maners and conditions, that their engendring was not naturall.

Out of the things already rehearsed (though we haue somewhat lingered by the way therein) wee may now gather the answer to that principall problem, *vz.* that wise mens children, are wel-neere alwayes formed of their mothers seede: for that of the fathers (for the reasons already alleaged) is not fruitfull for generation, and in engendering, serueth onely for aliment. And the man who is shaped of the womans seede, cannot be wittie, nor partake abilitie through the much colde and moist of that sex. Whence it becommeth manifest, that when the child prooueth discrete and prompt, the same yeedeth an infallible token, that hee was formed for his fathers seed. And if he shew blockish and vn- toward, we inferre, that he was formed of the seede of his mother. And hereto did the wise-marr allude, when he said, The wise sonne reioyceth the father, but a foolish child is a grieve to his mother. It may also come to passe vpon some occasion, that the seed of a wise man may be the agent & forme-giuer, and that of the woman, serue for nourishment, but the son so begotten will prooue of slender

slender capacitie : for put case, that cold and dry be two qualities, whereof the vnderstanding hath neede : yet it behooueth, that they hold a certaine quantitie and measure, which once exceeded, they doe rather hurt than good. Euen as we see men very aged, that by occasion of ouermuch cold and dry, we find them become children anew, and vtter many follies. Let vs then presuppose, that to some old man, there yet remaine ten yeeres of life, with conuenient cold and dry to discourse, in such sort, as these being expired, he shall then grow a babe againe.

If of such a ones seed a sonne be engendred, he shall till ten yeeres age, make shew of great sufficiency : for that till then, hee enioyeth the conuenient cold and drouth of his father; but at eleuen yeeres olde, hee will sodainely quaike away, for that he hath out-passed the point, which of these two qualities was behooffull. Which wee see confirmed by dayly experience in children begotten in old age, who in their childhood are verie aduised, and afterwards in mans state, prooue verie dullards, and short of life. And this groweth, because they were made of a seeds cold and dry, which had already out-run the one halfe of his race. And if the father be wise in the works of the imagination, and by meanes of his much heat & drinnesse, take to wife a woman cold and moist in the third degree, the sonne borne of such an accomplement, shalbe moist vntoward, if he be formed of his fathers seede, for that he made abode in a belly so cold and moist, and was maintained, by a blood so distemperate the contrary be-tideth, when the father is vntoward, whose seed hath ordinarily heat and excessiue moisture. The sonne so engendred, shalbe dull till 15 yeeres of age, for that he drew part of his fathers superfluous moisture. But the course  
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of that age once spent, it giueth firmenesse, in asmuch as the foolish mans seede, is more temperat and lesse moist. It aideth likewise the wit, to continue nine monethes space in a belly ofso little coldnesse and moisture, as is that of a woman cold and moist in the first degree, where it endured hunger and want. All this ordinarily befallerh, for the reasons by vs specified: but there is found a certaine sort of men, whose genitories are endowed with such force and vigour, as they vtterly spoile the aliments of their good qualities, and conuert them into their euill and grosse substance. Therefore all the children whom they beget, (though they haue eaten delicate meates) shall prooue rude and dullards. Others contrariwise, vsing grosse meates, and of euill temperature, are so mightie in ouercomming them, that though they eate beefe or porke; yet they make children of very delicate wit. Whence it prooueth certaine, that there are linages of foolish men, & races of wise men: and others, who of ordinarie are borne blunt and voide of iudgement.

Some doubts are incountred, by those who seeke to pearce into the bottome of this matter, whose answer (in the doctrine forepassed) is very easie. The first is, whence it springerh, that bastard children accustomably resemble their fathers, and of a 100 lawfull; 90 beare the figure and conditions of the mother. The second, why bastard children prooue ordinarily deliuer; couragious, and very aduised. The third, what the cause is, that if a common strumpet conceiue, she neuer looseth her burden, though she take venomous drenches to destroy the same, or be let much blood, whereas if a married woman be with child by her husband, vpon euery light occasion the same miscarrieth. To the first, *Plato* answererh, saying;

saying, that no man is nought of his owne proper and agreeable will, vnlesse hee be first incited by the vitiousnesse of his temperature. And he giues vs an example in lecherous men; who, for that they are stored with plentifulfull and fruitfull seede, suffer great illusions, and many combers; and therefore (molested by that passion) to driue the same from them, doe marrie wiues. Of such *Galen* saith, that they haue the instruments of generation very hot and dry: and for this cause breede seede very pricking & apt for procreation. A man then, who goeth seeking a woman not his owne, is replenished with this fruitfull, digested, and well seasoned seede, Whence it followeth of force, that hee make the generation: for where both are equall, the mans seede carrieth the greatest efficacie; and if the son be shaped of the seede of such a father, it ensueth of necessitie that hee resemble him. The contrarie betideth in lawfull children; who, for that married men haue their wiues euer couched by their sides, neuer take regarde to ripen the seede, or to make it apt for procreation, but rather (vpon euery light enticement) yeelde the same from them, vsing great violence and stirring; whereas women, abiding quiet, during the carnall act, their seede vessels yeeld not their seede, saue when it is well concoct and seasoned. Therefore married women do alwaies make the engendring, and their husbands seede serueth for alimient. But sometimes it comes to passe, that both the seeds are matched in equall perfection, and comba in such sort, as both the one and the other take effect in the forming, and so is a child shaped, who resemblenth neither father nor mother. Another time it seemeth that they agree vpon the matter, & part the likenesse betweene them: the seed of the father maketh the nostrils and the eies; and that of the mother,

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the mouth and the forehead. And which carrieth most maruell, it hath so fallen out, that the sonne hath taken one eate of his father, and another of his mother, and so the like in his eyes. But if the fathers seede doe altogether preuaile, the childe retaineth his nature and his conditions: and when the seed of the mother swaieth most, the like reason taketh effect. Therefore the father who coueteth, that his child may be made of his owne seede, ought to withdraw himselfe for some dayes from his wife; and stay till all his seede be concocted and ripened; and then it will fall out certaine that the forming shall proceede from him, and the wifes seede shall serue for nourishment. The second doubt (by meanes of that we haue said already) beareth little difficultie: for bastard children are ordinarily made of seede hotte and dry: and from this temperature (as we haue oftentimes proued heretofore) spring courage, brauerie, and a good imagination, whereto this wisdom of the world appertaineth. And because the seed is digested and well seasoned, nature affecteth what she likes best, and poutraicth those children as with a penfill. To the third doubt may be answered, that the conceiuing of lewd women, is most commonly wrought by the mans seede; and because the same is drie, and very apt for issue, it fasteneth it selfe in the woman with very strong rootes: but the child breeding of married women, being wrought by their owne seede, occasioneth, that the creature easily vnlooseth; because the same was moist and watry, or as Hippocrates saith, full of roustinesse.

what diligences are to be used, for preserving the childrens  
wits after they are formed. And as for the first, I have  
before said, that it is to be used, but I shall not say more  
of it.

**H**e matter whereof man is compounded, pro-  
prieeth a thing so reasonable, and so subiect to cor-  
ruption, that at the instant where he beginneth  
to be shaped, he likewise beginneth to be un-  
twined; and to decay, and therein can find no remedy. For  
it was said, so soone as we are born, we faile to be. Where-  
through nature provided, that in mans body, there  
should be 4 natural faculties, attractive, retentive, concoctive,  
and expulsive. The which concocting & altering the  
aliments which we eat, returne to repaire the substance  
that was lost, with succceding in his place. By this we un-  
derstand, that it little availeth to have engendred a child  
of delicate seed, if we make no reckoning of the meates  
which afterwarde we feede upon. For the creation being  
finisshed, there remaineth not for the creature, any part  
of the substance whereof it was first composed. True it is,  
that the first seeds, if the same be well concocted and sea-  
soned, possesseth such force, that digesting & altering the  
meats, it maketh them (though they be bad and grosse)  
to turne to his good temperance and substance; but we  
may so far forth use contrary meates, as the creature shall  
loose those good qualities; which it receiveth from the  
seed whereof it was made: therefore *Plato* said, that one of  
the things which most brought mans wit and his man-  
ners to ruine, was his evill bringing vp in diet. For  
which cause hee counselled that we should give unto  
children, meates and drinks, delicate, and of good tem-  
perature, to the end, that when they grow big, they may  
know how to abandon the evill, & to embrace the good.  
The reason hereof is very cleere: For if at the beginning  
the

the braine was made of delicate feed, and that this member goeth every day impairing and consuming, and must be repaired with the meats which we eat, it is certaine, if these being blisse and of a mild temperature, that vsing them many dayes together, the braine will become of the same nature. Therefore it sufficeth not, that the child be borne of good seede, but also it behooueth that the meate which he eateth, after he is formed and borne, bee endowed with the same qualities. What these be, it carrieth no great difficultie to manifest, if you presuppose, that the Greekes were the most discrete men of the world, and that, enquiring after aliments and foode, to make their children wittie and wise, they found the best and most appropriate. For if the subtile and delicate wit, consist in causing that the braine bee compounded of partes subtile, and of good temperature, that meate which aboue all others partaketh these two qualities, shalbe the same which is behooueth vs to vse, for obtaining our end. *Galen*, and all the Greeke Physicians, say that Goats milke boyled with honny, is the best meate which any man can eat, for besides that it hath a moderate substance, therein the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moist the drie. Therefore was said (some few leaies past) that the parents, whose will earnestly lea- deth them, to haue a childe, wise, prompt, and of good conditions, must eat much Goats milke boyled with honny, 7 or 8 dayes before the copulation. But albeit this aliment is so good (as *Galen* speaketh of) yet it falleth out a matter of importance for the wit, that the meate consist of moderate substance, and of subtile partes. For how much the finer the matter becommeth in the nourishment of the braine, so much the more is the wit sharpened. For which cause, the Greekes drew

out of the milke, cheefe and whey (which are the two grosse aliments of his composition) and left the butter, which in nature resembleth the aire. This they gaue in foode to their children, mingled with honny, with intention to make them wittie and wise. And that this is the trueth, is plainly seene by that which *Homer* recounteth. Besides this meat, children did eate cracknels, of white bread, of very delicat water, with honny and a little salt: but in steede of vinegar (for that the same is very noisome and dammageable to the vnderstanding) they shall adde thereunto, butter of Goats-milke, whose temperature & substance, is appropriat for the wit. But in this regiment growes an inconuenience very great, namely; that children vsing so delicate meats, shall not possesse sufficient strength to resist the iniuries of the aire: neither can defend themselues from other occasions, which are woont to breed maladies. So by making them become wise, they will fall out to be vnhealthfull, and liue a small time. This difficulty demandeth, in what sort children may bee brought vp, wittie and wise, and yet the matter so handled, as it may no way gaine say their healthfulnes. Which shall easily be effected, if the parentes dare to put in practise some rules and precepts which I will perforce. And because deintie people are deceiued in bringing vp their children, and they treat stil of this matter I will first asigne them the cause why their children, though they haue Schoolemaisters and tutors, and themselues take such pains at their booke, yet they come away so meanly with the sciences; as also in what sort they may remedie this, without that they abridge their life, or hazard their health. Eight things (saith *Hippocrates*) make mans flesh moist & fat. The 1 to be merry and to liue at hearts ease, the 2 to sleepe much, the 3 to lie in a soft bed, the 4 to  
fare

fare well : the fifth, to be well apparelled and furnished : the sixth, to ride alwayes on horsebacke : the seventh, to haue our will : the eighth to bee occupied in places and pastimes, and in things which yeelde contentment and pleasure. All which is verietie so manifest, as if *Hippocrates* had not affirmed it, none durst denie the same. Only we may doubt, whether delicious people doe alwayes obserue this maner of life; but if it be true that they do so, we may well conelude, that their seede is very moist, and that the children which they beget, will of necessitie ouer-abound in superfluous moisture, which it behooueth first to be consumed : for this qualitie sendeth to ruine the apearations of the reasonable soule : And moreover the Philosophers say, that it maketh them to liue a short space and ynhealthfull. By this it should seeme, that a good wit, and a sound bodily health require one selfe qualitie, Namely drouth; wherethrough, the precepts and rules which wee are to lay downe for making children wise, will serue likewise to yeelde them much health, and long life. It behooueth them, (so soone as a childe is borne of dilicious parents) inasmuch as their constitution consisteth of more cold and moist than is conuenient for childhood, to wash him with salt hote water; which (by the opinion of all phisitions) soketh vp and drieth the flesh, and giueth soundnesse to the sinewes, and maketh the child strong and manly, and (by consuming the ouermuch moisture of his braine) enableth him with wit, and freeth him from many deadly infirmities. Contrariwise, the bath being of water fresh and hote, in that the same moisteneth the flesh (saith *Hippocrates*) it breedeth fise annoiances; Namely, effeminating of the flesh, weaknesse of sinewes, dulnesse of spirits, fluxes of blood, and basenesse of stomacke. But if the

child issue out of his mothers belly with excessive drie-  
nesse, it is requisite to wash the same with hote fresh wa-  
ter. Therefore *Hippocrates* said, children are to be washed  
a long time with hote water, to the ende they may re-  
ceiue the lesse annoiance by the crampe, and that they  
may grow and be well coloured: but (for certaine) this  
must be vnderstood of those who come forth drie out  
of their mothers belly, in whom it behooueth to amend  
their euill temperature, by applying vnto the contra-  
rie qualities. The Almaines (saith *Galen*) haue a custome  
to wash their children in a riuer, so soone as they are born;  
them seeming, that as the iron which commeth burning  
hot out of the forge, is made the stronger, if it be dipped  
in cold water: so when the hote child is taken out of the  
mothers wombe, it yeeldeth him of greater force and  
vigour, if he be washed in fresh water. This thing is con-  
demned by *Galen* for a beastly practise, and that with  
great reason: for put case, that by this way, the skinne is  
hardened and closed, and not easie to bee altered by the  
iniuries of the aire, yet will it rest offended by the excre-  
ments which are engendred in the body, for that the  
same is not of force, nor open so as they may be exhalked  
and passe forth. But the best and safest remedie is, to  
wash the children, who haue superfluous moisture, with  
hot salt water: for their excessive moisture consuming,  
they are the neerer to health, and the way through the  
skinne, being stopped in them, they cannot receiue an-  
noiance by any occasion. Neither are the inward excre-  
ments therefore so shut vp, that there are not wayes left  
open for them, where they may come out. And nature  
is so forcible, that if they haue taken from her a com-  
mon way, we will seeke out another to serue her turne.  
And when all others fail, she can skill to make new  
wayes

wayes, wherethrough to send out what doth her damage. Wherefore of two extreames, it is more available for health, to haue a skinne hard and somewhat close, than thinne and open.

The second thing requisite to be performed when the child shalbe borne, is, that we make him acquainted with the winds, and with change of aire, & not keepe him still locked vp in a chamber: for else it will become weake, womanish, peeuish, of feeble strength, and within three or foure dayes, giue vp the ghost. Nothing (saith *Hippocrates*) so much weakeneth the flesh, as to abide still in warme places, and to keepe our selues from heate and cold. Neither is there a better remedie of healthfull liuing, than to accustome our body to all winds, hot, cold, moist, and dry. Wherethrough *Aristotle* enquireth what the cause is, that such as liue in the Gallies are more healthy, and better colored, than those who inhabit a plashy soile. And this difficulty groweth greater, considering the hard life which they lead, sleeping in their clothes, in the open aire, against the sun, in the cold, and the water, and faring withall so courly. The like may be demanded, as touching shepheards, who of all other men enioy the soundest health, and it springeth, because they haue made a league with all the seuerall qualities of the aire, and their nature dismaith nothing. Contrariwise, we plainly see, that if a man giue himselfe to liue deliciously, and to beware that the sun, the cold, the euening, nor the wind offend him, within 3 dayes he shalbe dispatched with a post letter to another world. Therefore it may be well said, he that loueth his life in this world, shal leese it: for there is no man that can preserue himselfe from the alteration of the aire; therefore it is better to accustome himselfe to every thing, to the end man may liue careles, & not in suspense.

The error of the vulgar consisteth, in thinking that the babe is borne so tender and delicate, as he cannot endure to issue forth of the mothers wombe (where it was so warme) into a region of the aire so cold, without receiving much dammage. And vterly they are deceiued: for those of Almaine (a region so cold) vsed to dip their children so hore in the riuer; and though this were a beastly act, yet the same did them no hurt, nor deaths harme.

The third point conuenient to bee accomplished, is to seeke out a yoong nurse of temperature hot and dry: or (after our doctrine) cold and moist in the first degree; enured to hardnesse and want, to lie on the bare ground, to eate little, and to goe poorely clad, in wet, drouth and heat; such an one will yeeld a firme milke, as acquainted with the alterations of the aire; and the childe being brought vp by her, for some good space, will grow to possesse a great firmnesse. And if she be discrete and aduised, the same will also be of much auaille for his wit: for the milke of such a one, is very cleane, hot, and drie: with which two qualities, the much cold and moist will bee corrected, which the infant brought from his mothers wombe. How greatly it importeth for the strength of the creature, that it sucke a milke well exercised, is apparently prooued in horses, who being soaled by mares, toiled in plowing and harrowing, prooue great counters, and will abide much hardnesse. And if the dammes run vp and downe idly in the pastures after the first carriere, they are not able to stand on their feete. The order then which should be held with the nurse, is, to take her into house, some foure or fise months before the child-birth, and to giue her the same meats to eate, wheron the mother feedeth, that she may haue time to consume the blood

blood and bad humours, which she had gathered by harmfull meats, that she vsed to fore, and to the end the child (so soone as it is borne) may sucke the like milke vnto that, which relieued it in the mothers bellie, or made at least of the same meats.

The fourth is, not to accustome the child to sleepe in a soft bed, nor to keepe him ouerwarmed appaielled: nor giue him too much meate. For these three things (saith *Hippocrates*) scarfen and dry vp the flesh, and their contraries, fatten and enlarge the same. And in so doing, the child shall grow of great wit, and of long life, by reason of this drinesse: and by the contraries, thee will prooue faire, fat, full of blood, & blockish, which habit, *Hippocrates* called Wrastler-like, and holdeth it for very perillous. With this selfe receit and order of life, was the wisest man brought vp, that euer the world had: To wit our sauour Christ, in that he was man, sauing: (for that he was borne out of Nazareth), perhaps his mother had no salt water at hand, wherewith she might wash him: but this was a custome of the Iewes, and of all Asia besides; brought in by some skilfull Phisitions, for the good of infants, wherethrough the Prophet saith, And when thou wert borne, at thy birth day thy nauill string was not cut off: neither wert thou for thy healths sake washed in water, nor seasoned with salt, nor wrapped in swathing clothes. But as touching the other things, so soone as he was borne, he began to hold friendship with the cold, and the other alterations of the aire: His first bed was the earth, his appaiell course, as if hee would obserue *Hippocrates* receit. A few dayes after they went with him into Egypt, a place very hot, where he remained all the time that *Herod* liued. His mother partaking the like humours, it is certaine, that she must yeeld him a milke

milke well exercised, and acquainted with the alterations of the aire. The meat which they gaue him, was the same which the Greekes deuised, to endow their children with wit and wisdom. This (I haue said heretofore) was the butterish part of the milke eaten with honny. Wherefore *Esay* saith, He shall eat butter and honny, that he may know to eschew euill, and chuse the good. By which wordes is seene, how the Prophet gaue vs to vnderstand, that albeit hee was verie God, yet he ought also to be a perfect man: and to attaine naturall wisdom, he must apply the semblable diligences, as doe the other sons of men. Howbeit, this seemeth difficult to bee conceiued, and may be also held a follie, to thinke that because Christ our redeemer, did eate butter and honny being a childe, hee should therefore know how to eschue euill, and make choyce of good: when hee was elder, God being (as he is) of infinite wisdom, and hauing giuen him (as he was man) all the science infused, which hee could receiue after his naturall capacitie. Therefore it is certaine that hee knew full as much in his mothers wombe; as when he was thirtie three yeeres old, without eating either butter or honny, or borrowing the helpe of any other naturall remedies requisite for humane wisdom. But for all this, it is of great importance that the Prophet assigned him that selfe meate, which the Troians and Greekes accustomedly gaue their children, to make them witty and wise, and that he said, To the end he may know to shun euill and chuse the good. For vnderstanding, that by meanes of these aliments, Christ our sauiour, got (as he was man) more acquit knowledge, than he should haue possessed if he had vsed other contrarie meates; it behooueth vs to expound this parable, (to the end) that we may know what he meant; when

he spake in those termes. We must therefore presuppose, that in Christ our redeemer were two natures, as the very truth is, and the faith so teacheth vs; one, diuine, as he was God; and another humane, compounded of a reasonable soule, and of an elementall bodie, so disposed and instrumentalized, as the other children of men. As concerning his first nature, it behooueth not to entreat of the wisdom of our saviour Christ: for it was infinite without increase or diminishment; and without dependance vpon ought else, save onely in that he was God, and so he was as wise in his mothers wombe, as when he was 33 yeares of age, and so from everlasting. But in that which appertaineth to his second nature, we are to weet, that the soule of Christ, euem from the instant when God created it, was blessed, and glorious, euem as now it is; and seeing it enioyed God and his wisdom, it is certaine that in him was none ignorance: but he had so much science infused as his naturall capacity would beare: but withall, it is alike certaine, that as the glorie did not communicate it selfe vnto all the partes of the bodie, in respect of the redemption of mankind; no more did the wisdom infused, communicate it selfe; For the braine was not disposed, nor instrumentalized, with the qualities and substance, which are necessary, to the end the soule may with such an instrument, discourse and philosophize: for if you call to mind that which in the beginning of this worke wee deliuered, the graces *gratis* giuen, which God bestoweth vpon men, doe ordinarily require, that the instrument with which they are to be exercised, and the subject whereunto it is to bee receiued, doe partake the naturall qualities, requisite for ouerie such gift. And the reason is, because that the reasonable soule, is an

act of the body, and worketh not without the service of his bodily instruments. The braine of our redeemer Christ, whilst he was a babe, and lately borne, had much moisture: for in that age it was behoofull so to bee, and a matter naturall, and therefore in that it was of such qualitie, his reasonable soule (naturall) could not discourse nor philosophize with such an instrument. Where-through, the science infused, passed not to the bodily memorie, nor to the imagination, nor the vnderstanding, because these three are instrumentall powers (as tofore we haue proued) and enioyed not that perfection, which they were to haue; but whilst the braine went drying, by meanes of time and age, the reasonable soule went also manifesting euery day more and more, the infused wisdom which it had, and communicated the same to the bodily powers. Now, besides this supernaturall knowledge, he had also another, which is gathered of things that they heard whilst they were children, of that which they saw, of that which they smelled, of that which they tasted, and of that which they touched: and this (for certaine) our saviour Christ attained as other men doe. And euen as for discerning things perfectly, hee stood in neede of good eyes, and for hearing of sounds, good eares: so also he stood in neede of a good braine, to iudge the good and the euill. Whence it is manifest, that by eating those delicate meates, his head was daily better instrumentalized, & attained more wisdom. In sort, that if God had taken fro him his science infused, thrise in the course of his life (by seeing that which hee had purchased) we shall find, that at ten yeeres he knew more than to fye, at twentie, more than at ten, and at thirtie three, more than at twenty. And that this doctrine is true and catholicke, the letter of the Euangelicke text

prooueth, saying; and Iesus encreased in wisdome and age, and grace, with God, and with men. Of many catholicke senses which the holy scripture may receiue, I hold that euery better which taketh the letter, than that which reaueth the termes and wordes of their naturall signification. What the qualities are which the braine ought to haue, and what the substance, we haue already reported, by the opinion of *Heracitus*, That drinesse maketh the wisest soule. And by *Galens* mind we proued, That when the braine is compounded of a substance very delicat, it maketh the wit to be subtile. Christ our redeemer, went purchasing more drinesse by his age: for from the day that we are borne, vntill that of our death, we daily grow to a more drinesse, and leeing of flesh, &c a greater knowledge. The subtile and delicate parts of his braine, went correcting themselues whilst he fed vpon meates, which the Prophet speaketh of. For if euery moment hee had neede of nourishment, and restoring the substance which wasted away (and this must be performed with meates and in none other sort) it is certaine, that if hee had alwayes fed on cowes beefe, or porcke, in few dayes he should haue bred himselfe a braine grosse and of euill temperature: with which his reasonable soule could not haue shunned euill, or chosen good, saue by miracle, and imploing his diuinitie. But God leading him by naturall meanes, caused him to vse those so delicat meates, by which the braine being maintained, the same might be made an instrument, so well supplied, as (euen without vsing the diuine or infused knowledge) he might naturally haue eschued euill, and chosen good, as doe the other children of men.

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**I**T is proued by example, that if a child haue not the disposition and abilitie, which is requisite for that science whereunto he will addict himselfe, it is a superfluous labour to be instructed therein by good schoolemaisters, so haue store of bookes, and continually to study in. fol. 1

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FINIS.

*Examen de Ingenios.*  
**THE EXAMINATION<sup>R.</sup>**  
of mens Wits.

In which, by discovering the varietie of natures,  
is shewed for what profession each one is apt,  
and how far he shall profit therein.

*By John Huarte.*

Translated out of the Spanish tongue by

*M. Camillo Camilli.*

Englised out of his Italian, by

*R. C. Esquire.*



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for if sadnesse and affliction drie vp and consume the flesh, and for that reason man gaineth more vnderstanding, it fals out a matter certaine, that his contrarie, namely mirth, will make the braine moist, and diminish the vnderstanding. Such as haue purchased this manner of wit, are suddenly enclined to pastimes, to musicke, and to pleasant conuersations, and flie the contrarie, which at other times gaue them a rellish and contentment. Now by this, the vulgar sort may conceiue whence it growes, that a wise and vertuous man attaining to some great dignitie (whereas at first he was but poore and base) sodainly changeth his manners and his fashion of speech: and the reason is, because he hath gotten a new temperature, moist and full of vapours, whence it followes, that the figures are cancelled which tofore he had in his brain, and his vnderstanding dulled.

From moisture it is hard to know what difference of wit may spring, sithens it is so far contrarie to the reasonable facultie. At least (after *Galens* opinion) all the humours of our bodie, which hold ouermuch moisture, make a man blockish and foolish, for which cause he said, The readinesse of mind and wisdome growes from the humour of choler: the humour of melancholie is author of firmenesse and constancie; blood, of simplicitie and dulnesse; the flegmaticke complexion auaieth nothing to the polishing of mans. Insomuch, that blood with his moistures, and the flegme, cause an impairing of the reasonable facultie.

But this is vnderstood of the faculties or reasonable wits, which are discoursive and actiue, and not of the passiue, as is the memorie, which depends as well on the moist, as the vnderstanding doth on the drie. And we call memorie a reasonable power, because without it the  
vnder-

vnderstanding and the imaginative are of no valure. It ministreth matter and figures to them all, whereupon they may syllogise conformably to that which *Aristotle* sayth, It behooues that the vnderstander go beholding the fantasmes; and the office of the memorie is, to preserue these fantasmes, to the end that the vnderstanding may contemplat them, and if this be lost, it is impossible that the powers can worke; and that the office of memorie is none other, than to preserue the figures of things, without that it appertaines thereto to deuise them. *Galen* expresseth in these words, *Memorie* (verely) laies vp and preserueth in it selfe the things knowne by the sence, and by the mind, & is therein as it were their storehouse and receiuing place, and not their inuenter. And if this be the vse thereof, it fals out apparant, that the same dependeth on moisture, for this makes the braine pliant, and the figure is imprinted by way of straying. To prooue this, we haue an euident argument in boyes age, in which any one shall better conne by heart, than in any other time of life, and then doth the braine partake greatest moisture. Whence *Aristotle* moueth this doubt, Why in old age we haue better wit, and in yoong age we learne more readily? as if he should say, What is the cause, that when we are old we haue much vnderstanding, and when we are yoong we learne with more towardlinesse? Whereto he answereth, That the memory of old men is full of so many figures of things which they haue seene and heard in the long course of their life; that when the would bestow more therein, it is not capable thereof, for it hath no void place where to receiue it. But the memory of yoong folke, when they are newly borne, is full of plaits, and for this cause they receiue readily whatsoeuer is told or taught them. And he

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makes this playner, by comparing the memorie of the morning with that of the euening, saying, That in the morning we learne best, because at that time our memorie is emptie, and at the euening illy, because then it is full of those thinges which wee encountred during the day. To this Probleme *Aristotle* wist not how to answer, and the reason is very plaine: for if the spices and figures which are in the memorie, had a body and quantitie to occupie the place, it would seeme that this were a fitting answer; but being vndeuided and spirituall, they cannot fill nor emptie any place where they abide: yea we see by experience, that by how much more the memorie is exercised euery day receiuing new figures, so much the more capable it becommeth. The answer of this Probleme is very euident after my doctrine, and the same importeth, that old men partake much vnderstanding, because they haue great drinesse, and faile of memorie, for that they haue little moisture, and by this meanes the substance of the braine hardneth, and so cannot receiue the impression of the figures, as hard waxe with difficultie admitteth the figure of the seale, and the soft with easinesse. The contrary befalls in children, who through the much moisture wherewith the braine is endowed, faile in vnderstanding, and through the great suppleness of their braine abound in memory: wherein, by reason of the moisture, the shapes and figures that come from without, make a great, easie, deepe, and well formed impression.

That the memorie is better in the morning than the euening, cannot be denied, but this springeth not from the occasion alleaged by *Aristotle*, but the sleepe of the night passed hath made the braine moist, and fortified the same, and by the waking of the whole day, it is dried

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and hardened. For which cause *Hippocrates* affirmeth, those who haue great thirst at night, shall doe well to drinke, for sleepe makes the flesh moist, and fortifieth all the powers which gouern man: and that sleepe so doth, *Aristotle* himselfe confesseth.

By this doctrine is perfectly seene, that the vnderstanding and memorie are powers opposit and contrarie, in sort, that the man who hath a great memorie, shall find a defect in his vnderstanding, and hee who hath a great vnderstanding, cannot enioy a good memorie; for it is impossible that the braine should of his owne nature be at one selfe time drie and moist. On this maxime *Aristotle* grounded himselfe, to prooue, that memorie is a power different from remembrance, and he frames his argument in this manner: Those who haue much remembrance, are men of great vnderstanding, and those who possesse a great memorie, find want of vnderstanding; so then memorie and remembrance are contrarie powers. The former proposition, after my doctrine, is false; for those who haue much remembrance, are of little vnderstanding, and haue great imaginations, as soone hereafter I will prooue: but the second proposition is very true, albeit *Aristotle* knew not the cause, whereon was founded the enmitie which the vnderstanding hath with the memorie.

From heat, which is the third qualitie, groweth the imaginative, for there is no other reasonable power in the braine, nor any other qualitie to which it may be assigned; besides that, the sciences which appertaine to the imaginative, are those, which such vtter as dote in their sicknesse, and not of those which appertaine to the vnderstanding, or to the memorie. And frenzie, peeuishnesse, and melancholic, being hot passions of the braine,

it yeelds a great argument, to prooue that imagination consists in heat. One thing breedes me a difficultie herein, and that is, that the imagination carrieth a contrarie-ty to the vnderstanding, as also to the memorie, and the reason hereof is not to be gotten by experience, for in the braine may very well be vnited much heat and much drinesse; and so likewise, much heat and much moisture, to a large quantitie: and for this cause, a man may haue a great vnderstanding and a great imagination, and much memorie with much imagination: and verely, it is a miracle to find a man of great imagination, who hath a good vnderstanding, and a sound memorie. And the cause thereof behooues to bee, for that the vnderstanding requires that the braine be made of parts very subtile and delicate, as we haue prooued heretofore out of *Galen*, and much heat frets and consumes what is dedicate, and leaues behind the parts grosse and earthly. For the like reason, a good imagination cannot bee vnited with much memorie; for excessiue heat resolue the moisture of the braine, and leaueth it hard and drie, by meanes whereof it cannot easily receiue the figures. In sort, that in man there are no more but three generall differences of wits, for there are no more but three qualities whence they may grow. But vnder these three vniuersall differences, there are contained many other particulars, by meanes of degrees of accessse, which heat, moisture and drinesse may haue.

Notwithstanding there springs a difference in wits from euery degree of these three qualities, for the dry, the hot, and the moist, may exceede in so high a degree, that it may altogether disturbe the animall power, conformable to that sentence of *Galen*, Euery excessiue distemperature resolues the forces; and so it is. For albeit

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drinesse giue helpe to the vnderstanding, yet it may be that the same shal consume his operations. Which *Galen* and the ancient Philosophers would not admit, but affirme, that if old mens brains grew not cold, they should neuer decay, though they became drie in the fourth degree. But they haue no reason for this, as we will prooue in the imaginatiue; for albeit his operations be performed with heat, yet if it passe the third degree, forthwith the same begins to resolue, and the like doth the memorie through ouermuch moisture.

How many differences of wits grow by means of the superabounding of each of these three qualities, cannot for this present be particularly recited, except tofore we recount all the operations and actions of the vnderstanding, the imagination, and the memorie. But the whilest we are to know, that the principall workes of the vnderstanding are three: the first, to discourse; the second, to distinguish; and the third, to chuse. Hence comes it, that they place also three differences in the vnderstanding: into three other is the memorie deuided: one receiues with ease, and suddenly forgetteth; another is slow to receiue, but a long time retaineth; and the last receiueth with ease, and is very slow to forget.

The imagination containeth many more differences, for he hath three, no lesse than the vnderstanding and memorie, and from each degree ariseth three other. Of these we will more distinctly discourse hereafter, when we shall assigne to each the science which answereth it in particular.

But he that will consider three other differences of wit, shall find, that there are habilities in those who studie, some which haue a disposition for the cleare and easie contemplations of the art which they learne, but if

you set them about matters obscure and very difficult, it will prooue a lost labour for the teacher to shape them a figure thereof by fit examples, or that they frame themselves the like by their owne imagination, for they want the capacitie.

In this degree are all the bad schollers of whatsoeuer facultie, who being demaunded touching the easie points of their art, answer to the purpose: but comming to matters of more curiousnesse, they will tell you a hundred follies. Other wits aduance themselves one degree higher, for they are pliant and easie in learning things, and they can imprint in themselves all the rules and considerations of art, plaine, obscure, easie, and difficult; but as for doctrine, argument, doubting, answering, and distinguishing, they are all matters wherewith they may in no wise be compred: these need to learne sciences at the hands of good teachers, well skilled in knowledge, and to haue plentie of bookes, and to studie them hard; for so much the lesse shall their knowledge be, as they forbear to reade and take paines. Of these may be veresied that so famous sentence of *Aristotle*: Our vnderstanding is like a plaine table, wherein nothing is pourtraied. For whatsoeuer they are to know and attaine, it behooues that first they heare the same of some other, and are barren of all inuention themselves. In the third degree, Nature maketh some wits so perfect, that they stand not in need of teachers to instruct them, nor to direct in what sort they are to philosophise, for out of one consideration endicted to them by their schoolemaister, they will gather a hundred, and without that ought be bestowed vnto them, they fill their wit with science and knowledge. These wits beguiled *Plato*, and made him to say, That our knowledge is a certaine spice  
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of remembrance, when he heard them speake and say that which neuer fell into consideration with other men.

To such it is allowable that they write bookes, and to others not: for the order and concert which is to be held, to the end that sciences may dayly receiue increase and greater perfection, is to ioine the new inuention of our selues, who liue now, with that which the auntients left written in their bookes. For dealing after this manner, each in his time, shall adde an increase to the arts, and men who are yet vnborne, shall enioy the inuention and trauell of such as liued before. As for such who want inuention, the commonwealth should not consent that they make bookes, nor suffer them to be printed, because they doe nought else saue heape vp matters already deliuered, and sentences of graue authours, returning to repeat the selfe things, stealing one from hence, and taking another from thence; and there is no man, but after such a fashion may make a booke.

Wits full of inuention are by the *Tuscans* called goatish, for the likenesse which they haue with a goat in their demeanure and proceeding. These neuer take pleasure in the plaines, but euer delight to walke alone thorough dangerous and high places, and to approach neere steepe downe-falls, for they will not follow any beaten path, nor goe in companie. A propertie like this is found in the reasonable soule, when it possesseth a braine well instrumentalized and tempered, for it neuer resteth settled in any contemplation, but fareth forthwith vnquiet, seeking to know and vnderstand new matters. Of such a soule, is verified the saying of *Hippocrates*, The going of the soule is the thought of men. For there are some, who neuer passe out of one contemplation, and thinke

not that the whole world can discouer another such. These haue the propertie of a beast, who neuer forsakes the beaten path, nor careth to walke through desert and vnhaunted places, but only in the high market way, and with a guide before him. Both these diuersities of wits are ordinarie amongst professors of learning. Some others there are of high searching capacities, and estranged from the common course of opinions, they iudge and entreat of matters with a particular fashion, they are franke in deliuering their opinion, and tie not themselves to that of any other. Some sorts are close, moist, and very quiet, distrusting themselves, and relying vpon the iudgement of some graue man whom they follow, whose sayings and sentences they repute as sciences and demonstrations, and all things contrarying the same, they reckon vanitie and leasings.

These two differences of wits are very profitable, if they be vnited; for as amongst a great droue of cattell the heardsmen accustome to mingle some dozen of goats to lead them and make them trot apace, to enioy new pastures, that they may not suffer scarcitie; so also it behoueth, that in humane learning there be some goat-like wits, who may discouer to the cattell like vnderstanding, thorow secrets of Nature, and deliuer vnto them contemplations not heard of, wherein they may exercise themselves, for after this manner arts take increase, and men daily know more and more.

## CHAP. VI.

*Certaine doubts and arguments are propounded against the doctrine of the last chapter, and their answer.*



Ne of the causes for which the wisdom of *Socrates* hath bene so famous till this day, is, for that after he was adiudged by the oracle of *Apollo*, to be the wisest man of the world, he sayd thus: *I know this onely, that I know nothing at all*: which sentence, all those that haue seene and read, passed it ouer, as spoken by *Socrates*, for that he was a man of great humbleness, a despiser of worldly things, and one to whom, in respect of diuine matters, all else seemed of no valure. But they vtterly are beguiled, for none of the ancient Philosophers possessed the vertue of humilitie, nor knew what thing it was, vntill God came into the world and taught the same.

The meaning of *Socrates* was, to giue to vnderstand how little certaintie is contained in humane sciences, and how vnsetled and fearefull the vnderstanding of a Philosopher in that which he knoweth, seeing by experience, that all is full of doubts and arguments, and that we can yeeld assent to nothing, without fearing that it may be contrary. For it was said, The thoughts of men are doubtfull, and our foreseeings vncertaine. And he who will attaine to the true knowledge of things, it behooues that hee rest settled and quiet without feare or doubt of being deceiued, and the Philosopher who is not thus wise grounded, may with much trueth affirme that he knoweth nothing.

This same consideration had *Galen*, when hee sayd, Science is a conuenient and firme notice, which neuer departeth from reason: therefore thou shalt not find it amongst the Philosophers, especially when they consi-

der the nature of things : but verely much lesse in matters of Phisicke; nay rather (to speake all in one word) it neuer makes his full arriuall where men are.

Hereby it seemeth that the true notice of things failes to come this way, and to man arriueth only a certaine opinion, which makes him to walke vncertaine, and with feare whether the matter which he affirmeth be so or no. But that which *Galen* noteth more particularly, touching this, is, that Philosophie and Phisicke are the most vncertaine of all those wherewith men are to deale. And if this be true, what shall we say touching the Philosophie whereof we now intreat, where with the vnderstanding we make an anatomic of a matter so obscure and difficult, as are the powers and faculties of the reasonable soule? In which point are offered so many doubts and arguments, that there remaines no cleare doctrine vpon which we may relie.

One of which, and the principall, is, that we haue made the Vnderstanding an instrumentall power, as the Imagination, and the Memory, and haue giuen drinesse to the braine, as an instrument with which it may worke: a thing far repugnant to the doctrine of *Aristotle* and all his followers; who placing the vnderstanding seuered from the bodily instrument, prooue easily the immortality of the reasonable soule, and that the same issuing out of the body, endureth for euer. Now the contrary opinion being disputable, the way hereby is stopped vp, so that this cannot be prooued. Moreouer, the reasons on which *Aristotle* groundeth himselfe, to prooue that the vnderstanding is not an instrumentall power, carrie such efficacie, as other than that cannot bee concluded. For to this power appertaineth the knowing and vnderstanding the nature and being of whatsoeuer materiall

teriall things in the world, and if the same should be conioyned with any bodily thing, that selfe would hinder the knowledge of the residue: as wee see in the outward senses, that if the tast be bitter, all the things which the tongue toucheth partake the same savour: and if the christalline humour be greene or yellow, all that the eye seeth, it iudgeth to be of the same colour. The reason of this is, for that the thing within breeds an impediment to that without.

*Aristotle* sayth moreouer, That if the vnderstanding were mingled with any bodily instrument, it would retaine some qualitie, for whatsoeuer vniteth it selfe with heat or cold, it is of force that it partake of the same quality. But to say that the vnderstanding is hot, cold, moist, or drie, is to vtter a matter abhominable to the eares of all naturall Philosophers.

The second principall doubt is, that *Aristotle* and all the *Peripateticks* bring in two other powers besides the Vnderstanding, the Imagination, & the Memory; namely, Remembrance, and Common sence, grounding vpon that rule, That the powers are knowne by way of the actions. They sayd, That besides the operations of the Vnderstanding, the Imagination, and the Memorie, there are also two other different. So then the wit of man taketh his originall from fve powers, and not from three only, as we did proue.

We sayd also in the last chapter, after the opinion of *Galen*, that the memorie doth none other worke in the braine, saue only to preferue the shapes and figures of things, in such sort as a chest preferueth and keepeth apparell and what so else is put thereinto. And if by such a comparison, we are to vnderstand the office of this power, it is requisit also to prooue another reasonable fa-

culcie, which may fetch out the figures from the memorie, and represent them to the vnderstanding, even as it is necessarie that there be one to open the chest, and to take out what hath bene laid vp therein.

Besides this, we sayd, that the vnderstanding and the memorie are contrarie powers, and that the one cha-  
seth away the other, for the one loueth great drinesse, and the other much moisture, and a suppleness of the braine. And if this be true, wherefore sayd *Aristotle* and *Plato*, That men who haue their flesh tender, enioy great vnderstanding, seeing this suppleness is an effect of moisture.

We sayd also, that for effecting that a memorie may be good, it was necessary the braine should be endowed with moisture, for the figures ought to be printed therein by way of compression, and the same being hard, they cannot so easily make a signe therein. True it is, that to receiue figures with readinesse, it requireth that the braine bee pliant, but to preserue the shapes some long time, all affirme that it is necessarie the same be hard and drie, as it appeareth in outward things, where the figure printed in a pliant substance, is easily cancelled, but in the drie and hard, it neuer perisheth. Wherethrough we see many men who con-by heart with great readinesse, but forget againe very speedily. Of which *Galen* rendering a reason, sayth, that such through much moisture, haue the substance of their braine tender and not settled, for the figure is soone cancelled, as if it were sealed in water. And contrariwise, other learne by heart with difficultie, but what they haue once learned, they neuer forget againe. Wherethrough it seemeth a matter impossible, that there should be that difference of memorie which wee speake of, which should learne with ease,  
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and preſerue a long time.

It is alſo hard to vnderſtand how it is poſſible that ſo many figures being ſealed together in the braine, the one ſhould not cancell the other, for if in a piece of ſoftned wax there be printed many ſeales of diuers figures, it falls out certaine, that ſome cancell other ſome, by the intermingling of theſe figures.

And that which breedeth no leſſe difficulty, is, to know whence it proceedeth, that the memorie by exerciſing it ſelfe, becommeth the more eaſie to receiue figures, it being certaine, that not onely bodily exerciſe, but ſpiritual much more, drieth and ſoketh the fleſh.

It is alſo hard to conceiue, in what ſort the imagination is contrarie to the vnderſtanding; if there be none other more vrgent cauſe, than to ſay, That exceſſiue heat reſolueth the ſubtile partes of the braine, leauing an earthly and groſſe remnant, ſeeing the Melancholy is one of the groſſeſt and earthlieſt humours of our bodie. And *Aristotle* ſayth, That the vnderſtanding vſeth the ſeruice of none ſo much, as of that. And this difficultie is encreaſed, conſidering that melancholy is a groſſe humour, cold and drie; and choler is of a delicat ſubſtance, and of temperature hot and drie, and yet for all this, melancholy is more appropriat to the vnderſtanding than choler. Which ſeemeth repugnant to reaſon, for this humour aideth the vnderſtanding with two qualities, and gainſetteth it ſelfe only with one, which is heat. But melancholy aideth it with his drineſſe, and with none other, and oppoſeth it ſelfe by his cold, and by his groſſe ſubſtance, which is a thing that the vnderſtanding moſt abhorreth. For which cauſe, *Galen* aſſigneth more wit and prudence to choler, than to melancholy, ſaying thus; Readineſſe and Prudence ſpring from the humour of choler,

choler, and the melancholicke humour is author of integrity and constancie.

Lastly, the cause may be demaunded, whence it may grow, that toiling, and continuall contemplation of studie maketh many wise, in whome at the beginning, the good nature of these qualities, which we speake of, was wanting: and so by giuing and receiuing with the imagination, they come to make themselues capable of many verities, which tofore they knew not, nor had the temperature which thereto was requisit. For if they had possessed the same, so much labour should not haue been needfull.

All these difficulties, and many other besides, are contrary to the doctrine of the last chapter. For naturall Philosophie hath not so certaine principles as the Mathematicall sciences, wherein, the Phisition, and the Philosopher (if he be also a Mathematician) may alwayes make demonstration: but coming afterwards to the cure which is conformable to the art of Phisicke, hee shall commit therein many errors, and yet not alwayes thorow his owne fault (sithens in the Mathematicks he alwayes followed a certaintie) but through the little assurance of the art, for which cause *Aristotle* said, The Phisition though he alwayes cure not, is not therefore a bad one, provided, that he foreslow not to performe any of those points which appertaine to the art. But if he should commit any error in the Mathematicks, he would be void of excuse: for performing in this science all the diligences which it requireth, it is impossible that the truth should not appeare. In sort, that albeit we yeelde not a manifest demonstration of this doctrine, yet the whole fault is not to be layd on our want of capacitie, neither may it straightwayes bee recounted as false that

we deliuer.

To the first principall doubt, we answer, that if the vnderstanding were seuered from the body, and had nought to doe with heat, cold, moist, and drie, nor with the other bodily qualities, it would follow that all men should partake equall vnderstanding, and that all should equally discourse. But wee see by experience, that one man vnderstandeth and discourseth better than another; then this groweth, for that the vnderstanding is an instrumentall power, and better disposed in one than in another, and not from any other occasion. For all reasonable soules and their vnderstandings (seuered from the body) are of equall perfection and knowledge. Those who follow *Aristotles* doctrine, seeing by experience, that some discourse better than other some, haue found an excuse in apparence, saying; That the discoursing of one better than another, is not caused, for that the vnderstanding is an instrumentall power, & that the braine is better disposed in some than in othersome: but for that the vnderstanding (whilst the reasonable soule remaineth in the body) standeth in need of the fantasmes and figures which are in the imagination, and in the memorie; through default whereof, the vnderstanding fals to discourse illy, and not through his owne fault, nor for that it is ioyned with a matter badly instrumentalized. But this answer is contrary to the doctrine of *Aristotle* himselfe, who prooueth, that by how much the memorie is the worse, by so much the vnderstanding is the better; and by how much the memorie is bettered, by so much the vnderstanding is impaired: and the same we haue heretofore prooued as touching the imagination, in confirmation of that which *Aristotle* demaundeth, What the cause is, that we waxing old, haue  
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so bad a memorie, and so good an vnderstanding : and when we are yoong, it fals out contrary, that we possesse a great memorie and small vnderstanding. Hereof, in one thing we see the experience, and *Galen* noteth it, that when in a disease the temperature and good disposition of the braine is impaired, many times the operations of the vnderstanding are thereby lost, and yet those of the memorie and the imagination remaine sound, which could not come to passe, if the vnderstanding enioyned not a particular instrument for it selfe, besides this which the other powers doe partake.

To this I know not what may be yeelded in answer, vnlesse it be by some metaphysicall relation, compounded of action and power, which neither themselves know what it meaneth, nor is there any other man that vnderstands it. Nothing more endammageth mans knowledge than to confound the sciences : and what belongs to the Metaphysicks, to entreat thereof in naturall Philosophie; and matters of naturall Philosophie in the Metaphysicks.

The reasons whereupon *Aristotle* grounded himselfe are of small moment, for the consequence followeth, not to say, that the vnderstanding, because it must know materiall things, should not therefore enioy a bodily instrument : for the bodily qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument, make no alteration of the power ; nor from them doe the fantasmes arise, euen as the sensible, placed aboue the sence, causeth not the selfe sence. This is plainly seene in touching, for notwithstanding that the same is compounded of foure materiall qualities : and that the same hath in it quantitie, and hardnesse of softnesse ; for all this, the hand discerneth whether a thing be hot or cold, hard or soft, great

or little. And if you aske in what sort the naturall hear which is in the hand hindereth not the touching, that it may discerne the heat which is in the stone; we answere, that the qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument, doe not alter the instrument it selfe, neither from them doe there issue any shapes whereby to know them. Euen as it appertaineth to the eye to know all figures and qualities of things, and yet we see that the eye it selfe hath his proper figure and quantitie, and of the humours and skins which goe to his composition, some haue colours, and some are *diaphane* and transparant, all which hindereth not, but that we with our sight may discerne the figures and quantities of all the things which shall appeare before vs: and the reason is, for that the humours, the skins, the figure, and the quantitie, serue for the composition of the eye, and such thinges cannot alter the sightfull power, and therefore trouble not nor hinder the knowledge of the outward figures. The like we affirme of the vnderstanding, that his proper instrument (though the same be materiall and ioyned with it) cannot enlarge it, for from it issue no vnderstandable shapes, which haue force to alter it: and the reason is, For that the vnderstandable placed aboute the vnderstanding, causeth not the vnderstanding; and so it remaineth at libertie to vnderstand all the outward materiall things, without that it encounter ought to hinder the same. The second reason wherein *Aristotle* gronnedd himselfe, is of lesse importance than the former, for neither the vnderstanding nor any other accident can bee qualiti-like, for of themselues they cannot be the subiect of any qualitie. For which cause it little skilleth that the vnderstanding possesse the braine for an instrument together with the temperature of the foure first qualities, that therefore

therefore it may be called qualitic-like, in as much as the braine and not the vnderstanding, is the subiect of the heat, the cold, the moist, and the drie.

To the third difficultie which the *Peripateticks* alleage, saying, That by making the vnderstanding an instrumentall power, we reauce one of those principles which serue to prooue the immortalitie of the reasonable soule: we answere, That there are other arguments of more soundnesse, whereby to prooue the same, whereof we will treat in the chapter following.

To the second argument we answere, that not euery difference of operations argueth a diuersitie of powers: for (as we will prooue hereafter) the imaginative performeth matter so strange, that if this *maxime* were true in sort as the vulgar Philosophers had it, or admitting the interpretation which they giue it, there should be in the braine ten or twelue powers more. But because all these operations are to be marshalled vnder one generall reason, they argue no more than one imaginative, which is afterwards deuided into many particular differences, by the meanes of the sundrie operations which it performeth: the composing of the shapes in the presence or the absence of the obiects, not onely argueth not a diuersitie of the generall powers (as are the common sense, and the imaginative) but euen not of the very particulars.

To the third argument we answere, that the memorie is nothing els but a tenderesse of the braine, disposed with a certaine kind of moisture, to receiue and preserve that which the imaginative apprehendeth: with the like proportion that white or blew paper holds with him who writeth: for as the writer writeth in the paper the things which he would not forget, and  
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after he hath written them, returnes to read them; euen so we ought to conceiue, that the imagination writeth in the memorie the figures of the things knowne by the five senses, and by the vnderstanding, as also some others of his owne framing: and when it will remember ought (saith *Aristotle*) it returneth to behold and contemplat them. With this maner of comparifon *Plato* serued himselfe, when he said, That fearing the weake memorie of old age, he hastened to make another of paper (namely bookes) to the end his trauailes ought not to be lost, but that hee might haue that which might represent them vnto him, when he list to read them. This selfe doth the imaginatiue, of writing in the memorie, and returning to read it when it would remember the same. The first who vttered this point was *Aristotle*; and the second *Galen* who sayd thus, For as much as that part of the soule which imagineth, whatloeuere the same be, seemeth to be the selfe that also remembreth. And so verely it seemeth to be, for the things which wee imagine with long thinking, are well fixed in the memorie, and that which we handle with light consideration, also soone we forget the same againe. And as the writer when he writeth faire, the better assureth it to be read: so it befalls to the imaginatiue, that if it scale with force, the figure remaineth well imprinted in the braine; otherwise it can scarcely be discerned. The like also chanceth in old deedes, which being sound in part, and in part perished by time, cannot well be read, vnlesse we gather much by reason and coniecture. So doth the imaginatiue, when in the memorie some figures remaine, and some are perished, where *Aristotles* errour had his originall; who for this cause conceiued, that remembrance was a different power from the memorie. Moreouer, he affirmed, that  
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those who haue great remembrance, are likewise of great vnderstanding, which is also false: for the imagination, which is that that makes the remembrance, is contrarie to the vnderstanding; in sort, that to gather memorie of things, and to remember them after they are knowne, is a worke of the imagination: as to write and returne to read it, is a worke of the Scriuener, and not of the paper. Whereby it falleth out that the memorie remaineth a power passiue, and not actiue: euen as the blew and the white of the paper is none other than a commoditie whereby to write.

To the fourth doubt may be answered, That it maketh little to the purpose, as touching the wit, whether the flesh be hard or tender, if the braine partake not also the same qualitie, the which we see many times hath a distinct temperature from al the other parts of the body. But when they concur in one selfe tenderesse, it is an euill token for the vnderstanding, and no lesse for the imagination. And if wee consider the flesh of women and children, wee shall find that in tenderesse it exceedeth that of men, and this notwithstanding, commonly men haue a better wit than women: and the naturall reason hereof is, For that the humours, which make the flesh tender, are fleagme and bloud, because they are both moist (as wee haue aboue specified) and of them *Galen* said, That they make men simple and dullards: and contrariwise, the humours which harden the flesh, are choller and melancholy: and hence grow the prudence and sapience which are found in man. In sort, that it is rather an ill token to haue the flesh tender, than drie and hard. And so in men who haue an equall temperature throughout their whole bodie, it is an easie matter to gather the qualitie of their wit by the tenderesse or hard-

hardnesse of their flesh: For if it be hard and rough, it giueth token either of a good vnderstanding or a good imagination; and if smooth and supple, of the contrarie, namely of good memorie, and small vnderstanding, and lesse imagination: and to vnderstand whether the braine haue correspondence, it behooueth to consider the haire, which being big, blacke, rough, and thicke, yeeldeth token of a good imagination or a good vnderstanding: and if soft and smooth, they are a signe of much memorie, and nothing els. But who so will distinguish and know, whether the same be vnderstanding or imagination (when the haire is of this sort) it must be considered of what forme the child is in the act of laughter: for this passion discouereth much, of what qualitie hee is in the imagination.

What the reason and cause of laughter should be, many Philosophers haue laboured to conceiue, and none of them hath deliuered ought that may well bee vnderstood: but all agree, that the bloud is an humour, which prouoketh a man to laugh, albeit none expresse with what qualitie this humour is indewed, more than the rest, why it should make a man addicted to laughter. The follies which are committed with laughing, are lesse dangerous: but those which are done with labour are more perillous: as if he should say, When the diseased become giddie and doting, doe laugh, they rest in more safetie, than if they were in toyle and anguish: for the former commeth of bloud, which is a most mild humour, and the second of melancholie: but we grounding vpon the doctrine whereof we intreat, shall easily vnderstand all that which in this case may bee desired to be knowne. The cause of laughter (in my iudgement) is nought els but an approouing, which is made by the

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imagination, seeing or hearing somewhat done or said, which accordeth very well : and this power remaineth in the braine, when any of these things giue it contentment, suddainly it moueeth the same, and after it all the muscles of the bodie, and so many times we doe allow of wittie sayings, by bowing downe of the head. When then the imagination is very good, it contents not it selfe with euery speech, but onely with those which please very well : and if they haue some little correspondence, and nothing els, the same receiueth thereby rather paine than gladnesse. Hence it groweth, that men of great imagination laugh very seldome, and the point most worthie of noting, is, that iesters and naturall counterfeiterers neuer laugh at their owne meriments, nor at that which they heare others to vtter : for they haue an imagination so delicat, that not euen their owne pleasures, can yeeld that correspondence which they require.

Hereto may bee added, that merriments (besides that they must haue a good proportion, and be vttered to the purpose) must be new, and not tofore heard or seene. And this is the propertie not onely of the imagination, but also of all the other powers which gouerne man : for which cause we see, that the stomacke when it hath twice fed vpon one kind of meat, straightwaies loatheth the same : so doth the sight one selfe shape and colour ; the hearing one concordance, how good soeuer ; and the vnderstanding one selfe contemplation. Hence also it proceedeth, that the pleasant conceiued man laugheth not at the iestes which himselfe vttereth : for before he send them forth from his lips, hee knew what he would speake. Whence I conclude, that those who laugh much, are all defectiue in their imagination,

nation, wherethrough whatsoeuer meriment and pleasure, (how cold soeuer) with them carrieth a verie good correspondencie: And because the bloud partaketh much moisture (wherof we said before, that it breedeth dammage to the imagination) those who are very sanguine, are also great laughers. Moisture holdeth this propertie, that because the same is tender and gentle, it abateth the force of heat, and makes that it burne not ouermuch. For which cause it partakes better agreement with drinesse, because it sharpeneth his operations. Besides this, where there is much moisture, it is a signe that the heat is remisse, seeing it cannot resolute nor consume the same: and the imagination cannot performe his operations with a heat so weake. Hence wee gather also, that men of great vnderstanding are much giuen to laughter, for that they haue defect of imagination, as we read of the great Philosopher *Democritus*, and many others whom my selfe haue seene and noted. Then by meanes of this laughter wee shall know, if that which men or boyes haue of flesh hard and tough, and of haire blacke, thicke, hard, and rough, betoken either the imagination or the vnderstanding. In sort, that *Aristotle* in this doctrine was somewhat out of the way.

To the fifth argument we answere, that there are two kinds of moisture in the braine, one which groweth of the aire (when this element predominateth in the mixture) and another of the water, with which the other elements are amassed. If the braine be tender by the first moisture, the memorie shall be verie good: easie to receiue, and mightie to retaine the figures for a long time. For the moisture of the aire is verie supple and full of fatnesse, on which the shapes are tacked with sure holdfast, as wee see in pictures which are lymned in oyle,

who being set against the sunne and the water, receiue thereby no dammage at all: and if we cast oyle vpon any writing, it will neuer bee wiped out, but marreth the same: and that which cannot be read, with oyle is made legible, by yeelding thereto a brightnesse and transparence. But if the difference of the braine spring from the second kind of moisture, the argument frameth very well: For if it receiue with facilitie, with the same readinesse it turneth againe to cancell the figure, because the moisture of the water hath no fatnesse, wherein the figures may fasten themselues. These two moistures are knowne by the haire: for that which springs from the aire, maketh them to proue vnctious, and full of oyle and fat, and the water maketh them moist and very supple.

To the sixth argument may be answered, that the figures of things are not printed in the braine, as the figure of the seale is in waxe, but they pearce thereinto, to remain there affixed, in sort as the sparrows are attached to birdlime, or the flies sticke in honnie: for these figures are bodiless, and cannot be mingled, nor corrupt one the other.

To the seuenth difficultie we answer, that the figures amasse and mollifie the substance of the braine, in such sort as wax groweth soft by plying the same betweene our fingers: besides that, the vitall spirits haue vertue to make tender and supple the hard and drie members, as the outward heat doth the yron. And that the vitall spirits ascend to the braine, when any thing is learned by heart, we haue prooued heretofore. And euery bodily and spirituall exercise doth not drie: yea the Physicians affirme, that the moderat fatteneth.

To the eighth argument wee answere, that there are

two spices of melancholie: one naturall, which is the drosse of the bloud, whose temperature is cold and drie, accompanied with a substance very grosse, this serues not of any value for the wit, but maketh men blockish, sluggards, and grynners, because they want imaginati-on. There is another sort which is called *choler adust*, or *atra bile*, of which *Aristotle* said, That it made men exceeding wise: whose temperature is diuers, as that of vine-ger; sometimes it performeth the effects of heat, lightning the earth; and sometimes it coolerth, but alwaies it is drie and of a very delicat substance. *Cicero* confesseth that he was slow witted, because he was not melancholike adust, and he sayd true, for if he had beene such, he should not haue possessed so rare a gift of eloquence. For the melancholike adust want memorie, to which appertaineth the speaking with great preparation. It hath another qualitie which much aideth the vnderstanding, namely, that it is cleere like the Agat stone, with which cleerenesse it giueth light within to the braine, and maketh the same to discern well the figures. And of this opinion was *Heracitus* when he said, *A drie cleerenesse maketh a most wise mind*, with which cleerenesse naturall melancholie is not endowed, but his blacke is deadly: and that the reasonable soule there within the braine, standeth in need of light to discern the figures & the shapes, we will prooue hereafter.

To the ninth argument we answered, that the prudence and readinesse of the mind which *Galen* speaketh of, appertaineth to the imagination, whereby we know that which is to come, whence *Cicero* said, *Memorie is of things passed, and Prudence of those to come*. The readinesse of the mind is that, which commonly they call a sharpenesse in imagining, and by other names, craftinesse,